高善文演讲揭示中国经济数据造假，30岁的年轻人是不是可以洗洗睡了？｜高善文｜中国统计数据｜失业率｜价格指数｜房地产泡沫｜GDP增速｜王局拍案20241209

Recently, speeches by two economists have caused a significant response in public opinion.

One is Fu Peng, an economist from Dongbei Securities, and the other is Gao Shanwen, the chief economist of Guotou Securities.

I want to explain to everyone here that economists are actually divided into different types.

One type is the academic type, such as Lin Yifu, Zhou Qiren, and Zhang Weiying.

They either study macroeconomics or institutional economics.

In short, they focus mainly on theoretical research.

Another type is the market-oriented economists. We have many brokers domestically.

In fact, there are also many large brokers worldwide. Within these brokers, they all have their own research institutions.

These research institutions conduct theoretical analyses, and those who conduct theoretical analyses are also known as economists.

Fu Peng and Gao Shanwen belong to the latter category. So, what is the difference between these two types of economists?

In my view, the first type of economists primarily focus on theoretical research.

Theoretical research is often difficult to falsify, especially in economics, which makes it even harder to falsify.

Another point is that even if it is falsified, you generally do not need to take responsibility.

For example, Lin Yifu, you might say that China's economic model is now recognized worldwide.

The great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation has been achieved.

China's unique market economy development

has received worldwide acclaim and is replicable.

After your theoretical research is published, if no one refutes it, even if others do, it doesn't matter much.

Even if you are wrong, you do not need to bear any costs and might even get promoted or become wealthy because leaders like to hear it.

However, market-oriented economists are different because they primarily focus on judgment and prediction.

These theoretical economists mainly focus on explanation.

They explain how the market has formed or how these achievements have been made.

For example, China's economic reform and opening up over the past 40 years have indeed achieved significant growth.

How to explain this growth is something academic economists handle.

But market-oriented economists do not do this because explanations are meaningless to them.

What they do is analysis and judgment, especially prediction.

They predict how China's economy will develop in the coming years and which industries will be the focus.

For them, this forecasting is extremely important.

Because if their forecasts are wrong, it’s different from academic types.

Academic types might get promoted or become wealthy even if they are wrong.

For market-oriented economists, if their judgments are wrong, they will face market penalties.

For example, if you predict the future economic prospects of China and there is a deviation during the actual development process,

the industries you invest in may deviate, and you could suffer significant economic losses.

Because when brokers guide their clients to invest, they do so based on the analysis and judgments of these economists.

Therefore, in my opinion, market-oriented economists are often more accurate and objective in their judgments about future economic development

and current economic conditions than academic economists.

For this reason, today I want to talk about these two economists and their views on the current economy.

I am not very familiar with Fu Peng, but I interviewed Gao Shanwen many years ago.

At that time, he was still the chief economist at Anxin Securities. During the bull market in 2006,

he was actually one of the first to predict it accurately, bringing significant profits to Anxin Securities, which is truly remarkable.

Gao Shanwen's speech actually revolves around a core concept. What is this core concept?

Everyone knows that China's economic development has been struggling in recent years.

Economic development is sluggish with weak consumption, a stagnant real estate market, and a decaying education sector—in a word,

but the GDP figures are still quite good, maintaining around 5% annually.

Gao Shanwen's speech essentially poses a question: Is China's GDP really reliable?

His conclusion is that it is unreliable.

Over the past three years, China's GDP has been overstated. Saying it is overstated is a mild way of putting it; it is essentially fabricated.

According to his conclusion, the entire GDP has been artificially inflated by an average of 3% per year over the past three years,

resulting in an overestimation of about 10% over the three-year period. This conclusion is quite sensational.

Think about it—the National Bureau of Statistics officially publishes China's GDP growth at around 5% annually.

Now, as an economist, if you say that China's GDP is fabricated, how is it fabricated?

Let everyone listen to my analysis. Of course, this is all Gao Shanwen's analysis.

I am summarizing his speech briefly to analyze his analytical methods for everyone.

His analytical method is like this: he says that China's economy began a transformation from 2016 to 2018.

That year, the so-called "Made in China 2025" was proposed.

"Made in China" was to shift from labor-intensive industries to technology-intensive industries,

creating a new economic structure focused on innovation-intensive industries.

He said there was nothing wrong with this transformation, so he categorized Chinese listed companies.

This classification is divided into three categories.

One category, from a policy perspective, includes industries that the government hopes to support and encourage

to promote economic transformation and guide the direction. We place them in the first row and call them "supportive industries."

Another category of industries represents those that the government attempts to regulate and restrict

due to economic growth itself and changes in the economic growth model.

These industries are also gradually declining, such as real estate and media, among others.

We place them in the third row, simply referred to as "restrictive industries."

In reality, there are many sub-industries that are completely neutral from the perspectives of economic transformation and government policy guidance.

That is, the government neither deliberately encourages the expansion of these industries nor clearly restricts them.

We place them in the middle row, such as commerce and retail, and social services.

They are not closely related to the economic transformation process and are generally a neutral category.

He found that after 2016, the total market value and profits of these companies experienced a change and differentiation.

Whether viewed from the perspective of total operating revenue or the proportion of total market value,

we can see that the proportion of neutral industries remains generally stable.

This data also indicates that our overall understanding of the neutral industries is generally credible.

However, in the data, we can also see that between 2018 and 2020,

if we take this period as a turning point,

after this turning point, from the perspective of total operating revenue, the proportion of restrictive industries showed a significant decline.

Meanwhile, the proportion of supportive industries showed a significant expansion.

From the perspective of total market value, the proportion of industries the government tried to restrict declined,

while the proportion of industries the government tried to support increased.

All these clearly indicate that economic transformation has been steadily taking place over the past four to five years,

and the direction of economic transformation aligns with the direction the government policies are trying to guide.

Then he continued by saying that everyone feels that the economic development in recent years has indeed had problems, with sluggish consumption.

What causes this? Is it brought about by industrial upgrading?

This is a growing concern and a cost of transformation. He found that it's not incorrect. How to analyze it?

After the pandemic, the growth of consumption in a province began to show a very close relationship with population aging.

What are the characteristics of this close relationship?

The characteristic of this close relationship is that the younger the population of a province, the slower the consumption growth,

and the older the population structure of a province, the faster the consumption growth. This is very counterintuitive.

Intuitively, we always think that the more young people a place has,

the more vibrant and creative its economy is, and the more robust the economic consumption activities are. The more elderly people, the opposite.

However, since the pandemic, the data in China shows the exact opposite.

The more young people there are, the less vibrant the economy; the more elderly people, the more active the economic activities.

That is, after the pandemic, Chinese society is filled with lively elderly people,

lifeless young people, and middle-aged people who have lost all enthusiasm for life.

But why has this contrast appeared in recent years? It's not normal.

His research says that after the pandemic, the pensions of elderly people haven't changed much and are still increasing.

So for the elderly, their income hasn't been affected, including those in the system whose salaries haven't been impacted.

What exactly is the impact? He found that it's actually the most economically active regions that might be experiencing economic problems.

But for young people, one of the biggest impacts after the outbreak was

a significant downward revision of expectations for future income growth and a substantial decrease in the certainty of income growth.

After graduating from university, they can't find a job, or the job they find significantly falls short of their original expectations.

Under such conditions, young people are frugally cutting expenses, turning off the lights, and eating instant noodles.

The second point he discovered is that he said before the pandemic, the prices of China's real estate

had no obvious relationship with overall consumption.

In other words, when real estate prices rose, people's consumption did not show significant growth.

When real estate declined, people's consumption did not show significant contraction either. But it was different after the pandemic.

From the data, it means that after the pandemic, the more the housing prices rise, the faster the consumption growth in that area.

But the problem is that after the pandemic, housing prices have basically not risen.

So the real conclusion of this chart is that after the pandemic,

the more a place's housing prices fall, the more severe its consumption decline.

Why did this change occur?

His conclusion is that in these regions, after the pandemic, the main buyers of houses became young people.

These young people, if their income expectations decline,

or their income is affected and the real estate market continues to decline, they immediately dare not consume. This is the second point.

He said, look, these data contradict our traditional understanding. Why?

Because the state publishes data showing economic growth is 5% and the unemployment rate hasn't changed significantly.

So why are these abnormal numbers appearing? He studied a particular set of data. What data?

Over the past three years, the dashed line above follows the normal historical trend of the growth it should show,

and the solid line below is the actual growth. In these three years since the pandemic,

how large is the cumulative deviation between the trend shown by the curve and the actual employment growth?

This cumulative deviation is 47 million people, approximately equivalent to 47 million labor forces.

In other words, compared to the normal historical trend, a cumulative 47 million labor forces have been unable to find jobs normally.

Such a large loss of employment opportunities naturally aligns with the pressure people feel regarding employment.

The problem is, where have so many people gone after losing such a huge number of employment opportunities?

The red line below represents the historical trend of rural employment. The broken line within it

follows the changes that rural employment data should present under long-term normal conditions.

The solid line represents the actual changes that occurred.

In these three years of the pandemic, compared to the normal historical trend, rural employment has increased by a cumulative 41 million.

This magnitude is roughly comparable to the decrease in urban employment numbers.

After the pandemic, as the ability to create urban employment significantly deteriorated, a large population returned to or remained in rural areas.

They originally went to the city to find jobs but couldn't find any, had to rent apartments, and then had to eat,

so they simply returned to their hometowns. After returning from the city to their hometowns, their data

doesn't show up in urban unemployment rates, but it clearly appears in the overall population employment data.

And there are still 6 million, which could mean these people have exited the labor market and stopped working.

For example, those in their 40s who can't find jobs anymore might stay home to take care of children and grandchildren,

thereby exiting the labor market and not being counted in the unemployment rate.

Next, he draws a conclusion.

China's economic data is generally very reliable, but we also know

that some parts of the economic data are more reliable than others.

Economic data is sometimes more reliable than at other times.

This statement is thought-provoking. We will analyze it shortly.

Next, he talks about what data is the most reliable: prices.

He says that prices are easier to collect and there's no need for falsification or manipulation.

He said that China's prices have historically had a statistical correlation with overall economic GDP growth.

But now they have found that according to the officially announced GDP growth rate, there is a significant anomaly with prices.

There are two very obvious outliers, which we have marked with two lines on the chart.

These two outliers deviate from the normal trend by more than two standard deviations without a doubt.

They even exceed three standard deviations.

In other words, the two outliers we describe here

do not conform to the trends that the data should have had over the past ten-plus years.

It does not conform to the predictions made by general economic theories.

So when did these two outliers occur? These two outliers are the recent two years.

At the same time, they also compiled data on physical consumption.

In the past, there was also a pattern in the growth relationship between the consumption of physical goods and GDP.

However, they found that in the past three years, this data has also been significantly anomalous compared to the overall historical pattern.

So what do all these anomalous data indicate? He drew a conclusion.

If we consider the data on the growth rate of employed persons to be reliable, then the economic growth rate is too high.

If we consider the data on economic growth rate to be reliable, then the growth rate of employed persons is too low.

Based on the relatively stable relationship between employment and economic growth over the past decade or so.

In these two years, the relationship between employment and growth has also appeared very anomalous.

Because if you have such a large unemployment figure, your economy cannot grow so high according to past patterns.

These two data points are contradictory, as are your price levels and the consumption levels of food and goods.

So finally, what conclusion did he reach?

Since the bursting of the real estate bubble, China's economic growth rate may have been overestimated by an average of 3 percentage points each year.

The cumulative overestimation of the total economic output in the past few years may be as high as 10 percentage points.

What does that mean? It means that our actual GDP growth is only 2%, not 5%.

Of course, he also added one piece of evidence.

What evidence did he add? He said that in the past few years, China's GDP growth rate has slowed down.

A very important reason is that our current housing price bubble has burst.

The bursting of the housing price bubble has led to a long-term slump in the real estate market prices.

We see that in all countries around the world, three years after the real estate bubble bursts,

economic growth rates have experienced a significant decline, with the median decline being 3-4 percentage points.

For economies with larger declines, the average growth rate over three years has decreased by as much as 7 percentage points.

In China, three years after the real estate bubble burst, the economic growth rate has declined by 0.2 percentage points compared to before the bubble burst.

The economic growth rate has almost not declined, perhaps our macro-control level has indeed reached a level that requires in-depth study and understanding.

So that our economic growth rate can relatively remain stable after the bursting of the real estate bubble.

It may be that this phenomenon exceeds our ability to understand, which is possible.

But based on the comparison of all these publicly available data.

We tend to believe that we need to give more careful consideration to the data on economic growth rates.

So he said that if the GDP numbers are revised down by 3 percentage points, then all the data can be explained.

For example, the disappearance of 47 million employed persons, and the significant decline in current consumption data.

For example, the current long-term low level of prices lingering.

Therefore, his conclusion is that the current GDP figures are completely inflated.

What is the result of this inflation? It has caused China's decision-making layer to be deceived.

The GDP statistics have not only deceived the common people but also the officials in China's Politburo.

The leaders also believed that the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation was about to be achieved and would soon surpass the United States.

Think about it, with 5% growth each year, surpassing the United States is just around the corner.

But Gao Shanwen said that on September 26, the Politburo meeting discussed economic issues.

Finally, the leadership realized that they might have been deceived.

If before August, the mainstream view still considered economic growth to be growing pains,

then after the 9/26 Politburo meeting, we began to face the problems.

Facing the existing problems in economic growth and preparing to take strong measures to address these difficulties.

I think the first step in this policy shift is to face the problems.

First, to face the current situation, which is not growing pains but cyclical pressures.

Next, to take strong measures to address these difficulties.

Such a huge shift is based on the most important foundation of significant market changes.

The current economic situation is not as good as imagined, not reaching 5%, possibly only 2%.

This is the decision-making background behind the 10 trillion stimulus policy introduced before the Golden Week during the National Day (October 1).

Of course, he also talked about how to stimulate such economic development.

He said that it should be lowering interest rates, injecting capital into banks, and at the same time, the government should adopt expansionary fiscal policies.

After the bubble burst, the economic growth rate needs to return to the previous normal level, which generally takes about 9 years.

After 3 to 4 years since the bubble burst, the economy begins to recover and grow.

But this growth is very weak.

Only after eight or nine years can the economy fully absorb the impact of the bubble bursting and return to a relatively more normal growth rate before the bubble burst.

In other words, he said that 2025 is likely to be a year of economic transformation for China.

That is, from the great impact that the bubble bursting brings to economic activities.

In the past 30 years, during periods when economic growth rates appear very abnormal in data, the actual economic growth was very weak.

Gradually transitioning to a turning period where a relatively weaker growth rate can be maintained in the post-bubble era.

Of course, in his analytical model, I think there is one questionable point.

That is, whether China's situation can be considered a real estate bubble burst.

Because when Japan's real estate bubble burst, it was very painful.

When housing prices dropped by three or five times, it was very normal.

But China's real estate, overall in absolute terms, is still somewhat worse compared to Japan at that time.

So, whether we can say that the real estate bubble has burst now, I personally think there may still be some doubts.

Whether it is caused by a real estate development cycle, we are still unsure.

But overall, I think his analysis of the entire GDP being inflated and falsified.

The data inference and analysis process is very reliable.

After reading through, Gao Shanwen still holds a cautiously optimistic attitude towards China's development in the next 5 to 10 years.

But in my opinion, Gao Shanwen's speech six years ago was actually more important and more macro.

That time was in 2018, at a conference of Shanxi Securities where he gave this speech.

He actually analyzed the prospects of China's economic development in the next 30 to 50 years, and in that speech, he explained this principle.

He said, do you know what important thing Deng Xiaoping did when he carried out the reform and opening up in China at the end of 1978?

He said that this matter actually determined China's national fortune over the past 40 years.

Within my knowledge, there has been no particularly public discussion, which is deciding to fight Vietnam.

That is, China's opening up to the outside world is its opening up to the United States.

China's opening up is not to the Soviet Union, nor to Eastern Europe.

Not to India, not to Africa, not to Latin America.

China's opening up is to the United States, and it inevitably has the prerequisite that the United States accepts you.

If we open "Water Margin," we would know that the heroes of Liangshan.

In "Water Margin," they raised the banner of carrying out the way of Heaven, and many people flocked to join.

Joining Liangshan doesn't mean that when you arrive at Liangshan's gathering hall, you can just say you want to join.

The process is not like that; the revolutionary process is not like that.

In the revolutionary process, if you want to join Liangshan, you must have a "testo" (oath or identification).

He said that Deng Xiaoping's decision to fight Vietnam back then was actually China's "testo" to gain trust from the United States.

Everyone knows that back then, Deng Xiaoping, as Vice Premier of the State Council, visited the United States, right?

He mentioned that when Deng Xiaoping visited the United States, he later had a closed-door conversation with Carter.

After the official procedures ended, everyone was ushered outside, leaving only Comrade Xiaoping, President Carter, and two translators.

The Chinese translator was Ji Chaozhu, and then Comrade Xiaoping told President Carter that they were preparing to fight Vietnam. President Carter was very surprised.

For a while, he couldn't speak, and then he immediately took out a pen and a piece of paper to start listing a checklist.

What was on this checklist? The checklist was the weapons and equipment that the United States was about to provide to China.

An expert on Sino-American relations told me that the level of military aid the United States provided to China at that time exceeded that provided to its allies.

That is, many of its weapons were not even sold to the UK or its allies, but were sold to China at that time.

Imagine how amazed the United States was to hear this news.

Because the United States had feelings about Vietnam. First, when the US fought Vietnam, they didn't win and suffered great losses.

Second, Vietnam was the Soviet Union's little brother in Asia. So when China fought Vietnam, what does that indicate?

In other words, there can never be reconciliation between China and the Soviet Union.

And at that time, the US actually aligned with China hoping to use China to deal with the Soviet Union.

China was an important pawn to counter the Soviet Union, so China's fight against Vietnam was essentially China's "testo" to the US.

And the United States indeed bought into this very much.

Therefore, Deng Xiaoping's policy of reform and opening up, and the fight against Vietnam, won the United States' great trust in China.

It laid a very important foundation for the future national development of China, that is, Sino-US relations became friendly.

Why is the friendship in Sino-US relations so important?

There is no doubt that the United States is the most successful country on Earth in the past 100 years or even the past 150 years.

The United States' position in the world economy, its technological and military strength,

and the United States' influence in global political life.

During the time when the Soviet Union was very strong, it could at most barely keep up with the United States.

But after the collapse of the Soviet Union, no country has had the ability and strength to challenge the United States up to now.

He then mentioned that he said the United States is the most successful country in the past 100 years or even 150 years.

Its industrial manufacturing capability has naturally made it the world's leader.

At the same time, you can see that countries that have good relations with the United States have their economies develop.

Countries that do not have good relations with the United States have their economies lagging behind.

Why? Because the United States is a huge market, and another point.

The United States has a deeply ingrained missionary complex.

The United States is a country established by white Anglo-Saxon Protestant elites.

These white elites have a deeply ingrained missionary complex at their core ideologically.

The so-called missionary complex means that they hope to promote their own values and lifestyles globally.

And always regard this as an extremely important cornerstone of the country's foreign strategy.

If a country is willing to accept or at least approach the United States' ideology,

or at least willing to appear aligned with the United States' ideology, the United States will be willing to treat you as a friend.

Then the United States will be willing to engage with you normally and provide assistance within its capacity.

The United States is willing to help you, but if the United States believes that ideologically you are incompatible with it,

and ideologically you are diametrically opposed, it will regard you as a stranger, a passerby, or even a malicious enemy.

At that time, Deng Xiaoping worked hard to make China a friend of the United States, establishing a friendly quasi-allied relationship.

He said that this time, he bet correctly on China's national fortune. Why?

Although the Sino-Vietnamese self-defense counterattack was fought very arduously, we know that at that time, the main forces of the Chinese military were all in northern China.

Back then, in Hailar, very close to the China-Mongolia border,

along the railway line in Hailar, there was an abundance of explosives.

Including the entire Shenyang Military Region, Beijing Military Region, and Lanzhou Military Region were all in a state of high alert.

Although the war occurred at the China-Vietnam border, the China-Soviet border was extremely tense.

One reason the Soviet Union did not mobilize against China is that President Carter told Xiaoping that the Soviet Union had 150 conventional divisions in Eastern Europe.

At the China-Soviet border, their military forces were very depleted.

When the Soviet troops were transferred from Europe to the China-Soviet border,

China hurriedly withdrew all its troops from Vietnam.

So you can see, in this war, although China paid a high cost on the battlefield,

it won a very good international environment for China's reform and opening up. This is what he explained.

Next, he talked about Deng Xiaoping's second visionary insight, which was the sudden collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States actually faced a new international strategic choice.

With the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the Eastern European socialist bloc, the United States achieved a complete victory in the Cold War.

In this context, China's strategic importance as a pawn for the United States to deal with the Soviet Union seemed to rapidly decline.

Therefore, in this context, Sino-US relations face a whole new set of choices regarding their direction.

So, when China faced the collapse of the Soviet Union, there were two uncertain factors.

First, the socialist bloc of countries has disintegrated, so how does China's socialism continue, and how does it proceed ideologically?

Second, is there a possibility of becoming a strategic opponent for the United States to contain China?

Of course, there was another background situation that Gao Shanwen did not dare to discuss, which was the suppression of the Tiananmen Square protests in 1989.

So at this time, Deng Xiaoping proposed a new slogan.

"Observe calmly, stabilize your position; hide your strengths, bide your time, and never seek the limelight."

What does this mean? It means that China should never stand out in the international community; instead, hide your strengths and make money quietly.

He said that when making these two decisions, Deng Xiaoping was steadfast in the face of opposition.

But indeed, he laid the foundation for the prosperity of China's national fortune over the past 40 years.

He said, "Look, Deng Xiaoping usually enjoyed playing bridge and did not involve himself in seeking the poor or the suffering."

Like many of our leaders, when they enter someone's home, they lift the lid of the pot to see what you are eating, and often say, 'I'm late.'

Deng Xiaoping never did this.

But you can see that during critical periods and key moments concerning the nation's fortune, Deng Xiaoping made these strategic decisions.

They all determined that China has been on a prosperous path for the past 40 years.

He said, look at the current Sino-US trade war; after 2015, the situation has completely changed.

He talked about how, as a representative of a think tank, he visited the United States, including some semi-official Chinese think tanks, to visit the US.

After 2015, especially after Trump took office, things have changed dramatically.

He said where did this change come from? It comes from our own policies going wrong.

Because when Clinton supported China's entry into the WTO, he once said,

"As China moves closer to a market economy, the Chinese people not only have the right to have dreams

but also the opportunity and channels to realize their dreams. This change will inevitably bring about great economic prosperity."

With the realization of great economic prosperity, as the Chinese people become more and more capable not only of having dreams

but also of having channels to realize them, they will also inevitably demand or have greater say in politics.

And this point is what the US government steadfastly promotes as its goal.

He said the Americans now see it completely differently: China's economy has developed, and the country seems to have become strong.

But have the common people gained more political participation and expression? No.

Then, the whole society is more open, but not conversely hostile and antagonistic towards the US.

So the US finally realized that as China develops, not only does it not integrate into the world,

but on the contrary, it has become the top competitor for the US globally.

So now the entire US policy has undergone a dramatic change,

that is, to engage in strategic competition with China, and what does this strategic competition lead to?

It leads to a dramatic change in the international trade environment China faces.

The US is increasing tariffs on China, Europe is increasing tariffs on China, Canada is increasing tariffs on China,

aren't these all side effects brought about by the entire Sino-US relationship?

But the problem is whether the current central leadership has the same strategic vision and foresight as Comrade Deng Xiaoping in 1978.

This needs to be tested by history; it cannot be achieved by just bragging.

This needs to withstand the test of history.

Gao Shanwen actually did not dare to fully state this domestically.

When we interpret this report abroad, we are actually very clear.

That since Xi Jinping came to power, he has been messing around.

You continue to implement the "hide your strengths and bide your time" policy and maintain relatively friendly relations with the US, but that's not best for China.

As a result, suddenly your own ambitions and aspirations overflow, and you want to go against the US.

No, it has brought huge uncertainties to China.

So when he returned from visiting the US, he talked about the past.

He said that the long-term political foundation for peaceful development in Sino-US relations has completely disappeared.

In the future, China may face a long-term uncertain Sino-US relationship with constant conflicts.

Six years have passed; everyone can see whether China is on this path, single-mindedly moving forward.

Whether Sino-US relations are now filled with uncertain and turbulent relations, full of conflicts.

Indeed.

And the economy, as per Gao Shanwen's new report, is also like this.

So, looking at Gao Shanwen's two reports over six years, I personally resonate deeply.

Why? First, your current economic data are all inflated and falsified.

Not only do you deceive the common people, but you yourself have been deceived, not knowing how bad China's economy really is.

Second, internationally, the entire diplomatic landscape is now.

Besides pulling in Putin and these third-world brothers for the Belt and Road Initiative,

all the countries like the US and Europe have introduced unfriendly foreign trade policies towards China.

This is the entire domestic and international situation that China is currently facing.

In his second speech, during the process, he once said a sentence.

"For young people, those under 30, if you fail this time, just go back and wash and sleep."

For people our age, it already doesn't matter.

Using Comrade Ziyang's words in the square, we are already old, it doesn't matter.

But for young people, we are indeed at a very important crossroads in terms of choices.

What does that mean? It means that if you live in an era where the leader has made a wrong bet on the country's fate,

no matter how hard you try, it's in vain.

But when you think about it, it's quite cruel. Why?

Because ordinary people and these political leaders indeed have different levels of influence on the course of history.

Our generation is actually quite lucky to have experienced the period of economic prosperity and development brought about by Deng Xiaoping's bet on the country's fate.

So our efforts ultimately earned us some achievements.

But today's young people may be facing an era where the bet on the country's fate was wrong.

I don't even know if the leaders of the Communist Party can see such a report.

What I hope is that when they see the deterioration of China's economic development, when they see the international encirclement of China,

when they see the various difficulties in people's livelihoods right now,

I really hope they let go of their own ambitions and grand aspirations.

They should consider the interests of ordinary people more and really prioritize China's economic development.

If that's the case, shouldn't they reflect on the entire China-US relationship and foreign relations?

And also reflect on various domestic policies within China?

Well, that's all I have to say today. Thank you, everyone.