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Hello everyone, welcome to Bumingbai podcast.

I'm your host, Li Yuan On February 28th , the United States and Israel launched a joint military strike against Iran.

This war is reshaping the geopolitical landscape of the Middle East.

At this moment, the most intriguing bystander is not an Arab country, but China.

China is Iran's most important economic partner, and the two countries have signed a 25-year, $400 billion strategic cooperation agreement.

More than 55% of China's oil imports come from the Middle East, with about 13% coming from Iran, almost all of which pass through the Strait of Hormuz.

According to any traditional geopolitical logic, Beijing should be restless.

However, after the outbreak of war, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs' statements were conservative and measured.

This... Behind this behavior lies strategic resolve or a deep strategic dilemma.

What kind of self-interest is behind this detached stance ?

The upcoming summit between the leaders of China and the US raises the question: how will this war affect the agenda and the future trajectory of Sino-US relations?

Today's guest, Yun Sun is the Director of the China Program at the Stimson Center, a Washington think tank. Last week, she published an article in *Foreign Affairs* entitled "Why China Won't Aid Iran," systematically arguing why Beijing has chosen to stand by in this war and the strategic logic behind this restraint.

Sun Yun, hello. Yuan Li,

hello.

Could you first explain to our audience why China considers Iran the most important country ? The most important factor

? The most important factor in Iran's current international isolation , in my opinion, is the scarcity of countries that can truly be considered its partners.

Traditionally , as the successor to the Persian Empire, Iran has a long history of conflict with the Gulf states ( the seven Sunni Arab states).

Some even describe the conflict as being far greater between Shiites and Sunnis than between Shiites and the West or the United States. Therefore

, after multiple rounds of US economic sanctions against Iran, the number of countries that can be considered its economic partners is extremely limited . China, as Iran's largest oil buyer ,

. China, as Iran's largest oil buyer , imported approximately 1.3 million barrels of Iranian crude oil daily last year , accounting for roughly 90% of Iran's total crude oil exports.

While this may not seem like a huge figure , it is essentially the sole source of foreign exchange earnings for Iran's national economy.

Therefore, it is said that Iran's oil cooperation with China, specifically the oil sales arrangement, is the most important external source of income for maintaining Iran's economic operation.

So, we know that for the United States, Iranian crude oil can generate revenue internationally. This

is also an important reason why the United States believes that Iran is unwilling to make due compromises with the United States on the Iranian nuclear issue.

This is also why the Iranian nuclear issue is a major issue in Sino-US relations or Sino-US competition.

I see that you wrote at the beginning of the "Foreign Affairs" magazine that Beijing is Tehran's most important partner.

The two countries have a close relationship because of their common history and goals.

Why do you say that ? Is this point important?

? Is this point important?

Actually, this point is that more than ten years ago, when I was working in China, at the International Crisis Group, I wrote the first report on Sino-Iranian relations.

I remember that when I talked with Chinese experts , such as the former Chinese ambassador to Iran, Hua Linming , and a series of Chinese experts on Middle East issues, they all focused on three points when discussing the Iranian issue.

It can be said that Iran and China share a common history.

The first point is that the ancient Persian Empire and the Central Plains dynasties, which were created by the Han people, had commonalities in history. They believed that both were very glorious cultural empires or cultural existences . Both the Persian Empire

. Both the Persian Empire and the Central Dynasties , after experiencing colonial expansion—the period of Western colonial imperialism— have declined.

This is a shared historical memory between China and Iran. Secondly, returning to China and Iran today, their national strategies and identities consistently reflect a lack of identification with the West. This explains why China, Iran, Russia, and North Korea can form an anti-Western or anti-American alliance, if not a formal one, but at least a cohesive one. This is because these four countries, including China and Iran, are ideologically

incompatible with and drastically different from the democracy and liberalism supported by the West.

This is the second point: China and Iran share some common ground in their identity.

Thirdly, which I haven't discussed much in this article, is that both China and Iran consider themselves revolutionary countries.

We know that China's revolution was the People's Democratic Revolution led by the Communist Party of China . However, in Iran,

. However, in Iran, since 1979, it has been considered an Islamic country.

After the establishment of the Islamic Republic , Iran essentially considered what it was conducting and leading to an Islamic revolution.

In other words, both China and Iran today believe they share a revolutionary gene.

So, was Iran's Islamic revolution a success or a failure?

China doesn't often discuss this , but both countries have a glorious past and share a common thread: anti-Western sentiment or a rejection of democracy.

Thirdly, both Iran and China possess this revolutionary gene.

I believe these three points are significant in demonstrating that these two countries share a common national identity and have formed a deep sense of camaraderie. After

the outbreak of war, Beijing's public statements were described by many observers as lukewarm.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs even listed Iran and the United States together, calling for a cessation of military action rather than calling on the United States and Israel to stop their military strikes against Iran.

In your opinion, is this wording a diplomatic ambiguity or a clear policy signal ? Is Beijing deliberately drawing a line?

? Is Beijing deliberately drawing a line?

Undoubtedly, Beijing's diplomatic stance this time, since February 28th, represents a significant shift from its stance after the December 12th attack last year.

During the December 12th attack, China repeatedly emphasized its firm condemnation of Israel's actions against Iran, which endangered Iran's sovereignty, security , and territorial integrity.

The word "condemn" was used multiple times last year.

However, this year, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in its public statement, only used "strong condemnation" once : firmly opposing and strongly condemning the attack on the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the killing of him.

In reality China did not condemn the attack launched by Israel and the United States against Iran this time . This

. This represents a significant adjustment compared to China's stance last year shifting from a firm opposition to Israel and the United States to a more subtle shift towards the center.

Why this major change in stance?

I believe there are two main reasons.

The first is China's assessment of Iran.

It can be said that since the Al-Aqsa floods, specifically the Hamas attack on Israel on October 7, 2023, and more specifically since the 12-Day War last year, China's assessment of Iran has undergone a sharp and negative shift . This negative shift,

. This negative shift, I believe, ultimately stems from China's fundamental doubts about Iran 's national strategy and its ability to achieve it.

This can be explained from several angles . First,

. First, Iran's performance during the 12-Day War was far from satisfactory ; it was a complete rout , utterly powerless to retaliate.

Even Iran's air defense system was completely destroyed.

Although Iran later attempted to regain face by launching continuous missile attacks on Israel's Iron Dome, we also saw its missile reserves rapidly depleted.

Therefore, I believe that China first observed that Iran's performance during the 12-Day War was far from that of a regional power.

Secondly , we know that Iran has consistently adopted a strategy of proxy wars in the region . People say that

. People say that Iran has seven proxies in the Middle East, including Syria , the Houthis in Yemen, Hezbollah in Lebanon , and Hamas.

Iran's "pot of resistance" serves two purposes: firstly, it keeps enemies outside its borders by actively attacking or using its proxies to bring the battlefield to its adversaries ; secondly, it allows Iran to enhance its deterrent capabilities through proxy wars.

However, since October 7th, we've seen Israel launch a series of wars against Hamas , Gaza , and Hezbollah , including the removal of many Hamas leaders . During this process, Iran

. During this process, Iran has provided insufficient support to its proxies and allies.

A prime example is in December 2024, when Assad was forced to flee to Russia due to various forces and factors.

During this period , everyone was watching Iran's actions , wondering if Iran would offer substantial financial support. Iran has been using its own strength

support. Iran has been using its own strength to help the Assad regime because we know that the Assad regime has long been considered Iran 's right-hand man, a proxy with significant regional influence . However, Iran has actually

. However, Iran has actually done nothing in this process . While its proxies and allies have been eliminated one after another by Israel , Iran has essentially cheated. In fact,

in April 2025, Iran publicly severed ties with its proxy, withdrawing its military advisors from the Houthis in Yemen.

The background at that time was that Iran wanted to conduct nuclear negotiations with the United States , hoping to avoid war through negotiations.

Therefore, Iran openly severed ties with its proxy.

From China's perspective, how can a regional leader call himself a leader?

When your proxy is in trouble , you should help them, you should turn the tide and support them . But Iran

. But Iran has not done enough in this regard . Thirdly,

in China's view, Iran has always had a tendency to surrender . What does " tendency

. What does " tendency " mean?

It means that Iran, on the surface or in rhetoric, consistently claims it will fight the United States, displaying a very tough stance in its diplomatic pronouncements.

However, if you look at its actions, it constantly seeks to negotiate and compromise with the US and the West , hoping to find a solution through compromise . A clear example of this is

. A clear example of this is the December 12th conflict last year.

Iran was preparing to launch a counterattack against the US military base in Qatar.

To leave itself room for maneuver, several hours before the attack, Iran notified both the US and Qatar separately , saying, "I'm about to attack your base.

This is what you call preparation ?" I remember it being particularly laughable, right?

?" I remember it being particularly laughable, right?

Everyone was laughing at this.

What kind of stance is this , or what purpose are you trying to achieve?

So this is why...

Many people in China describe Iran's actions as performative retaliation , or a show to demonstrate that it has retaliated and can now return home.

This is something I think is difficult for Chinese policy circles to understand.

Of course, I believe the Chinese side has also done a lot of analysis , explaining why Iran exhibits such inconsistency between its words and actions , and why it is so incapable of supporting its proxies ' survival and struggle. I think the conclusion reached by the Chinese side is very correct, and many American experts have also made this judgment

: Iran, as a theocratic state, whether you call it a performance... Whether it's a theocratic state or not, there's a fundamental contradiction between its goals and methods . That is, Iran, as a theocratic state,

. That is, Iran, as a theocratic state, claims to be pursuing an Islamic revolution.

This inherently means that Iran, as the leader of the Islamic revolution, cannot compromise with the United States or the West.

However, the reality is that after years and rounds of sanctions from the US and the West, Iran's national economy has deteriorated to the point of barely surviving.

Under these conditions, how can one talk about an Islamic revolution?

In other words, if Iran wants to improve its economy , it must improve its international environment and its relationship with the United States . As a revolutionary Islamic state,

. As a revolutionary Islamic state, Iran is unable to improve its relations with the United States.

This means there's a misalignment between its objectives and its means.

This is why I believe China , and not just China, but many Iranian observers, believe Iran has entered a dead end : to carry out an Islamic revolution, it must maintain its revolutionary nature; but when it has to compromise with the United States , its revolutionary nature shifts.

Ultimately, this leads to China's fundamental doubt about Iran's status and capabilities as a regional leader or a regional power.

The second reason...

We just mentioned two reasons.

I think the second reason is that China's attitude this year is in stark contrast to its attitude last year because the overall environment of Sino-US relations has changed.

Last year, during the trade war, China and the US had just experienced a relatively intense round of trade war, which had just subsided.

This year, we know that Sino-US relations, under President Trump's second term, seem to be gradually improving in Washington . To put it simply,

in Washington . To put it simply, both sides have sent many positive signals and are subtly exchanging pleasantries.

In addition, later this month, we know that President Trump will be visiting China for a state visit.

The high-level talks involved both China and the US, generating significant expectations . At this critical juncture,

. At this critical juncture, where a qualitative shift in Sino-US relations is possible (as seen by China), China is unlikely to allow a seemingly minor issue like Iran to negatively impact the overall environment or the broader picture of Sino-US relations.

Therefore, the relatively moderate and less critical stance of the Chinese Foreign Ministry is quite understandable.

The reason for not strongly condemning the US is also quite important . If the Chinese Foreign Ministry were to

. If the Chinese Foreign Ministry were to strongly condemn the US , would it still be able to host the US president?

I think this is a very important question. You've already directly condemned him, saying his actions are untenable both internationally and under international law.

You've mentioned the Twelve-Day War several times before . Could you briefly explain

before . Could you briefly explain what the Twelve-Day War was about?

The Twelve-Day War occurred in June 2025. It was

an operation called "Operation May Hammer," led by Israel and supported by the United States, against Iran.

The main targets were Iran's nuclear facilities , including its centrifuges, nuclear test laboratories and bases storing nuclear materials — the enriched fuel oil used to manufacture nuclear weapons.

At that time… It is said that the US's May 1968 strike , according to the US narrative, successfully destroyed Iran's nuclear facilities.

During this process, Israel also took the opportunity to launch attacks on some of Iran's military facilities.

Iran 's main retaliatory action was against Israel , using Iranian ballistic missiles to directly attack Israel.

Most of the missiles were intercepted by Israel's air defense system , but some still caused casualties and property damage in Israel . This is known as the Twelve-Day War. You also raised

. This is known as the Twelve-Day War. You also raised a crucial point in the article , saying that Beijing does not oppose regime change in Iran as long as the new leader can guarantee oil... Regarding supply and economic cooperation,

oil... Regarding supply and economic cooperation, as mentioned earlier , China and Iran signed a 25-year strategic cooperation agreement in 2021.

From China's perspective, is this merely a commercial contract?

Does it possess any substantial strategic significance?

In other words, how does China actually view Iran?

I think there are two questions here : first, how does China view Iran and its cooperation with Iran?

Second, how does China view the Iranian regime and the issue of regime change?

Firstly, regarding China's view of Iran, as we've already discussed , both Iran and China are ancient civilizations, both countries have revolutionary histories , and both exist within a context of Western democracy in international relations, where they are often perceived as "black sheep" —unable to integrate into Western society.

So, how do these two countries...

I believe that historically, both sides have shown compassion and empathy.

From this perspective , I think this is why China will definitely help Iran when it sees an opportunity.

This is why, especially during the Biden administration China has continued to purchase Iranian crude oil despite the risk of unilateral US sanctions.

It's not that China is unaware of the risk, but rather that China believes that even with such risks, given Iran's economic near collapse, China will still help if it can.

However, if we move from the individual Iranian perspective to the broader Middle East context, China's diplomacy in the Middle East is not centered on Iran. Because,

as we know, China has consistently pursued a balanced diplomacy in the Middle East in recent years , if not equidistant , and has maintained good relations with Sunni countries.

China also has relatively close relations with Iran , and with other countries in the region, such as Turkey and Egypt . However, returning to

. However, returning to the 2021 25-year strategic cooperation agreement you mentioned , it is certainly not just an economic agreement ; more importantly, it is a blueprint for the strategic relationship between Iran and China over the next 25 years.

While we haven't seen the original text of this agreement , from the information revealed ... We can see

revealed ... We can see that these contents include Iran's national economic development, infrastructure construction , and digital economy development.

It is a very comprehensive and systematic approach to how China can help Iran achieve economic development. While it may not be accurate to say that China can absorb Iran's economy , it at least reflects a response that integrates with China's regional strategy and regional economic and geopolitical strategies.

However, I think that when people see this agreement, they should also note that it was signed in 2021.

But starting in 2022, China began to vigorously strengthen its relations with Arab countries, especially the Gulf Cooperation Council of the Arab League , which established a very close economic consultation relationship.

Therefore, I believe that the 2021 China-Iran agreement cannot be viewed in isolation from the series of agreements subsequently reached between China and the Gulf states . In fact, if you look at

. In fact, if you look at the implementation of these two tracks, the pace and speed of economic cooperation between China and the Gulf states far exceed the speed of cooperation between China and Iran . To give a clear example , after the agreement was signed, I recall it was 2023.

Let's look at China's investment in Iran. If we follow

Iran. If we follow the 2025 agreement of 400 billion, then there should be at least 16 billion in investment annually . However, in 2022,

. However, in 2022, China's total investment in Iran was less than 150 million USD . In reality,

. In reality, although the agreement was signed, its implementation has been poor. Of course, some on the Chinese side have pointed out that a significant reason for this poor implementation is Iran's reluctance.

Iran , as a descendant of the ancient Persian Empire , possesses a deep-seated pride in its nation , coupled with a fear of losing imperial sovereignty or being taken advantage of . I remember many years ago an

. I remember many years ago an Iranian described to me how they believed that any agreement acceptable to the Chinese was insufficient for Iran. This is

because Iran has always felt that if it retains its resources and oil and gas fields, for example, in future cooperation with France or other European countries , but receives a compromised agreement...

The benefits EO receives are certainly greater than those from cooperation with China, so there are many reasons on both sides . Both sides are worried that their national sovereignty or security will be eroded by China.

The Chinese side believes that since they have taken such a big risk to engage in economic cooperation with you , such cooperation must be high-risk, and you must offer more.

I think this exists between China and Iran, and also between China and Russia.

In other words, if you look at the level of economic cooperation between China and Iran, it is far behind the level of economic cooperation between China and the Gulf countries.

And regarding the issue of regime change, I believe that China will never support regime change.

However, not supporting is not the same as opposing or even if China opposes regime change , it doesn't mean that China will definitely take action or adopt real policies to help the regime resist change . These three concepts

. These three concepts are different . China's opposition does not mean that

. China's opposition does not mean that China will definitely help the regime resist foreign enemies.

I think this is quite evident in the Iran issue.

At its core, if China wants to help Iran resist the impending doom of the US and Israel , what has China done?

Has China provided its own military aid , or even intelligence aid like that from Russia, to help the Iranian regime ? I think when people look at

? I think when people look at whether China has helped Iran, they shouldn't look at what the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs says or what the Chinese mission to the UN says on behalf of Iran.

Ultimately, people look at what kind of real and substantial help has been given to Iran . I think that, relatively speaking

. I think that, relatively speaking , we haven't seen any obvious signs of this yet. I think we can also compare this to another war last year, the four-day war between India and Pakistan in May last year.

In that four-day war, China's support for Pakistan was very obvious, including the fact that the Chinese ambassador met with the Pakistani foreign minister immediately.

I remember meeting with the Prime Minister followed by a statement from the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs directly supporting Pakistan.

Then, Foreign Minister Wang Yi had a direct dialogue with Pakistani leaders.

This shows that China's position can be expressed through communication.

However, since the US and Israel's attack on Iran, neither Chinese leaders nor the Ministry of Foreign Affairs have actively communicated with Iran. Foreign Minister Wang Yi spoke with the Iranian Foreign Minister. Compared to this, China's support for Pakistan during the Indo -Pakistani war

and its lack of substantial support for Iran create a stark contrast. This

contrast. This indicates that in China's strategic priorities, Iran is far lower than Russia and Pakistan.

Is this fair?

I think it's definitely true.

First, Russia and Pakistan are China's neighbors with shared borders.

Iran is not a neighbor; in China, Iran is defined as a major neighbor , but not a direct neighbor .

Therefore, in terms of priorities, Iran is definitely lower.

It can be said that Russia and Pakistan have a very direct impact on China's national security, while Iran's impact on China's national security is undoubtedly lower.

Some American think tank experts believe that the US military action against Iran is actually aimed at striking at China's military presence in the Middle East.

The researcher wrote that Beijing has invested billions of dollars over the years to build Iran into its strategic asset, and the Trump administration's direct strikes against Iran, whether intentional or unintentional , are undermining one of the pillars of China's strategic layout in the region . This article has actually circulated quite widely.

. This article has actually circulated quite widely.

What do you think of this assessment?

I think it's like when you think of yourself as a hammer and see everyone as a nail; when you consider yourself a theorist of what we call the US-China great power competition, you see everything from the perspective of that competition . So you can explain everything

. So you can explain everything using the US-China great power competition.

But as far as I know, the most fundamental reason for this strike against Iran is Israel, because of the war on December 12th last year.

Of course... The US has stated that

course... The US has stated that it has made every effort to dismantle Iran's nuclear facilities and its nuclear potential.

However, the December 12th war served as a stark warning to Israel : Iran's ballistic missile capabilities pose a significant threat to Israel.

I recall that Iran attacked Israel's Iron Dome with its missiles, and by the end, both sides were exhausted . If Iran

. If Iran had been able to hold out for another week , Israel's air defense system would have suffered considerable damage resulting in a greater threat to Israel's security and property.

This is why, after the December 12th war, Israel has come to regard Iran's missile program and capabilities as the greatest threat to its national security.

This is also why , during the joint US-Israel attack on Iran, ballistic missile capability was a core issue discussed before the war.

Iran was unwilling to compromise, as developing ballistic missiles is a sovereign right of any nation but this was unacceptable to the US and Israel.

Therefore, I believe this is more of a security dilemma or an unsolvable security deadlock between Israel and Iran.

How much does this have to do with China?

As I said , if you think this is a matter of great power competition...

It seems like everything is about great power competition.

It's like Washington, and especially the US, is so quick to drag China into everything . As a journalist who writes about China,

. As a journalist who writes about China, I wonder, is that really the case?

As someone who studies Sino-US relations and follows these things daily, is it really true?

Did the US arrest Maduro because of China?

Do you remember a few years ago there was a theory that China was the biggest winner?

Now, in the US, everything is about China being the biggest winner.

It seems like everything the US does is targeting China.

Of course, there's another view : that the Chinese government would be happy to see the US involved in another war, so that the US wouldn't have as much energy and resources to deal with China. What

do you think of this judgment?

I think there's a fairly consistent pattern at play here.

Whenever the US initiates another war, you see Chinese netizens or some Chinese strategic scholars saying that it's best to let the US get bogged down in a war.

I think this is strategically understandable . I remember one particularly vivid

. I remember one particularly vivid example: in 2012, President Obama drew a red line, saying that if President Assad used chemical weapons, the US would intervene militarily.

At that time, China thought, "Let's use chemical weapons quickly!"

So the US intervened, and then... The US has once again become

and then... The US has once again become mired in a Middle East war, just like the Iraq and Afghanistan wars.

The military expenditure and strategic implications of these wars for the US are, in my opinion, extremely significant.

This is understandable .

From the perspective of great power competition, China would naturally want the US to be drawn into another war.

However, based on my observations within the national security circle in Washington , the prevailing view is that the US cannot afford to send troops.

A war launched through precision strikes or decapitation strikes would only consume US military resources, but...

but...

Sending US troops to the ground for combat is fundamentally different . As long as the US doesn't

. As long as the US doesn't send troops to the ground , there's always the possibility of the US withdrawing . Even today,

. Even today, President Trump has ample opportunity to declare victory , stating that Iran's facilities or capabilities have been completely destroyed.

However, the situation changes if ground troops are deployed.

Therefore, I believe that unless the US sends ground troops, China's assessment that the US is bogged down in a people's war is not entirely valid.

Many in the US share this view .

Since we've discussed Venezuela another issue of concern in US public opinion is whether the US's transnational arrest of Venezuelan leader Maduro or the recent military strikes against Iran will make China feel it's easier to use force against Taiwan lowering

the threshold for military action, both internationally and morally.

Of course, some argue that the US's demonstrated military and intelligence capabilities in these two actions will make Beijing more wary of the US.

I don't know what you think of these analyses; I think both are correct.

On the one hand, the US's actions, for example, on the Maduro issue, are unilateral...

are unilateral...

Setting a precedent for using its own domestic laws to arrest another country's leader, bring him back to New York, and try him is excellent for China.

China has the Anti-Secession Law, which has been in effect for over 20 years , and China has consistently stated that it will treat Taiwan and pro-independence elements according to this law . This

sets a precedent for China . However, a more important question

. However, a more important question is whether China possesses the necessary strength.

And as you mentioned, it's not just about military strength.

The US military has always been strong ; it didn't suddenly experience a significant leap after President Trump took office.

I believe the real leap came from one of the key figures in the US's use of this capability —President Trump.

Compared to his predecessors, he has a particularly strong desire to use America's powerful military to achieve his national strategic goals.

I think his tolerance for risk is higher than that of previous US presidents.

So far, he believes this has been relatively successful without incurring high costs.

For China, a country that values ​​strength, and one that is particularly practical and realistic, this is understandable . If you ask China to judge

. If you ask China to judge whether a situation where the US precedent is favorable to China , but the US's demonstrated strength and willingness to use that strength are unfavorable to China, would make China more daring or more cautious?

I believe it would make China more cautious.

After all, President Trump 's unpredictability is extremely high.

Therefore, China must make more calculations when making judgments, and must assess the strength of the US and its willingness to use that strength . Under these conditions,

. Under these conditions, I don't think that dealing with Maduro or striking Iran will make China more reckless , but rather more cautious.

In the past few years, Beijing has been trying to portray itself as a... As a builder and mediator of the Eastern Order, for example, China brokered the restoration of diplomatic relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia in 2023, which was once considered a major breakthrough in Chinese diplomacy . Has this war ended?

. Has this war ended?

I think China believes it has not. The war

has now entered its ninth day, and China has dispatched its Middle East Special Envoy, Zhai Jun, formerly Vice Foreign Minister, to conduct shuttle diplomacy.

He has met with leaders of the Gulf Peace Conference countries and the Saudi Foreign Minister.

I believe China has put its mediating role , or its willingness, on the table; China is willing to mediate.

However, a rather awkward situation has arisen. The awkward situation is like the Russia-Ukraine war, which has been going on for over four years.

China offered to act as a mediator or peacemaker in what was arguably the second year of the war.

However, Russia has stated that it doesn't need mediation.

And now, we see this in Iran's statements – specifically, the Iranian Foreign Minister 's public statement that Iran doesn't need mediation.

Anyone seeking mediation should mediate with the country that started the war , not with Iran.

Therefore, I believe a crucial prerequisite for China's foreign policy and conflict resolution practices is that all parties to the conflict are willing to accept China's mediation . When

. When a friendly party in a conflict explicitly states its rejection of Chinese mediation, there is little room for further mediation.

If the war continues, do you think Beijing will eventually intervene?

I don't think Beijing's intervention would necessarily be strictly speaking military support or participation in the war to support Iran.

You have to look at Beijing 's support for Russia in the Ukraine war.

Beijing didn't actually participate in the war, but the support Beijing provided to Russia —whether it was oil and gas exports, war funds, or dual -use technology and equipment— actually Beijing maintained a pro-Russia neutrality policy

in the Ukraine war.

So, if the war with Iran drags on for a month or two and the US is still unable to extricate itself...

I don't think China has sufficient reason to support Iran.

For China, whether it's arms sales or oil trade with Iran, or, as reported yesterday in the Washington Post , China allowing two Iranian ships to transport missile fuel from Zhuhai back to Iran, does this violate international law?

Does an agreement for China to sell arms to another sovereign state violate international law? Does it

violate UN Security Council sanctions resolutions?

From the perspective of international law, China hasn't violated anything.

You could say China has violated the US's unilateral sanctions , or the US 's attempt to restart relations with China.

This might have an impact , but strictly speaking, it's illegal.

So, if this war cannot end within two months , I think China's support for Iran , or the provision of dual-use technology or equipment, or even the revenue that China's purchase of Iranian crude oil brings to the Iranian government that can be used for war —Russia in the Ukraine war is a good example—is problematic.

Therefore, the final point of this article isn't about how China should abandon Iran, but rather, if this war drags on...

If the conflict drags on and on, I think it's almost certain that China will provide support to Iran that the US wouldn't want.

Why ? Because, firstly, morally speaking, Iran is the one being attacked.

Iran has n't attacked the US or Israel ; in China's narrative, Iran is portrayed as harmless and being bullied. From an international perspective, China has consistently emphasized its role as a representative of international morality and justice. Logically, it wouldn't be reasonable for China to do nothing. Let's talk about Trump's visit to China. He's scheduled to visit China at the end of this month and hold

a summit with Xi Jinping. You pointed out in your article that Beijing doesn't want the Middle East war to disrupt the process of easing tensions between China and the US.

But conversely, could Washington use this war as a bargaining chip, implying that as long as China and the US reach an agreement on other issues, the US won't further target its interests in the Middle East?

What are Beijing's priorities at this summit? Beijing

summit? Beijing 's priorities at this summit are certainly not trade issues , nor are they the Middle East issue.

This summit between Chinese and US leaders, or rather, the summit between China and the US in 2026... I believe

in 2026... I believe

the four upcoming leaders' summits represent a significant opportunity for China.

After eight years of intense great power competition— the first and second terms of Trump's administration —now presents the best opportunity for China to reset Sino-US relations.

It's like a computer being reset; it's been turned on and off again.

For China, the most important starting point lies in how to leverage this year's summits, through high-level leadership and a shift in leadership positions, to influence the assessments of various US government departments and the US strategic community regarding China.

We know that great power competition has its specific historical context , but it's clear that during Trump's first term, when the top leadership proposed making great power competition a central theme of US national security strategy, changes began to occur in Sino-US relations.

These changes didn't happen overnight; rather, they started when a new concept was introduced at the top, and then actions began to emerge from below.

Now, in Trump's second term , Sino-US relations seem to be warming up again, or perhaps re-entering a relatively constructive state.

This is extremely important for China, because... With

because... With

Trump's second term lasting only four years, less than three remain, if we consider the 2028 US presidential election and the 2029 US president— regardless of whether he is a Democrat or a Republican — would the new president continue Trump 's current China policy?

If you ask observers in Washington, they will undoubtedly say no. Because,

from a strategic perspective, the current US policy towards China is not the norm; it's an anomaly. It's not a linear development of the main line of the US's grand strategy of competition with China , but rather a significant shift and twist.

Therefore, for China, while these next few years are certainly important , to take a long-term view and look at the future of Sino-US relations, to ensure that the relatively less confrontational state we have today continues, even to the point of Trump's "G2" concept , I believe the most important thing

is to ensure this direction continues and to define the basic framework of Sino- US relations in a positive and constructive way.

Compared to this strategic restart, trade, the Middle East issue, or oil and gas issues— in Chinese parlance, these are all insignificant— they are not a big deal.

If you can grasp the main theme and move Sino-US relations in a positive direction , and solidify this direction, and continuously consolidate this positive momentum over the next two years, even preventing the next US president from returning to the state of great power competition between China and the US, then this is of greater significance to China than anything else

. So, what do you think they will mainly talk about?

. So, what do you think they will mainly talk about?

Just some fluffy stuff, like "okay okay we're good buddies," right? Of

course, this time, President Trump is more concerned about specifics, such as trade details . We know that Boeing has already

. We know that Boeing has already confirmed the order , and China's purchase of US agricultural products should also be confirmed.

Next there 's China's purchase of US energy products.

Because as you saw last week, the US Treasury Department said that China hopes to reduce or even cut off its purchases of crude oil from Russia and Iran during this summit diplomacy.

Cutting off is definitely impossible , but China , seeing from the energy crisis, needs so much oil . If it doesn't buy from here, it has to buy from elsewhere.

. If it doesn't buy from here, it has to buy from elsewhere.

The US jumps out and says, "You can buy from me!

I've already achieved energy self-sufficiency, I can export energy. "

Of course, this energy export is subject to some specific restrictions, such as the US exporting crude oil to China . Whether there are enough air routes,

. Whether there are enough air routes, cruise ships, or ports in terms of infrastructure is not something that can be changed simply by signing a deal.

However, for Trump, these specific issues are important , but for China, these specific issues are merely numbers.

What China actually wants to achieve is a change in the underlying principles, the principles and numbers in international relations.

So, for the US, of course, there are also demands from China . But for China, through these specific

. But for China, through these specific cooperation agreements or trade agreements, a qualitative shift and restart in Sino - US relations can be achieved.

I think China is willing to pay some price for this positive interaction.

Last time, during Trump's first visit to China , Xi Jinping invited him to dinner at the Forbidden City. I think

that was the highest level of hospitality . I can't even imagine

of hospitality . I can't even imagine that this time they're going to have dinner on the Great Wall.

It might be too cold on the Great Wall in March, too cold, and there are strong winds and sandstorms . The exact dates for

. The exact dates for March and April are not clear , but it is conceivable that China will definitely offer the highest level of hospitality . It may

. It may not be about using the resources of the entire country to win Trump's favor , but at least it will try to guide the interaction between the two leaders in a positive direction. So

, for Trump, I've seen that in all these policy discussions, the focus has been on the trade deal he's been emphasizing last year.

Will this deal be signed this time ? I've also seen that

? I've also seen that most people are pessimistic.

There's no indication that the US and China can reach an unprecedented, strategically crucial, and mutually acceptable trade agreement.

I think it's unlikely this time. However, this doesn't mean

this time. However, this doesn't mean the two sides can't reach an agreement on specific trade issues. In

international relations, we don't necessarily pursue grand pronouncements ; tangible benefits are more important to Trump.

Finally, because of this war, oil prices have exceeded $100 , and global stock markets have plummeted . For China,

. For China, as we mentioned before, the Strait of Hormuz is where 55% of China's imported oil comes from. If this

comes from. If this war continues, it will certainly cause significant losses to China's national and economic interests, and the same applies to the rest of the world.

I wonder if Beijing will take any action next . Does China have any leverage

. Does China have any leverage in this game to get involved in this war?

At least what can be done?

That depends on what you're doing; the difference is huge.

First of all, of course, everyone says China's energy is insecure.

I think China's energy security and China's oil security are two different things.

Because for many years, China has been working on sustainable, renewable, and sustainable energy.

So far, China's energy self-sufficiency rate is 85%.

So when we say China's energy is insecure, I want to say that 85% of China's energy is domestically produced, so how can it be insecure? As for China's oil, it's true that 71% is imported , 30% is domestically produced , and 55% comes from the Middle East.

So, there is indeed a problem with oil ... It's a safe place

with oil ... It's a safe place , but the oil here is mainly used in the Chinese domestic market.

First it 's used for aviation fuel; second, it's used for diesel in heavy trucks ; third, it's used for maritime transport ; and fourth, it's not actually an energy source, but rather a petrochemical product.

We know that China's development of rare earths and high-tech industries relies heavily on petrochemicals .

Therefore, much of the crude oil imported into China is actually used to refine petrochemical products, ultimately chemical products , for other purposes rather than energy.

China actually exports both refined oil and refined diesel.

This is why yesterday, China announced a ban on the export of refined oil.

In other words, China has already sensed the potential for energy problems . China's oil and gas reserves,

. China's oil and gas reserves, currently estimated at 130 to 160 million barrels, can basically support China for more than three months, assuming crude oil imports.

Therefore, China's resilience surpasses that of most countries in the world, exceeding that of Japan and South Korea by a significant margin . Under these circumstances

. Under these circumstances , I believe China is not the most anxious party.

If a prolonged blockade of the Strait of Hormuz prevents oil tankers from passing, China will be affected , but it will certainly not be the most affected or the most anxious party.

What's worrying is that it will likely come down to a question of who will downgrade first , or who will take the first step . If

. If China were to approach Iran and request the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz , Iran's first reaction would likely be that Chinese oil tankers haven't been affected ; all ships currently passing through the Strait of Hormuz are flying the Chinese flag.

Secondly, Iran might argue that while it's willing to downgrade , the other side must do so first . It's not the aggressor

. It's not the aggressor ; its national security is threatened.

Therefore, it should first ask the US and Israel to de-escalate the crisis before it can then proceed with a mutual de-escalation. If the

final resolution of the dispute is to be reached, then how persuasive will this be for the US and Israel ? I think that's a question.

? I think that's a question.

Of course, this isn't entirely China's problem.

Not only are major oil-consuming countries like Saudi Arabia and Iraq, but also the UAE and Qatar are very anxious because their oil sales are not going well , resulting in significant economic losses for their countries.

Therefore to put pressure on both sides —specifically, on the US and Israel— it actually requires a collective effort from all countries to exert considerable pressure . Only then can the crisis have a chance of de-escalation.

. Only then can the crisis have a chance of de-escalation.

Otherwise, if it's just China trying to persuade Iran, Iran will say, "I'm already prepared for war !" At worst, if the regime collapses,

!" At worst, if the regime collapses, I'll drag you all down with me.

No one should expect to have an easy time, right?

Therefore, I think simply putting pressure on Iran isn't convincing.

This matter definitely requires de-escalation from all parties to achieve a settlement.

The last question is, in your opinion, what are the most likely outcomes of this war ? For each

? For each scenario—whether it's the collapse of the Iranian regime, a protracted war of attrition , or some kind of negotiated ceasefire— what are China's position and options? Which

outcome does Beijing most hope for, and which does it least want?

I think China should be relatively neutral and detached.

We've seen different outcomes, for example, the Libyan civil war … Then an opposition emerged, claiming that all of China's interests and assets had been confiscated.

We also saw that while Maduro's situation wasn't a regime change , China stated that as long as it wasn't a regime change , the money owed to them still needed to be repaid.

This is because Iran didn't borrow heavily from China; the relationship between China and Iran was primarily an oil purchase agreement.

Therefore, this isn't entirely accurate.

I think what China probably least wants to see is Iran become fragmented and descend into chaos.

Because when a country is in chaos, it lacks a strong central government.

Although we all say Iran is a theocratic government, there are many different opinions on this. It's rather cruel, brutal,

this. It's rather cruel, brutal, Islamist and anti-human rights , but it is, after all, a strong central government that has kept Iran a country.

This doesn't hold true in many other examples , such as the civil wars in Libya and Syria.

When these countries become fragmented , not only is economic development and foreign economic cooperation impossible, but the survival of their people and their property are also insecure.

Therefore, I believe the worst-case scenario isn't just for China.

China can simply not invest, or not buy oil from you; they can find other places. However

, I think the worst-case scenario is that Iran's regime collapses without a new, strong government capable of uniting the country as a nation. This

wouldn't necessarily be a good thing for the region, because if the Iranian government can't govern its various regional powers, what kind of relationship will these powers have with the Gulf states ? How will

? How will these political forces protect their own interests ?

It would certainly be a terrible outcome.

Besides this, I think there are two other possibilities : a new regime might emerge , but so far we haven't seen this.

I think Trump has been hoping for this for a long time , but it hasn't happened , so I think the possibility is now slim.

Another possibility is that the current regime continues to exist, although it's very inefficient —some call it a zombie regime , others say it's "dead but not dead"—meaning it hasn't exhausted its last bit of vitality . For example,

. For example, if the son of the current leader is elected supreme leader, and that leader is assassinated , someone else can certainly be elected from within the regime.

If the regime continues to exist, the challenges it faces after this crisis...

The more significant issue I face is whether you want to reform, whether you want to completely change your Islamic Revolution ideology.

It seems unlikely now , but if you follow this path , you've already seen what kind of results it might bring to the country and the nation.

I think this is something that's not very clear to everyone right now . After such attacks, you can imagine that the Iranian regime, or its government, will definitely move in a relatively hardline direction.

Because in this situation, if you're not tough, the leader lacks persuasiveness and legitimacy.

So, after this crisis ends, will you continue with a hardline stance ? Will you continue down

stance ? Will you continue down this old path , going down a dead end ? I think it's impossible to judge right now.

? I think it's impossible to judge right now.

Many people are hoping... The current Iranian regime has collapsed because it was so brutal.

However, any strong government almost completely wipes out civil society and reactionary forces.

Although 80% of the Iranian population does not support this government , there is indeed no other option.

There is no real opposition party. Can this kind of force really pull the country back up if the regime collapses?

It's a dilemma , there's no way to say it.

I think you're right, if you weren't in this regime , what other better options would you have?

It's very difficult.

Or do you have any film or television recommendations? I think

recommendations? I think there have been quite a few papers recently on Sino-US relations and Iran.

There are two articles that I think are particularly worth reading.

The first is from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

I particularly admire a senior expert on Iran named Karim.

He once wrote an article specifically about the different possible future scenarios for Iran, focusing on what might happen. Those interested in Iran should definitely check it out. Secondly, the second and third articles are about potential future changes in current US-China relations. One of them, written last week, is by Brookings a pro - China

and Taiwan researcher specializing in Taiwan and Northeast Asian affairs. He discussed Trump's visit to China and his meeting with Chinese leaders, and what bottom lines should be followed on the Taiwan issue .

I think he 's a mature and prudent expert on US-China relations. The history of the US policy toward Taiwan is very clear , and he personally experienced designed , or participated in these historical processes.

From his perspective, his analysis of the US policy toward Taiwan is very accurate.

Whether Trump will ultimately implement it is unknown, but at least I think what Pritzker said is very accurate.

Thirdly regarding the outcome of Trump's trip to China, Ke Qingsheng also published an article in a foreign policy magazine, asking whether Beijing has overplayed its hand this time , whether it has excessively pushed Trump to achieve some of Beijing's goals.

I think his article is very insightful.

So recently, because I have been quite busy, I have been reading a lot of academic papers, so I would like to recommend three papers to everyone.

Okay thank you, thank you. Sun Yun

also thanks everyone for listening and watching.

See you next time.