为什么西方制度干不过中国制度，李世默两个字总结，所有人看了都服【李世默最新对话，闭眼冲】#Eric Li #李世默辩论 #china

of countries in the global south, vast majority, um gave up whatever politics they had before

and whatever economic systems they had before. They adopted the western

before. They adopted the western universal outlook and western universal institutions. Many countries copied

institutions. Many countries copied their constitutions from western countries. I mean, word for word,

they never had these things ever for a thousand years. But oh no, let's

thousand years. But oh no, let's jettison everything we had and let's install parliament.

Okay. And then let's have these elections.

Um and and and let's just do them every four years because the Americans are doing every four years.

>> Yeah, we're doing it every 5 years.

>> Yeah. Wow.

>> You know what I mean? Um so so vast majority of developing countries did that. Um and they all thought

that. Um and they all thought when they once they adopted these rules once they took these medicines they will

become rich just like western countries very soon. Um but they did not most of

very soon. Um but they did not most of them uh did not succeed. um uh many of them were still mired in civil conflicts

um poverty um very unsatisfactory uh the the one country uh fortunately I'm from that country China and he said I'll tell you

exactly why because you had a revolution we didn't you had a revolution and the revolution gave you the political

institutions and the DNA that allowed you to chart your own course.

We're stuck with the DNA and the institutions that were imposed on us and we're still stuck with them.

>> Yes. So, yeah, the you wrote a book which I thought was >> really profound.

>> Thank you.

>> Uh and and I it resonates to somebody like me from the global south. uh the

way you've described a number of things.

One of which is the contrast between universalism and pluralism. Talk about that.

and pluralism. Talk about that.

>> Well, um we had a period when I was growing up and and we're same generation.

Um where as you know uh after the cold war, >> right? Um everybody thought that

>> right? Um everybody thought that there was only one way to go uh in every aspect of course. Um so which which was

the amazing thing uh it's it's all encompassing and universal uh one set of moralities

one kind of political system one set of economic rules

um all of it uh and and every country every people every culture every economy every region no matter what your background grounds, what your original

roots are. You need to adapt to that

roots are. You need to adapt to that universal vision.

Um, and we all thought that humanity was moving towards that um, inevitably.

Um uh but it turned out the last few decades that this kind of approach had done much more harm than good to

vast number of countries and peoples including the people in the countries where this idea originated from the US

and and the west u that's why you see these revolts in western countries. Um

so so I think we're at a juncture where that universal bubble has bursted.

>> Y >> and I for one think the future world will be more

interesting because pluralism is fundamentally more interesting than than a singular way and a singular vision.

Um, so I think we're moving towards a more pluralistic world where people have different values, different religions, different communities, different

economic systems, political systems. Um, and and hopefully they can coexist. I'm

sure there will be conflicts. Um, but

but it's a much more interesting world and it's more conducive uh for especially for countries of the global

south to develop. Um you know post cold war uh what was interesting is that uh the vast majority of countries in the

global south vast majority um gave up whatever politics they had before and whatever economic systems they had

before they adopted the western universal outlook and western universal institutions. Many countries copy their

institutions. Many countries copy their constitutions from western countries. I mean word for word.

They never had these things ever for a thousand years. But oh no, let's

thousand years. But oh no, let's jettison everything we had and let's install parliament.

Okay. And then let's have these elections.

Um and and and let's just do them every four years because the Americans are doing every four years. Yeah, we're

doing it every 5 years.

>> Yeah, you know what I mean. Um, so so vast majority of developing countries did that. Um, and they all thought

did that. Um, and they all thought when they once they adopted these rules, once they took these medicines, they

will become rich just like western countries very soon. Um, but they did not. Most of them uh did not succeed. um

not. Most of them uh did not succeed. um

uh many of them were still mired in civil conflicts um poverty um very unsatisfactory uh the the one

country uh fortunately I'm from that country China uh said no to that >> okay >> amazingly >> yeah they said you know we're going to adopt some of the stuff but not the

other stuff we're going to pick and choose um uh based on our own circumstances and our own cultural heritage and our own political system

and our own values. Um, so

we did that and and I I believe I fortunately belong to the generation that witnessed the great success uh of that path.

Um so I would based on that experience recommend this to other global south countries and say look the medicine you

took after 1990 didn't work for you. You

look as sick as ever if not sicker and by the by the way the doctor that prescribed the medicine to you has now fallen ill. Look at them. So try

fallen ill. Look at them. So try

something different.

>> Yeah. Why why do you think it looked a lot more appealing during the cold war and it just came crashing down ever

since the end of the cold war? Right. I

mean, one one could argue that the west kind of embarked on this ill approach to spread liberal values ever since 1991 or

early '90s. Why wanted to look a lot

early '90s. Why wanted to look a lot more appealing before then?

Okay, during the cold war, in fact, the west in order to struggle against the Soviet Union, it was a it was a hard

struggle. Okay, naked struggle. I mean,

struggle. Okay, naked struggle. I mean,

just watch James Bond, right?

I mean I mean this is no kiss stuff. It

was serious serious business.

>> They did not try to spread these things in their own camp. If you look at the the the western camp uh against the Soviet Union, there were all sorts of

political systems. Yeah.

>> There were, you know, so-called dictatorships. There were religious

dictatorships. There were religious regimes. There were right, there were

regimes. There were right, there were left.

Just across the board. It's it's a it's a diverse set of countries with a diverse set of regimes and values and

politics. Um

politics. Um but once they sort of won the cold war they went on a different path. Um but be

before the end of the cold war uh actually the western camp just the western camp itself was pretty diverse.

The you've alluded to this as the myocracy right in terms of the kind of paralysis that resulted >> the movement.

>> Yeah. the the color revolution and the Arab Spring, you name it, right? Uh do

you see an end to that by way of the self-paralyzing element that we're seeing in the West now?

>> Well, it's already ended. Um I think um of the countries that undertook so-called color revolutions or or regions that undertook color revolutions

uh you know you could hardly find one single example >> that they ended up better off than before. Uh so this was the most this was

before. Uh so this was the most this was the most destructive fraud that was imposed on peoples around the

world in the last several decades. It's

it's amazing. Um if I think when historians look back uh they'll see this period for what it was. Um so it's unfortunate.

>> Yeah. One of your main appeals is that you can say things that a lot of people in the global south probably would not want to

say, right? And that I think is on the

say, right? And that I think is on the back of the strength of China. And and I want to put this in the context of the comparison between China and Southeast

Asia. Just in the last 30 something

Asia. Just in the last 30 something years, China's GDP per capita has gone up by a factor of 10 times. Southeast

Asia is on average 2.7 times.

It's on the back of four or five identifiable attributes in my view.

First is the underinvestment in education.

Second, underinvestment in infrastructure.

Third, governance or lack thereof. Fourth is

lack of competitiveness.

You issue 10 business licenses on a per 10,000 adult people basis. We in

Southeast Asia only one.

>> Yeah.

>> And then the fifth is I think bit paradoxical because you democratize or decentralize economic activities much better than most democracies around the

world.

What's what's the root cause for this? Again I think every country, every culture is an organic

being is an organic entity.

uh when you transplant something to your country especially something as fundamental as your political system uh it kills the

patient.

Okay. So, so I think a large number of countries in the global south in in Southeast East Asia too, uh, they got they now have

it's kind of like, you know, these countries in the former British Empire, right? They have these artificial

right? They have these artificial borders. They're drawn by some British

borders. They're drawn by some British bureaucrats when they were rushing out.

And these things they're get they get stuck with them and they never get settled.

because it's artificially imposed on them. It's not organic. It's not real.

them. It's not organic. It's not real.

Um so I I see many countries among the developing countries uh in Southeast Asia too are stuck with political institutions

and social institutions and legal framework that are not the outgrowth of their natural cultural and moral

conditions. Yeah.

conditions. Yeah.

>> Um I I think that's where the fundamental problem is. Um we all know where we want to end up. We want vibrant

economies. We want people live living

economies. We want people live living harmony. We want to achieve advanced

harmony. We want to achieve advanced countries living standards. We want to educate our people. But how do we do that? We need to build roads.

that? We need to build roads.

>> Yeah.

>> We need all these things. We need we need to build schools.

>> Yeah. We need to raise the number of STEM graduates in our countries. But to

do these things, there's only one route to doing these things. It's called

politics, right? It's how we organize our

right? It's how we organize our societies, how we fundamentally organize our collective activities.

It's called politics.

And if your politics is fundamentally flawed, it's built on transplanted foundations, these things cannot be carried out effectively.

I mean, not to say that the original thing is going to succeed, >> right?

>> It has problems, too.

So, if you stick to your original form without reforms, that's not good either.

Uh, but at least you have a chance.

>> Yeah. But if you're building your countries based on transplanted constitutions, >> Yeah.

>> you have no chance of success.

>> Yeah. You you referred to the three stages >> Yeah.

>> of China's Communist Party. The first was the revolution took place 1949. Then the

infusion, then what we're seeing right now is the consolidation right?

Are you surprised that the infusion took as little time as it did for China? And

when I talk about infusion, it it it resonates to me in the context of how institutional building took place by way

of the mandate directive from the party into the various dimensions of the society. Talk about that. Yeah. Well,

society. Talk about that. Yeah. Well,

look, the revolution was the key.

>> Yeah. Okay. which is what China went through uh at at a heavy price. Of

course, every revolution in history has been um uh uh partially um destructive.

Okay. Um you know, a couple years ago, I I I have a media company in China and I interviewed I I do this um leadership series interviews just by myself.

>> Um I interviewed President Lula of Brazil. Um and I asked a very simple

Brazil. Um and I asked a very simple question like you asked me today. I

said, "Look, President Lula, um, at the end of the Cold War, we all had great hopes of all the developing countries that there's now a playbook to success,

right? There's now a a winner strategy,

right? There's now a a winner strategy, you know, like these books, you know, how to get rich books. We we got a really good one.

It's called the US Constitution." Um so so so so we all had great hope that if we adopted liberal politics,

capitalist economics uh and and and just follow the examples of America and western countries, we will very soon become prosperous and

rich.

But how come so many countries that did that, Brazil included, in fact, if you look at all the BRICS countries and China was the only one

that really succeeded and the rest were kind of just, you know, got a little stuck one way or another. How come?

And I was really surprised. President

Lula answered me so fast and so emphatically uh in Portuguese, but I could I could see he was speaking emphatically and fast. And then I read the transcript.

fast. And then I read the transcript.

Well, I got simultaneous translation. He

said, "I'll tell you exactly why."

Because you had a revolution.

We didn't. You had a revolution. And the

revolution gave you the political institutions and the DNA that allowed you to chart your own course.

We're stuck with the DNA and the institutions that were imposed on us and we're still stuck with them.

You know, the the special interests that the all the so-called checks and balances, the checks and balances are are there to protect special interests.

Okay? You know, every when when I was growing up, I I go to America, I study politics and and and know they they talk about check and balance as if it's the

panacea. I mean it's it's it's just BS.

panacea. I mean it's it's it's just BS.

Okay. There the check and balances are there to check their own people's.

So So there there you go. Uh so we had a revolution and and and again revolutions are dangerous. Revolutions are risky,

are dangerous. Revolutions are risky, >> right?

>> Uh it could turn bad, >> but we were lucky. We had a revolution.

We survived the revolution. So would you argue that on the basis that you had your revolution completed in 1949

despite the fact that you went through difficulties during the great leap cultural revolution and the fact that

you chose to geopolitically collaborate with Nixon that was actually a reflection of the infusion that already started happening. Is that the right right way of thinking?

>> Yeah. Well, I mean, I think the revolution uh succeeded in establishing the people's republic in 1949, >> right?

>> But of course, it had momentum. It

continued on for another decade or two >> uh through the cultural revolution actually. So, it was a was kind of a

actually. So, it was a was kind of a revolution and then and then pseudo revolutionary phase after that. Um these

we talk about you know but history is so long so big >> um a decade two decades half a century if you really look back >> these things

>> yeah it's nothing >> pass fast okay um but so if you could focus on the big scheme of things um I think um the most important thing is

that we the Chinese were lucky enough although having paid a heavy price but they were lucky enough to have survived and succeeded in a revolution that gave

them a set of institutions.

>> Yep.

>> That ended up working for them and also allowed enough space for reform.

And we're now going we're now beginning have begun a process of rejuvenating past traditions that within the Chinese

culture that were compromised and sacrificed through two periods. Okay. We we we had we had two

periods. Okay. We we we had we had two period. We had one period which was our

period. We had one period which was our the communist revolution. Okay. and and

and in that period we we for we had foregone a lot of our own traditions in order to just to survive.

Um we were almost getting expert exterminated by the way. Uh so we we had to uh do something drastic and then after the revolution we had the

reform period which we absorbed these western practices like market economics. Okay. um that also in many

economics. Okay. um that also in many ways are contrary to Chinese traditional values. Okay. But we survived that too.

values. Okay. But we survived that too.

>> Yeah.

>> Now we're in the process of reinccorporating our traditional ethos back into the game.

>> Yeah.

>> Um and we're I think just at the beginning of that phase. Um there's a there's a uh in our own in in Chinese political lexicon it's called two fusions.

>> Uh the first fusion has been around for a long time which is you know essentially fusing socialism with with with uh Chinese uh circumstances with the

second fusion I think was brought forward just a few years ago is fusing socialism and Chinese traditional values. Uh and we're just at the

values. Uh and we're just at the beginning of that process.

>> Wow. Now,

early 90s would have been really tough, right, for you to decide on sticking with the gun, right? I mean, on the back of

to to what extent was the failure of Perisroka and Glasnos >> in the Soviet Union?

>> Yeah. a factor for you not to go the Russian way in the early '9s or was it a lot more of the pre-existing institutional building on the back of

this infusion that's taken place for decades since 1949?

>> Well, the Soviet case is an interesting one. I talked about in the first chapter

one. I talked about in the first chapter or two of of my book, right?

>> Uh it turned out there was a lot of luck involved.

So there's a lot of chance. Okay.

History is like the history.

>> Serendipity plays a part.

>> Exactly. There's destiny and there's fate. Okay.

fate. Okay.

>> Destiny is necessity. You know,

inevitability. Fate is random.

>> Okay. So in in the fall of the Soviet Union, the collap of Soviet Union, there was a there there were many elements of

fate, many elements of chance involved.

If if if somebody was not away on holiday, they had that vote and that vote, you know, maybe a certain leader would not emerge to become the leader

and and someone else would make totally different decisions. Um and certainly I

different decisions. Um and certainly I think the Soviet collapse was I think most historians would agree that that

particular collapse was in many ways self-inflicted.

Okay. Um not to say they won't collapse in the future but you know for that particular event. Um so so there's

particular event. Um so so there's there's quite a bit of fate in there but there were also

um deliberate decisions which is like I said they were enamored by the material successes

of the west at the time and concluded that what led to those successes were those political institutions and those

those liberal values.

Um it turned out so I mean that's a fun that's that's like a classic mistake of mistaking you know correlation for causality

>> and and and the Soviets they they started as you aptly pointed out becoming a credto state.

>> Well that too because the you know the Soviet Union was an incredible experiment by the way. Yeah. Um I always talk about everybody you know kind of uh

uh you know talk about the Soviet Union as a as a great failure. Uh it

eventually collapsed of course but let's not forget it was the greatest success story one of the amazing success story too of the 20th century. I mean if you read

>> right >> Totoy and read Dossioski you know what Russia was like >> absolutely >> in the 19th century even as late as 19th

century the uh the surf um the backend all of that and the Soviet Union in one generation

turned into a modern superpower.

>> Wow. I mean modern in every way from science >> to everyday life uh in one generation it was >> you were first put something on any

orbit >> it was a miracle almost um you know the west industrialized and modernized over a 300 year period

>> 400 year period >> wow >> Soviet Union achieved superpowers our status. Uh if you if you go to Soviet Union, you know, the first

part of the the the 20th century, you see Soviet people living totally modern lives from

what we read about Russia in the 19th century. It was a miracle in many ways.

century. It was a miracle in many ways.

But there there's one characteristic about the Soviet Union was that it was a credo state.

Okay? It was not a you know the modern modernity the one big important unit in modern world is called nation state and states based on

nations.

Um and nations have a set of cultural and moral >> right >> heritage and traditions and norms and

customs. Uh and the Soviet Union was a transnational entity.

>> Yeah. And it's based it was based on socialist ideology.

So it's an ideiational or ideological state. I call a credo state. So it

state. I call a credo state. So it

doesn't matter what your cultural heritage are cultural heritage is. Doesn't matter

where your nationality is. You got if you subscribe to the set of ideologies then you're Soviets which was an

experiment and didn't succeed. Okay. And

and I would argue that the United States >> Yeah.

>> in recent decades >> had become a credo state.

It had gone from a nation state with fairly distinct cultural lineage and religious and moral heritage

into a liberal credo state. And the ideology is

credo state. And the ideology is liberalism.

>> Yeah.

>> It's about essentially extreme individualism.

>> Yeah.

>> Uh so it doesn't matter what your values are, what your traditions are, what your cultural norms are, you subscribe to this abstract set of

ideology ideological uh uh values, then you are America.

And I think that's a risky approach >> and and the US was not like that 100 or 200 years before.

>> Of course not.

>> Yeah.

>> Of course not. Um

>> the fact that it wasn't it was actually what propelled the major industrial revolution.

>> Yeah. that the industrial revolution in the west at least uh not in China but in the west >> right >> uh were part and parcel with a with

their cultural and and and and religious >> right >> and moral traditions.

Um so it worked for them.

Um so so I think the United States today has become a liberal credo state.

>> Yeah.

um which are now um leading to the internal revolts within the US and and and by the way EU is the same thing.

>> Yeah.

>> European Union is essentially a credo entity, a credo state, an ideological state.

Um if >> what do you think could have gone wrong with the West as for them to become much more of a

credto state, Europe and the US? What could have gone wrong?

>> What do you think would have made it go wrong?

>> Um, I I think um Western modernity was a package.

>> Yeah. Okay, it had many elements to it.

If you you know any freshman textbook on western civ and those books are banned by the way now.

When I was going to school in America, I read them and then and then it became politically incorrect. I think so you

politically incorrect. I think so you don't do western civ anymore. I think I think in America most universities had ditched the core curriculum except very

few like Columbia or something but um so so you don't read these things anymore in American universities. I read them >> um because I went there before this

happened. Um, so any freshman year

happened. Um, so any freshman year western civ textbook would tell you that the the western the mainstream western civilization that led to

industrialization were of course the classics the Greeks and the Romans >> Christianity

extraordinarily important. Okay. Um um

extraordinarily important. Okay. Um um

and at the time they call barbarians which is basically Germanic tribes.

Okay. So, so, so religious tradition was a major part, >> right, >> of western modernity. I mean, the United

States was built on Puritans that moved from Europe to to US. So,

it's was was about religion, was about values and and Christianity of course is about community.

Of course, in that package there was individualism. Okay. that the the worth

individualism. Okay. that the the worth of the individual was always part of the western modernity but it was not the only thing traditional and religious values and

community were always major components of western modernity >> western both traditional societies and modern societies >> the communal element thick >> but then

>> this one strand because of liberalism this one strand of the western modern package age overtook the rest of it.

It's a viralent strand that somehow just metastasized like a cancer

and it's now all-encompassing in western societies. It's all about the individual.

It's so much about the individual. It's

It's gone totally woke big time.

>> Woke is the end result of extreme individualism.

>> Yeah.

>> Identity politics also I mean some people say you know identity politics is against the individual because they group them together. No.

Identity politics is about the the the goal of identity politics is to maximally empower the individual.

>> Y >> in order to maximally empower the individual, you you have to uh um somehow recognize the group, it so so

the group politics in whether it's ethnic groups or whatever uh uh in western societies, it's not about the group, it's about the individual in that

group.

um whether it's a group based on race or based on sexual orientation >> or based on gender.

>> Um it it's it's all about the the the maximal amplification of the individual.

You you made reference to something to the following in the book.

the atomized individual with divinely endowed rights corrots a community >> and the creation of the Frankensteines right >> of capital

>> especially if they're concentrated in certain oligarchs right at the expense of the majority >> right >> now would could you or could we argue

that economic inequalities structurally I think drove woke liberalism Well, they they go hand in hand. They

drive each other, >> right?

>> Um the loss of community and the maximal expansion and amplication of the individual.

>> Lead to basically rules of the jungle.

>> Yeah.

>> So those who win win big and they keep winning. I mean it's fun basic

winning. I mean it's fun basic economics, right? If you get bigger and

economics, right? If you get bigger and bigger, you become monopoly. the

monopoly gets extremely competitive because the of the science. Uh so so those individuals become oligarchs. The

rest of the people because they had lost their community don't have the power to respond.

>> Yeah.

>> Because they have no community. They're

all alienated individuals. They're

they're they're outcasts out there.

They're disorganized. Um so that I think that's where that's the conditions of the west today.

>> Well, you you finally mentioned that you know Wall Street and Silicon Valley they don't employ any more than 2 million people that they seem to control >> including their nannies >> and waitresses.

>> Yeah, exactly.

>> And they control pretty much and and then this is what often times gets described as as a plutoaucracy, right?

>> We don't see that in China. No, I mean policy makers are way above capital. You

know, capital is subservient to political authority in China, of course.

Um because China is fundamentally a collective society. Um so but I think

collective society. Um so but I think things are changing in America.

>> Yeah.

>> In many parts of Europe where people are saying no to that. Um I think part of the MAGA movement >> is driven by that.

>> Yeah.

>> Um where is headed? We don't know yet.

We'll have to see. We're still at early stage.

>> The rhetoric seems to resonate to the earlier, you know, Puritanism, you know, >> or or at least at least a desire to recapture a sense

of community, >> correct? to rejuvenate

>> correct? to rejuvenate collective values that have roots and customs and norms that have roots

instead of totally uprooted individuals.

>> Yeah.

So we've talked about revolution, we've talked about infusion which has resulted in tremendous institutional building in

China, right? The next phase is really

China, right? The next phase is really consolidation, right? Which which really

consolidation, right? Which which really is underpinned by three pillars, right?

The anti-corruption drive, friendliness towards the environment and reduction of inequalities and and and it just intuitively seems to me as a great

foundation for China to help globalize particularly to the global south. Talk about that.

Um, China is a developing country of course. Um, and also um, China's future

course. Um, and also um, China's future development depends on continued interconnectedness with the rest of the world. Okay. So, so

there basically two things are happening two trends in the world that are happening today. Okay. I call it

happening today. Okay. I call it deglobalization and reglobalization. Okay. So

and reglobalization. Okay. So

decolonalization was is mostly driven by the US-led western camp um for their own reasons and I'm not judging them here.

Um I think you know the west the US and the west made many strategic mistakes during globalization.

Uh that all of the fruits of globalization. All of the rewards went

globalization. All of the rewards went to very few people and their interests are not within are not in line with their own people anymore with not with

their nations and that's how they de-industrialized you know. Um so so now they're going through political changes trying to correct that and unfortunately

one way to correct that as they see it is to del deglobalize um so that's happening okay but the

other trend is I think the the the biggest um growing the most significant um country that's growing is China of

course >> and China's continued growth, like I said, depends on interconnectedness because, you know, we're the biggest trading nation in the world and biggest

trading nation in the history of mankind.

And no one traded, no country traded more than China's trading today. Okay.

And um and and and >> I think there's only one country in the world that doesn't have China as its largest trading partner >> or something like that.

>> It's Bhutan.

>> But you've covered the other 193. Okay.

So, so needless to say, we we in order to continue to prosper, we need to keep that going.

>> Uh but the West is is retreating for their own reasons. Nothing is wrong for them. Okay.

them. Okay.

>> Um so they're doing their thing and we're at a different stage. We we're we have different conditions, right? I

always joke. I say, "Look, look, you know, America could do just fine without the rest of the world. They got two big oceans

on both sides of their country. Nobody

could ever invade them. It's too hard."

Uh, and they got so many natural resources, right? And if they really,

resources, right? And if they really, you know, get Canada and Greenland, Greenland as they say they want, that's enough natural resources for 500 years.

Okay. And then they got, you know, Mexico where they could re, you know, work to re-industrial, help reindustrialize North America, maybe.

And and then there's Latin America. I

mean, they got so much going. They don't

need that. They don't need interconnectedness as we do. We don't we China doesn't have as nearly as many natural resources. Okay? We have to

natural resources. Okay? We have to trade and we're a manufacturing power.

So we have to make things and trade with the rest of the world. Um so so the second trend is I call reglobalization

where China is the main proponent one of the main drivers and where are they going to drive this? Of course only with the global south mainly with the global

south because like I said the west is retreating.

So, so we China must find ways to reglobalize to continue interconnectedness with the entire global south in mutually beneficial ways

and that's the only way to go.

Otherwise, why would people trade with um so the the US government under Donald Trump came out with a new national security document some weeks ago.

it it makes specific mentions of certain things. One of which is reestablishing

things. One of which is reestablishing strategic stability with Russia and the other obviously is making reference to the Monroe

Doctrine, right? And this this ties into what

right? And this this ties into what you've just said, Canada all the way down to the very end of South America, right?

What are the implications to Europe, China, and the global south?

I mean I I I'm not I don't want to I'm I'm not in the place to make judgment on the moral doctrine and and where where

the US wants to do. Um I could see why um because simple accounting as I just expressed >> 500 years of

>> natural resource everything >> uh I would hope that they wouldn't do it in such a crude way like the Monroe doctrine.

>> Um but it's really their strategic imperative. Okay. And I

think we could understand where that's coming from. Um I I I I

coming from. Um I I I I don't think it's smart for them to do it aggressively like what they're doing in

Latin America. Okay. But it's really

Latin America. Okay. But it's really it's up to them. It's it's their their their thing. Okay. Um the implication of

their thing. Okay. Um the implication of it, I think, is that um it doesn't pay for them.

to keep maintaining this global empire that they built post cold war.

It's not a good deal, right, >> to them. Uh it's not a good deal to America. It's not a good deal to the

America. It's not a good deal to the American people. You know, I've always

American people. You know, I've always said that the the American empire was built at the expense of the American nation.

Okay. The way they built this global system is that you know the people at the very top.

>> Yeah.

>> Okay. Wall Street, Silicon Valley, and Hollywood.

>> Yeah.

>> The holy trinity made almost all the money.

Okay. And and the rest lost their social safety net.

>> Yeah.

>> Lost their community, lost their good paying manufacturing jobs >> while piling up $38 trillion worth of debt. lost their local church. Yeah.

debt. lost their local church. Yeah.

>> Lost their religion, lost their morality to woke.

Okay. So,

so that's uh I mean I can understand why the American people or at least a a large segments large

segments of the American population are saying no no no we we don't want to maintain this global empire for the

benefits of these few people.

We want our communities back. We want

our industry back. We want

>> our values back. Um, so I see that and and I think we should understand that and the implication of it I I believe I I think that that this this national

security document um is not a random thing. It didn't just come out of blue.

thing. It didn't just come out of blue.

I think the undercurrents the forces that has been visible for some time >> for many many years for at least a decade.

>> Yeah.

>> Um and I think it will continue regardless with what h what what political leaders they produce. Um so so I think what the rest of the world means

to the rest of the world is that I I think this this America le global sort

of system global empire is going to retreat much faster than people think.

Um and and of course that carries significant implications.

um and you know to the global south >> if if the US were to seriously reestablish strategic stability with

Russia intuitively Europe would just have to look at China more favorably do you see that as a

collective or more individual type of >> posturing I don't know I mean I think you know we trade China trade is with many European countries

uh in a big way.

>> I mean our our economic relationship with Germany was >> enormous. Y

>> enormous. Y >> okay we got German companies all the big companies in China. All I mean >> Audi's Volkswagen

you know making electric cars in China.

Um and so so we we have deeply intertwined economic and other relations with

European countries.

Um and of course we now have the uh difficult situation >> y in Europe and with the military conflicts

um that had complex reasons and complex rules roots um and if the if the US

is less inclined now than before to to be

let's say an active actor in those conflicts uh for for their own good >> right >> for America's own interests um then I

think everybody needs to recalculate um and certainly I think European countries have much to gain by

increasingly improving interconnectedness with China. Uh uh

it's unfortunate.

I read, you know, some in Europe are so afraid of for economic reasons that that they they're not giving up. They're not

ditching their climate goals because they're afraid of Chinese EVs. It's unbelievable.

>> Oh my god. I mean that was like last time I read the FT that was their religion you know energy transformation energy

transition to address climate change was Brussels religion that was that's that was as politically correct as it gets.

>> Yeah. Actually, an argument could be made for the decline of Germany's competitiveness or manufacturing competitiveness would

have been by way of some element of you know embracing climate change as a religion.

What I would say to many European countries and Europe and and the US included is when things are not working out for you, don't just blame other people.

>> Yeah.

>> Look at the kind of reforms that you could do.

>> Yeah.

>> Okay. You know, at the end of the cultural revolution, we had a lot of troubles.

You know, we didn't say, "Oh, it was the US fault that our plan economy didn't work out."

work out." >> Yeah.

you know only if they could do plan economy too and get on a level playing field we do better than them so we need to resist them. No, we said okay parts

of our parts of our political uh economic system are not working. So we

need to reform and actually learn from what working elsewhere and and we did import many aspects of

market economics from the west and we competed on that.

So, right, I I want to drill down on this institutional building, right? You

you've you've mentioned to me in the past >> about the 155-year plan, >> right, >> that was announced in the early 50s, right? And for a little bit, it was

right? And for a little bit, it was displaced by the Great Leap, then it reverted back, right? And then I want to tie this to what you had alluded to in

the book called Shi Dauu, right? I mean

it's it's really technocratization, right? It's

right? It's >> or meritocracy.

>> It's technocratization >> with ideals.

>> Yeah. Talk about that.

>> Um well the Sudaf tradition has been with us for 2,000 years. Really since

Confucious.

>> Yeah.

It's about common people. So we we we did away with

common people. So we we we did away with aristocracy many many centuries ago, millenniums

ago. Okay. Um gradually of course but

ago. Okay. Um gradually of course but but fundamentally we um we did away with uh uh landed aristocracy

uh when when Chinuangi unified China. We began to to ditch that

unified China. We began to to ditch that and >> right >> established a uh uh what what some political scientists

called modern state at that time of course but it wasn't wasn't modern yet u but that possessed many elements of a

modern state um and and then then of course one core element of that state is a creed

is a group of is is the belief that commoners through learning you could go from nobody to

sky's is the limit except for the emperor.

Um but you the learning had the purpose.

It's not technocratic just technocratic learning learning had a purpose of serving >> right >> the civilization serving the state serving the collective

and to to serve the values that undergard the collective and of course at the time was confusion values

okay um so that ethos I think continues to this day um and and continues through the revolution too. The revolutionaries were

revolution too. The revolutionaries were Saddafos because they cared about the country that and they all they they were mostly all common people.

>> Yeah.

>> I mean in Europe, you know, up until maybe Napoleon a couple hundred years 300 years ago only aristocrats could go to war. It was a privilege to go to war,

to war. It was a privilege to go to war, right? Peasants are not good enough to

right? Peasants are not good enough to go to war.

the the the 15 five-year plans.

>> Yeah.

>> I mean, you know, Mao had already this vision that, you know, within 75 years, China could overtake the US, right? I

mean, >> he he said that at at the announcement of the of the first 5-year plan, and it was crazy. It was um he we're now

was crazy. It was um he we're now starting the 15th >> correct five-year plan. and he wrote something to the effect that, hey, you

know, we're starting our first 5-year plan. Let's work hard and and look, our

plan. Let's work hard and and look, our goal is not to mess around and just just put food on the table. Our goal is to catch up and surpass at the time the most advanced country in the world, the

United States. He says, "How many years

United States. He says, "How many years going to take? 5, 10, 20? You're

probably too soon? That's too

optimistic." He said, "I don't know." He

said, "Maybe, maybe 75 years. How about

that? That's just 15 five year plans.

He actually wrote that at that time. It

was 1950.

>> He was pretty preient, you know.

>> I mean, you're you're up there now, you know, when it comes to a bunch of stuff.

>> EV for sure.

>> We're now AI pretty soon. We're

embarking on the 15th 5year plan. And

I'll tell you what's happening in China, okay? Uh amazing stuff. Okay? We are so

okay? Uh amazing stuff. Okay? We are so so we began to engage in globalization 30 some years ago right and it of course

began to uh it it it we joined the WTO in 2000 um and the way we engaged globalization at the time was through manufacturing

uh because that's our strength at the time and we went from single digit share of the global industrial capacity to today our industrial capacity is the

biggest in the world bigger than the US Germany Japan India and the next five six countries put together okay enormous 35% of the industrial output I think

going up maybe to 40% more >> yeah okay um and so so we kind of cleaned up industrial capacity our

manufacturing and very successful okay um but at that time 2000 plus minus But we weren't in the room in terms of science and technology,

>> right?

>> Okay. And the US was indist indisputably the leader. So we just followed Silicon

the leader. So we just followed Silicon Valley. Okay. Whatever they did, we we

Valley. Okay. Whatever they did, we we we followed and we seeded enormous territories like semiconductor.

Okay. Um and and they were leading the way. Okay.

way. Okay.

But we didn't just lay flat like the you the the current popular Chinese term is you know uh

tamping we didn't lay flat they they worked very hard on education on science and technology infrastructure all that so it accumulated over decades and we

are now at the cusp of major science and technology breakouts and breakthroughs across us multiple sectors and I predict

we're going to have 5 10 15 deep seeds in different sectors in the next generation 10 years >> nonlinear >> nonlinear nonlinear okay I'll just give

you an example okay I I I would say that this process began in 2020 okay and the first sector that it

affected was renewable energy >> okay and in 2020 to 2025 today in those five years not just solar and wind and

all of that the Chinese were very successful globally also in automobiles and and and let me kind of explain how

how big that is okay the auto industry is a pillar industry of the world okay a pillar industry okay and post World War II it took three countries

>> y >> 75 years to dominate that pillar industry Okay. Germany, Japan, and the

industry Okay. Germany, Japan, and the US. And in 5 years, we uprooted the

US. And in 5 years, we uprooted the entire thing.

>> Yeah.

>> And it's never going back.

>> Hands down.

>> Okay. 5 years compared with 75 years in a pillar industry in the world. Okay.

That's auto. Okay. So, from 20 right now 2025 to 2030 in the next three year uh five years, I would say it's going to happen. Same thing is going to happen in

happen. Same thing is going to happen in three industries.

Okay, biotech which is already happening, AI and robotics or advanced manufacturing let's say not

just robotics alone. Okay, in biotech and I began to invest in biotech 7 8 years ago. Never in my wildest dream did

years ago. Never in my wildest dream did I anticipate the current in situation. I mean, China

is quickly becoming a biotech superpower. Okay. 78 years ago, our

superpower. Okay. 78 years ago, our share of the global novel medicine patents was maybe low teens,

11 12%, 14%. Today is 44%.

We'll go up to 50% very soon. Okay. Of

all the clinical trials that are taking place globally, our share is 35% maybe and and going up. That's bigger than the

US Europe put together. Okay. The entire

world is here in China shopping for novel medicines. I always said that you

novel medicines. I always said that you know in the year 2000 if you want to get a picture of globalization you go to Guanjo to the Canton fair, right?

Everybody in the world is in Canton Fair. If you own a little gift shop in

Fair. If you own a little gift shop in Seattle or you own a uh whatever um factory in in Barcelona, you're there buying whatever you need for your home

markets. Today there's a canton fair

markets. Today there's a canton fair happening in China and biotech.

Okay. All these companies are entertaining potential customers from America, Europe, Russia and you name it buying novel medicines IPS from China.

Okay. And that's happening already. So

in the next 5 years I think it will continue. Okay. Second AI. AI of course

continue. Okay. Second AI. AI of course everybody's saying US and China commit.

Of course there's competition but China takes a totally different approach and it's very relevant to the global south.

Let me explain. Okay.

>> Um so we take an open source approach.

Okay. US takes the closed source approach. It also has to do with

approach. It also has to do with political system and political DNA.

Okay. Will take hours to explain this but let me just I'm with you. So the US US approach is essentially invest innovate

and seek grants right okay like all these companies all these big techs we've been paying them rents for the last 20 years you know that okay um the

Chinese approach is different is invest innovate and compete and scale up and make things affordable that everybody gets it okay like what we

did with manufacturing okay how come you know how Um, everybody in America, I mean, you think all these Americans and Europeans could afford to

buy these Christmas toys 30 years ago without China? No,

without China? No, >> dude. You go to Amazon, you go to

>> dude. You go to Amazon, you go to Walmart, 99% of the goods are made in China, >> you can afford, of course, that has an issue. There is an issue. I understand

issue. There is an issue. I understand

where, you know, I think President Trump said, you know, maybe too many dollars is not a good thing. Maybe two is enough. Maybe he's right. I'm not

enough. Maybe he's right. I'm not

judging that, okay? I'm just saying we make things massive scale and affordable and same things happening in AI. Okay. I

mean I know there the US is stronger on on computing power because the chips um but it doesn't it's not that's not where it's at. I think okay we where I know

it's at. I think okay we where I know companies around the world including major American companies are kind of secretly they're not

advertising they're using Chinese AI because they're using Q1 they're using you know Kimmy whatever it is I mean because look the Chinese AI companies

are selling a million tokens for 38 cents US >> disproportionately cheaper >> okay GPT I think sells them

$5.5 US. I mean, that's so big. The

$5.5 US. I mean, that's so big. The

difference is so big. Okay, I tell you, you know, without Chinese AI, global south and AI will never meet.

They will have nothing to do with each other other than the global south paying rents to American AI companies like they've been paying rents to Apple and Google

and everyone else, all the big taxs.

Okay. But Chinese AI open source, they are affordable.

If you're an Indonesian company, you want to use AI 38 cents, maybe going down to 25 cents a million tokens, you can actually use them as a tool to help

your business.

It's actually affordable. You're not

paying rents. Okay. So, so I think um AI very important uh especially in the global south it may even be in America but especially in global south um and

the third is advanced manufacturing robotics I mean that's already happened so that's the next five years 19 uh 2025 to 2030 and look beyond 2030 to 2035

>> oh my god >> I see future you know I can name to quantum and nuclear fusion >> and I see >> well you've already announced aum >> right nuclear But still early. Okay. I

see tremendous amount of capital, human resources, government policies going into these sectors and I think will bear fruits 5 years from now. So we will be

China will be at the forefront of science and technology across the board. Two two of that will be made to

board. Two two of that will be made to be shared with the global south. Think

about that.

two two fundamental observations that just keep on staring at me. First is

the US economy is just too bloated.

>> You know, you you take a DD qua ride in Shenzhen. There's no tipping,

Shenzhen. There's no tipping, >> right?

>> And on a per mile cost, it's cheaper.

and the marginal productivity for China. I

mean, you you can get a an Apple Watch equivalent in Shenzhen for $12. It

functions. It looks just as good when you're paying about $450 in Palo Alto for an Apple Watch.

I mean, you know, for somebody in Africa, somebody in Papua, somebody in any village in the global south, those are just going to resonate, right? That's

right. the way you open source everything.

So what could stop this? I mean, well, let me let me also share that you produce 4 to 4.5 million STEM products per year. Southeast Asia only 750,000 of

per year. Southeast Asia only 750,000 of which Indonesia 250,000. The US only 800,000 STEM products per year.

Your your marginal productivity is only going to keep going up and beating the rest.

unstoppable, right? So your your I think your struggle is the degree to which you can democratize capital to the global south.

>> Yeah. Would would you agree with that?

>> I I so so if you go to China, the buzz word today is called chuhai. Chuhai

means literally means going overseas.

Okay. But but what it means are or Chinese companies mostly technology companies. some manufacturing companies

companies. some manufacturing companies too but but manufacturing companies with heavy technology uh content uh going to

globalize going overseas um and a lot of these companies including EV companies I mean I think BYD manufacturing in Brazil in Thailand in

in in in Hungary Indonesia >> Indonesia Chinese drone company robotics companies um so all these battery companies um All these companies are

>> CL is opening a frank.

>> That's right. That's right. Um so so I would say that look I say I just throw this out for for I mean I really haven't thought this through so I

could be wrong. Okay. Um I I think the first phase of globalization which is ending

has three main drivers. Okay. American

capital and technology, Chinese production and global market.

I think the next phase of globalization will also have three drivers. That's

Chinese capital and technology, world production and global market.

Hm.

>> And and the Chinese have to spread their production and spread their their industrial and technological footprint

and around the world especially in the global south and the the challenge is how to make it mutually beneficial. how

to bring up the development of the entire global south uh uh with that and I think um the the political desire is there.

>> Yeah.

>> The geopolitical necessities also there um and the commercial incentives are there too.

>> Yes. You know, I tell I tell my Western friends, you know, they keep thinking that the reason why BYD is building factories in Thailand and Indonesia would be that >> it's geopolitical.

>> And I tell them it's not geopolitical.

It's pure economics, >> right?

>> You know, they got to compete with 98 other EV makers in China, whereas in Southeast Asia, they're the only boy in town.

>> They're going to make more money in Southeast Asia. But but I I think the

Southeast Asia. But but I I think the long game as it relates to the global south or call it Southeast Asia is technological transfer.

>> Yeah.

>> Right. And and if if we take a look at the FDR that comes to Southeast Asia, it takes place at a rate of about 200 to$230 billion a year.

>> Of which Singapore gets about 100 to 140. Indonesia gets about 30 to 40.

140. Indonesia gets about 30 to 40.

>> Thailand, Malaysia, Philippines, Vietnam each gets about 10 to 20. the the

structural limitation in capital allocation relates to I think rule of law.

>> Yeah.

>> And translational wherewithal. So if we want to see China help with reglobalization, I think China could take a view on how rule of law could get better in the

destination countries and how the translational wherewithalss, >> the translational wherewithal is really correlated with the number of people they get educated in STEM, >> right?

>> Whether you bring in Chinese professors to Southeast Asia or we send a bunch of Southeast Asians to the Chinua of the world,

>> right? And my idea is that I think

>> right? And my idea is that I think Chinese un I think Chinese universities are the first rate. Okay. Uh and there are many of them. I got number two. Um

and they're particularly good particularly good at STEM.

>> Yeah.

>> Um so I think our top 50 universities should I think the government should encourage them go around the world and set up campuses, STEM campuses. Yeah.

Yeah, you don't have to, you know, include philosophy, but STEM campuses uh in different subjects are partnering with the best educational institutions

locally uh to train people to train young people in the global south and have them come to China uh uh and and go back and forth uh and that I then we build a network

>> Yeah.

>> uh of people uh and talents. Um I I mean I think that many of them are doing it.

Yeah. I see some of the best universities working on setting up campuses overseas mostly in the global.

>> Not enough.

>> Yeah. Not enough.

>> I think it needs I agree needs to scale and and and the beauty about the educational system in China is that you can be pretty indiscriminate about it because you you don't gain the system

there. You can send your kid to Chungtu,

there. You can send your kid to Chungtu, Chungqing Dalian Shanghai Beijing you get pretty much the same quality education. Whereas in other countries,

education. Whereas in other countries, you got to be rich to be able to get your son or daughter to get a better education, right? Because you can game

education, right? Because you can game the system. That that I think is is

the system. That that I think is is going to bode well for the look, my thesis for Southeast Asia is to look to China increasingly more for technological capital allocation and to

the west for economic capital because they've been printing a lot of money.

>> Right. Right.

>> But that money is not coming to Southeast Asia because of their perception of perhaps lack of rule of law, lack of translational wherewithal.

that that I think could be the recipe for reglobalization as you aptly pointed out and and we have to uh like China and the global south and other countries in China's a main part

of global south China and other countries of the global south need to work together to establish

rules and standards that are conducive to our common development.

Okay. That work for us. Yeah.

>> You know, not the so-called rule of law that doesn't work for us that's imposed on us. Okay. Um so so that's why a lot

on us. Okay. Um so so that's why a lot of the you know a lot of the so-called rule of laws or other political

institutions you know they used to they used to say that for many decades they used to say that you know if you just if you just did this in Indonesia you you'll get rid of

corruption and they did all the corruption got worse there many many studies okay um so so that that's I think you know China at that level has

something to contribute as well because China had the experience of building institutions that work for them. Not

perfect case study. There are many flaws, many problems. I mean, China has a corruption problem, too. Um, but

they're cracking down. They've been

cracking down. Um, but China does have the experience of have building institutions that more or less work for them and continue to reform reform them.

I want to go back to climate change. Yeah. If if you charge

climate change. Yeah. If if you charge your Tesla in PaloAlto, it'll charge you about 48 to 55 cents per kilowatt hour.

>> You charge your Xiaomi or BYD in Shenzen, it's only 4 to 5 cents per kilowatt hour. So, I mean, I I I can

kilowatt hour. So, I mean, I I I can only deduce that >> it's because of the massive supply chain capabilities, right? So I I don't think

capabilities, right? So I I don't think that's easily replicated onto the global south, but I think what works is the political economy argument, >> right? I think capital allocation from

>> right? I think capital allocation from China will take place in the global south if China understands a little bit better about the political economy argument.

>> Right? I would argue that if China does enough to educate the glo the global south whether it's STEM or others particularly STEM

if the EV in a global south gets charged at a cost of seven cents >> not necessarily fine because of the lack of supply chain they will still pay

>> of course you know what I mean I I read I mean for Indonesia you know I read that Indonesia has the on its agenda energy

transition. Energy transition. Okay.

transition. Energy transition. Okay.

>> Um for a country of this size of so many islands, I mean, okay, this is an amazing country. I look at the map

like, "Wow, Indonesia." Okay. I I was I came to see you. So, I looked at the map. Okay. I mean, for a country like

map. Okay. I mean, for a country like Indonesia with this kind of population, energy transition, I mean, come on. And

you got to have I mean China is the only allow me to say this. I'm not saying it in a in a in any in an arrogant way or anything like

that. Okay? I say in the most humble

that. Okay? I say in the most humble way. China is your only viable partner.

way. China is your only viable partner.

China is the only country that could produce the hardware, the equipment, the infrastructure at affordable costs, >> right?

and scale them up, okay, and and can execute on a timely basis and they they're they're fast.

Um so so we I mean you you need to partner with the Chinese.

>> Yeah. figure out a way possible >> particularly for technological capital and the and the and the Chinese China is is just by sheer size is is a big presence

everywhere I know sometimes that could appear uh threatening.

>> Yeah.

>> Uh but it's a soft one.

>> Yeah.

>> Okay. I mean think about it. I mean

don't believe these people will tell you the Chinese are big that's why they're threat. The Chinese never go around the

threat. The Chinese never go around the world telling them how to run their countries. Never. Never.

countries. Never. Never.

>> Yeah. Okay. So,

>> just just by that alone, >> we're not discounting Western technology, >> right?

>> I'm only making a point that Western technology might be more 0ero to one, >> but it's just not as affordable as Chinese technology and and I do believe

China in the near foreseeable future will be able to do more 0 to1.

>> Of course, right, we're doing 01.

>> Yeah.

>> Um, It's a lot more affordable for people in Africa, Southeast Asia and the de you know the global south.

>> No, I I think you know for medicine you know biotech I mean in the last decades western companies dominated medicine and

it's not cheap. Some countries have just have to ditch IP and just do generics but we're not doing that. Okay. So, so I

with the current trajectory persists I think in 5 years China Chinese affordable Chinese novel medicines are going to spread around the world.

>> Yeah.

>> To the benefit of hundreds of millions of people.

>> Yeah. Do do you see this as an incentive for the West to reduce the bloat?

The west has its own myriad complex issues to deal with.

>> Yeah.

>> They are deeply rooted issues and we're not in the position >> to make judgments y

>> on them. Okay. They must make tough choices and and like any tough choices, China

made tough choices over decades. um that

you know sacrifice certain interests for others right the west is having to do that I think and we have no idea how they but it's it's their decisions to

make it's their decisions to make um so you know we're we're sort of like living in a much more structured multipolarity now

>> and and revisionism is inevitable coming from countries that used to be really tiny nowadays gone much larger.

>> Yeah.

>> And I think it's high time and and I I sense that Southeast Asia is one of the very few that can actually toggle between China and the West because of

scale and I think geopolitical and geostrategic relevance.

Would would you agree with that?

>> I think it's possible. Um I I happen to think that uh if the current trend continues, China will be able to deal with America

directly very well.

Um, you know, I think America's is possibly the United States is on a trajectory of um acting in its own best

collective interests instead of the interests of the liberal elites at the expense of national

interests to maintain this global uh hedge hedgeimon status.

Um so if that's that trend continues um I I think China and the United States will be able to

of course they will compete uh but I think they will be able to avoid harmful conflicts and act in their own respective best interests.

Eric I want to ask you two more questions.

the the national security narrative for Indonesia is underpinned by essentially food

security and energy security, right? You

you as a capital allocator, what would you advocate for for Indonesia?

>> I would add advocate like I said partnering with China energy transition so you have affordable, scalable and executable

infrastructure built for renewables that you can chart your own course on energy.

Okay, China's charting it own course on energy. You can charge your own course

energy. You can charge your own course energy in the long term. Okay, it's it take time but >> yeah.

>> Okay, second um agriculture I mean that's Indonesia is a major agricultural country. It's it's your pillar industry.

country. It's it's your pillar industry.

>> Um and and agriculture also had a lot to do with social fabric. Um and that's how you incorporate technology. I mean China is

incorporate technology. I mean China is also at the forefront of agricultural technologies and for instance robotic and drones. Okay. Now I have a drone

and drones. Okay. Now I have a drone company. We have a drone company. It's

company. We have a drone company. It's

one of the largest agricultural drones in the world and we manage huge farmlands with no human being. Maybe one. Okay. um

and and >> smoking cigarette looking at the screen >> and we're active in Thailand, active in Brazil, you know, all these agricultural

countries um and robotics on the ground, cotton fields, robots picking them. Um

so, but how you incorporate with technologies in a way that's that helps you improve productivity but also doesn't hurt your social cohesion

and the benefits are shared.

Uh that's what Indonesia needs to really consider. But technologies are there.

consider. But technologies are there.

China has them affordably again.

Wow. You know, Southeast Asia has about five to six million hectares of mangroves, >> right? Mangroves I think is one of the

>> right? Mangroves I think is one of the more undernarrated decarbonizing narratives because you know with with one hectar you can sequester about a

>> they suck up they suck up >> a ton of carbon right so just imagine if Southeast Asia could plant up to 10 million hectares >> it's amazing >> this region could suck up could

sequester a quarter of humanity's carbon emission which is about 40 gat tons So that's 10 gigatons and and I I think drones could play the role of planting

because the productivity is orders of magnitude more than just a fisherman planting one by one, right? You can just shoot it down and then plant.

>> Yeah, absolutely.

>> That is what the Chinese and the Chinese leader called a shared destiny, >> right?

Think about that of this size suck up >> amazing >> carbon emission.

China is a major manufacturing power.

>> You know, building nuclear reactor takes years, right? But planting mangroves,

years, right? But planting mangroves, that's right.

>> With the with the help of drones, it's instantaneous and you can sequester within couple of years or whatever.

>> Last question.

It's it's it's about an hour and a half already. What what do you think would

already. What what do you think would slow down China's engine?

>> I mean, you know, talk about all the great >> two risks.

>> Yeah.

>> Um, one is we have a demographic challenge in the horizon.

>> Uh, it's it's not immediate, but it's in the horizon. Um, and I hope we address

the horizon. Um, and I hope we address that. um um you know in sometime in the

that. um um you know in sometime in the distant in the future that we have a lot of retirees and fewer young people working that's always a problem. Okay.

It's it's not the total population problem. It's the structure of the

problem. It's the structure of the population. Um we need to we are

population. Um we need to we are addressing it uh in in through technological means. Of course, all the

technological means. Of course, all the robots got to make them work, right? Um

but we may also need to address that through policies, >> right?

>> And and social policies and education and values. Um so so that's something I

and values. Um so so that's something I think we need to address. It's a risk.

Second risk of course is that in this emerging multipolar world there are a lot of uncertainties a lot of geopolitical tensions uh is that we

somehow get dragged into some kind of unwanted military conflict. Uh I think the

military conflict. Uh I think the Chinese don't want that. Um but there are many other forces in play. Yeah.

>> Um, so we need to really act be extra careful about that.

>> Anything we might have missed.

>> No, I think this is that was that was pretty exhaustive.

>> Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Great.

>> Thank you so much.

>> Thank you so much. We'll have We need a beer.

>> Yes.

>> All right.

>> Thanks, >> friends. That was Eric Lee, chairman of

>> friends. That was Eric Lee, chairman of Changi Capital from China. Thank you.

for the speech.

High power.

Fore speech.

forchech.

for shout out