Former Defense Minister YOAV GALLANT (Part 2) - The Hostage Dilemma
By Call me Back Podcast - with Dan Senor
Summary
## Key takeaways - **No Messaging Hamas First**: The first order I gave to the IDF is no one is messaging anything to Hamas; they will come to us. If you message them you are considered the weak side, so take their assets, tunnels, and especially their lives until they come to breathe and talk. [06:37], [07:10] - **Israel Never Abandons Hostages**: You never leave wounded soldiers or anyone in the battlefield; if someone is in the hands of the enemy you do whatever is necessary to release him, whether by rescue operation or negotiation. This is the spirit of the Jewish people and the IDF, from exchanging hundreds of Egyptians for five Israelis in 1956. [13:14:13], [14:06:14] - **Refused Partial Child Hostage Deal**: In negotiations for women and children hostages, I refused to vote for 50 including only 22 kids when our list had 40 kids and 57 women, saying what will I tell the 18 kids' families left behind. We compromised to extra hostages per ceasefire day, releasing 80 instead of 17. [32:19:32], [33:49:33] - **Bibas Kids Murdered Early**: We had intel that the Bibas kids were murdered by Hamas, clear enough for us but not to declare publicly; Hamas wouldn't release some women because of what happened to them and didn't want them revealing truths. They were captured by a radical branch beyond Hamas. [34:10:34], [35:33:35] - **Canceled Risky Broads Family Raid**: Special forces hid for days near the Broads family (mother and four kids) in Shati camp apartment, developing a dangerous operation, but I held off as November deal negotiations progressed, and they were released safely in the deal. [37:32:37], [40:00:40] - **Hostages Before Destroying Hamas**: War goals: destroy Hamas but create conditions to bring hostages first, as you can't release 250 militarily alone and must negotiate politically; priority is live hostages soon, then continue fighting Hamas which will give reasons to persist. [41:23:41], [46:29:46]
Topics Covered
- Force Hamas to Negotiate via Pressure
- Rescue One Israeli at Any Cost
- Prioritize All Kids Before Compromising
- Hostages First, Destroy Hamas After
- Values Strengthen, Don't Paralyze Israel
Full Transcript
and the first order I gave to the IDF about this issue is no one is messaging anything to Hamas they will come to us
if you will message anything to them you will consider as the weak side so you need to take their assets their tunnel
and especially their lives if you do So eventually they will come to you and I said put their heads under the water one they don't have enough air they will
come to breathe and they will talk to us and that's what happened in the first deal exactly [Music] [Applause]
that it is 10:00 a.m. on Monday March 3rd here in New York City it is 5:00 p.m. on Monday March 3rd in Israel as
p.m. on Monday March 3rd in Israel as Israelis wind down their day last month we released the first in a series of interviews with Former Defense Minister
General yav Galant telling the story of the October 7th war from his unique vantage point that first interview titled four days in October focused on
the drama that took place behind closed doors about the possibility of Israel focusing its efforts on Israel's stronger adversary Hezbollah if you have not heard or seen that
interview I highly recommend following the link in the show notes in today's interview we will focus on the most complicated and sadly polarizing aspect
of this war the hostages what to do about the hostages how to get the hostages home Former Defense Minister General yov Gant thanks for coming back to continue this conversation thank you
very much then I'm looking forward to continuing the conversation last time we were together you told me I can call you yoav last our our listeners and viewers think I'm not being sufficiently
respectful or formal I am following your lead that's fine and actually last time we were speaking about operations and battles and War and this time as you
mentioned in the beginning we're going to discuss something that is not less important values and speaking about values I think it should be very
personal so I'm with you so I want to Begin by going back to those first 48 Hours immediately after October 7th when
you and your team were assessing what Israel was actually contending with and at that point or pretty soon thereafter you knew that the nature of the massacre
of the attack of the invasion was brutal and barbaric some 1200 uh Israelis slaughtered but you also learned of hostages taken now hostages being taken
for Israel was nothing new and we'll get into that but the scale of it 251 hostages taken this in American terms just so our American audience
understands in American terms proportionate to the US population would be the equivalent of 10,000 Americans being taken hostage so I I I often try to remind American audiences imagine if
when 911 happened here in the United States we suffer devastating loss of life and then at the same time we're informed that 10,000 Americans have been
taken hostage which means 911 is not just one day but it is this ongoing trauma with no real clear end in sight so I want to take you or I want you to
take me back to when you were processing that information and what you and your team were assessing it at the time like when you were told there are 251 Israelis
taken hostage how shocked were you there's the sheer shock of it and then there's also the reality that Israel no Western Country no country in the world
has a playbook for how to deal with this large number of of its citizenry being taken in captivity well uh the the most
uh important point in this event in the very first days was the proportions first of all the amount of casualties that accumulate every hour
and it turned to be dozens and later on hundreds and eventually thousands uh second the amount of hostages that we
were inform in the beginning about few and then dozens and within a short period of time it turned to be hundreds and although I was very experienced with
issue of hostages including as a commander and a soldier this was something different and I understood that beside being so
brutal it is complicated because I knew Gaza very well and in Gaza everything was inside a populated area with
millions of Palestinians that are part of the scenario so I understood very well that it's going to be very very complicated what kind of at that point regardless I said before there was no
Playbook but like in real time are you making any adjustments to how you would immediately think about a hostage situation we'll get into specific hostage situations in Israel's history in a moment was anyone say well this is
what we do in hostage situations but we have to do things different like was there any kind of discussion about any kind of precedent for what to do with something like this I'm fighting Hamas
since it was established in ' 87 and I know them quite good and I knew that they will not give you anything unless
you have something that they really need and this is not the Prisoners the prisoners in Israel mean the Palestinian prisoners in Israeli prisons the Palestinian prisoners in Israeli prisons
was already given they were speaking about Israel withdraw from Judah and Samaria they were speaking about how to divide Jerusalem in their thinking so
meaning in return for return for isra for for a deal so that's what was running in their minds if you want to get the hostages you have to apply a
serious military pressure that means that after you kill 5,000 terrorist if they see that you are going to continue then they will think about it the first
order I gave to the IDF about this issue is no one is messaging anything to Hamas they will come to us if you will message
anything to them you will consider as the weak side so you need to take their assets their tunnels and especially their lives if you do so
eventually they will come to you and I said put their heads under the water once they don't have enough air they will come to breathe and they will talk
to us and that's what happened in the first deal exactly that we're taking a short break to tell you about the sponsor of this episode we'll only be
doing this selectively but I wanted to take a moment to discuss seir which is a quarterly publication edited by Brett Stevens each issue is built around a theme the
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orgc call meback you can find the link to the publication in the show notes now back to our conversation okay so I want to look at
previous hostage situations that Israel because it's not the first time Israel as I said has had to deal with a hostage situation just had never had to deal with something on this scale so I want to look at previous hostage situations
and I just want to read them off because I don't think our audience appreciates how far back Israel has been dealing with hostage situations so just to name a few and this is not a a complete list
there was the 1972 Munich Olympics 1974 the maot massacre in which a lot of school children were slaughtered in
Northern Israel by the PLO there was 1976 the the inbi uh hostage crisis 1984
nakon Waxman was taken hostage 1986 Ron arod was taken hostage 2000 goldvaser and regev taken hostage which ultimately
was a precursor to the um 2006 Lebanon war 2006 gilad Shalit in which he was held hostage for 5 years ultimately exchanged in 2011 for over a thousand
Palestinian prisoners what had been Israel's policy and and dare I say best practice in dealing with these hostage situations and what if any of that
experience was applicable to what you were facing on October 7th 2023 well when I was 14 years old the Munich
Olympic took place and I was collecting every front page of the paper that was speaking about the Israeli
achievements in the oics weightlifters wrestling running everything one day the headline was that
there are Israeli hostages in Munich and that the Germans went to you know to release them and the massacre that
happened there for me it was I think the first personal contact with such an event this was dramatic first of all
because it happened on Munich and you know we are the Son and the daughter of Holocaust Survivors and
Munich is something very symbolic and this is after the sixth day war before the 73 War so the the mood in Israel was that we can achieve anything triumphant
triumphing altogether it was a shock I think this event paved my way to join special forces in the future two years
later it was the the event of malot and later on two years later just before I was drafted was the event of anbe my
instructors in the Boy Scouts were soldiers in these events so I knew everything from speaking to to them
before going to the military so everything was very personal we knew everything and I'll give you one short
example in the o October 86 I was in the Navy Seals as a young Commander I was less than 28 and all of
a sudden my commander at the unit did who was at the same time a Navy Captain called me and say come immediately to the office I came to the office and he
said an Israeli pilot fall in Lebanon we need to rescue him his name by by the way later on we learn that his name was
one and prepare all the forces that are possible every everybody that you have in hand with one hour two helicopters
Sosi are going to land in in the base and we are going to rescue him taken hostage by we didn't know that he was taking hostages but we didn't want he knew he was missing he's he was missing
in action we knew the the general area the location and we want to rescue him so I'm giving you this example
to show how much we were devoted to the mission of rescue one Israeli pilot we started to prepare ourself we didn't
know much about the location about the mission about the conditions about the enemy but we knew one thing if an Israeli soldier is in a possibility to
fall in the hands of the enemy we are going to rescue him so we were thinking that this is the right thing to do we were willing to sacrifice our life to
risk our soldiers to do whatever is necessary in order to rescue one Israeli soldier this is the spirit of the Jewish
people this is the spirit of the IDF because you never leave wounded soldiers or anyone in the battlefield if someone is wounded you rescue him if someone
unfortunately is died you bring him and barrier and if someone is in the hands of the enemy you do whatever is necessary no matter what it is in order
to release him if you need you go and you rescue him in a special operation and if you need you negotiate it and by the way you mentioned 72 as the first
day but you know in 56 just after the establishment of the state of Israel we
were winning the the Sinai desert War against Egypt we had I think five uh hostages five prisoners in the hands of
the Egyptian we pay hundreds as an exchange to bring these five people there was a pilot or two and some three others we released hundreds of Egyptian
soldiers so the proportions are there for the beginning of the state of Israel what was the underlying policy then what's what's
Israeli policy or Israeli Doctrine in or the Israeli protocol in dealing with these kinds of situations first of
all there are values and principles that you don't bend and this is the goal this is the target you bring your own people and this is the reason that they are
willing to participate in the next operation the reason the Israelis are willing to participate in the next operation because the reason that the Israeli soldiers and their mothers and their families are willing to do
anything that is risky is because they know that the state of Israel is behind them this is a legacy and you cannot do it if someone knows that if he volunteer
and something happened you are not backing him he need to know that the simple very simple issue one for all and
all for one is the basic now as you speak about policy first of all you do any effort to release them in an
operation but in a battlefield condition sometimes you don't have this option first of all because not all the time and including the last war you know
where is everybody MH second the conditions if you see six people under the ground as it was exposed to the
public after this brutal action against the Israeli hostages that they actually execute them under the ground you see it you mean this is in August of 2024 in
August 24 when the public was exposed to what happened under the ground to six Israeli hostages two women and four men
you understand that these conditions are next to impossible to release someone in an operation it's a tunnel one entrance
a gate gods and the the the width is less than one one meter and as El sharabi recently said in the in the udda interview which which is the equivalent
of 60 Minutes in Israel the host ofda alanaan did an interview with Alish shabi a little over a week after he was out after having been in captivity brutally uh for close to 15 months so
Alan why don't you bring out the clip and I just want us to watch it for a moment for Fore spe foree
[Music] Elish sharabi is a hero yarden bias is a
hero because of what happened to them as hostages and because they were losing everything they had the
families and they are so obliged to the goal to bring the others you see this hero Elish what he is speaking of in the interview and I spoke to him before the
interview I was sitting with him with my my wife and uh I couldn't believe that someone can be behave like he's behaving
after what happened to him and to his daughters and to his wife and to his brother this is the demonstration of the strength of his character and his
education but also the the state of Israel it's unbelievable this man who lost his family and uh was suffering so
much he thinking about one issue how to release his friends and those who were with him under the ground and what is telling you is almost common sense it's
very difficult to operate in certain circumstances especially under the ground when people are locked there with chains and with with guards
so you see the conditions and you understand that this is next to impossible to bridge in a an operation
but if you apply enough pressure then you bring the RS close enough and you need a political tie you cannot make the
tie in a you know military action so you can release one 10 20 but you cannot release
250 unless you have a deal once you don't have enough Intel all the operational conditions are not ripe and
time is running short because the life of hostages is under risk all the time you need to make concessions and those
concessions to my understanding are a sign of bravery and resilience of the state of Israel it's not weakness you
are willing to pay in order to bring back your own people this is essential this is part of the education this is part of the values and believe me
fighting for your own values is is the most important issue on a personal level and also in a national level what is the
difference between those Jews like my parents and others that were in the Holocaust and the situation right now
Israel has the ability and of course the right to defend itself by itself and we are translating it so for me the
commitment that was mentioned all the time never again it's not only a a phrase it's not only a commitment this
is a Manuel never again means that any Jew anywhere not only in Israel all over the world if he is under a risk we will find a way to rescue him and we did it
many times all over the world we send Special Forces we cooperate with with others to release one Israeli citizen or
one Israeli soldier and in many cases even after they died you know we we have done great operations with some
countries in order to bring back the bones or the bodies of our late soldiers that died in in Wars much before that so
I think that this is a sign of Bravery a sign of resilient and I willing to fight for my uh my values and especially I'm willing to fight for the values of the
state of Israel and the Jewish people I think many people and I I encounter this all the time when I talk about Israel's hostage dilemma um many people including
many in the Jewish Community outside of Israel are genuinely torn about the asymmetrical nature of these dilemmas these negotiations in
terms of what Israel is willing to give up what high price Israel is willing to give up and obviously so we don't talk in abstract terms I mentioned it earlier
2011 to get gilad Shalit one Israeli hostage back Israel released 1,027 prisoners Palestinian prisoners
some brutal terrorists from Israeli prisons in fact uh AUD mer when he was prime minister was presented with a comparable deal and he we had sippy Livy on this podcast former foreign minister
at the time they came away saying this deal is way too generous to were not doing it and then sometime after that Netanyahu was prime minister he did the
deal and in the context of that deal people like yir was serving multiple life sentences he was released from an
Israeli prison to he got a new lease on life which included orchestrating the biggest Massacre of Jews in a single day
since the Holocaust so you say to have a state of Israel means never again here Israel released a modernday Hitler or or
modern day Osama Bin Laden who didn't just do never again it was again it was it was a real live war against Jews a real life pgam in the Jewish State
orchestrated by someone released from an Israeli prison in a lopsided deal one thing you know when Palestinian prisoners are released Hamas members are
released from Israeli prisons you know that at some point that release of of Hamas terrorists from Israeli prisons will result in a incentivizing future
hostage takings because enemies of Israel will know that taking hostages works and they you also know it will likely result in more violence right senoir gets released it's not like he
goes to live a quiet life into retirement he gets released and he begins plotting more violence against Jews so it's a high price
yes you know uh this is not only arithmetical calculation how many versus how many this uh is uh much more
complicated once because how do you recruit people to serve in the most difficult and severe
situation uh as Volunteers in special units or in the mosad or the shinb and uh by telling them that you are by yourself if something happened to
you we are not with you I think that this is something that won't work second you know the obligation is not only to
your state and to your people state of Israel and the Jewish people it's also to the close H group that walking with
you that know that one for all and all for one this is the way you fight if something happened to someone you go and do whatever is necessary in order to to
secure it and by the way I was chasing Muhammad sin and Muhammad de since 97 for 26 Muhammad Muhammad sin and
Muhammad de Y at that time wasn't that prominent yeah so Muhammad sin y sin's brother yes the real one that running
Hamas now at least in inside the inside Gaza I was with Muhammad de so many times and you know maybe we'll find some
time to discuss how many times we we miss him but if it's not it's somebody else I mean you cannot change values you
can change policy but you don't change values during the the situation that we had the things that uh were on the table
were to bring back the number that was spoken of was 33 hostages during April May June July of 24
24 and the price was less than we paid for gilach Alit and the reason is that Hamas was under pressure I want to go back to the days after the war started
my understanding was that in the days after October 7th very senior officials within the security apparatus I I'll be careful here to protect names and
positions let's just say very very senior officials assessed that basically none of the hostages would come back
alive 251 hostages taken and they argued that their working assumption was that none of them would come back alive when
you heard that assessment what was your reaction when this uh senior figures uh said that we want release
any hostages I said we have something only one thing that is common a common interest between us and Hamas the
hostages we need them because of their lives of their families of our values and because this is a declared goal of War they need them as an asset to deal
with it so they won't risk them they will do anything necessary to preserve them because this is the so-called insurance policy that they think they
have and that's what happened and later on when some people presented similar things I said to them you don't know
Hamas they will come to us when we they will need us and they will need us to survive to live so if you kill a
thousand and then another thousand and then you intend of Hamas of Hamas of Hamas Terror eventually they will come to you to discuss the conditions don't approach
them they will approach us and in the first weeks we created an enormous pressure on Hamas with the Air Force with the maneuvering into the area it
wasn't easy to convince the cabinet to maneuver into the the area and eventually in the middle of November there was a proposal that started from
Kama through the katar in order to achieve something but it was very clear that they won't give all of them in this
phase so the compromise I I was willing to to make in this point was to bring all the kids and all the women 100
exactly 40 kids and 60 women and 13 out of these women were mothers of some of the kids among the 14 kids and this is
uh beginning of November maybe middle of November later on three of them were released three of the women after this I
got a call after a few days from my sister and my sister who is younger than me is telling me that the mother is a
lady that 50 years ago her parents and my parents were friends and we were playing together and at that time her name
was udit latan and I knew very well our parents David and Tammy David was the professor that taught literature to my
father my father never learned as a young kid because of the war so uh when he was able to do it he went to the
university to learn H Israeli and Russian literature because that was something that interest him and he was these professors and they turned to be
friends and we turned to be friends with the kids and we were playing uh together and when I was 10 years old I was
playing chess with her father on the coach H so I called her afterwards and I said you are youa latan yes she said yes
that's that's me so we had a a long conversation and she asked me if I remember her apartment and I said sure I remember the same couch that I was
sitting when I played with your dad and I even remember what move I I made in the in the beginning of the Chess at the chess games because we were playing in
in routine I was a young kid so this is Israel so the obligation is also personal to everyone and you know either him or his family or his relative or
something so if I close this event we got a list in the list this were 97
names 40 kids 57 women we started to negotiate we started with proportion of
bringing 10 hostages versus one day of ceasefire or a pose in the in the military actions and the one that was
leading the the legation from the Israeli side made a mistake and in one day he said to the kataris well let's
start with 50 this wasn't approved by the by the cabinet the war cabinet and all of a sudden the qataris jump on this
idea and said okay 50 and it came to the war cabinet and prominent figures there say let's go for 50 and I said this is
impossible we have a list and in the list there are 97 names and it's not a theoretical issue and the number is not
the most important issue the category is important all the women and all the
kids ER so I was alone in this situation and only three of us had the the right to vote prime minister G and myself and
G was arguing me about this issue arguing against you yes and I said you suggest to release 50
and we knew that the 5050 includes 22 kids and the rest are the women what am I going to tell the 18 kids and their
families that were on release after they are on the list I'm not voting for that and the Prime Minister as well was pushing me to compromise and I said you
know you have majority I'm by myself I will vote against it no way and I was blamed in the cabinet and also in public
that because I am you know looking only on the military side which is absolutely false I'm going to neglect these 50
hostages and I say no the opposite I insisting that we release all of them and then we came with the solution that
for any extra day we will get another 10 hostages and eventually we released 80 and they didn't want Hamas they didn't
want to release the last 17 two kids bibas family and 15 ladies and we knew
at that time I knew at that time that some of them including the bbas kids are not alive
unfortunately it wasn't proof 100% but this was the the the current Intel uh but unless you don't unless unless you
have H evidence you are doing anything like they are alive and we knew that those ladies are not being
released because of what happened to them by the Hamas terrorists so they didn't want them to go in public and to say that you mentioned the bbus kids and
Sherry bbus so this is in November of 23 Israel is negotiating as you said to get all the women and children back
including the bbus uh family Hamas is trying to hold back some of the women and children for different reasons you say partly because they don't want these live women to come back and be able to
tell the stories of what they have suffered and endured and they also don't want to reveal that the bbus kids were
murdered how did you know at that point I know you said you didn't have perfect information but why were you so confident that the BBS is the the Sher BBS and and the two
children were dead at that point we had Intel where they were murdered by by Hamas so the information was clear enough for Intel
but it wasn't clear enough to declare that they are dead as it happened unfortunately with others and when they the B bosses were taken Sheri and the two children because I know yarden was taken separately when they were taken
hostage is it true that they were not actually taken by Hamas per se they were taken during that second wave when all these quote unquote average Palestinian civilians came pouring over in that
second wave on October 7th they were taken in that wave well uh a lot of this uh information I learned from Yen bibas
himself when I spoke to him and he describe everything including how he and Shir decided to to fight and he went
outside with with his pistol and uh was falling in the hands of Hamas and what he learned later on but they were
captured by people that eventually broke them to the hands of a a branch that is
more radical than Hamas it took another months or maybe a little bit more before we learn that they are not they are not allow
this was of course a a tragic event because they in the heart of any Israeli they're in my heart up to up to now you know I had the the the picture on my
table I have all the others on my my table but kids are kids I mean to kill kids in intention uh this is something that you
know even animals don't behave this way were there any operations where you or were there any possible operations that were seriously considered seriously planned for but
then for one reason or the other you pulled back and decided we're not going to move forward with this operation even though it seemed very doable I'll tell you a story that I don't think was
discussed in the past somewhere in the middle of November we learn to know that a mother and the
four kids are being hold as in hostages in a sh refugee camp in an apartment above the ground it was the broad's
family three kids and the mother and theile that was with them and their parents were murder in October 7 and we
knew where is the apartment and uh we send Special Forces into the area and they stayed there for
a long period of time I'm not speaking about hours days long days just hiding there m in some some kind of cover
camouflage whatever and the the conditions W weren't good enough because they are in the second or third floor
and next to them there is an apartment and in the apartment there are terorists and the issue is can you get to them before the terrorist can surprise them
plus you have terorist in the apartment itself and we were looking for many solutions I'm not going to discuss all the details uh but we develop a special
system to do something about it h but it was very dangerous dangerous to the life of the kids and the mother so uh the
chief of staff of the military L and the head of shet on arrived to me and they presented the operation i s s them for
do some homework and then they came back and they said we have the solution operationally it could have been done but very dangerous to the
kids and at the same time the negotiation is on going about the first phase this is so this is the the negotiation for the November deal November of 23 yes this we we are
speaking about November 23 the middle of November and we are moving we are moving forward and after they presented it to me again
I said to them we are waiting because the deal is under progress the deal that we are having and eventually they were released in the deal and we didn't use
this opportunity but Israeli soldiers including yamam and shinette were in the area ready to create an operation very
risky operation risky for the kids but also risky for them but I didn't confirm it and I think that in this situation I was right and the reasons are are there
butth you know this is not something that is 100% guarantee we're taking a short break to tell you about the sponsor of this
episode sep which is a quarterly publication edited by Brett Stevens each issue is built around a theme the new one is around diversity not in the Dei
sense you can have a hard copy of this print publication arrive in your mailbox every quarter which is especially good for shabas reading I'm a religious reader my view is they should be
charging for it but it is free all you have to do is subscribe so go to superj journal. org SLC call meback you can
journal. org SLC call meback you can find the link to the publication in the show notes now back to our conversation going back to the early
days of the war a decision at some point was made to make the return of the hostages one of the wars objectives at the same time
that another one of the war's objectives was to destroy Hamas and it seems that those two objectives are paradoxical
they contradict one another because hanging on to the hostages is ultimately the only way Hamas can try to preserve its path to take over
God again so destroying Hamas and getting the hostages back sends a message to Hamas that hanging on to the hostages is the only way they can prevent their
destruction how was the decision can you just talk a little bit about how the decision was made to make the return of the hostages one of the war's objectives because it seems to be in conflict with
the destruction of Hamas I was the one that declare in the first day in front of the general and others in the IDF and
our organizations that these are the goals of the war to destroy Hamas to decapi their leadership to have the
ability to maneuver in the area in any given time later on and to switch the regime and to bring the hostages now the F three is a something that you can
achieve in a military way you can destroy and dismantle the infrastructure and also the formation of Hamas you can decapitalize the leadership you can have
the ability to maneuver but defeating the enemy is only a phase in the victory in order to gain a victory you have to achieve the goals of war and this is a
political Arrangement a political system now in order to achieve the the last two goals one to release the hostages and
second to uh create an alternative for Hamas you need also a political action
and uh I also uh Define the Waring about this goal and I didn't say to bring the hostages I said the goal is to create
the conditions to bring the hostages and this is a difference because I was experienced I have seen the second Lebanese War when it was declared that this is the goal the goal is to create
the conditions why because if you have 250 or more than that hostages you need a political Arrangement and uh I think
that this is possible and it's even possible nowadays today but the order is very simple first you need to bring the
hostages and then you need to continue to defeat Hamas and uh the reason is very simple if you will start with you
know destru the destruction of Hamas by the end you will finish it you won't have hostages so this is not only a value but this is a goal of war and
believe me I the last one that you know the last one in Israel and maybe the last one in the world that don't want to destroy Hamas I was making living for 48
years from you know killing Hamas terrorist andala terrorist and others and I'm willing to continue with this sequence as as much as needed but let me
remind you the simple facts we take over Judah and Samaria in 67 we went to defensive shields in
2002 and we are still fighting almost 25 years later we are still fighting in the same places to uh you know in the West Bank in Jud Sam Judea and Samaria to to
kill terrorists every day in order to protect ourself and this is after a very successful and vast operation so dismantling the f
of the military force of Hamas was very successful that doesn't mean that you don't have resistance because if you
take a jabalia refugee camp or jabalia city or saaya or other places let's say that in one of these neighborhoods you
had thousand tourist which is the average 300 were killed 300 were wounded 200 escaped to RAF or somewhere else and
200 of fighting in a terror action and this will last for a long period of time they don't have the ability to maneuver into Israel with large formation they don't have the ability to defend
themselves efficiently as they behave but the idea is still there therefore we will fight them for a long period of
time that doesn't mean that we have to neglect the issue of the hostages the priority and the order of preference is
very simple first of all bring the hostages especially the live hostages as soon as possible and then the bodies once you have them in in your hand we will continue to fight Hamas and
unfortunately they will give us the reasons to keep to keep going and the arrangement is a political one you
cannot bring all of them in operations and even Elish shabi said that in the video you know and was there it's a big difference if you are above the ground
under the ground I mean this is this is the the the given condition so in order to fulfill all the goals of War you have
to negotiate and to find solutions for the hostages and I think we could have done it ER almost a year ago and if not
a year in April in May in June in July and in August 24 we could have achieved a deal and basically the the deal we
achieved in January 25 is very similar to the deal that we had in May 24 and I'll tell you uh something that is also
frustrating the deal that we had then was much better because we had more hostages live hostages under this
category plus we we decided on better conditions at least 110 terrorists that were in prison for life sentence were
released in the in the New Deal and they shouldn't been released on 24 but let me let me ask you about that because some of the Biden Administration officials who were involved in that negotiation
are now saying publicly some of the things they have been saying privately or more discreetly that that period you're talking about spring summer of 24
that Hamas ultimately was never going to do a deal then even if the deal could have from your perspective it would have been a better deal for Israel to take to use the offu cliche it takes two to tango and Hamas ultimately was going to
do a deal and I want to read a quote here from Brett mcgurk who I know you know and worked with who was the senior Middle East policy coordinator for the Biden Administration in the white house
he was the top official in the White House overseeing all the negotiations around the hostages and a ceasefire he wrote recently in the Washington post about that time and I'm quoting here he
wrote though Hamas and its Defenders claim it accepted the framework in early July that is not true Hamas reinserted
demands for a permanent truce and in those negotiations it never not once even when nearly every other detail seemed locked down agreed to a list of
hostages that it would release if a ceasefire agreement was reached Hamas had had no serious intent to release hostages so long as Iran and Hezbollah
backed its maximalist demands with ongoing attacks against Israel and then he goes on to say that his conclusion was until Hamas believed they could not rely on Iran and Hezbollah there was no
point in negotiating with Hamas and he went back to President Biden and said we need to stop pretending we're having a real negotiation with Hamas Israel is
not our problem Hamas is and he he goes on to argue in this spe it wasn't until nasala was killed and hezb was eviscerated and and Iran was severely
weaken it was only then which was late in 24 and early in 25 that Hamas was ready to negotiate so well I was the one
that argue to kill nasala and all the others and to use the walki talkis to killala Terrorist on October 11 I knew
why why I'm doing that I wanted to get rid of the most uh prominent and and difficult enemy that
we had which wasala and this wasn't adopted so under these given conditions
when we devote 60% of our power on land and on the air uh to the northern border and we actually under under this this
threat we are dealing with with this situation and I am the one that arguing every day including with the Americans every day
that we need to create much stronger efforts against hisbah otherwise they will hold us with you know Israeli formations on the border with the
evacuated communities on the border and they will do it for nothing so I said they they need to pay price every day and this is the reason that we increase
those efforts every day but putting Bala on a side let me tell you what happened with the sequence it's very
simple after November we were ready to try and to create another phas and we knew that military pressure is the key because otherwise they don't come come
to you and we apply a serious military pressure after the second time that we have been to shifa headquarter of Hamas under the hospital we were out of hanun
hundreds of terrorists were captured and killed in this in those places and uh we came to the cabinet as the security establishment with all the ingredients
shabbach and mosad and the IDF and the all of them and the idea was that we will restart the the negotiation by pulling off narim creating proportions
between hostages and prisoners that supposed to be released and this was adopt by the Israeli government in the late days of April somewhere in Passover
in the last day days I I don't remember the the exact day and it was at 5: or 6 p.m. the cabinet was meeting and Al this
p.m. the cabinet was meeting and Al this information was very confidential and I will tell you what is the details that were decided on the war cabinet the
details were that we are moving towards a deal withdraw from narim Corridor so the corridor in the
center the center of Gaza yeah we will RW from this Corridor and the decision that the cabinet take in
consensus BB and guns and myself vote for it was that we start from the number
of 40 hostages which was only an opening position we will aim to 33 which is the right number and the last line when you
stop is 18 hostages if you have 18 there is a deal 17 No Deal okay this was part of the Mandate and this was very confidential because if the enemy hear
that you you know heate down yes he will he will play with us few hours later after the war cabinet the full cabinet is meeting in the full cabinet SM which
is entering into the cabinet M so the Finance Minister Finance Minister who is part of the full cabinet but is not part of the world cabinet is entering into
the room and said we are going to leave the government because they are going to to decide the war cabinet they are going to decide about the deal on 18 hostages
how did he learn about it I don't know but no one in the cabinet in the full cabinet understood what he's speaking about because they weren't exposed to the information and at the same time I
got reports for the shim that they are having in Israel negotiation a successful negotiation with the Egyptians and it started on the right on
the right way and there is you know there is a room to maneuver and we are going forward and uh few hours later I got a
call from the Prime Minister it was close to midnight maybe 11:00 and he said did you see what's going on in the media I said no what
going on in the media I don't I don't have time to watch media he said we are being aake by all the different players
in the media for negotiate a deal on a 18 hostages I said to him if all the cabinet members and all the military and
security establishment was in favor how it got to the media and he didn't answer me he said everything is on the media
and I'm canceling the resolution that we had the same day at at noon I I said to the prime minister with all the respect first of all you cannot
cancel a resolution because it was taken by the war cabinet and we have three of us in consensus and if you change your mind you should convince guns because
I'm not convinced I think we should go forward and later on Hamas recognize that we are dealing about 40 but at the
same time the Israeli media is speaking about 18 so he said why should I deal about 33 if they want 18 and basically
the the deal was collapsing and it was collapsing because of a a leak that went from someone from the Israeli system to
the Israeli media and eventually was exposed by Hamas so uh this is something
that I think shocked me uh because this was a war or cabinet resolution and the goal was dear and important
and the conflict inside the cabinet was clear the full cabinet bang and smwi didn't want a deal for their own
purposes all the rest understood that this is a good deal basically and the deal collapsed that's what happened so
this is the phase of April then the American president on May 28th took the Israeli proposal put it as his proposal
proposal and said we adopt this idea and went in in public now the only difference was that he was speaking about one phase and we were speaking
about two phases so during June there was an ongoing conversation in different places in the world in order to shape
the situation to two phases and eventually on July 3rd Hamas announced that they agreed to two phases one
humanitarian phase and second one is the rest and this was paragraph 8 and 14 in the agreement and it it was achieved
they bridge to our to our proposal and this is the presidential announcement so by the beginning of July the conditions
were ripe to start the the detailing of the final agreement and then it took us 25 days to answer and I said to the Prime
Minister you are going to give them an answer that will be they will not accept because this is the negotiation do it
today to save time we gave the answer only on July 28 or 27 we waste three and
a half weeks for nothing there wasn't anything on the table and on July 28 we came with a serious of new conditions
and I have no expectations from Hamas the only thing I want for from Hamas is to kill them but I have expectations from the Israeli government and the
expectations is to do anything possible to bring the hostages because these are Israeli citizens that were kidnapped from their beds or Israeli soldiers and
because this is a goal of War and the goals of Wars should be achieved and the hostages is something that is there for
a given period of time this is a TST time sensitive Target if you don't achieve it on time it can disappear and
we knew they are suffering I think early on we all had we all imagined how horrible it could be certainly after the first release but
especially after the more recent releases we don't have to imagine because it's actually I think worse than we had imagined and I want to just go back to Ellie sharabi who we talked
about earlier in the uvda interview Alan if you could just bring that clip I just want to play One Clip of what he describes what life was like in
[Music] captivity [Music] [Music]
for now you have said to me I I'm less surprised by what he said than shocked meaning when I really think about it it makes sense that things were that bad and it's still shocking you've said to
me that you and the other decisionmakers knew about these conditions quite early on what did you
know and how did you know it it was exposed to the wall cabinet in many many uh occasions by the head of the services
that they said what's going to them and what happened with them that they are starving and they they they are in under very poor conditions and this is not something
that unique to me this information was in the hands of uh the Prime Minister and the defense minister and the senior figures in the military establishment
heads of the organizations and it was emphasized Time and Again by nitan alone and on bar and by the chief of staff and
the head of Intel all of them said that the condition are very poor so I think that the all the all situation direct us
to achieve a deal and you can learn from another issue you know the American president went with the Israeli position
because he didn't want to have a daylight between Israel and America this is fine but what was the reason that
eventually after Hamas agreed on July 3rd we didn't adopt what they said and uh I won't get into all the details but
I would say one very important issue the first phase that was on the table in May
June July and August is exactly the same Arrangement that we made in January 25 so it could have been achieved much
before that and by the way at that time going back into the war was was something that was much more natural it
was a seiz fire or a pause in the war and then you continue after 42 days but the whole sequence was ready to be H
deployed on July the deal was there and this is the same deal that we had 6 months later when I met with some of the
hostages they lost 30 or 4 40 kilos in the in the tunnels and when you see it on the the screens you understand what
happened to them because the starvation is only one part and after we we heard what Eli said there were also tortures
and beaten this is something that was well known in the cabinet especially in the war cabinet I want to
um close by trying to to asking you to try to put yourself in the mind of hamas's current leaders what's left of
Hamas or a future wannabe Hamas how could their lesson from the last 18 months be anything but the key in any
war with Israel is to steal its citizens if you take Israeli hostages it paralyzes Israel Society if not shatters
it it introduces a level of dysfunctionality understandable dysfunctionality in Israeli society and in the decision-making of its leaders
that give those who take israeli's hostage a massive advantage in a certain aspect of the war and in other words I agree with much of what you've said in
this conversation in terms of what Israel needs to do and and needed to do on the one hand on the other hand I am terrified to think that future enemies
of Israel will learn from this last 18 months if you get into a confrontation with Israel if you if you initiate a confrontation with Israel the first thing to make sure you do the highest
priority is take Israelis hostage if I was one of Israel's enemies Hamas orbal in Iran the first
lesson I would have learned is that it's not a good deal to create a war against Israel because you pay deal prices and
you can ask those questions to Nara or to hania or to muhamad Ora they all not with us and this lesson is learned by
those who replace them and they understand it very well and if you will ask anyone in Lebanon or in Iran or in
Gaza was it a good idea to start a war against Israel the answer is negative it was a bad idea for them and they know that they can pretend in a different way
but this is clearcut one so this is the first lesson as the to the issue of
hostages for me keeping your values protecting your people and being able to
deploy whatever is necessary in order to achieve it this is a a point of strength and resilience this is I would say a
center of gravity for the Israeli Society k andad k all for one one for all this is strength this is not a
weakness and what they should learn is that if you hit Israeli kids or kidnap or try to rape or rape Israeli women you
will pay dear price you your Society your supporters everyone we are not here to allow those
issues to happen for me never again is not only a commitment this is a manual I'm working according this means that if
someone hit you it's eye against eye and it's not one eye because we have to defend ourself we have to protect our kids we have to protect our women and we
are willing to do whatever is necessary to preserve our values value is not a neglected issue value is almost
everything you are fighting for a lot of things that are more important than your life your people your nation your
country your family and your unit and you are willing to do whatever is necessary and I think that we should be proud of the Israeli soldiers of the
Israeli civilians of the Israeli women and for to protect their kids this is unbelievable behavior of the Israeli
society and I hope that what was shown in those dramatic days that were very very difficult in those dramatic days
you have seen the unity the willing to sacrifice of the Israel Society people went bare hands into the fire this is a
a point of strength and part of it is to release their friends their families everything that they are here to protect
you wake up in the morning you drink coffee or you went to spot in 6:00 and in 6:30 you hear the news in in 7:30 these
people res reservist and just civilians are in the battlefield fighting for their life and other life this is not somewhere in the other side of the globe we are fighting to defend the only
Jewish State the state of Israel and we are willing to do anything that is needed anything yov thank you again for a um Illuminating conversation I uh I
look forward to picking back up for our next conversation I'll be happy to thank you very much [Music]
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researched by Gabe Silverstein our music was composed by yalo until next time I'm
your host Dan cenor
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