FULL HEARING | Predatory Pricing: How China Manipulates Global Mineral Prices to Maintain Dominance

All right, the select committee will come to order and I just want to say good morning and welcome and it's great to see you all

here today. Uh today we're meeting to

here today. Uh today we're meeting to discuss how the very elements that power our energy infrastructure, our manufacturing, and our defense industrial base are increasingly

controlled by our greatest strategic rival, the Chinese Communist Party. Do

we continue to buy Chinese minerals and increase our dependence on our greatest adversary? Or do we and our allies begin

adversary? Or do we and our allies begin to mine and produce these critical minerals ourselves?

When the Chinese government controls critical minerals, it then has the power to dictate what we say and what we do.

This is because if we don't do what they want, they can turn off the flow of critical minerals and our industry. This is not a theoretical

industry. This is not a theoretical problem. The Chinese government has

problem. The Chinese government has weaponized the rare earth supply chain against the United States. Last month,

China imposed export restrictions on rare earths and other materials necessary for American industry. This

didn't happen overnight. Over decades,

the Chinese government took advantage of our inaction and built up this critical choke point. In 1992,

choke point. In 1992, China's then leader Ding Xiaoping stated, "There is oil in the Middle East. There is rare earth in China."

East. There is rare earth in China."

Since that statement, China's dominance in rare earths has grown to the point where China will control 76% of rare earth element refining by 2030.

That's according to an estimate by the International Energy Agencies.

We're watching Xi Jinping wield the rare earth weapon Deng Xiaoping began developing decades ago. Over the span of

30 plus years, China grabbed different parts of the critical minerals industry, developed a loaded gun, and pointed it

directly at American industry.

It strategically acquired an American magnet company, stripped out the American know-how, and then shipped everything to China. It also bought up

mining assets overseas, tanked global mineral prices, and killed American mining firms. These strategic moves by China threaten

our nation, our people, and our way of life.

Take the rare earth element Samarium. It

is crucial for military platforms, but almost the entire supply comes from China. Without it, we would be unable to

China. Without it, we would be unable to make certain defense platforms. And that's only one element. There are many more that are critical to American

manufacturing, national security, and our economy. Without them, our society

our economy. Without them, our society would crumble.

Bringing mining value chains back to the United States will take time and require concerted effort from Congress and industry. Without a permanent signal

industry. Without a permanent signal from Congress, businesses will not invest and China's advantage will grow.

This year, the Trump administration has taken bold actions to start breaking our dependence on China. President Trump

issued executive orders to unleash American energy and created the National Energy Dominance Council. He also

strategically invested in US companies, sending a strong signal to the market that the US government will take on the CCP to prevent its long-term dominance

of the critical mineral sector.

in South Korea. In his meeting with Shei, President Trump brought the United States and our allies a crucial one-year

opportunity on rare earths and other critical minerals, the export of which the Chinese government unilaterally restricted in October.

The task now before Congress, the executive branch, private industry, and our many allies and partners around the world is to use this year and move

quickly to disarm China's rare earth's loaded gun before it can be fired again at the global economy. We need an all

hands-on deck effort to maximize rare earth's mining, processing, and manufacturing capabilities across the free world and end our mineral

dependencies on China before it's too late.

Last week, the committee released an investigative report on China's price manipulation.

Prices are a crucial part of this industry because it tells customers how much to buy and investors when to invest. When China controls the

invest. When China controls the [clears throat] prices, investors cannot make smart decisions. And we will never have an American centric mining

industry.

Today, we will hear from three dynamic American companies about the work they're doing to bring back these supply chains.

the challenges they're facing and the threat China poses to this process. And

I hope our investigation and this hearing today will spur Congress to act and take bold, decisive action to bolster American supply chains. And with

that, I now recognize ranking member Raja Krishna Morphy for his opening statement. Raja.

statement. Raja.

>> Thank you, Mr. Chair. With the holidays upon us, I'd like to play a familiar Charlie Brown clip that we may all see next week.

As you can see, just when Charlie is about to kick the ball, Lucy pulls it out from under him, as she always does.

And that's exactly what's happening with the US and China. The CCP is running the same old economic playbook in different industries, and we're falling for it

again and again. Here's the playbook.

First, the CCP makes much more stuff than their domestic market requires.

Second, they export the excess stuff below their cost. By doing this, they pull the rug out from under non-Chinese companies trying to compete. And then

third, once the CCP has killed the competition, they weaponize their monopoly for coercive purposes. Last

week, this committee released a 52-page bipartisan investigation into how the CCP uses this playbook to dominate critical minerals and by extension our

supply chains.

America once led the world in rare earth production, but those days are gone.

China, as you can see, has surge production, flooding world markets. But

the CCP didn't just produce more. They

sold critical minerals at unfair prices even below the cost of production. In

doing so, they killed their competition and created a monopoly. If private

companies colluded to kill off their competitors, their executives would be in these handcuffs. But because this massive price fixing conspiracy was

orchestrated by the Chinese Communist Party, it's us, not them, that find ourselves in handcuffs.

This is a rock. Inside these types of rocks are rare earths which eventually get processed and made into

these these magnets.

What you might not know is that there's a magnet in every motor. And motors

aren't just in cars, but in so many devices that we depend on, including this blender.

Mr. Chairman, care for a smoothie.

[laughter] You could thank me and the magnets that helped power this blender later. America

used to be the world's leading producer of magnets until 1998.

But then we got played. Just take the story of Magna Quench, a GM subsidiary which had a large magnet factory in Indiana. Chinese investors bought it and

Indiana. Chinese investors bought it and agreed to keep the Indiana factory open for five years. But five years and one

day later, I'm not making that up. Five

years and one day later, guess what happened? They shut down the magnet

happened? They shut down the magnet factory in Indiana and moved all production to China. Here's a picture picture of this magnaquench factory in China.

Now that China dominates rare earths and magnets, they have the power to not just unplug this blender, but our entire economy. But the keys to unlock our

economy. But the keys to unlock our handcuffs are right here in this room.

Niron produces the world's only permanent magnet that uses zero rare earths. MP Materials operates the only

earths. MP Materials operates the only rare earth mine in America, Mountain Pass, California, which is pictured behind me. And Lithium Americas is

behind me. And Lithium Americas is developing the largest lithium deposit in the US. If these companies fail, the CCP wins. But if these companies

CCP wins. But if these companies succeed, we all win. And that includes the Chinese people themselves. Some of

us may recall the 2005 movie Blood Diamond about African diamonds mined using forced labor. Well, it turns out the CCP is mining many of its critical

minerals using weaguer forced labor. So,

here's my proposal for a fictional sequel. It's called Blood Minerals, a

sequel. It's called Blood Minerals, a movie about how China is exploiting its own people to mine critical minerals and then weaponize its monopoly against

Americans. This is unacceptable. I think

Americans. This is unacceptable. I think

it's time for a Manhattan Projectlike effort to end our rare earth dependency on China. But if we just increase

on China. But if we just increase production and not the tools and the talent, we won't solve the problem. We

need to mine, refine, and train the workers who can do it. So, let this investigation be our call to action.

Right now, back home in Chicago, Mr. Chairman, my beloved Chicago Bears are seven and three because they stopped just playing defense and they started

playing offense. Chairman, let's be like

playing offense. Chairman, let's be like the Bears and show the CCP how it's done. Thank you, and I yield back.

done. Thank you, and I yield back.

>> Thank you, Ragn. And uh we're proud of those Bears and their comebacks. Uh and

thank you for the [laughter] smoothie as well. Uh

well. Uh if any other member wishes to submit a statement for the record, uh without objection, those statements will be

added to the record.

Today we have three witnesses who will help us understand the challenges in critical minerals. Mr. Evans is the

critical minerals. Mr. Evans is the chief executive offer officer of Lithium America's Corporation.

Mr. Schlausister is the executive vice president, corporate affairs and chief communications officer at MP Materials. Mr. Roundtree

is the chief executive officer at Nyron Magnetics. I want to welcome all of the

Magnetics. I want to welcome all of the witnesses and thank you for being here this morning. And Mr. Evans, you're now

this morning. And Mr. Evans, you're now recognized for your opening remarks.

>> Thank you, Chairman Mullinar, Ranking Member Christian Mory, and members of the committee for having me here today.

I appreciate your focus on highlighting the Chinese Communist Party's domination of market manipulation when it comes to critical minerals. Lithium Americas is

critical minerals. Lithium Americas is proud to be part of the conversation and the solution. My name is Jonathan Evans.

the solution. My name is Jonathan Evans.

I'm the pre president chief executive officer of lithium Americas. We're

developing the critical pass project, a fully integrated mining and processing operation located humble county in northern Nevada which hosts the largest known measured lithium resource and reserve in the world. The pass is owned

by a joint venture between lithium Americas and General Motors. Our

immediate focus is advancing phase one of the project towards production targeting nominal design capacity of 40,000 tons per year of battery grade lithium carbonate. Once online, phase

lithium carbonate. Once online, phase one will increase US lithium production 10fold and could meet roughly 20% of the US processed lithium demand. We're

grateful to the US Department of Energy's $2.23 billion loan, which will help finance the construction and processing facilities at that pass.

Together with our partners and administration, we are strengthening America's supply chain, creating highquality jobs, and bolstering our long-term energy security and prosperity. Onshoring large-scale US

prosperity. Onshoring large-scale US lithium production is not optional.

Lithium is a critical element of national security, powering a vast array of defense technologies sustain both resilient military operations and essential civilian infrastructure.

Beyond its strategic importance, lithium represents a powerful driver of economic growth and energy independence, creating American jobs, strengthening domestic industries, and bolstering long-term energy resilience. Yet, the United

energy resilience. Yet, the United States remains dangerously dependent on foreign countries, including China, for this critical mineral. The US currently produces less than 1% of the US global the global supply of lithium. This is

not merely an economic vulnerability. It

poses a direct threat to national security. China recognizing lithium

security. China recognizing lithium strategic value has aggressively moved to dominate the global supply chain.

From mining and refining to battery manufacturing, Chinese companies now control roughly 70% of the global lithium chem chemical processing capacity using state scale statebacked subsidies and predatory pricing to

suppress competition and cement their market dominance. I'll add they control

market dominance. I'll add they control over 80% of the battery production in the world. While the US played a

the world. While the US played a critical role in developing lithium lithiumion battery in the 1980s, China has since built the infrastructure in industrial base needed to dominate the global market and shows no intention of relinquishing the that control. The CCP

views dominance over critical minerals as a matter of geopolitical strategy through a coordinated decadesl long effort. China's systematically secured

effort. China's systematically secured control over key mineral supply chains to shape their global markets in their favor. China now leads the global

favor. China now leads the global lithium industry, not only in mining and processing raw materials, but also in manufacturing critical components such as battery cathodes, electrolytes, and the batteries themselves. The CCP

actively supports its domestic companies and acquiring foreign assets, offering them load to no interest uh loans and political backing to secure supply chains abroad. This pattern is evident

chains abroad. This pattern is evident across regions including Africa, Australia, and Latin America. To

maintain its dominance, China has depressed global lithium prices to discourage investment by non-Chinese firms and to deter public or private capital from entering the market.

Despite soaring demand and double-digit annual growth in lithium applications, this price manipulation has constrained the development of independent transparent supply chains. Efforts by

Western entities to establish transparent market-based price indexes have been undermined or displaced by Chinese control platforms such as the Shanghai Metals Market and the London Metals Exchange, both of which are now

controlled by Chinese pricing data. As a

result, global financial institutions rely on distorted benchmarks limited western limiting Western firms ability to secure financing and expand non-Chinese lithium supply chains. We

cannot let the CCP continue to dominate critical minerals. We are thankful that

critical minerals. We are thankful that President Trump, his administration, and Congress are focused on this and that the US government is partnering with companies like Lithium America to ensure a strategic global supply chain.

Backpass is the only firm fully permanent under construction lithium production project on US soil. This

project will put the US on a path to self-sufficiency, but it's just a start by de but developing projects like that pass is highly risky. The upfront costs for exploration, permitting, appeals, and community engagement are high, and

the timelines are long and uncertain, which deter private investment.

Targeting federal support, including streamlined and predictable permitting, timely resolution of appeals, and tools to derisk early strategies can help ensure these projects are successful. US

cannot compete globally unless important national projects can be built in a timely manner. The formal peritting and

timely manner. The formal peritting and subsequent appeals process for the hacker pass took nearly five years. We

were actually considered fast-tracked given the process typically takes seven to 10 years in the US which is among the longest in the world. Such lengthy

unpredictable and litigationprone processes discourage private capital from investing domestically. The federal

government must also continue to explore financial support via lowcost loans and other structural financial instruments to help fund projects and attract private capital to co-invest. We also

need to establish programs and tools that deliver true price transparency.

Public capital markets are dissuaded from financing and supporting non-cap China backed supply chains given the global narrative has been hijacked by China and its pricing models. The same

pattern appears in other critical minerals including rare earths. Despite

weak headline prices, China continues to acquire overseas lithium and other key resources often at discounted valuations reinforcing its market power. The US can level the playing field by supporting a temporary minimum price tied to

validated market price based production costs. Today, China is running high-cost

costs. Today, China is running high-cost domestic capacity below cost backs stop by subsidies to flood this market and depress prices. In November, the CEO of

depress prices. In November, the CEO of CL, which is the largest battery manufacturer in the world, admitted to this, telling Reuters that they were now stopping production at their mind as they achieved their goal of lowering

lithium prices. Thank you again for this

lithium prices. Thank you again for this opportunity to speak to you today.

Securing America's lithium supply is about far more than resource development. It's about safeguarding the

development. It's about safeguarding the nation's economic future, techn technological leadership and national security. Thank you, chairman.

security. Thank you, chairman.

>> Thank you very much. Uh Mr. Sloshutter, you may now proceed.

>> Thank you. Uh Mr. Chairman, ranking member and members of the committee.

Thank you for the opportunity to appear.

Since its inception, the select committee has made the security of America's rare earth supply chain a top priority. We deeply appreciate your

priority. We deeply appreciate your leadership and the chance to engage consistently on this critical issue. I

appear today on behalf of MP Materials, the largest and most commercially advanced rare earth producer in the United States. We own and operate

United States. We own and operate Mountain Pass, America's only scaled rare earth mine and processing facility, which we rescued from bankruptcy in 2017.

To restore the full supply chain, inclusive of mining, refining, magnet manufacturing, and recycling, we built Independence, the first fully integrated magnet facility built in the United

States in a generation in Fort Worth, Texas. When MP was founded in 2017,

Texas. When MP was founded in 2017, America's supply chain was at a complete standstill. Today, after investing more

standstill. Today, after investing more than $1 billion of private capital into our US operations, Mountain Pass is the world's second most productive rare earth mine and an indispensable

cornerstone for our secure end-to-end supply chain in the United States. We've

restored refining capabilities, produced the first rare earth metal in decades, and are commissioning full-scale magnet production. Our workforce has grown from

production. Our workforce has grown from eight, literally a team of eight, to nearly a thousand people across California, Texas, and Nevada. In the

coming years, MP Materials will invest another billion dollars to execute our public private partnership with the Pentagon and deliver for our foundational customers, including

General Motors and Apple, creating over 1,000 incremental new manufacturing jobs and scaling US capabilities across every link of that supply chain. Your

investigation makes incredibly clear what we have experienced directly at MP Materials. While China's industry is

Materials. While China's industry is highly skilled and highly capable, its domins dominant position is both enabled and hardened by subsidies, price

manipulation, and scale. In the early years of our business, we produced mineral concentrate at Mountain Pass that could only be sold into China, the sole market with the refining capacity

to process it. We reinvested those profits to build US refining capabilities at Mountain Pass. But as we prepared to launch, neodymium praisemium

prices, the price of the key commodity collapsed to to levels below even China's lowest production costs. That

predatory pricing destroyed incentives to invest and it kept capital scarce.

China's sweeping export controls this year were a significant wakeup call.

They disrupted supply chains, triggered factory shutdowns in the United States, and they underscored an important truth.

Rare Earths may be a small upstream industry worth just tens of billions of dollars, but they underpin trillions in downstream economic activity and

millions of jobs. Physical AI, robotics, advanced semiconductors, electric vehicles, blenders, uh everything. Um

these are the industries that are the backbone of the US economy. This

vulnerability created the conditions for urgent coordinated action. In July of this year, MP materials in the Pentagon entered into a transformative public

private partnership. The agreements are

private partnership. The agreements are anchored by three pillars closely aligned with this committee's recommendations and they reflect the urgency that the chair and the ranking

member have called for. We are grateful for the bipartisan support expressed by the chairman and ranking member following this announcement. It's a

clear signal of the importance of securing and acting to to restore America's rare supply chain. First, the

partnership is anchored by a price floor agreement that directly addresses the market distorting practices identified by this investigation.

Second, it includes a 10-year magnet offtake commitment enabling us to invest well over another billion dollars in the coming years to take our US production capacity uh uh towards a 10-fold

increase to 10,000 metric tons of magnets per year. Finally, it includes a transformational capital investment that positions the Pentagon as MP's largest

shareholder. Now, this feature ensures

shareholder. Now, this feature ensures that taxpayers share in the upside opportunity created by the partnership's features, including mechanisms like the

price floor. Based on our current market

price floor. Based on our current market capitalization, this stake has already generated approximately 700 million in unrealized gains for taxpayers. These

measures demonstrate how public private partnerships can deliver national security benefits while creating opportunities for taxpayers and the federal government to share in the

upside rather than simply absorbing risk and losses.

The bipartisan recommendations contained in this committee's report offer a strong blueprint and we endorse its direction. Where appropriate, the

direction. Where appropriate, the federal government should deploy tools that neutralize predatory pricing.

Congress should level the playing field in trade. Congress should support

in trade. Congress should support workforce development initiatives.

Congress should endeavor to reasonably compress permitting timelines for high standard projects. The United States

standard projects. The United States should pursue sectoral arrangements with trusted allies and partners. And

finally, the United States should incentivize and reward American companies that source US- produced critical minerals and derivative products. It is worth noting the irony

products. It is worth noting the irony that China is not only the largest producer of rare earths but also the largest end market for both materials and magnets. They're the largest

and magnets. They're the largest customer. Strong deliberate action by US

customer. Strong deliberate action by US companies akin to the agreements we signed with General Motors in 2022 and Apple earlier the earlier this year can

help res uh re reverse decades of dependency. Mr. Chairman, ranking

dependency. Mr. Chairman, ranking member, members of the committee, America can achieve resiliency again. We

share your view that doing so is no longer optional. Supply chains are the

longer optional. Supply chains are the front lines of industrial and national security. Beijing's escalation this year

security. Beijing's escalation this year was a wake-up call. In the near term, its actions were disruptive and costly, but they may ultimately prove to be a strategic miscalculation. If we respond

strategic miscalculation. If we respond with sustained resolve, these actions be can become a catalyst for rebuilding a secure competitive supply chain that takes this issue off the table once and

for all. Thank you for your attention to

for all. Thank you for your attention to this urgent issue and I look forward to your questions.

>> Thank you Mr. Roundtree. The floor is now yours.

>> Chairman Molina, ranking member Christian Mory and distinguished members of the committee. Thank you for inviting me here today to testify. My name is Jonathan Roundtree and I serve as CEO of

Nairomagnetics, a Minnesota-based company that manufactures the world's first commercially scalable high-powered permanent magnets free of any rare earth

elements. I'm proud to report that we're

elements. I'm proud to report that we're already producing magnets for customers across multiple sectors at the ton scale. I'm grateful for the strong

scale. I'm grateful for the strong bipartisan support in Congress and the administration for the strategic value of US manufactured magnets that eliminate foreign dependencies while

strengthening domestic industrial capacity. Your attention to America's

capacity. Your attention to America's magnet supply chain is very much appreciated by virtually every industrialized sector, but particularly our automotive, consumer, and defense

customers and prospects.

Today, US industries consume roughly 50,000 tons of permanent magnets annually. But analysts believe this

annually. But analysts believe this figure will at least double by 2040.

However, current US manufacturing output is no more than 10,000 tons. This import

dependency touches virtually every congressional district as robots, smartphones, medical devices, and advanced weapons systems cannot function without these materials.

The Chinese government has strategically pursued its market position to gain leverage over critical supply chains that drive enormous global economic activity.

Over the last 30 years, Chinese companies have exported lowpriced rare earth magnets to global markets benefiting from state subsidies and non-market economic structures. China

now controls 90% of global rare earth processing and magnet manufacturing, rising to over 98% for the most strategic heavy rare earths. And until

only very recently, US magnet production capacity had collapsed.

But decades of anti-competitive pricing have also created domestic economic incentives to invest in breakthrough technologies that could disrupt legacy systems and thereby weakening

monopolistic control of the rare earth supply chain.

The 2010 maritime trade dispute between China and Japan led American engineers to invent in 2011 a highly stable permanent magnet without any rare earth inputs. Unlike legacy neodymium based

inputs. Unlike legacy neodymium based magnets, these iron nitride magnets are manufactured with secure domestically abundant resources, iron and nitrogen,

the most common element in our atmosphere. Iron nitride is a new magnet

atmosphere. Iron nitride is a new magnet for a new century that no foreign power can monopolize or restrict.

We recognize that we are only one among many alternative solutions including postconumer recycling and tailings as a matter of national security. Every

option should be explored and supported as the US builds a more resilient domestic supply chain.

However, iron nitride technology transforms the magnet supply chain by enabling the manufacturer of permanent magnets from iron and nitrogen, reducing the need for rare earth mining, chemical

separation facilities, and complex metallological processing. A single

metallological processing. A single vertically integrated facility transforms commodity iron or atmospheric nitrogen into finished magnets. This

entire pipeline pipeline exists today within America's borders.

Third party and customer testing confirms commercial viability in approximately twothirds of permanent magnet applications and institutional investors including GM, Stalantis and

Samsung have invested over 300 million in scaling the technology.

Iron nitride is not a science experiment. Non broke ground last month

experiment. Non broke ground last month in a facility that will begin producing up to 1500 tons of permanent magnets in 2027 and we're actively evaluating sites for a second 10,000 ton per year

facility.

This domestic production capacity serves American automotive manufacturers, technology companies, defense contractors, and energy firms with reliable supply while creating hundreds

of highly skilled manufacturing jobs.

The United States already has everything needed to build a secure, resilient, and diver diversified magnet supply chain.

To accelerate this transition, I respectfully urge Congress and the administration to consider five concrete actions.

One, to establish federal procurement preferences for domestically manufactured magnets. Two, extend title

manufactured magnets. Two, extend title three of the Defense Production Act and similar authorities to alternative magnet technologies alongside rare earth processing initiatives.

Three, create tax incentives that level the playing field for domestic producers without picking winners among competing technologies.

Four, direct federal agencies to prioritize supply chain security over short-term cost savings. And five,

provide import tariff exemptions for manufacturing equipment from allied trading partners. American industry and

trading partners. American industry and innovation have produced proven solutions. Federal policy must now align

solutions. Federal policy must now align with strategic necessity. Thank you.

>> Thank you very much all three of you.

And now we'd like to move to questions.

And um as we've discussed, you know, last week our committee released an investigative report highlighting that the US mining and refining capacity is limited in part because China has

manipulated critical mineral prices for decades. And the Trump administration's

decades. And the Trump administration's recent deal with China essentially gives the United States and our allies about a year to become less reliant on Beijing

for critical minerals. Given that mining and refining operations traditionally take years and years to bring online, it's our belief that we need to act

quickly and act now. And what I'd like each of you to do and maybe start with Mr. Evans is to describe what are the current

barriers that you're facing financial and otherwise and how can we work with you to speed up the process given this timeline that we are working with.

>> Thank you Mr. Chairman. One of the largest barriers that we have to to level the market is price transparency.

I think you've heard the same and rare earths. Uh lithium is no different. They

earths. Uh lithium is no different. They

followed the same curves. uh in our industry pricing is just starting to go up uh after coming off a high about two or three years ago. Now it's about where it was about five years ago. I know

rarest fairly well as well. If you look at ones like Dprosium, you would think it'd be an all-time high pricing given the situation the global uh economy is facing outside of China and it's in the

same situation. Price discovery and fair

same situation. Price discovery and fair pricing attracts private investment. The

partnership between the US government and private companies can actually be enhanced that way. uh the ball has gotten started to roll already with some of the programs and some of the assistance programs that both lithium

americas and MP materials now are are enjoy the other issue is around permitting just as it takes the difficulty getting actually uh financing done permitting timelines in the long in

the US are very very long if you're a private investor you're going to look at market conditions and market growth potential but you're also going to look at when am I going to get my money back if permitting takes 10 years or 20 years

and there are projects in this country I point out in copper in resolution. I

think that's been around 15 years in developments of very large copper deposit. Uh uncertainty around

deposit. Uh uncertainty around permitting timelines makes people go away. I've had pension funds and others

away. I've had pension funds and others ask us in our financing process, are you fully permanent? When we weren't, they

fully permanent? When we weren't, they said come back and tell me when you are.

So those two legs are very very important. Uh the third thing I I I

important. Uh the third thing I I I believe is is actually programs like were being discussed today and were actually already in place. Public

private partnership is important. the

government needs to give a signal uh and it's the government's job to actually determine really what's important for this country down the road. This is no different than the space race. If you

look at the the problems that the uh Johnson administration had convincing the American public to keep funding the space race over the 60s, it was difficult. What we got out of that was

difficult. What we got out of that was we were leaders in the semiconductor industry. Things like Velcro and all

industry. Things like Velcro and all other kinds of technology actually came out during that process. Semiconductors

were $1,000 each in 1960. By 1970, they were a dollar and it spurned huge economic growth and leadership globally that the US enjoyed. We're in the same situation here. All of the technologies

situation here. All of the technologies we talked about are in everything in this room. Your blender, your phone,

this room. Your blender, your phone, your computer, our defense systems. We need to respond, but we need to be on a level playing field. The industry and and the capital markets need to understand what true pricing and true

cost is. that'll attract financing and

cost is. that'll attract financing and the government definitely needs to give a signal and we need we need be able to build things in this country. Again, the

laws are are such that we have to have and we do have the highest standards in the world, but they need to be somewhat predictable and reasonable for financial investors to support projects like this

and actually get a return. Thank you.

>> Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Um, six months ago, the thing that we were most worried about at MP Materials was the predatory pricing identified by your investigation, and it was an issue

entirely outside of our control. Um,

that changed entirely with the inking of our transformative public private partnership in July. This issue has effectively been taken off the table, and it's now incumbent on us to execute

and act, and we take that responsibility um, uh, incredibly seriously. Um the

truth is there's no silver bullet here.

These [snorts] issues are complex. Um

all of the committee's recommendations in its bipartisan report are important to execute on. There isn't one individual thing that will solve this in and of itself. Um but I would highlight

that uh products do need markets and I think what the Congress can do is both incentivize and aim to reward companies large downstream end users that give procurement preferences for US-made

critical minerals and derivative products. There is enormous aggregated

products. There is enormous aggregated buying power in the downstream of the American economy that can compel a lot of activity and that can happen in the private sector. Um, and again, I would

private sector. Um, and again, I would applaud uh the efforts of of General Motors in 2022. We would not have a rare factory coming online in Fort Worth, Texas, were it not for them acting in

2022, well before this issue was in the mainstream. And I would also recognize

mainstream. And I would also recognize Apple for doing so with us earlier this year following a a 5-year relationship.

Um the second thing I would advise is that between our closest allies and trusted partners uh countries like South Korea uh and Japan uh Australia we can

work together to have the right resources the right processing capabilities um and the right markets to create real resiliency. Right now we need to bring supply online but as that

supply comes online we have a a lot more optionality and I think our efforts abroad can be a lot more effective.

Thank you, chairman. Um, at Nyron, we've had incredible government support um, over the last decade to develop our technology. And every time we've uh,

technology. And every time we've uh, received that support, we've been able to use that to catalyze private investment. And so, it's been a great

investment. And so, it's been a great public private partnership. For us, the biggest impediment right now to scale is capital. And so here we need access to

capital. And so here we need access to loans, grants and other vehicles that would help us to um catalyze that private capital to build our capabilities. Naron's technology is

capabilities. Naron's technology is based on iron and nitrogen. And so we have inherent cost um advantage in terms of our input raw materials. But magnet

making as you've seen is a very competitive market. And so for us to be

competitive market. And so for us to be competitive, we need to be at scale. And

so here help and support to get to that 10,000 ton scale is critical. A 10,000

ton plant for us is a world-scale magnet factory. That's the size of factories

factory. That's the size of factories typically in China. And so at that scale, we were designed and developed that technology to compete head-on with

China and really provide you know secure reliable magnets uh to every industry that's critical um and how it enables.

Thank you.

>> Thank you. Uh now I'd like to recognize uh ranking member Christian Morphy.

>> Thank you, Mr. Chair. Um, I want to show a picture of from 1973 when OPEC, a group of oil rich countries in the Middle East, imposed a total oil embargo

on America. Millions of Americans were

on America. Millions of Americans were left with empty tanks and our economy nearly ground to a halt. This wasn't was

not lost on the CCP. As the chairman mentioned, 20 years later, Deng Xiaoping, the former leader of China, said, quote, "There is oil in the Middle

East. There is rare earth in China." Mr.

East. There is rare earth in China." Mr.

Roundtree, the CCP saw America's dependence on Middle Eastern oil as a model. And the CCP copied this model to

model. And the CCP copied this model to control rare earths and induce American dependence. Right.

dependence. Right.

Uh yes, it's similar but it's a little bit different because they didn't embargo a country here. They have a licensing system where individual customers have to apply an ownorous process sharing a lot of sensitive

information to basically obtain a license that only lasts for six months to obtain those magnets and so sharing a lot of sensitive you know American IP.

Let's take a look at one important rare earth compound where the CCP used their playbook. Let's look at a material

playbook. Let's look at a material called NDPR oxide, which is essential in permanent super hard magnets. It costs

Chinese producers roughly $50 per kilogram to make NDPR.

$50. That's the key number to keep in mind. When the US tried to make our own

mind. When the US tried to make our own NDPR, let's see what China did. They

slashed the price from roughly $170 per kilogram, as you can see here, to about $49 per kilogram in 2024.

And that's now $49, Mr. Slower, that's less than the $50 cost of production, right?

>> Correct.

>> That's not a coincidence. The steep

decline happened immediately after the CCP met to discuss the price of NDPR and then ordered Chinese producers to flood the market to drop the price. But that's

not the only mineral the CCP has targeted. Let's take a look at Samarium,

targeted. Let's take a look at Samarium, which powers heatresistant magnets and guidance technology in our critical weapon systems such as the F-35,

the Tomahawk cruise missile, and the Stinger missile. The CCP controls nearly

Stinger missile. The CCP controls nearly all of the world's supply of Samarium.

And just like with NDPR, they've used that control to drop prices so America cannot compete.

Just look here as the US made attempts to create domestic sources through contracts with MP materials and other companies. Uh we see how the CCP brought

companies. Uh we see how the CCP brought the price down from around $20 per kilogram in 2022 to $9.91

per kilogram in August of this year. But

the key thing here is that the average cost to produce samarium, even in China, is $11 per kilogram. Again, the CCP is

selling for less than their cost. The

same is true for magnets. Mr. uh

Slouster, as you can see behind me, in 2020, we found this very interesting memo from the Chinese Commerce Ministries archives.

Can you please put this up?

This is a fascinating memo. It says

uh for magnet exports uh for Chinese rare earth companies, quote, "The transaction price tends to be low, even to the point of being lower

than the production costs. The CCP is straight up admitting that it's selling for the for less than the cost of production. Right, Mr. Slower?"

production. Right, Mr. Slower?"

>> Yes. Our view is that magnets [clears throat] are being sold for less than the production cost and the cost of raw material.

>> That's predatory pricing. As you

mentioned, the CCP playbook is clear.

Overproduce, underpric below the cost of production, thus attempting to kill its competitors and then weaponize the monopoly. So the question is, what do we

monopoly. So the question is, what do we do about it? Mining and processing more rare earths in America is only one part of the solution. I respectfully submit.

We also need alternatives that potentially bypass rare earths entirely.

Mr. Roundtree, your company produces the world's only high-performance rare earth free magnets. I actually have one right

free magnets. I actually have one right here, uh, which is stronger than traditional rare earth magnets. If

produced at scale, it appears that your magnets could be cheaper than normal magnets. So if the CCP cut off rare

magnets. So if the CCP cut off rare earth exports entirely to the US, potentially at scale, your magnets could keep our economy going. They work by

using an entirely new technology which you described which is called iron nitride, combining iron and nitrogen.

Mr. Roundtree, this approach was developed by a University of Minnesota professor named Jingpang Wong pictured behind me. Correct.

behind me. Correct.

>> Yes, that's correct.

>> And Dr. Wong isn't just your founder, but he's also an immigrant from, you guessed it, China. He does his work at a federally funded lab in the US. If we

want to break China's strangle hold on magnets, we need an all hands-on deck approach. That means welcoming the best

approach. That means welcoming the best talent from around the world, including China. It also means funding research

China. It also means funding research and uncuffing ourselves from our dependence on the CCP. Thank you, and I yield back.

Thank you. Uh now I'd like to to recognize Representative Whitman. Uh I

want to also compliment you for your leadership on our critical minerals working group uh in the past session.

>> Well, thank you. We had uh Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. We certainly did uh did a lot of discovery during that time.

Lots of uh critical information that's led us to today. But I want to ask our our witnesses today. Uh the issue is how do we catch up? you know, we are way

behind the Chinese, especially with critical supply chains as it relates to not only rare earth, but critical minerals. Um, how long do you think

minerals. Um, how long do you think it'll take the United States to build back supply chains to make sure they're fully capable of supplying all the demands in the US marketplace? And what

role could efforts like price supports play in buttressing that market to make sure as uh ranking member Christian pointed out that the cost don't drop

below the cost of production that we kind of create a price floor there. We

aggregate demand. We make sure that we are producing to the US demand and making sure that we produce with a guarantee that the floor never drops below the cost of production which kind

of acts as an insurance policy. So I

want to get your perspective on how you think that uh would play in helping uh the marketplace and making sure too the demand signal is send and investments take place as they should in those

areas.

Mr. Rry begin with you and then we'll go to Mr. Schler, Mr. Evans.

>> Yeah, I [clears throat] think for Nairoon for us we just we we need the capital to help get to scale. At scale

[clears throat] we don't necessarily need the price support. Um what we would help us is offtake agreements, right?

And you know, we are scaling up our technology as quickly as possible to get to that 10,000 ton where we can really move the needle on on magnet supply. Um,

but we're going to need all of the above solutions to, you know, really accelerate out of this challenge. Um, at

Nyron, we have 1500 tons of capacity coming online starting in 2027, and we're working with the administration to see how quickly we can bring on a 10,000 ton factory, targeting to try and have

that coming online by sometime around 2029. That's great,

2029. That's great, man. Um, before I look forward, I want

man. Um, before I look forward, I want to I want to look back because I think it it's relevant here. Um, in in 2017, the founder of our company, James Luinsky, he acquired Mountain Pass when

it had eight people and was in care and maintenance under the supervision of a federal judge. There was no accounting

federal judge. There was no accounting system, no corporate infrastructure of literally eight people. The US had zero mining, zero refining, and zero magnet manufacturing. Today we have the second

manufacturing. Today we have the second largest rare earth mine on earth right now in the state of California. We have

the largest rare earth refinery in the western hemisphere again at Mountain Pass. We have metal production online

Pass. We have metal production online and on a commercial basis and we're getting ready to do full-scale magnet production. And we've come that far in 8

production. And we've come that far in 8 years with very little air support for the core central issue identified by this committee which is predatory pricing. So now that we have significant

pricing. So now that we have significant resolve and that issue uh in our case has been effectively taken off the table, we can move much more quickly. Uh

the key missing link in the supply chain today um is both increasing domestic magnet manufacturing capacity which we're on pace to get to 10,000 tons by

2028 and certain heavy rare earths which are essential in small quantities to the production of those magnets which we're working on via our public private partnership. So I do think now that this

partnership. So I do think now that this issue is well understood and there's a lot of resolve um you know we are a lot further today than we were three years ago and I think three years from now we'll be even further.

>> That's great. Thanks

>> Jonathan.

>> I think price discovery is is very important. At the end of the day what's

important. At the end of the day what's happening here should be an obvious solution for public capital uh to actually or private capital actually finance this. But what we've seen here

finance this. But what we've seen here and lithium is no different than rare earths is that economics and the science of economics is being bent to the China's will that has dissuaded private

capital come off the sidelines. I think

putting in as we mentioned as a report actually recommends price discovery to help redefine and take over the narrative is going to help. Uh on top of that there are tools that we have in place already with tariffs and other

anti-dumping things that can be triggered if the Chinese misbehave.

Finally, as mentioned here before, I think globally that'll help spur more development, including even investing in the United States. Uh, allied

governments like Korea and Japan have very little uh critical minerals or rare earths. So, they have invested abroad

earths. So, they have invested abroad for years with uh with firms like Jog, which is part of the Japanese government, which helps fund and they typically take small investments. But

the biggest issue we have in the United States is the upfront cost. So building

a facility like MP Materials has or is already built like we're actively in construction and you're all welcome to join. We have 900 workers on site right

join. We have 900 workers on site right now is much more expensive than building it in China for obvious reasons. We

follow rules here and laws. We're

investing uh money actually in the community. It's a holistic. It's a

community. It's a holistic. It's a

long-term generational asset. But

overcoming that no different than semiconductors. You need clear market

semiconductors. You need clear market signals for private capital to either come off the sidelines and finance it on its own or in concert with the government once facilities are in place.

These are worldclass facilities. We can

compete on a global basis when the when the PL level playing field, but upfront actually getting the capital costs actually financed is always been a challenge.

>> Good. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield

back.

>> Thank you, Representative Stevens.

>> Thank you, Mr. Chair. Uh

I come from automotive land uh in Metro Detroit and as uh Mr. Schlowerster mentioned a handful of years ago, some

of our automotive leaders have directed uh a a cause or a purpose for this nation to really do some great work in critical minerals. But it wasn't just a

critical minerals. But it wasn't just a handful of years ago that policymakers recognized that we have a problem with our dependency on China for critical

minerals, critical materials that go into our supply chain. And in fact, when I was working in the administration of Barack Obama on a little thing called

the US auto rescue, uh the initiative that saved our large large automotive companies from bankruptcy and rescued hundreds of thousands of jobs. We

recognized that we were dependent on China for minerals and we were dependent on China for microchips. uh in a

bipartisan way this Congress acted in uh the year 2022 on microchips. Now we have cause of purpose to act on uh minerals.

I have drafted legislation that I encourage all of you to take a look at.

It is called Unear America's Future Act.

This is a 100page comprehensive bill to direct loan guarantees, tax credits, create an R&D center of excellence to address what all three of

you have been talking about, the access to capital considerations. Now, Mr.

Rentree, you're the only synthetic mineral or material producer on the panel. Why is it uh important that

panel. Why is it uh important that synthetic critical materials be included in congressional policy and what are the most important ways they need to be

reflected in that policy?

>> Yeah, alternative technologies are absolutely critical across a different range of applications. Um you know it really then focuses on place to the strengths of what the US does best which

is to innovate. And so that's what we need to do is to innovate across these critical materials to find different solutions that enable us to reduce and basically eliminate our dependence on

you know foreign supply so we can become basically a champion of that in our own economy.

>> Yeah. And so while um Iron Magnetics is already scaling production, many synthetic materials are still in the demonstration phase. And as Congress

demonstration phase. And as Congress seeks to act now, how do we make sure that the next generation of innovations like these are included in our policy

discussions or our way forward?

>> Yeah, I I think I mentioned earlier it's taken us 12 years to get to this point.

You know, materials development is is tough. it takes a long time and and so

tough. it takes a long time and and so support is needed during R&D, but it it's basically beyond that through pilot. And so we were a successful

pilot. And so we were a successful recipient of several Department of Energy grants, including a $20 million scaleup grant that enabled us to get from the Graham to the ton scale where

we currently producing today. What's

needed now is support beyond that to help us scale. And so need to make sure that we you know cross the valley of death here and scale the technology and get to a point here where you know we

can be competitive here with China based prices on these critical minerals.

>> Yeah. And that's one thing where we remain hopeful in my drafted legislation on Earth America's future act that uh we can address some of those valley of death considerations. And then Mr.

death considerations. And then Mr. Schlouster, you know, in terms of existing uh trade deals, as they still somewhat exist, uh we have USMCA, which

is under its review process. I'm in

Michigan, uh a manufacturing evangelist, and I recognize that there's potential opportunity for us to double down uh

with our allies. You mentioned uh Texas uh but what are other ways in which we could work with trusted trade partners on uh critical minerals and development?

>> Well, I think when you look at our trusted allies, you have all the pieces you need. You have production capacity,

you need. You have production capacity, you have processing capacity, you have large end markets. Um and those are the fundamental pieces you need to create

resiliency in a supply chain and and viability for producers. Um, you know, >> and is there an opportunity to box out China?

>> We need supply online. That's the most urgent thing. But as we bring supply

urgent thing. But as we bring supply online, I think there's an opportunity to work with partners to create resiliency and create the outcomes we want in terms of recognition of market

economy costs, recognition of standards that are acceptable, and I think those are things we should be pursuing.

>> Yeah. Thank you. And I'll just conclude by saying that the purpose and point of this hearing is to direct American strategy to give us leadership. Of

course, I've pitched my own bill many times and and we'll continue to talk about it until I'm blue in the face, but I I continue also to join for bipartisan

solutions for a way forward for American manufacturing and our supply chain to beat China. Thank you so much, Mr.

beat China. Thank you so much, Mr. Chair, and I yield back.

>> Thank you, uh, Representative Nun.

Well, thank you, chairman, and thank you for the panel for being here today.

Talking about rare earth minerals, you have laid out just a stark intel brief on what we face right now. We

highlighted here that China now refineses 85 to 90% of all accessible rare earth minerals. They control 90% of the magnet production. 80% of battery production owns or influences the

majority of foreign mines owned in the United States. And it's not just the

United States. And it's not just the rare earth minerals, it's critical minerals. Things from the F-35 fighter

minerals. Things from the F-35 fighter jet here in the United States that require 920 pounds per fighter of rare earth minerals just to be successful all the way to the fertilizer that helps

grow things in my home state of Iowa.

Now, whether you're a fighter pilot or a farmer, this is some gradea We know that the Chinese have the ability to not only control it but cut it off

when they want. The challenge that I think going forward and my colleagues from the Midwest have pushed forward is being able to identify critical elements that we can have here in the United

States. First and foremost, we were

States. First and foremost, we were successful with the Trump administration moving forward both pod ash and phosphates components critical for input

costs for fertilizer. not only being able to provide our own food supply but driving down costs for consumers. We've

built our entire society around these fundamental resources and when they are cut off we don't have a backup plan. Now

one of the things that we have known that has been successful is that we need a strategic reset and it was mentioned by both my Democratic and Republican colleagues here an opportunity to go

back to that World War II mentality of a whole of nation approach. This year

we're going to be looking at the Defense Production Act, ways that we can aggressively get after competing with Chinese statebacked subsidized ownership and competition in this space. And while

it was passed in the 1950s, it provides the United States the ability to have a strategic engagement against China in these critical areas. The facts are bleak. China is beating us in

bleak. China is beating us in controlling the entire market, but nothing can outpace or outperform America's ingenuity or innovation in these space. I want to thank our panel

these space. I want to thank our panel for being here and get to the facts of this. Now, Mr. Stchester, you and your

this. Now, Mr. Stchester, you and your company have worked with the administration in using the Defense Production Act to help prioritize a couple of things. Let me ask this. Has

it helped your company move faster and be more competitive against China?

>> Absolutely.

>> Has it helped production outpace increase in a way that you wouldn't have been able to do on your own?

>> Yes. With the new DPA coming up, do you believe that there's a requirement here for rare earth to be prioritized in America's national security strategy?

>> Yes.

>> And specifically, does the DPA allow you to compete with a statebacked Chinese uh entity that has both companies as well as government-owned entities?

>> It's certainly a helpful tool uh in competing.

>> Very good. I'd like to know a little bit here on how the US measures uh could successfully decouple uh with DPA from China and decrease our reliance on China's production of critical minerals.

You've got some great examples.

>> Sure. Um, you know, the Defense Production Act was first invoked for rare earth materials, I believe in 2019 along with a series of presidential determinations, and it's been used in

the past three administrations to help build up our domestic capabilities to refine RAIRs. We received our first

refine RAIRs. We received our first award. It was a very small one. We were

award. It was a very small one. We were

a much different company in 2019. Uh,

and then received uh two more awards in 2020. And that resulted in a little bit

2020. And that resulted in a little bit of capital investment alongside a lot of private capital from us to bring the separation facility that is now online at Mountain Pass, the one I referenced

in my remarks. It is now online. Um, but

it wasn't just the capital. I think at that time it was relatively small. It

was $10 million relative to a $200 million plus investment. It was the signaling power. We were going public at

signaling power. We were going public at that time. The US government essentially

that time. The US government essentially said this is an important national security project. I think that does sort

security project. I think that does sort of signaling power helps to unleash the private markets, the private capital markets, which are something I think we should all endeavor to unleash. And so I

do think um DPA is incredibly important and has been throughout our history.

>> Mr. Evans, I'd like to speak with you a little bit as well. You've worked on the lithium side, such a critical component to our future going forward. Is there an ability for the United States to actually be able to compete against China? And what other tools would you

China? And what other tools would you recommend that we do to help secure lithium as a future for the US?

>> Yes, we actually have a lot of lithium in this country in different forms. In the basin in Nevada, which we're at, which we've done measurements and drilling and it's the largest in the world. Uh also in Arkansas and Texas,

world. Uh also in Arkansas and Texas, the Smackover Formation also has lots of promise and there's another project there that is going to be great. Uh

difficulty for up front. Uh for us, we've had to compete through uh market peaks and market troughs. And I want to recognize General Motors as well.

They've invested nearly a billion dollars in us early on. Uh and they've stuck with us through this uh through this project along with Orion uh Finance, which the government has chosen actually to work with the with the

Department of War to invest offshore.

But it's very very important that uh we attract we have a level playing field here. Pricing is key. Look, the

here. Pricing is key. Look, the

government at the end of the day shouldn't have to pay for all of this.

But the signals and the data have been completely hijacked by the Chinese. The

fundamental exchange which this committee identified is actually controlled by China which is actually a surprise to me. All the pricing data for rare earth for lithium and for a lot of these other minerals that we've been talking about are defined by China. The

financial community uses that their investment decisions and it dissuades investment. The Chinese on the other

investment. The Chinese on the other hand have been shopping around even in the face of pricing declining in some cases in our industry 80% after a peak and are still buying assets in Africa,

in the Latin America, all over the world. Um because it's a long-term play

world. Um because it's a long-term play and the pricing in the market is controlled basically by the large by the government but also by collusion with CAT BYD and others to suppress any

further development. When pricing peaked

further development. When pricing peaked in this industry at $80,000 a ton, I think the committee recognized that.

There was two meetings when pricing went up and you saw an immediate decline, which has lasted for three years. Now

it's going up because they can't control it because the issue that China has and we have as well is power. So we're

dealing with trying to expand our grid uh and with adding more capacity.

Capacity takes time. Building nuclear

power plants uh twin cycle uh uh gas turbines. What's happening right now and

turbines. What's happening right now and the highest growth in this sector is actually putting in battery banks of 2 to 10 hours to be able to deal with peaks in communities. Typically 6:00 to 10 p.m. at night you come home uh you

10 p.m. at night you come home uh you have to have a peaker plant. The

batteries are turned on for 2 to 10 hours whatever that's needed and they're re uh recharged during the day. It's

going to grow 50%. So we're competing now not only on uh consumer applications and defense applications but the very core kitchen table issue we have is electricity in this country and power.

>> Mr. Evans, this is a 40-year campaign.

The Chinese are using economic warfare against us. Luckily, the resolve is

against us. Luckily, the resolve is right here in the United States. We have

the opportunity to stand up and fight back today. Thank you, Mr. Chair. I

back today. Thank you, Mr. Chair. I

yield the remainder of my time.

>> Thank you, Representative Brown.

>> Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Um, today we are talking about something that affects our economy, our national security, and the daily lives of families in Ohio's 11th district. The minerals and

11th district. The minerals and materials we need to build cars, batteries, medical equipment, and modern technology.

Lithium, nickel, cobalt are all critical for innovation and supporting industrial growth in Ohio and across America. Right

now, China controls most of these minerals from start to finish. They mine

them, process them, and manufacture the key components we depend on. And the

evidence is clear. China uses this as a control to push other countries like the United States out of the market. They

suddenly drop prices to levels no American company can match or they cut off exports to gain leverage during disputes. When that happens, the impacts

disputes. When that happens, the impacts hit home quickly. Factories in my district face unstable prices for the parts they need. Auto suppliers can't

get the magnets required for electric motors. Steel and chemical producers see

motors. Steel and chemical producers see costs jump overnight. And workers, many of them union members who keep our

district strong, end up facing uncertainty they didn't create. This is

not the result of normal market competition. It's the result of a

competition. It's the result of a deliberate strategy by the Chinese government to control the supply chains that power the 21st century economy. And

if we don't respond, we risk becoming dependent on China for products that are central to everything from clean energy to military readiness. People in every

corner of my district and all across the Midwest know what it feels like when our industries lose out to unfair competition.

We've lived that story before and we cannot afford to relive it again. So my

focus today is simple to find out how we can protect American workers, strengthen our supply chain, and prevent China's manipulation.

I'll start with you, Mr. SL sloster. For

decades, industries in my district have been hit hard by China's below dumping.

Now, we're seeing China use these exact same tactics in critical minerals. What

changes in trade enforcement would be most effective to protect workers and manufacturers in places like Cleveland from being undercut all over again?

>> Thank you, ma'am. Um, I've spent a lot of time in Ohio's autotowns, Mary'sville, Anna, um, in a prior life.

Um, so I know firsthand how those factories are really the engine of those small towns. Um, there were shutdowns

small towns. Um, there were shutdowns earlier this summer. Uh, as a result in in autoactories in the United States as a result um of of the rare earth

situation. Um, with regard to standards,

situation. Um, with regard to standards, I I think we need to work with our allies and partners and agree on a set of standards um uh that align with market economies that align with our

values. Um, and I think if we do so, and

values. Um, and I think if we do so, and I think we are doing so with some of these agreements that we've been forming in in the last few years. Um, I think that will help um um lift up the entire market over time and I think it's a

really important aspect of the whole conversation. Thank you.

conversation. Thank you.

>> Thank you, Mr. Roundtree.

China's dominance in magnet production gives it the ability to influence global prices overnight.

How have you seen China use that leverage to push competitors out of the market or pressure companies trying to build non-Chinese supply chains?

>> Yeah, I think when you look at the pressure the low prices but it's really around getting the capital or attracting the capital that we've heard to scale you know alternative technologies. Uh at

Nyron, our source of iron are iron salts. It's a byproduct of steel making.

salts. It's a byproduct of steel making.

Um our source of nitrogen is ammonia which is used heavily in the Midwest for fertilizer manufacturing. And so we are

fertilizer manufacturing. And so we are bringing back um you know magnet production but you know not playing the same game. We've changed the game. We've

same game. We've changed the game. We've

out innovated and and that's what our technology provides is with well other technologies that are alternatives to these rare earths. And so uh it's critical for us as we as we're scaling

here that we get to scale uh so we can be fully competitive right because of the lower cost inputs right from our steel making and from our fertilizing manufacturing that will enable us to

provide a reliable secure supply of magnets to the US economy.

>> Thank you. And Mr. Evans, you've seen how long-term supply contracts, processing bottlenecks, and foreign ownership can shape whether a supply chain succeeds or fails. In your view,

what are the biggest points of vulnerability in the US lithium supply chain today that could slow down or even derail new domestic investments?

I >> think it's losing the opportunity we have right now. I think it's taken some time uh to actually act on some of the things that are being recognized here so

we can level the playing field. I say

this as a former proud Ohio and both my kids are Buckeyes. You can see most of the battery capacity in the US between the Southwest with a huge chunk of it going in the Midwest because of the skilled workforce uh and excellent

universities that they have. If we take our eye off the ball, the chairman mentioned we have a year now uh and revert back, it's exactly what China wants us to do. uh we can set ourselves

in a situation where not only we can we can actually develop the raw materials and the intermediates needed to actually fund these these uh supply these facilities in our case in the Midwest

you've seen uh potential structures that have been set up where the Chinese want to set up facilities but the issue with that is is they want to the good stuff the family jewels they want to ship in in this case cathodes cathodes and

anodess basically which is the high-tech part of it they wanted to ship in and basically just do assembly in the United days. That's not the way it works in

days. That's not the way it works in China. I spent a large time of my career

China. I spent a large time of my career in and out of China and you have to bring everything with you. We have the ability to actually build the entire supply chain here, but it all starts with leveling the play playing field.

>> Oh, >> I owe.

>> Thank you. And with that, Mr. Chair, may I yield back?

>> Thank you. Uh, Representative Johnson.

So the report uh released from this committee proved what we all have known to be true which is the Chinese Communist Party has been engaging in textbook anti-competitive behavior over

production dumping uh government subsidy of those uh of those arenas those industries and of course we've seen it very acutely in this critical minerals space

and as a free market Republican I think about well okay what what can we do to try to push back on China's attempts to gain a near monopoly in the critical minerals arena. Uh the US government has

minerals arena. Uh the US government has taken an equity stake uh Mr. Slower, Mr. Evans, in your companies. That's not

normally the first place my mind goes to what our government should do. I'm open

to the idea that as the ranking member said, we need a Manhattan project approach and maybe unusual times call for unusual tactics, but what can you say that would make me feel a little

better about uh the government owning a piece of your companies?

>> Well, thank you, sir. Um this is a very important discussion to have. Um free

market capitalism uh is the engine of our economy. No doubt about it. But I

our economy. No doubt about it. But I

think the reality is today we are not operating in a free market. China is

both a monopoly and a non-market economy. The most important features of

economy. The most important features of our agreement and I do think um you know with respect to some of the other agreements that have been disc been discussed ours is very very unique. Um

the actual most transformative feature of that agreement is the price floor which corrects this distortive non-market behavior that this investigation found. And what the equity

investigation found. And what the equity piece of of the agreement allows us tax taxpayers to do is to benefit from the upside the upside gain that comes along

with correcting for that issue. And as I said in my prepared testimony it's already re uh um manifested in significant unrealized gains uh for taxpayers. So I think it's important

taxpayers. So I think it's important when we think about this um where there is market intervention it should not just be to absorb risk or take losses but to enable the US government and the

taxpayer to participate in some of the upside and I think that's what our agreement allows for >> in our case in return for the government's equity stake we're being offered the lowest cost of capital in

the world as I mentioned here one of the difficult parts for industries like ours is actually the upfront capital cost because again we're not on a level playing field. I have to follow laws

playing field. I have to follow laws here and there's things that we need to do. So the $2 billion of lowcost capital

do. So the $2 billion of lowcost capital is actually a huge advantage, but it's also a signal to the industry that this is important and to also the private sector. That loan which was under

sector. That loan which was under process which took about two and a half years to go through the whole process attracted General Motors which put in a base investment and actually became a joint venture partner and also attracted

Orion which again the US government's working with offshore to develop mining projects with the department of war.

those two partners likely would not have come if it wasn't a public private partnership. And as I echo uh Matt's

partnership. And as I echo uh Matt's comments as well, if we do well, the taxpayer should do well. This really

enabled our project to be successful, but has also said a signal to the industry this stuff is important and now more private capital has actually been involved. So, we're happy to be a good

involved. So, we're happy to be a good example for the rest of the industry, but also >> well, gentlemen, listen, I I get it. I mean, you're arguing in essence that this is a super special

circumstance and that because hearing phrases like, oh, you know, if if our company does well, then the American taxpayer does well. I mean, that's just not how we view the private sector,

right? That if that store owner or that

right? That if that store owner or that dentist or that architect does well, that there's an equity stake for government. I mean, generally, if they

government. I mean, generally, if they do well, they pay more taxes, right? So,

but that's the more traditional system.

I'm open to the idea that this is a bold approach that is unique to your industry. Mr. Evans, you said you you

industry. Mr. Evans, you said you you hope that this can be an example for for within your industry. I just hope it's not an example across other industries because it does seem that if this if we

start to do this in other industries, we're going to go to a place that doesn't feel like free market capitalism. But with the limited time

capitalism. But with the limited time I've got left, uh Mr. Evans, help me.

You mentioned permitting reform briefly.

uh seems like a hugely important part of where we need to go if we're actually going to become a global leader in critical minerals. Uh share some

critical minerals. Uh share some additional thoughts.

>> It's really for anything, sir. Any type

of infrastructure we want to build in this country. I don't care if it's a

this country. I don't care if it's a cell phone tower, it's tight tension lines, we're under the same laws, NEPA laws and so forth. And look, we need to have very strong regulations in this country. But a lot of the regulations

country. But a lot of the regulations were actually struck and cast when we were in a time where we were dealing with an opposite problem which we were there was overgrowth overgrowth in housing overgrown in industry and so

forth. It's a real barrier. Uh if the

forth. It's a real barrier. Uh if the goal of all of this is to have private sector come forward but they need certainty around things. Our process was five years look and I was sued. I was

permitted by the Trump administration and one week later I was sued and I was stuck in court for four and a half years. I went through a formal appeals

years. I went through a formal appeals process. I went through an appeal

process. I went through an appeal process on top of that in California and the and the circuit court. And part of the the the issue behind that is groups that actually do that. They know they're not going to win. They just want to slow

you down and hopefully bankrupt you because you're not going to get any financing. And this faces our whole

financing. And this faces our whole country. And we're at a point now where

country. And we're at a point now where we have to grow. We have to put important infrastructure in place. Can

you imagine building the interstate highway system today in this country?

You would never get done. So we have to fix this where there are limits around appeals it and not depend on whatever judge that you get uh or somebody listening to two people out of a hundred

that are claiming the same thing over and over again. The certainty if it's not there look I've talked to the Koreans and the Japanese and so forth.

They would rather invest here than anywhere else in the world. Once you

have an asset and the government's not going to take it away we we're the strongest economy in the world. you'll

attract actually even more overseas investment here if there's certainty around the legal process. It's much too latigious and much too long.

>> Thank you, Representative Stanton.

>> Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank

you for holding this important hearing.

Arizona is now the semiconductor hub of the United States of America. The chips

and science act has delivered more than 11 billion dollars in federal support to our state in this critical industry.

Those investments are going to create 38,000 new jobs anchored by major expansions at Intel and the historic

$165 billion commitment from TSMC. These

facilities do not exist in isolation.

They sit on top of a supply chain built from dozens of upstream inputs including gallium germananium antimony cobalt and other critical minerals that make

modern chips possible. The Chinese

Communist Party holds overwhelming control of that upstream supply chain.

China refineses the heavy majority of these minerals. In some cases, such as

these minerals. In some cases, such as with rare earth elements used in F-35s at Luke Air Force Base and in the magnets that power electric vehicles, their dominance is close to total. This

translates to leverage. Last December,

Beijing restricted exports of gallium, Germanmanium, and antimony in retaliation for US export controls.

These actions disrupted global markets overnight and they were a reminder to every advanced manufacturer in the world that the PRC can tighten the spot whatever it chooses. This is not an

abstract threat for my state of Arizona.

Our semiconductor industry, our defense installations, our EV manufacturers like Lucid Motors all depend on reliable access to the minerals China has spent

decades cornering and manipulating. We

are also watching a global race unfold in clean energy. China has reached a point where it installs more renewable power each year than the United States and Europe combined. It is nearly double

the world in solar capacity. It produces

close to a terowatt of renewable energy capacity annually. These are staggering

capacity annually. These are staggering numbers and they give the PRC an enormous economic advantage. This

matters to Arizona where solar already provides almost 14% of electricity and where domestic manufacturing is expanding but still lacks a full supply chain. Energy markets and mineral

chain. Energy markets and mineral markets are now inseparable from national security. This is defense

national security. This is defense industrial bases and our clean energy deployment. We don't need to be

deployment. We don't need to be provocative to recognize the risk. We

need to be realistic and cleareyed.

There is a practical path forward. We

need to build regional supply chains, expand processing and refining outside of the PRC, and support upstream diversification with our allies. We need

to deepen cooperation with our partner in the Americas and Indo-acific. And we

need to make targeted investments that reflect the scale of the challenge.

That's why I work to include the intent of my semiconductor supply chain security and diversification act in the House Foreign Affairs Committee's DFC Reauthorization. Strengthening the DFC's

Reauthorization. Strengthening the DFC's authority to invest in semiconductor supply chains is a bipartisan step we can take right now. The United States should never be in a position where a

single foreign government can threaten our economic security or undercut the industries at the heart of Arizona's growth. The stakes are straightforward.

growth. The stakes are straightforward.

If we want to maintain our leadership in semiconductors, protect our national security, and compete in a global clean energy economy. We can't afford to let

energy economy. We can't afford to let the PRC's dominance harden into permanence. Mr. Evans, we have companies

permanence. Mr. Evans, we have companies in Arizona, from semiconductors to EVs, that need reliable lithium supply.

What's the realistic time frame for standing up nonPRC processing capacity if the US and its partner actually move with needed urgency?

Our project actually started in 2007.

It's been 18 years. Our company took it over in 2016. So, these are very lengthy processes. Uh we're lucky that we're

processes. Uh we're lucky that we're blessed with a lot of these critical minerals in the US. Uh they're not going to get out of the ground though unless we have reform around permitting, unless

we have government support for price uh for price transparency to attract private capital. And then in the case of

private capital. And then in the case of a lot of things we've been talking about here, grants, other financial instruments that we can pull in place to help spur things along. It's going to

take many years. Luckily though, we have our allies. There are deposits like this

our allies. There are deposits like this in other countries like and other like-minded countries like Canada and others that we can collaborate with. Uh,

but we've got to start the ball rolling now. What you see here, I think, is a

now. What you see here, I think, is a great start, but it's certainly we're not done.

>> All right. Thank you very much. Thank

you, Mr. Chairman. This is a very important hearing. I yield back.

important hearing. I yield back.

>> Thank you, Representative Dunn. Thank

you very much, Mr. Chairman. Uh, Mr.

Roundtree, and my district, Florida State University, recently established a center for rare earth, critical minerals, and industrial byproducts. Now

FSU is also the home to the National Magnet Lab. I'm sure you're familiar

Magnet Lab. I'm sure you're familiar with your business. Uh these are very special high power magnet labs. They

exceed field strengths of 30 Tesla.

Recently they've been re researching and reporting on separating rare earth's critical minerals, not all of them, but something like two dozen of them from

the tailings of old burned out phosphate mines. These are phosphate mines that

mines. These are phosphate mines that haven't been used in decades, but the tailings are still there and they just reprocess them with magnets instead of

chemical processes and uh and smelting.

Are you familiar with this process at all? Uh I am not familiar with that

all? Uh I am not familiar with that process. Um I am familiar somewhat with

process. Um I am familiar somewhat with the companies that are trying to do that. And you know this is another

that. And you know this is another alternative right where we take [clears throat] tailings and and basically rework those to provide some of the mineral supplies that are critical here in the US.

>> Either of you three gentlemen familiar with that process? It's new research and I I mean I don't know much about it myself.

>> I am sir. Um in general the the principle of extracting critical minerals of various types including rare earth elements from um industrial byproducts. Um it's interesting

byproducts. Um it's interesting technology. The challenge is that in

technology. The challenge is that in many cases the concentration of the rare earths um in these byproducts are in the hundreds of parts per million versus uh in the ground at Mountain Pass, the

second largest rare earth mine in the world, it's 60 to 80,000 parts per million. So the amount of stuff you need

million. So the amount of stuff you need to move to get what you want to process becomes challenging and that's where these uh advanced processing technologies like that you referenced come into [clears throat] play. And I do

think it's a it's an interesting area where we should continue to >> I was interested in so so and maybe Mr. Evans you could answer this. Can you see how companies like yours might benefit

from public private partnerships with academia institutions like FSU that uh that that do research in these areas?

>> Yes sir. We're actually working with the University of Nevada at Reno. We work

with Colorado School of Minds with Penn State. Uh it's an important uh bridge

State. Uh it's an important uh bridge between business and academia not only for a pipeline of new students or or new employees through students which we do actively with internships but also on

new innovative ways whether it be from recovery out of uh like tailings for uh for phosphates or in the case in our industry optimizing uh process steps to lower the cost. The end of the day all

these industries you want to set them up that they're world class that they compete on a global market. uh when I read the research I was interested thought looked like might be a way to quick jump start the the process because

we know how difficult it is to mine in the United States of America. Um also

Mr. Evans, if if our goal is to encourage domestic mining and refining, how should we structure our uh production tax credits or price

supporting mechanisms so that we don't accidentally re engineer our dependence on China and we actually do in real life

incentivize domestic production.

>> 45X was helpful uh for projects like us.

Uh I I know that sunsets in the 2030s, but that's certainly an incentive for companies here just because our operating costs versus the Chinese are always going to be higher. U I think uh price discovery helps and that we need

to redefine the narrative and get the financial community also as well to look at those types of things for investment decisions. Uh things like stockpiling

decisions. Uh things like stockpiling our industry aren't as necessary. Uh but

things like anti-dumping or tariffs uh if the Chinese continue to behave this way are helpful tools. uh in the meantime I think the complexity around uh some of the products that we talked

about here as well like today a lot of the lithium that China has it's all contained in the batteries uh so you can tear off the batteries which I believe we we do u but as processing gets stood up in the in the US look we're a

chemical company to be honest with you if you look at >> follow your advice on this >> um uh so for for perhaps all of you uh

>> what which industries in America America are going to collapse first when we run out of rare earth and critical minerals.

I mean, who's the canary in the coal mine?

I think the audio auto industry is uniquely impacted. To build a car, you

uniquely impacted. To build a car, you need 7 to 10,000 individual parts. They

all have to arrive on time. Um, that any company can assemble an automobile, I think, is a feat of epic proportions.

And I think there are so many components within a car. Um,

>> that's why I can't tell who's who's >> that contain magnets. It's it's

enormously challenging and so I think that's the canary in the coal mine.

>> Thank you gentlemen so much for coming here and Mr. Chairman. Thank you.

we had, you know, we need strong demand quite frankly from US companies for domestic and allied critical minerals and especially rare earths to support a strong industry that is not dependent on

imports from China. Would each of you agree that creating domestic demand by statutory statutoily limiting critical mineral purchases from China could be a good way to ensure US industry and

investors have the stability that they need to invest? Essentially by US or our allies first, China only if nothing else is available.

>> Anyone want to start?

>> Uh yeah, I can start. I'd like to just refer to your original comments here about looking forward. Um I think that's critical. We've got to look where we

critical. We've got to look where we need to be 20 years from now. And that's

why investment in alternatives um we think is critical. Right? It's not going to be the solution for everything. It's

all hands on deck right now. But uh our technology has a potential to have very significant higher performance levels and you know be the the magnet technology of choice for the 21st

century not the 20th century. And so

critical to invest in those alternatives and look at what do we need in the future for many of these emerging technologies and we've seen the emergence of AI and there's a lot of data centers that require a lot of

magnets to move the air and liquids to cool those data centers. But there's a lot of emerging applications here in in robotics, humanoid robots, even in drones that'll become the kind of

physical manifestation of of AI and those uses tremendous amount of magnets.

Uh and so it's critical for us to invest in those um technologies to be able to make sure that we can support them and grow them here in the US.

>> Thank you.

>> I'll just say yes, incentivizing and rewarding American companies for producing Americanmade products is a very good idea.

>> I would agree.

>> Thank you. And Mr. Royantry. Um

what is the timeline essentially that you think if we were to actually invest the kind of capital that we are talking about uh to be able to look at alternatives to replace rare earth

minerals? What kind of capital are you

minerals? What kind of capital are you talking about first of all and how quickly could we actually get this done if we if we did the moonshot to have those alternative to Chinese rare earth minerals?

Yeah, for Magnus in particular and for for our technology, um you know, it's it's several billion dollars that's going to be required to get to move the needle. And so we're building a 1500 ton

needle. And so we're building a 1500 ton facility right now. But we're also uh currently in state selection mode for a 10,000 ton facility. Uh and that is going to cost us, you know, between one

and one half billion dollars to build that that facility. So um you know when you look at the investments required we're just solving for for magnets but there are many other critical minerals

that we need to solve for u but I will say it takes time right it has taken us 12 years to get to a point where we're commercializing and scaling the technology because uh developing new technologies takes time

>> so I guess you would also agree that in addition to the capital that's required we need to start investing in the R&D the workforce the innovation all of these different things as was mentioned earlier recruiting the very best and brightest that's going to help us come

up with to alternatives to what right now we're completely dependent on China to import in. I have just a few seconds left, but um would like to ask all of you right now we're literally shipping

all of our e-waste to China and to countries quite frankly that are easily manipulated by China so that they can extract a lot of these critical and rare earth minerals um in processes that are very environmentally unfriendly and then

be able to take that back to China.

Should we ban exporting e-waste given we know that the technology and the value is there to recycle and harvest critical and rare earth minerals from our electronic waste that we have right now?

Is this a potential strategy? Are we

literally shipping off um critical and rare earth minerals to China given that we really don't have a robust recycling mechanism here in the states?

>> Yeah. So I I think this is one of the other alternatives that has to be looked at and explored and and supported. there

are companies out there trying to do that but there are challenges with separating post-consumer recycled content to separate those minerals as you mentioned um so I think they need to

be explored and and part of the innovation support you mentioned um they need to be looked at as one you know one other potential solution here to to limit our dependence on China >> but would you not agree that at least

for now minusing the technology and the processing facilities we are literally shipping out from this country critical and rare earth minerals back to China or many of their, you know, their friends

and allies that ultimately would allow them to recoup even more of the critical and rare earth mineral market.

>> Yeah. So, I think there's definitely opportunity. There are companies out

opportunity. There are companies out there that are already starting to look at this, but they need to be supported.

I don't think they have all the solutions and have scaled yet and that's, you know, again, back to the investment needed to be able to do that.

>> I would agree and I'd add that the pricing for that like black mass is actually controlled by China as well. So

they control the demand, they control the supply and it makes it difficult for uh companies with innovative technologies in the US, even in Europe to actually compete because the price floor is so low.

>> Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

>> Thank you, Representative Henson.

>> Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Um thank you to our witnesses for being here today. Uh

we have heard loud and clear that the CCP really um uses their pressure tactics to take advantage of and manipulate certain markets using a lot of illicit means to do that. and um they are able to dominate in those spaces

because the the playing field is not level. Uh we saw what happened during

level. Uh we saw what happened during COVID. Um that really I think

COVID. Um that really I think spotlighted our over reliance on China.

Um specifically with the supply chain and what that did to affordability for American consumers and that's really I think our focus going forward as we talk about critical minerals and how many things they're in. um we we talk about

how is that affordable for consumers and um I think the CCP's goals understanding those and how geopolitical they are in nature and how they fit into the bigger strategy that we're playing here um I think it it is apparent that we cannot

let their dominance grow further um and that's why I think these uh conversations about how we level the playing field what we do strategy-wise going forward are are so critical so um

what I want to talk about today is um how they've been able to do this how they've been able to aggressively undercut cut um not only the prices but dominate foreign markets and we've seen

them use that playbook specifically in the auto industry. Um can you discuss maybe Mr. Slower the the ways in which they are using their undue influence and unfair practices to dominate those

critical mineral supply chains um to impose the leverage over industries like the automotive industry. We saw that play out during COVID. Um we've seen a little recovery in the last few years but um how has that played out? And then

um using that as an example specifically in the auto industry, how can we maintain affordability for American consumers as we're looking to maybe shift around our supply chains to not be so reliant on China?

>> Yeah, it's a it's a really important point. I I think the interesting thing

point. I I think the interesting thing um certainly about like rare earth magnetics is relative to the total bill of materials on a car, it's a very insignificant portion. the cost, the

insignificant portion. the cost, the bill of materials for the actual rare earth magnets inside an automobile, it's very small. But you can't build the car

very small. But you can't build the car if you don't have the magnets. And think

about what's happening today. Um, in

order to secure your magnet supply chain and you're an automotive company, you're having to apply uh for a license and you hope it gets approved and you hope it gets approved so that you can keep your

auto plant running. So think about the coercive effect of that. What do you think those companies have in the back of their minds when they're deciding where to build their next generation

product right now? Literally right now.

Where should we site that plant? Um this

is why um um having this sort of control is coercive and kind of seeps into the decisions of uh all of all of really corporate America. And I think that's

corporate America. And I think that's why this is such a critical issue. As I

said in my prepared testimony, this industry is small. It's tens of billions of dollars, but there's trillions of economic activity downstream that it impacts and that's why this issue just

has to be taken off the table.

>> Yeah. Um given their price manipulation and of course uh global dominance in uh critical mineral supply chain, do you think that um Chinese auto manufacturers pose an existential threat to our

American manufacturers because they have the control over these mechanisms?

Well, I think China has um very astutely um recognized that the rare earth industry um uh while it may be a small

industry is absolutely vital to competitiveness in the downstream industries of the future, not just cars.

One thing we talk about a lot is physical AI, robotics. Robotics are

probably going to be the largest industry the world has ever seen. All of

the motion in a robot is rare magnet actuators. Um it's not just the products

actuators. Um it's not just the products of today, but it's the products of tomorrow. And absolutely, if you control

tomorrow. And absolutely, if you control the upstream supply chain, uh uh you can become enormously competitive and dominant downstream. Um and just look at

dominant downstream. Um and just look at Europe Europe's auto market today and how many Chinese cars are sold in Europe today. And I think it's it's no accident

today. And I think it's it's no accident um that that's happened.

>> So I think I know your answer probably to this next one then. Should we allow Chinese manufacturers to make their cars here? Should we allow them to um develop

here? Should we allow them to um develop batteries and and advance that supply chain here in the United States?

>> Um you know, I'm going to keep my comments isolated to the rare supply chain, but that does not sound like a great outcome to me. No.

>> Yeah, that's what I thought. Okay. So um

we know that our allies uh you talk about Europe, um they didn't do enough to thwart the the threat of China's dominance in rare earths. um we filed a World Trade Organization complaint only

um that caused China of course to shift their tactics in this space. So they've

always found found ways to kind of dodge and go around it. But um thankfully we're seeing some some push back there um from the Trump administration. Um we

know China was also able to dominate um the lithium industry specifically in a very short time span. And if it took as we know less than a decade to really control such a pivotal part of the supply chain um what would you say Mr.

Evans is the next thing that we need to address now. Right. I think we my

address now. Right. I think we my colleague talked about looking ahead and playing the long game here. Um is there any place that's kind of a blind spot for us outside of lithium that we need to be looking at um to get ahead of

this?

>> I can't comment as much about minerals outside of lithium, but I think there are other examples that are on the critical minerals list that came out uh that are all important. You know,

whether they be related to some of the the gallium and others that are used in small quantities. Uh I don't know if all

small quantities. Uh I don't know if all those are getting the same attention.

Antimony, there's a variety. Again, it

has to be a holistic look. Uh even with our neighbors like like Canada and other allied nations, but I'm hoping the question was asked earlier, when's the moment? I'm hoping it's now uh that we

moment? I'm hoping it's now uh that we take a look at what kind of threats these have, what ability we have in this country to actually respond. And the

question you asked earlier, I think it's tough for the automotive manufacturers because you have to get a foot in both worlds. So I have no choice but to buy

worlds. So I have no choice but to buy from the Chinese. So and they have global markets. uh they can suffer the

global markets. uh they can suffer the same consequences where Chinese government can actually literally just one company can't buy here anymore you know as punishment. So until we put alternatives for them and I'm not saying

that we wholesale were completely independent but alternatives that are either here or in allied countries I think it's very difficult for the automotive manufacturers I think it's like 4% of our GDP uh to actually make

clean decisions like that.

>> Thank you Mr. Chairman I yield back.

>> Thank you Representative New House.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thanks for having such a critical issue on critical mining for the subject today. Gentlemen,

thanks for being here and providing us important information. I want to go back

important information. I want to go back to the whole idea of federal permitting.

Um, it's no secret that China over the last number of decades has built up their critical mineral uh industry

whereas we have not. um we we face many challenges as in this country in order to accomplish that and certainly permitting reform as you've talked about

Mr. Evans in response to Mr. Johnson is is a big part of that. Um, so I'm I'm get I'm thinking that this is good timing to bring this issue up because

we're looking at in Congress right now addressing some of the critical aspects of building out infrastructure and that could mean a long list of different things and certainly mining is part of

that. So I'm glad we're talking about

that. So I'm glad we're talking about that today. Uh,

that today. Uh, as we go through this debate and discussion, I want to hear from you guys, all of you if you if you have an some input here. What are some of the

key factors that should be addressed as we look at this permitting reform issue?

What would be the most helpful in your space?

>> Putting uh as at least at least aspirational but hopefully uh more firm uh time limits on things, formal permitting process. And I also think the

permitting process. And I also think the same around the appeals process. Uh

again, it it rolls down to sometimes who the federal judge is, whether they're going to allow uh uh more folks into the into the actual the trial itself. U it's

very unpredictable.

There is a process that was put on by the first Trump administration for a year for a record of decision. It's

difficult uh partly because actually it it's difficult to find folks. We're in

Nevada. Nevada's a great state to operate in. It's a mining state and

operate in. It's a mining state and we're proud of that. uh but in other states you perhaps don't have the same experience northern amount staff to actually get that done. I think as well you can work with private companies

where uh they can assist actually through the permitting process uh with actually more help uh for the federal government in terms of outside uh resources that they need to actually move things

forward. And I think once you get to a

forward. And I think once you get to a point where there's a decision and there's an appeal, there has to be some sort of time limit on that as well. I

could have been in construction a year and a half ago. Uh you between the manipulation of price and driving it down, the lengthy process we had to go through appeals where private capital is

afraid to come off the sideline. Um and

even, you know, legislation we have here, the loan can't even be closed and drawn until you have no more litigation.

Uh and it's all compounds uh and slows things down. And in unfortunate cases

things down. And in unfortunate cases with some companies, it bankrupts them.

>> Yeah. Which like you said is the goal on some of these people's parts.

>> Anybody else? I think in these industries permitting does need to move more quickly and ideally at the speed of national security. There are national

national security. There are national security implications. I think due

security implications. I think due process is important. Um not all projects, not all mines belong in all areas. That's a reality. I I agree with

areas. That's a reality. I I agree with my colleague here that um if you put timestamps on a process to allow that to happen, I think that's that's hugely helpful. But I just want to highlight

helpful. But I just want to highlight too that there are very high standard projects. A lot of people are surprised

projects. A lot of people are surprised when I tell them the second largest rare earth mine in the world is in the state of California that we operate uh in an incredibly environmentally um

responsible way. Um I'm very proud of

responsible way. Um I'm very proud of that. It is very possible. Um and and I

that. It is very possible. Um and and I I think that's what everyone should keep in mind. There is a way to do this

in mind. There is a way to do this responsibly and we just have to figure out how do we get there more quickly.

>> Yeah, good deal. Mr. Roundtree.

>> Yeah, I think this is another benefit of alternative technologies. Uh we're

alternative technologies. Uh we're fortunate because we're using iron and nitrogen. um that the processes that we

nitrogen. um that the processes that we use uh enable us to make magnets more sustainably than than rare earth magnets and so we're not quite as constrained on the on the permitting side but at scale

yes we will be you know we will need help on permitting right um and I think having a clear timeline clear processes that allow certainty or more certainty

right that things will move forward at the right required speed to address this are going to be important >> good good um just real quickly in the few seconds I have left. You know, some

of the minerals certainly are not that we need are not geographically located here in the US. We have to depend on other sources obviously. So, how can how

can this country better leverage our um relationships with our allies so that we're less dependent on places like China?

Are there things opportunities there perhaps that we can identify?

Um maybe I'll go first. Um I think it's every single country outside of China is fa facing for rare earth the same licensing issues, right? It's not just the US. And so I think it is critical to

the US. And so I think it is critical to um basically come together and work together to try and solve and create these alternate supply chains and support critical industries, you know, around the world.

>> Very good.

>> Yes. I I know we've had recent discussions with Australia and Australia has actually suffered the same fate with their nickel industry, even their lithium industry uh with dumping in China uh because they send the raw

materials in and unfortunately there's not really processing capabilities in Australia. Uh Canada is another uh

Australia. Uh Canada is another uh country that we've done a lot of work with. We can continue are their

with. We can continue are their neighbors next door and they're rich in some of the minerals that we don't have here as well. Even countries uh even the European Union uh I don't know what their mining regime is like there as

well but in Scandinavia and other places are actually good deposits of actually critical minerals as well but we're all suffering the same issue and I think it's all coming to roost all these

countries uh that somewhat sold our soul and allowed China to take the narrative here it's hollowing out the the downstream industries which are highly technological this country is going to

their growth because the Chinese can shut off this whenever whenever they want to.

>> Yeah. Right.

>> I would just add support US companies projecting American capabilities abroad.

I I think we have to go abroad in some cases and it should be American companies doing so.

>> Oh, great. I appreciate again. Thank you

guys for being here and uh this is just the beginning of this conversation.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

>> Thank you, Representative Jimenez.

>> Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I've said this before. I mean, I look for the day

this before. I mean, I look for the day I look forward to the day when we make the the Chinese can eat their lithium.

And so I I I don't think that we're going to we're chasing we're chasing tales here. I I don't think we're ever

tales here. I I don't think we're ever going to get to the point that uh um we're going to be able to compete with the Chinese on uh the rare earth on the rare earth issue. I really don't. I mean

I just think that if we even try, they'll take steps to make sure that it fails. They'll embargo us or whatever

fails. They'll embargo us or whatever and then we'll we'll we'll cry uncle and and that's it. So I'm I'm more more focused on alternatives

and investing in alternatives. Are there

alternatives to these rare earths today or are there alternatives to these rare earth uh materials and the uses for them you know you can see on the horizon and

then um Mr. uh Rree Rontree uh if you can answer that I appreciate it.

Yeah, I I think you know we developed our technology you know over 12 years to really solve the challenge with rare earth magnets right so this is a new type of magnet technology it's the first

new magnetic material being commercialized in 30 years um there are other alternatives um that need to be developed and and invested in and found but it's not going to find not

necessarily going to be a quick solution to this >> but we have to invest now we have to start that journey. Now, um we're fortunate that the Department of Energy

had the foresight to invest in Nyron after the first world's rare earth crisis uh back in 20101 where a Japanese uh impounded a Chinese fishing troller

and that was the first kind of signal how China would use rare earths really as a as an economic trade weapon. Um so

yes, we need to invest in these alternatives now, but it is not going to be quick and easy. We're fortunate that for Nyron, we're at a place where we've already gone from the gram to the ton scale and now we're really scaling the

technology. So, we're at the in the

technology. So, we're at the in the right place at the right time with the right product to help solve for rare earth magnets. Um, but there are other

earth magnets. Um, but there are other alternatives that need to be developed and innovated and invested in.

>> Would it wouldn't it be cheaper just for us to go full blast on on developing alternatives versus trying to catch the Chinese at this game? I think the Chinese are so far ahead, it's it's impossible for us to catch up. We need

all of the above solutions to this right now. So, we need to do all of the things

now. So, we need to do all of the things that we've talked about here today. Um,

and more uh because this is this is a crisis for for the US supply, but also for the West and we have to work together to solve this as quickly as possible.

>> Well, right now we need their rare earths, but they also need our money, our cash. And I, you know, I've been

our cash. And I, you know, I've been saying here, we need to decouple from China because I think we're funding the instrument of our demise every single day. Every dollar that we send over

day. Every dollar that we send over there is actually going to be used against us. And it is being used against

against us. And it is being used against us. What percentage of u the rare rare

us. What percentage of u the rare rare earth market does the United States represent?

>> We mine the what?

>> No, no, no. % of the the in other words the pro the processed end product how much of it do we buy what percentage of

the world market do we buy need here for our for our purposes >> I I can answer that the so the US uses around 50,000 tons per year of magnets they don't buy that amount of magnets

are embedded in a lot of the end devices you know cars audio systems pumps motors etc that contain those magnets. uh today

it's around 300,000 tons of magnets globally right so it's around 15 to 20% of the world's rare earth magnets are being supplied into the US in a variety of different end use applications

>> how about the European uh union how much do they do they consume >> it's a little bit less but it's that kind of same um 10 10,000 it's it's less

but it's it's quite significant >> so with us and the European uh union well over a third of the market.

>> Yes, I believe so. We can provide that information uh afterwards in writing if that would be helpful. would the

European Union be be willing to let's you know one of the things that that I looked at here or the testimony or at least um some of the things that I saw was was that you know maybe what we

should do is um establish kind of rolling tariffs on these materials so that a Chinese uh rare earth

materials would never we would never allow it to be cheaper than say US a US-made product. So, you know, would

US-made product. So, you know, would bounce up and down. So, if if somehow the the Chinese uh you know, really wanted to suppress the price of a certain product, certain material, we

would then raise the tariff on that material so that it would always be kind of like equal uh to the United States.

Do you think that that the the European uh Union would join us in this effort knowing that they're just as vulnerable as we are to Chinese manipulation?

Yeah, I um it's a great question. I I

can't comment on the European Union, but I will point out that even though we use 50,000 tons a year here in the US, we're not buying that that many magnets. It's

significant. It's around 7 to 10,000.

So, the challenge there is they're embedded in different end devices that we're purchasing. So, how how do you

we're purchasing. So, how how do you manage that or how do you regulate that or provide tariffs on that? It's not an easy question to figure out.

>> Okay, my time is expired. Thank you. May

I yield back?

>> Thank you, Representative Moran.

>> Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you uh for each of you being here today to discuss this very important issue about critical minerals and the CCP's economic warfare against the American people.

Warfare that, as each of you know, is strategic. It's long-term. And as our

strategic. It's long-term. And as our report today aptly describes, it's predatory. When our country prepares for

predatory. When our country prepares for war, or when any country prepares for war, what does it do? It not only stockpiles resources that it needs, but it also seeks to consolidate the means

of production to ensure that their populace and industries are the only ones who can consume those in a very critical time period. That's exactly

what I think Xiinping and the Chinese Communist Party are doing. The goal in my mind for them, and I think they've stated this clearly, is total control, to total domination. We both, the United

States and China, know how vital critical minerals are. we both

understand how vital that role is in our economy across the world. I want to start talking about something specific to my region, Northeast Texas. Uh it's a

region where lots of lithium is and lithium as many people know, but for those that are watching that don't know, it's critical. It's a key critical

it's critical. It's a key critical mineral that the US must invest in and that we will see dividends if we properly do. East Texas is at the

properly do. East Texas is at the forefront of that as as all of you are aware of uh with companies nearing production in that area. Uh northeast

Texas has the highest grade lithium brine resource in all of North America.

It's part of that smackover region. Uh

it's part of that smackover formation that spans from western edge of Florida all the way to East Texas and we're proud to be uh supporters of that development in northeast Texas as we

can. So let me start with you Mr. Evans.

can. So let me start with you Mr. Evans.

What are the most significant barriers to your that your companies have faced when trying to start a new critical minerals project in the US? You

mentioned a few earlier. And then how can the federal government either get out of the way or give you your your industries the ability to progress quickly.

>> Thank you, Congressman. And you're

right. I know the smack formation well.

Actually, good friends with the CEO of Standard Lithium. So, they're doing

Standard Lithium. So, they're doing great work. Uh, look, permitting and

great work. Uh, look, permitting and it's a little different probably maybe in the region there. there's a lot of private land but still a state gets involved and there will be federal involvement. So to the extent that the

involvement. So to the extent that the red tape can be cut and the permitting processes actually can be predictable I think that's really important. Number

two of that again is is capital uh cost of these projects is very similar in terms of capital intensity. Uh it's

going to be more than than the Chinese.

It's going to be more than Africa and so forth. These are high quality worldclass

forth. These are high quality worldclass resources. But getting over that capital

resources. But getting over that capital hump, this is no different than to me semiconductors building a semiconductor fab in the United States is very expensive. However, once they get into

expensive. However, once they get into operation, their operating costs are world class. Both these deposits can

world class. Both these deposits can operate actually on a global basis and actually become a new supply free from Chinese control. But getting over and

Chinese control. But getting over and getting financing is really key. But

part of that, as I mentioned before, is pricing transparency. Both of these

pricing transparency. Both of these projects could have moved much much faster if the Chinese hadn't colluded over the last three years to depress lithium prices to an all-time low. As I

mentioned before and actually the CEO of CL actually even admitted they there was an active effort amongst the Chinese government and actually the largest battery suppliers to push the price of lithium actually well below their cost

to run it. I know the deposit that they have in China and they're claiming it's really great. If it was so great they

really great. If it was so great they would have done it 10 years ago. It was

an active effort actually to suppress projects like that and ours from actually growing. Can

actually growing. Can >> can you help the American people understand or any of the three of you how large the deposit of lithium is would be across the United States in that smacker formation? What it could be

transformationally to our economy and to our ability to uh become independent from and decouple from China >> between Nevada and the Arkansas Texas region. We have much better reserves

region. We have much better reserves than the Chinese do. Uh and actually if you combine them together, it's more than what you actually have in Bolivia.

Uh it's higher grade and better than what you have in Canada. It's actually

better and more responsible mining techniques. Uh we could be actually a

techniques. Uh we could be actually a worldclass sizable global supplier of actually lithium refined chemicals in this country and actually usurp the Chinese. Mr. Slasher, I want to come to

Chinese. Mr. Slasher, I want to come to you with my last question. I'm a member of the Ways and Means Committee. I've

been clear that I think our tariff policy should be focused on key industries and imposed in a manner that is targeted and gets the results we need for those key industries. In April this year, the Trump administration launched

a section 232 investigation into critical minerals and has closed deals with many of our trading partners, including Argentina, South Korea, Australia, Japan, Thailand, that address

opening our markets to trade critical minerals. The most recent deal with

minerals. The most recent deal with China states that they must quote effectively eliminate China's current and proposed export controls on rare earth elements and other critical

minerals end quote. I think we have to stay very vigilant to ensure that that is actually upheld. Mr. Schlouse, here's my question. If China does not uphold

my question. If China does not uphold their agreement to export minerals freely, what targeted tariffs would be beneficial for your industries that might change China's behavior and how

can they be structured to not inadvertently be a barrier to you?

>> Yeah, thank you sir. That that's a really important 232 investigation. I

think the administration's taking strong efforts to bring supply online and as we do, I think we should look at trade measures to protect our domestic markets. I think the key thing here is

markets. I think the key thing here is we should not just look at the critical minerals themselves um but the derivative products such as magnets and

then um the imports of those derivative products in in consumer goods. Uh we

bring in a lot of magnets in consumer goods and I think we need to contemplate that.

>> Thank you. My time's up. I yield back.

>> Thank you. And uh I also just want to thank all our witnesses. Appreciate you

being here with us today. And questions

for the record are due one week from today. And without objection, the

today. And without objection, the committee hearing is adjourned.