Global Geopolitical Outlook 2026

Thank you. Thank you. Good afternoon. My

name is Terry Martin as you just heard and uh it's great to be back at the World Knowledge Forum. This is I believe my eighth time at the World Knowledge Forum and I always get to talk to really

interesting people. It's why one of the

interesting people. It's why one of the reasons why I keep coming back. I also

like Korea a lot. Um but you I never get to talk to people any more interesting than the gentleman sitting right next to me here on this stage. Um it is really

my my great pleasure to introduce uh Hal Brance. Hal Brans uh we already just

Brance. Hal Brans uh we already just heard a brief introduction. You saw some details about him up on your screen. He

is a foreign affairs global policy guru in many circles. I know he's not he would reject that title, but uh he's highly regarded. He's a professor,

highly regarded. He's a professor, distinguished professor at John's Hopkins. He's a senior fellow at the

Hopkins. He's a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. He's a

columnist with Bloomberg and he's an author of many books. Uh as you may know, uh in fact, he's coming directly from a book signing. Some of you may

have attended that. I understand it's been translated into Korean danger zone.

gripping titles by the way complements that the coming conflict with China from 2022 still very relevant though and most recently the Eurasian century hot wars

cold wars and the making of the modern world uh that's out this year we say we're going to be hopping around to different global hotspots looking at different conflicts the one we're going

to look at right now is the Ukraine war Russia's war in Ukraine we saw President Trump and Vladimir Putin meeting in Alaska uh last month Um, what are the prospects for a peace deal at this

point?

>> I think they're they're pretty slim. And

you know, I mentioned that I I got off the plane and saw news of the Israeli strike and and Qatar. The other thing I saw when I got off the plane was news that a number of Russian drones had

crossed into Poland and had apparently been shot down by the Polish Air Force, may maybe with some support from from other NATO uh countries. And and that's

a that's a reminder that while the war has been mostly localized in Ukraine, the longer it goes on and the more assertive Russia feels, the higher the

chances that it will spill over in some way or or another. Um I think President Trump uh hoped and and and thought that maybe he had a chance to push Putin

toward a peace deal when he hosted him in Alaska a couple of weeks ago.

Unfortunately, there there's just not much evidence to suggest that Russia's objectives in the war have have changed at all. Um, when Putin talks about

at all. Um, when Putin talks about Russia's objectives, they appear to be the same as they always have been, which is not just the the conquest of more territory from Ukraine, but basically

destroying Ukraine as an independent political entity that can make its own choices about foreign policy and whether it's going to align with the West rather than Russia. that that's been his goal

than Russia. that that's been his goal throughout this conflict and there's not much to suggest that that has changed.

Uh and so as long as that is the case, it's it's really hard to see what a settlement looks like because any settlement that Putin would offer would be one that that would be, you know,

sort of lethal to the Ukrainian future and one that a Ukrainian government would find very difficult to accept. And

and so my view is that this conflict is going to persist through the end of this year almost certainly. Um and ultimately the outcome will be determined by sort of this question of whether the

Ukrainian military or the Russian economy gives out first.

>> Interesting. Yes. Uh just yesterday I have had a session uh which involved the former foreign minister of Ukraine. He

told me too that he does not see any that we are nearing peace there anytime soon either. India. Many many people

soon either. India. Many many people expected that the US and India would have better relations under Donald Trump. That Donald Trump would try to

Trump. That Donald Trump would try to move closer closer to stronger ties with India. Now we've seen massive tariffs

India. Now we've seen massive tariffs being imposed on India for buying Russian oil. Uh and this is uh this you

Russian oil. Uh and this is uh this you know involves the Ukraine conflict as well. So, but anyway, so far we've seen

well. So, but anyway, so far we've seen disputes over trade, security issues, the war in Ukraine, all of it affecting that. Why are in why are US Indian

that. Why are in why are US Indian relations deteriorating? I I think this

relations deteriorating? I I think this has been one of the big surprises of Trump's second term in part because President Trump and Prime Minister Modi

got along pretty well during Trump's first term. Trump traveled to India and

first term. Trump traveled to India and Modi had a big rally in his honor. Modi

came to the United States and Trump repaid the favor. Um the these are leaders that you know both uh have sort of very populist personalistic styles of politics. You know that they both take

politics. You know that they both take sort of a transactional approach to international affairs. there seemed to

international affairs. there seemed to be a lot to suggest that they would get along. And moreover, um deeper

along. And moreover, um deeper engagement with and support for India has been a story of US foreign policy on

on a bipartisan basis for the last 25 years. Um really going back to the very

years. Um really going back to the very end of the Clinton administration in 1999 and 2000, American leaders have tried to cultivate a partnership with India. Uh because they say, well, you

India. Uh because they say, well, you know, America is the world's oldest democracy. India is the world's largest

democracy. India is the world's largest democracy. There's there should be an

democracy. There's there should be an ideological affinity there. They think

of India as a key contributor to a balance of power in Asia that wouldn't be dominated by China. So there's a geostrategic imperative there.

>> Exactly.

>> And and over the past 10 years in particular that they've looked at India as um an alternative to China when it comes to supply chains and technological development and other aspects of the

international economy. And and so it

international economy. And and so it sort of seemed for a long time like this relationship was destined to work in one way or another, but there there have been some strains and I think the Trump

administration has has brought them to the surface. And so one one strain was

the surface. And so one one strain was that American leaders I think have long been frustrated with um protectionist economic policies in India. Up until

2025, the idea was that you would sort of chip away at that issue privately incrementally as opposed to having a public confrontation. The Trump

public confrontation. The Trump administration had had less um patience with that approach. The other issue that has sometimes been a source of friction in the US India relationship is the

perception in the United States that that India sort of plays both sides of the fence when it comes to international politics. And so the United States and

politics. And so the United States and India have have pretty close cooperation on Asian security issues and issues pertaining to balancing against China.

Um but India follows its own national interests and has long gone its own way in dealings with Russia in particular which has long been a crucial strategic partner for for India. Um and and that

is um at sort of the root of this dispute over India buying Russian oil.

It it's a complicated backstory because the US actually encouraged India to buy Russian oil in in the early stages of the war. Um the Trump administration

the war. Um the Trump administration again has had less patience with that because Trump looks at this and he says if the Russians couldn't sell oil to India and also to China, it'd be very

difficult to keep funding the war. And

so he sees this Indian practice as a barrier to the peace that he's trying to broker. And then there's one last piece

broker. And then there's one last piece of this which makes it even even naughtier which is that um I think Trump is quite serious when he says that he

wants to win the Nobel Peace Prize. Um

and we've had reports that uh you know he he was very uh encouraged by the fact that Pakistan nominated him for the Nobel Peace Prize after he may or may not have played a role in mediating between India and Pakistan early this

year and he was annoyed that the Indians had not done the same. uh and and so you know you can decide how seriously you want to take that but I don't think it's it's an outlandish approach. So so

that's all the the backstory. I mean

what I will say just about the road forward we've seen even in the past 24 hours Trump and Modi have sort of tweeted very nice things about each other. They they've said that they are

other. They they've said that they are going to continue to negotiate on the tariff issue and that they both see a lot of value in the relationship. I hope

and I think ultimately that we will get some sort of deal here because from an American perspective there there's really no way of balancing against Chinese power in India in Asia without

India and from India's perspective there's no way of balancing against the big Chinese power next door without a functional relationship with the United States.

>> So many analysts have been saying that Trump the Trump administration is at risk of pushing India into the arms of China. India and China having been great

China. India and China having been great geostrategic rivals for a long long time. You don't really see that

time. You don't really see that happening.

>> No, I I I think Indian officials understand that if they were to sort of go over to the Chinese side of the fence that that would be sort of quasi suicidal from the perspective of of

Indian security and perhaps economic interests. Um there has been a modest

interests. Um there has been a modest thaw in India China relations underway for about two or three years. um

basically trying to get back to where things were before that deadly border clash uh in the Himalayas in in 2020.

And so US policy has probably given Prime Minister Modi a little bit of extra incentive to to go go in that direction. But I I think I would view

direction. But I I think I would view this very much as sort of a tactical repositioning by India rather than a bigger strategic shift.

>> Focusing now on China itself. Uh,

President Trump started out with high tariffs on China, uh, trade pressures.

Now he seems to be looking for a big economic deal with Xi Jinping.

What is Trump trying to achieve and how likely is it that we'll see a some sort of bargain in the making there?

>> Well, I think Trump has always seen himself as the world's ultimate dealmaker and and that certainly applies to the relationship with with China. Um

it it's interesting that you know we often date sort of the emergence of the US China the new cold war this great power rivalry to President Trump's first term which is appropriate in many ways

because that was when a number of US policies toward China shifted but you'll recall that Trump actually spent the first three years of his presidency

chasing a big beautiful trade deal with China wi-i which which was signed in January 2020 and then co came along and the relationship ship fell apart. I

think Trump has had in mind some sort of economic deal with China since he he took office again in January 2025. He

started out by pursuing that through pressure tactics layering on tariffs on the fentinel issue uh and and then tariffs uh the liberation day tariffs in early April to the point where you had

sort of 143% or or whatever the number was tariffs on Chinese goods by the time we got to the middle of that month. Uh

Trump has since pivoted in part because he was sort of shocked by how hard the Chinese were able to squeeze the United States with with its export controls on rare earth elements. But but the

objective is the same. He's still trying to get this big breakthrough deal with with Xiinping focusing on economic issues. Um and and we've seen some discussion of what this

might look like. you know, greater Chinese soybean purchases from the United States, maybe greater access, the Chinese market for US firms, perhaps from Chinese investment in the United States and other things of that that

sort. I I think there are sort of two

sort. I I think there are sort of two big challenges to the China uh ploy that Trump is attempting right now. The first

is that the Chinese government doesn't seem to be in a hurry to cut a deal. I

think Xiinping believes that China is in a very strong position because of the rare earth export controls that I just mentioned. And so for the last couple of

mentioned. And so for the last couple of months, he has been happy to sort of sit back and accept a number of concessions that the US has made on um semiconductor

export controls uh to give just one example and to kind of wait for things to come to him. So there hasn't actually been a huge amount of progress uh in these talks and I think you've seen

Trump get a little bit frustrated over that in the past 10 days or so. The

second reason though is is just that regardless of whether Trump and Xiinping can work out some sort of trade deal.

The reality is that the USChina relationship is going to remain fundamentally antagonistic um for a long time to come. The the

economic fundamentals of the relationship are are bad. there there's

no um chance that China is going to change its export oriented economic model which creates overcapacity problems for the US and other countries around the world. Chinese and US security interests still bump up against

each other in a pretty fundamental way uh particularly in the Pacific and and there are a variety of other deeper issues in the relationship and and so you might get a flashy summit that leads to some sort of nice signing of a trade

agreement but I don't think that the fundamentals of the relationship will dramatically shift >> which brings us to the Asia Pacific the South China Sea in particular another

hot spot um there was some remarkable video that came out uh recently. It was

just last month. Two Chinese ships, I don't know, many of you, I'm sure, have seen it, ramming, running into each other. I mean, inadvertently, while

other. I mean, inadvertently, while chasing a Filipino uh vessel away from this disputed reef, I want to ask you about the security situation in the South China Sea. Um that resonates very

strongly in this part of the world for obvious reasons. Uh what about Taiwan?

obvious reasons. Uh what about Taiwan?

What about the danger of a conflict? I

do lots of interviews on this subject as well and uh the question to the analysts is always so when do you think we're going to see some sort of hot conflict in the South China Sea and there are various uh you I'm not I won't say what

what I'm hearing most of the time but I'm just wondering what your take is on that.

>> So so the footage that you referred to um came from a place around a place called Second Thomas Shaw where where the Philippines and China have been sort of disputing a semi-submerged reef for a

long long time. Um, and the Philippine Navy ran around one of its own vessels there in 1999 as a way of trying to stake its claim to to the reef. Uh,

which has led to sort of a game of cat and mouse since then as the Chinese essentially try to prevent resupply of of sort of the the folks who are stationed on that vessel and to force

them off the reef. And it occasionally gets pretty dangerous. I I think sort of the bigger story uh in both the South China Sea and and in the Taiwan Strait

is that we're looking at a China that is increasingly militarily capable.

Um that is increasingly asserting its interests around disputed territories.

Um and as that happens that the danger of a larger outbreak of violence gets bigger. If we're thinking about the

bigger. If we're thinking about the South China Sea, um the the really sort of troubling scenario in my mind is one in which um a Chinese Coast Guard vessel

rams or or otherwise interferes with uh you know, one of these Filipino Navy vessels, a Filipino service member is killed and that could trigger the US

Philippines defense treaty. In fact, the United States has basically said um if China kills Filipino personnel in the South China Sea, that would invoke the US Philippines alliance and then we'd be

into a larger crisis. Uh and so the more Chinese coercion you get around these disputed features, the higher the chances of something like that eventually happening. The other problem

eventually happening. The other problem spot of course is is Taiwan. Um and here that the Chinese uh military buildup and and the buildup of Chinese military

activities has been pretty remarkable.

So if you think back just um three years to August 2022, it made global news when when China carried out these very aggressive

military exercises around Taiwan after Nancy Pelosi, the then the speaker of the US House of Representatives went went to visit. The Chinese are now doing things of this nature on a regular

basis, several times a year. Um, you

have increasingly aggressive uh aerial uh flights and coast guard patrols around some of the outlying islands of Taiwan. The Chinese are basically

Taiwan. The Chinese are basically advertising their ability to do a blockade or a quarantine or some other operation against Taiwan on very short notice. I think what what's driving this

notice. I think what what's driving this very briefly are two factors. First,

China's military capabilities are are getting better. So, China believes it

getting better. So, China believes it has a greater ability to coers Taiwan than it has before. But second, China has become more alarmed with the trend of Taiwanese politics over the past

decade and particularly since 2024 uh when William lie, the current president of Taiwan was inaugurated. I won't go into a lot of detail on this, but basically the fear in Beijing is that

Taiwan is drifting away from the mainland politically and at the same time, China is getting greater ability to coers Taiwan militarily. that that's

a bad combination. And so it's hard to predict when exactly a crisis might happen, but the risks are certainly rising.

Which brings us now back to this where we are right now on the Korean Peninsula. Uh tensions here, they go

Peninsula. Uh tensions here, they go back and forth. I've been coming here every year for the past eight years and each time I've been trying to visit the,

you know, those famous blue huts there on the border and it's been closed or open for different reasons. The first

time I came it was because there were peace talks going on there or some sort of reconciliation talks uh on that border. Then there were there were

border. Then there were there were blowing things up and you know it goes back and forth. I'm just wondering what's your take on where things stand right now, particularly given what's

happening with North Korea and its cooperation with Russia and where China fits into all of this and how with North Korea's capabilities, military

capabilities that it's been developing, its missile technologies, its uh tests that it's been carrying out. How

concerned should South Korea be at this point? Well, it's it's another timely

point? Well, it's it's another timely subject given that uh another one of the sort of the striking visual images of the last week or so was when Vladimir Putin and and Kim Jong-un showed up in

Beijing for the the ceremony to mark the the 80th anniversary of the end of World War II and they were welcomed as honored guests by Xiinping in a way that sort of underscored the extent to which all

three of these countries uh see themselves as struggling against sort of the same international system that has long been anchored by the United states and its its allies in Europe and and in

East Asia uh in particular. I I think you put your finger on the the key dimensions uh the key ways in which the North Korean challenge has gotten worse

uh over the past few years. And I I would really point to to two things in particular. Um the first is this

particular. Um the first is this alliance with Russia. uh uh there's long been a close relationship but it was formalized as an alliance with mutual defense commitments uh about a year ago

uh and we have now seen something that I think very few of us uh would have predicted three years ago which is North Korean troops deployed in a land war in

Europe um helping Vladimir Putin fight against uh Ukraine that came with fairly high cost for a number of the North Korean soldiers but it also means that Kim Jong-un now has a military or at

least part of that military is battle testing in a way that it was not uh before. And it and it indicates also

before. And it and it indicates also that the benefits that North Korea is is getting from this uh relationship, not just the military experience, but also um we've had reports that the Russian

technology and knowhow is now fortifying uh the North Korean defense industrial base and North Korean weapons programs. And of course, Russia has played a larger role in trying to shield North Korea from international scrutiny of its

weapons programs uh over the past uh year and change in particular. So that's

one way in which the challenge has gotten worse. The the other way is

gotten worse. The the other way is simply that the North Korean nuclear and missile programs have become more advanced uh and more sophisticated than uh they were at the beginning of the

last Trump administration when we had a year of fairly high tensions followed by a year of of of negotiations after that.

Um, and this is really bringing, I think, the US South Korea alliance to an inflection point. And, and so what's

inflection point. And, and so what's going to happen at some point this decade, if it hasn't happened already, is that North Korea's intercontinental attack capabilities will basically

outpace US homeland missile defenses unless those defenses are improved in significant way. And when that happens,

significant way. And when that happens, I think it creates pretty fundamental questions for the US South Korea alliance because from that point onward, every US president will have to take

into account the risk that if America intervenes in a conflict on the Korean peninsula, you could see nuclear strikes against the United States itself. And

and that sort of threatens the extended nuclear deterrence pledge that has underpinned the US South Korea relationship for a long long time. you

have seen the US and South Korea start tackling that problem. Um the the Washington declaration that was made uh by presidents Biden and Yun back in 2023 was meant to address this by creating

forums for consultation on nuclear issues and and seeing greater deployments of you know American nuclear weapon submarines around the Korean peninsula and things of that nature. But

but I think that's sort of only the beginning of the steps that the US and South Korea are going to have to take to make sure that the alliance remains cohesive as the North Korean threat increases.

Okay, we're going to move to questions here in just a second, so be ready for that. Um, what about the cooperation

that. Um, what about the cooperation between South Korea, Japan, the United States kind of helping to strengthen the

security on the peninsula here, but also in the region? I think this is has been one of the really positive developments certainly from an American perspective o

over the past uh few years just to to zoom out briefly before zooming back in.

Um the the key I think to understanding the the state craft of the US in the Asia- Pacific over the past decade um and under the Biden administration in

particular is to try to create greater connective tissue between America's various bilateral security relationships in the region. And so there there has never been a regionwide alliance that

the United States leads in Asia in the same way that there has been in Europe.

And that creates various dilemmas. But

what the United States has been trying to do is is to make sure that there is greater connectivity between those various relationships and and one of the areas where there was a big breakthrough

uh with the Camp David meeting in in 2023 um was with the South Korea Japan United States relationship that that's a critical strategic triangle in northeast

uh Asia. It can help um all three

uh Asia. It can help um all three countries deal with the North Korean threat. it can help all three countries

threat. it can help all three countries coordinate on other threats to regional security in the Western Pacific and in the Taiwan Strait in particular. And and

I think there was real optimism about where that relationship was going. I I

think there there are sort of greater question marks around it now because you have now had political changes in all three countries uh since 2023.

But I I hope that it will continue. I

hope the US will remain engaged on this issue. So I hope that the political

issue. So I hope that the political leadership in Japan and South Korea will remain engaged on these issues, but I think because I think it really is the key to sort of creating greater resilience in Northeast Asia to these

various forms of coercion.

>> Very good. Okay, we're going to move over to questions now. I believe we have one or two people with microphones standing by. There's a hand. Very good.

standing by. There's a hand. Very good.

>> Hello, Professor Brands. Um, nice to see you. I have a question about upcoming

you. I have a question about upcoming 2026 midterm, uh, US midterm. So I want to know uh if that's going to influence the 2026 politics uh geopolitics of US

because Trump might be you know kind of scared the midterm or even the post midterm how it's going to change either uh Democratic party uh gets the majority

seats on the Congress. I wonder how it's going to shift uh after the midterm.

>> Sure. Um, so the the way I would think about midterm elections in general and midterm this this midterm election in the United States in particular is that

the outcome of the midterm election will not have dramatic direct effects on US foreign policy or American engagement of the world because

uh foreign policy power in the United States is pretty pretty heavily concentrated in the executive branch.

branch and even if you were to end up with a Democratic majority in the House of Representatives or in the Senate for instance, it would be such a narrow majority that those bodies would not be

able to impose their will politically on the president on on any of the issues that he cares about, tariffs or other things uh for for instance. So you won't

get sort of a big shift in US policy on any particular issue globally simply as a result of the outcome of the elections. I think I think the elections

elections. I think I think the elections will be very closely watched internationally though because they will have sort of a large indirect effect uh or at least shape perceptions of where

the United States is going over the longer term. And so so the pattern

longer term. And so so the pattern politically in the United States is that uh the party that holds the White House typically loses seats in the midterm

elections. Not always, but that that's

elections. Not always, but that that's usually the rule. That's usually the pattern. Uh and so if you see the

pattern. Uh and so if you see the Democrats take at least one House of Congress uh during the 2026 midterms, I think it will be interpreted as an

indication that there's still some life left in the Democratic party, which has been struggling pretty significantly. uh

and and that there is a reasonable prospect that you will have a Democratic president in 2029 and and after. If the

Republican party is able to maintain uh its majorities in both the House and the Senate, um I think I think that will be a fairly strong indication that the

Democratic Party has a lot of work to do before it's going to be competitive nationally. Again, it's it's pretty

nationally. Again, it's it's pretty striking. So, if you if you look at the

striking. So, if you if you look at the polls right now, um, President Trump is is not wildly popular. His his his approval rating is, you know, it's typically somewhere between the high30s

and the low 40s, but he's still more popular than the Democratic party who whose approval rating is sort of in the low30s right now. That that that is a very bad place for the Democratic party

to be. It indicates that they have lost

to be. It indicates that they have lost enthusiasm among their own voters in addition to sort of swing v voters in the middle of the political spectrum.

And there are a lot of reasons for that.

It has to do with sort of the progressive moderate split in the party.

It has to do with the generational change that is happening as sort of the old guard moves out and and a new cohort of leaders moves in. Um but if they're

not able to sort of regenerate that enthusiasm among their base while also appealing to voters who might have swung toward Trump in in 2024, the Democratic party is going to have a very long road

ahead.

I can tell there there is tremendous interest in this room about what's going on in the United States. Uh but I we're we only have about three minutes left. I

want to get your take how on uh the kind of bigger geopolitical picture that's shaping up. Uh many are talking about

shaping up. Uh many are talking about great power competition. Suddenly it's

now we've got great powers that are now being contested again at this point and vying for um for for strength in a

multi- uh power multi uh multi-olar world. But the one question that many

world. But the one question that many have is with the United States kind of withdrawing to some degree from the world stage on in certain ways what is

going to fill the vacuum? Do you see the with the G8 and the G20 being challenged with even the United States putting NATO into question to some degree and the US

kind of pulling back with the America first policy? Do you see other other

first policy? Do you see other other groupings taking shape? Be it the the Shanghai Cooperation Organization that

where we just saw the big meeting taking place in in China or the uh the BRICS states. Do you see those organizations

states. Do you see those organizations or organizations like them playing a greater role moving forward on world war?

>> That's a really interesting question.

Um, let me let me try to sort of briefly offer three thoughts in response to that. First, I I think it is still an

that. First, I I think it is still an open question whether the US is going to be deeply involved or less involved in global affairs 5 to 10 years from now. I

think the story of the Trump administration is is complicated on these issues. There's some areas clearly

these issues. There's some areas clearly where the Trump administration has less patience for say US security commitments in Europe than than prior administrations did. But of course,

administrations did. But of course, President Trump, you know, for all he's talked about ending wars, he's already fought two wars in the Middle East through the first eight months of his administration. So, it's it's a

administration. So, it's it's a complicated picture. And that that's

complicated picture. And that that's point one. Point two is that um both of

point one. Point two is that um both of the institutions you just mentioned, BRICS and the SEO

um look very impressive on paper but have real conflicts with within them. Um

you know no matter whether Modi and she are are shaking hands, there is still a deep divide between India and China.

That that goes to the heart of both the SEO and BRICS because both both countries are members of both of those organizations. bricks in particular has

organizations. bricks in particular has had a hard time accomplishing anything concrete, anything substantive over the the 20 years or so that it has been in

in existence. So I I don't know that

in existence. So I I don't know that necessarily I would look to those organizations but but I do think that the the basic point underlying the

question is is right which is that it is really hard to imagine sort of a stable international system that persists and

that thrives if the United States is not playing constructive role and anchoring it and just sort of look look around at the regions that we've talked about. It

it is theoretically possible for European countries to sort of balance against Russia on their own. They have

the economic power to do that, but it's going to be a decade before they're ready to do it. In theory, you could get an Israel uh Gulf Arab combination and the Middle East that would balance against Iran, but if we've just seen,

there are real divides there as well.

And then when you look at East Asia, when you look at this part of the world, the challenge is that there's not even theoretically a coalition of countries that can push back against China without American support. And and so the United

American support. And and so the United States is going through sort of a strange and tumultuous period at the moment, but the reality is that its power and its engagement remain critical

to any stable international order.

>> Hell, thank you very much, ladies and gentlemen. Hell Brands.

gentlemen. Hell Brands.

>> Thank you so much.