Inside Palantir: Building Software That Matters | Shyam Sankar on a16z
By a16z
Summary
Topics Covered
- Reclaim Past Victory Formulas
- Whole Country Mobilizes for War
- Heretics Drive Defense Innovation
- AI Superpowers American Workers
- America's Suicide Risk Trumps Homicide
Full Transcript
World events remind us that there is actually evil out there. Just horrendous
barbarism is still possible. When a
country goes to war, it's not enough to just have the department of war fight these wars. It is actually the whole
these wars. It is actually the whole country. The idea that somehow the
country. The idea that somehow the American people are not capable of this.
It beggars belief. I think our biggest risk as a country is suicide, not homicide.
>> How do we win the AI race, particularly as it moves towards more physical AI and robotics etc. >> The things that we did to win in the past, we accidentally turned our back on. And there's an opportunity to
on. And there's an opportunity to reclaim that with vigor. In the moment right now, you could say we need to build more weapons. We need to do this.
We have Yes. But the most important thing we need to do is So, Katherine, when we were talking about guests that we had to add on, Sean was at the the the top of your list. Wh
what what what why was that?
>> Yeah. Well, I you know, it's it's I think people are, you know, after the Jeremy Stern profile and Colossus and a lot of um I think you know, stories that have come out recently or podcasts that
have come out about Sham. Um it he he's one of these people that if you were in the know several years ago, you knew he was the OG like fixer for everyone. You
know, I I think Trey Stevens, who's you know, the co-founder of of Andreal, came out um on Twitter and said like he's single-handedly responsible for my career. And I, you know, John Doyle, so
career. And I, you know, John Doyle, so many of our founders have pointed to Sham as the person who made their career and introduced them to Palunteer, supported them in Palunteer, but also sort of um, you know, gave them wings to
fly away from Palanteer and to start something new. And you hear that story
something new. And you hear that story time and time and time again. But it
wasn't until, and Eric, you and I were talking about this, it wasn't until a couple years ago that I think Sham actually became more of a public figure.
He was sort of the behindthescenes guy, the behind-the-scenes picture. Um, and I think the thing that really changed it was Sham, and I'd love to to talk to you about kind of what was the inspiration for this. You you sort of um wrote this
for this. You you sort of um wrote this seminal piece about First Breakfast, about defense reformation. Um, and we're the first person to really start talking about it. Um, but again, this was like
about it. Um, but again, this was like 17 years into the journey of Palunteer that you decided I'm going to be, you know, a strident voice for what needs to happen in America. Um, so I'd love to talk to you about this, you know, going
from the behind-the-scenes person, the the guy behind the guy in so many of our companies, uh, to saying, "I need to come out and and be a voice for this movement." What What was the kind of
movement." What What was the kind of impetus for that?
>> It was kind of equal parts an act of desperation and act of optimism. Um, you
know, I I felt like after years of just seeing uh the the the building, the Pentagon from the inside, seeing how defense was operating, I felt this frog boil that
continued to happen uh set in a historical context. But the reason to
historical context. But the reason to say something is actually I thought this was the moment that it could all be fixed. that alongside of that happening,
fixed. that alongside of that happening, seeing what was happening outside of the building that the founders were reemerging, there was a huge amount of energy, people wanted to build in the national interest, uh, and and it was a
moment to kind of crystallize what at least put forth what I thought the fundamental diagnosis was that really the things that we did to win in the past, we accidentally turned our back
on. And there's an opportunity to
on. And there's an opportunity to reclaim that with vigor. Uh, and we needed to do so quickly. That time was running out. there was a shot clock here
running out. there was a shot clock here that we have frogboiled our way to a place where we've lost deterrence. You
know, it's any one of these items in isolation you can write off. You could
say, okay, the Russians annexed Crimea in 2014. That's just one thing. Then you
in 2014. That's just one thing. Then you
have the militarization of the Spratley Islands in the in 15. You have the the failure of GC JCPOA to keep the Iranians from getting a bomb. You have a pogram in Israel. And certainly after October
in Israel. And certainly after October 7th, I I I it was kind of a radicalizing moment that like what is going on here?
Uh we we need to act. And I think we we've only had more things since then.
Now, I think the good news is in the last year, more has changed in the department than I've seen change in the prior 19 years. And and people are are
seizing that moment for reformation. Um,
and it's it's been it's been rewarding to kind of get it out there, get people to rally behind it, and uh all of us building in the national interest.
>> Yeah. I mean, what what is it because I think you get this question probably all the time. What is it about the last I
the time. What is it about the last I mean as you said it wasn't a single moment but there is some change in the culture and the zeitgeist and I think you know you have a unique understanding too of of of culture and and kind of how
these mimetic shifts happen but what was it about you know 18 months ago where it's like everyone seems to agree on the thing that was so contrarian uh for for many years where you were sort of
banging your head against a wall saying like this is you know this needs to happen. Well, maybe unsurprising for my
happen. Well, maybe unsurprising for my worldview, it all comes down to leadership. You know, I I we call them
leadership. You know, I I we call them the founding fathers for a reason. There
is something special about the American spirit. Uh that is, you know, every
spirit. Uh that is, you know, every founding story is is equal parts heresy and heroism. And um we had the right
and heroism. And um we had the right people who kind of saw like, hey, this is not working and we're the shock clock is running out and we have to do something. And we had those people both
something. And we had those people both inside the building and outside the building. So, it's kind of a conspiracy
building. So, it's kind of a conspiracy coalition of the willing, co coalition of the capable to go do that. Um,
so it's it's hard to point to any one single moment. I I think the the kind of
single moment. I I think the the kind of the election is a big part of it. Not to
not to make it political, but just being able to get in uh leadership that viewed it with clarity and set the conditions uh to to make this change happen.
>> Yeah. So, you've been busy. Um you you know, you've you've joined the army. Um
you're you've written a book that's coming out. Um, I'd love to get into to
coming out. Um, I'd love to get into to mobilize, but first, why did you decide now's the time to sort of write the write the canonical book of what needs to happen in America and then maybe we can talk about sort of the the sort of
fundamental thesis too, but why why now?
Why why write a book, join the army? Um,
and also uh be leading palunteer.
>> Yeah. Well, they're all there is a there's a cogent kind of thread through that, which is like how how do we mobilize to prevent a bigger conflict?
And if you're if you're really paying attention, it's hard not to think that we're kind of in the late30s here. That
things are are brewing. They've been
brewing for a while. Um people talk about great power competition. Uh and I think we're kind of coming out of the malaise of having won the Cold War or the Soviets having lost it perhaps more
accurately and that kind of led to a lot of of bad behaviors. It allowed us to believe a lot of lies about the future that that were kind of now working to
market. Uh and so part we we will not
market. Uh and so part we we will not have the luxury that we really had in uh in World War II of letting the adversary attack us first and then deciding to
mobilize. And I think a more cleareyed
mobilize. And I think a more cleareyed view of what actually happened in World War II is that's not it. It's not this fil thing that we just flipped a switch and the automotive industry decided, okay, after Pearl Harbor, we're going to
make all this war material. What really
happened is that leadership from FDR realized in the in the 30s in the late 30s that we needed to mobilize but there was not yet a national will or popular mandate to do so. uh and len lease
provided the mechanism to do that that we it took us 18 months to build factories and retool them and we were able to create capability deterrence that we we sold to the Brits and to the
Soviets such that when World War II really kicked off for us when Pearl Harbor happened we were at full rate production and the way that we mobilize you know when a country goes to war it's the whole country that goes to war it's not enough I think part of the legacy of
having won the Cold War is thinking like it's enough to just have a defense industrial base it's enough to just have the department of war fight these wars.
It is actually the whole country. And I
think that's the the most um stark thing. It's like we all as American
thing. It's like we all as American citizens need to be invested in both the prosperity the country gives us but also the freedom that underwrites that prosperity. And we have come a very far
prosperity. And we have come a very far away from that world. You know in 1989 only 6% of spending on major weapon systems went to defense specialists i.e.
companies that were exclusively in the business of defense. That's not that long ago. That's when the Berlin Wall
long ago. That's when the Berlin Wall still stood.
>> Now that number is 86%. So really the what we think of as normal is an aberration from the past and mobiliz seeks to set that story in context of one hey this is the industrial base what
I like to call the American industrial base that won World War II. Chrysler
built Minuteman missiles and minivans and every camera car serial box that an American consumer bought was actually also subsidizing our national security.
And that's really important. We see this with the hyperscalers. We see this with technology. The amount that our private
technology. The amount that our private sector spends on R&D dwarfs what the government is capable of spending. And
you want to get on that price performance curve as a way of delivering capabilities to our brave men and women in uniform.
>> Yeah.
>> Uh the so how do we get back to that you know and I oh so the second part of it yeah so we had the American industrial base but who was the American industrial base today? We think of it as north of
today? We think of it as north of Grumman. We think of it as Loheed
Grumman. We think of it as Loheed Martin, but actually it was Glenn Martin, it was Jack Northrup, it was Leroy Grumin. They were people. They
Leroy Grumin. They were people. They
were founders. They they were kind of not thinking about, hey, what's the performance going to be next quarter?
They were building something way bigger than themselves, way bigger than their their companies. And those founders
their companies. And those founders weren't just outside of government. They
were inside of government. It was the Heimman Rickovers, the you know, against the will of the Navy building the nuclear navy. And I love that story,
nuclear navy. And I love that story, too, because it takes a lot of hutzbah.
Oppenheimer, the father of the bomb, said the nuclear navy wasn't going to work. He told Oppenheimer, he told
work. He told Oppenheimer, he told Heyman he was going to fail and he still p he still proceeded. And that's
something I think in the valley we recognized as the classic founder personality.
>> And a big part of what happened, you know, after after the end of the cold war, we we wanted a peace de dividend.
We started spending less in defense. We
had this famous dinner, the last supper.
We went from 51 prime contractors down to five. I think the conventional
to five. I think the conventional explanation of what happened uh is wrong. This people think hey we had
wrong. This people think hey we had consolidation. Consolidation means we
consolidation. Consolidation means we lost competition.
That's not yeah okay maybe at the margin but that first of all it's always been a monopsiny you know the nature of the competition is not what people think.
It's not these companies competing against each other. The competition's
always been the services competing. It's
been competition inside of government that drove innovation not competition from industry. What really happened from
from industry. What really happened from the last supper is that consolidation bred conformity. It was the beginning of
bred conformity. It was the beginning of true financialization of defense. These
companies really could no longer think about growth. They thought about
about growth. They thought about financial metrics, dividends, buybacks, cash flow. And it it kind of became very
cash flow. And it it kind of became very narrow and that conformity is not an environment that founders can thrive in.
You know, the the heretics h were expuned. They left. They went to other
expuned. They left. They went to other parts of the American economy like tech.
Mhm.
>> Uh but the those heretics are required.
In fact, if you look at part of the book, we catalog all these amazing defense innovations almost to a tea.
Every single one of them was a heretical idea.
>> You know, the the institution was against it. The bureaucracy was against
against it. The bureaucracy was against it. The process tried to kill it. Uh and
it. The process tried to kill it. Uh and
these determinative outcomes, you can think about the Higgins boat, the boat that won World War II. The Navy didn't want to buy the boat. The Navy tried to steal the designs for the boat. In the
end, 92% of all boats in World War II were Higgins boats. Think about where we'd be if this Scots-Irishman wasn't just willing to just almost pathologically commit himself to making this happen. The boys that would not
this happen. The boys that would not have landed at Normandy.
>> Yeah. No, I mean, and that's super interesting. Yeah. Because I think that,
interesting. Yeah. Because I think that, as you said, it's always been, you know, that this sort of force consolidation that we've picked the winners there. You
know, we're we're we're post now, like we we don't actually need to build for for wartime. So, it's your view that
for wartime. So, it's your view that that really that just expuned all of the talent that used to go to defense. And
it's interesting because it's also I mean it's in some ways it's it's sort of serendipitous that that's exactly when the internet's rising. So, it's like if you're this kind of weird personality, you're going to go work on this new
thing that's so exciting. You know, I think of like, you know, Mark Andre, right? Like he's he could have been in
right? Like he's he could have been in the defense industry maybe 20 years earlier, but it's like, you know, the people who were building the internet in the '9s, they wanted to build the new thing. So I guess like is is that sort
thing. So I guess like is is that sort of the fundamental problem is that like it just became a place where anyone who was interesting or anyone who had a different view just could not thrive.
>> Yeah. Exactly. And then we compounded on that problem by you know the the nature of the monopsin. So unlike a monopoly where you have one seller over a thing, a monopoly is where you have one buyer over a thing that the department of war
is a monopsy. Um
the nature of the monopsin is it forgets it starts imposing all sorts of constraints on its suppliers and how they behave and what they need to look like. And that led to it's like putting
like. And that led to it's like putting we put all of these companies on the Galopagos Islands. Uh they're not on the
Galopagos Islands. Uh they're not on the mainland anymore. And so what do you get
mainland anymore. And so what do you get on the Galapagos? You get these exquisite giant tortoises. They're
really amazing. Like like it's like alien life. It's it's very cool. Except
alien life. It's it's very cool. Except
when you take the tortoise back to the mainland, they're not competitive.
They're going to get eaten alive by the wolves.
>> Yeah. Uh and so we started creating a huge number of barriers for these people who even when they had ideas that could those ideas come back into defense.
Uh I like to say like when we started Palunteer there was no front door in the department of defense. You know you had to the only front door. There was
exactly one. It was in the intelligence community. It was Inkutel. If you were
community. It was Inkutel. If you were an outsider there was no other way in.
The only people that worked here were insiders.
>> Uh of course now that is that's part of the sea change that happened starting really in 2015. But that means putting forth the 18 thesis and the defense reformation and 2024 makes a lot of
sense because we have 10 years of heretics who have been knocking at the gate ready to to come help the department.
>> Yeah. No, and so much of the book I mean you talk about these sort of heretical heroes, you know, in doing the research and I mean you're you're now sort of like the walking encyclopedia for the defense industry um in tech. Who who are
the most exciting heroes? Like who's the person you look at and you say like gosh that that is that is the person that people don't know about. They need to know. Well, I I think u it's hard to
know. Well, I I think u it's hard to pick only one. The a new profile that we put out there, which is so some of these figures are historical figures. Bernard
Shriber, Edward Hall, Heyman, Rick Ober, James Boyd, John Boyd, sorry, but the one that's new is Colonel Drew Cukor.
And Kukor is the father of Maven. And
here you have this uh Marine Colonel, you know, uh born raised by a single mother, Southern California, uh very modest background. found his only way of
modest background. found his only way of going to college was ROTC, joined the Marines. Lots of incredible experiences there, but he he had a a seminal experience where he was trying
to evacuate Yazadi refugees who were fleeing ISIS and a a young Marine looking at ISR made a call that he thought he saw RPGs and that would make
made it unsafe for the Marines to land and Xfill these people. And there there actually wasn't one. As a consequence, you have order of thousands of people who were tortured, enslaved, and raped
because of this failure of operation.
And it just it just changed this man.
And so when he had an opportunity in the basement of the Pentagon on a project with no resources to go after bringing AI to the department, he leaned all the way in. And you can see the the journey
way in. And you can see the the journey of the heretic here where everyone hated him. Everyone tried to kill him. Every
him. Everyone tried to kill him. Every
service thought they were doing AI. Uh
people tried to throw IG investigations and like one of the the details we document is that someone said that Colonel Cukor is housing Iranians in his basement. So they they actually sent out
basement. So they they actually sent out criminal investigators to his house to look at this. And here here's a a Mormon devout Mormon, four four daughters, 1400 foot home that doesn't have a
basement by the way.
>> Uh and you know the investigators were just completely dumbfounded. It shows
you sometimes that what you know are you are you willing to put it all on the line? Are you so committed so
line? Are you so committed so incorruptible in what you're trying to deliver or is this just a career? And
that's one of the things I think I draw a lot of inspiration from these folks is just seeing you know if they can do this we can too. Seeing that these people exist inside of government they exist
outside of government. And I think it's that's in the moment right now you could say we need to build more weapons. We
need to do this. We need Yes. But most
the most important thing we need to do is inspire the latent heretics to actually step up. This is the moment your country really needs you. Uh what
what's been exciting over the last year or so is I'm seeing those people. I'm
seeing them inside the building. I'm
seeing outside the building. And that's
that is you know what is driving the change is the leadership is setting the conditions to empower the heretics.
They're protecting them. John Boyd who was a famously difficult fighter pilot.
His own service the air force hated him.
But the Marines learned everything they could from him and all of his heresy. He
was really the father of the F-16. All
of his heresy was proven correct in Gulf War I where we destroyed the fourth largest army in the world in days. It
just everything came to bear. His high
low mix, his udaloop.
Um but you know John Boyd said to be or to do. You can be somebody or you can do
to do. You can be somebody or you can do something and but you can't have both and you know how committed are you to this? But he was so difficult
this? But he was so difficult he gets a lot of credit. I think the other person who deserves credit who I don't even know the name of is a three-star Air Force general who protected him because people like that do not survive in these bureaucracies on
their own. It's not like hey he's
their own. It's not like hey he's difficult and we somehow tolerated him.
It's no someone realized there's something special here and despite that we tolerate him. You see that with the dynamic between Bernard Shriber who built um our intercontinental ballistic missiles and Edward Hall who
specifically built the Minute Man.
Shrivever um fired Hull once and then hired him back realizing there was no way we were going to get to solidfueled intercontinental ballistic missiles without this notoriously difficult
human. And I think um that that's that's
human. And I think um that that's that's great leadership.
>> Yeah. Yeah. No, and and you just said something interesting which is that it really takes leaders inside the building to model the change to to encourage it to to protect the people who are who are
those heretics. Um and you've joined the
those heretics. Um and you've joined the army. Um, and it's a program from
army. Um, and it's a program from General George and Secretary Driscoll.
Maybe tell us a little bit about the origin of that and then what you're doing specifically inside uh inside the army now um to support that change.
>> Well, the the origin story of this is really so I've worked with the Israelis in some capacity since roughly 2014.
This is a very technical country. Um and
and they're proud of how technical they are. After October 7th, you know,
are. After October 7th, you know, October 8th, they mobilized roughly 360,000 reserveists. By definition, all
360,000 reserveists. By definition, all these reserveists are prior service through national conscription. Uh, and
most of them had now had 20 years of experience in industry. And when they got back to the IDF, they were horrified at the state of technology in the IDF, which is actually an implicit
self-critique, which is, hey, when I was 20, I was really good at coding, but I didn't know what I was doing. Now I have 20 years of experience building internet scaled things and I actually know how to
do these things correctly. So I saw them modernize more in the four months after October 7th I than I did in the prior 10 years of working with them >> and that was just I couldn't I couldn't
unsee that. So of all countries in the
unsee that. So of all countries in the world we are drowning with that talent.
you know, the the the skills we have at building things in the valley, the companies that A16Z backs, like we know how to do this as a nation.
>> The 20-year-old version of our green suitors maybe did it. You know, there's the will, there's the intelligence, the capability, but there's also then the tradecraftraft, the knowhow, the experience, all the dead ends that I've run into in my career, the mistakes I've
made. If you're going to make mistakes,
made. If you're going to make mistakes, please make new ones. Don't make the same ones I already have done. You know,
how can you stand on the shoulders of American industry to go faster and do this? And so I'm not sure I really had a
this? And so I'm not sure I really had a lot to give the army at, you know, 24, but I think at 44, uh, there's a lot I can do to accelerate certain things. And
that that's not just a narrow statement about me. I think that's a whole
about me. I think that's a whole statement about the valley. There's a
whole statement about American manufacturing, everyone in Elsagundo, you know, how do we make sure uh if the Chinese make civil military fusion compulsory, why do we make voluntary
civil military fusion impossible? And
and when I look back at history, we didn't used to make it impossible. In
World War II, we direct commissioned a 100,000 people that look like what we now consider detachment 2011 into the military and we should be doing that again. The authorities exist. They're
again. The authorities exist. They're
just laying there dormant and we're basically underutilized. So, I was proud
basically underutilized. So, I was proud to join the army with three other colleagues. We have Bob Mcgru, chief,
colleagues. We have Bob Mcgru, chief, former chief research officer at OpenAI, uh Bos, the CTO of Meta, and Andrew Wheel, the former chief product officer of OpenAI, head of science now. Uh, and
I think we've been able to work on different projects that really we act as senior adviserss to army senior leaders and there's different projects that we kind of get our hands dirty in and help.
But I think it's been a really I've learned a lot by doing it. Hopefully the
army's benefiting from it. But I think more broadly we would like to catalyze this across all the services and a broader call uh for folks who are listening to this now in industry.
>> What what's been the biggest surprise?
like I mean you've obviously worked with the department for for years but being on the inside now uh what's surprised you >> in my so my my focus is really um two
things I'm I'm helping them think through how to plan force structure over long periods of time so how do I generate the force I want for all the different military occupation specialties uh so that's been one but the second part of
it is thinking through how do we want to employ software as a almost like a malleable weapon system as something that our committ Anders can wield uh to drive advancement and they they call these the operational data
teams. What's been hugely impressive to me is the quality of talent in our green suitors. People who are not formally
suitors. People who are not formally trained computer scientists, people who have just learned these things. The most
compelling AI applications I'm seeing across commercial or you know, so private sector or public sector are being built by these green suitors.
>> Uh and it's and I think there's something about the existential stakes.
You know, you're not doing this for fun.
You're not doing this for 10% efficiency. It's a binary outcome, win
efficiency. It's a binary outcome, win or lose. The other thing about this
or lose. The other thing about this moment that I think is really interesting with AI is it's massively empowering to people with specific skills. So, you know, it is the intel
skills. So, you know, it is the intel warrant officer who really knows their domain.
>> And I was wondering, you know, as someone who's been doing this for 20 years, like where was this person 10 years ago?
>> Yeah.
>> And the conclusion I came to is they were always there. 10 years ago, what would they have done though with their idea? make a PowerPoint slide, brief
idea? make a PowerPoint slide, brief some program bureaucrat who would tell them how bad their idea is. No, because
they're smarter than that. They wouldn't
have wasted their time. Now they spend two weeks, they build it themselves. Now
they're having an empirical conversation about how what they've built actually drives the army forward and everyone is quick to adopt it because everyone wants to win. So it's it's been really
to win. So it's it's been really exciting to see that. Um the other part of it I think is uh big institutions is it's conserved
across private sector as well struggle with zero to one.
>> Everyone wants to get you know everyone want if if you have some sort of innovation they almost want to rush to get to N as quickly as possible. How do
I scale this across the formation? Well
the army is a very big place and thinking very critically about the pathing of what is the journey and cycle of getting an innovative idea to scale.
That's literally what we do as an industry all day long, right? And and
how how do they take and bibe those lessons rather than cargo culting their way there, which is frankly what I think the private sector, you know, large Fortune 100s do as well. So they they have more to learn from startups in this
capacity than they do from, you know, big Fortune 100 companies.
>> Totally. And that's so interesting too about just, you know, that is something I hear time and time again, like the the level of technical ability of someone very junior in the Army or the Navy today. It's like they came up tinkering
today. It's like they came up tinkering and yes as you said like now the tools are there they can just build something where it's you're not only learning from startups you're literally learning from individuals who are enlisted who have a great idea which is it's it it does feel
like as you said like this is a revolutionary time for the military where they can actually learn from their their you know junior people who who have a great idea and that can be deployed very quickly >> which plays to the American military
strengths of bottoms up innovation mission command type control um it it's really something that our military can uniquely do that no one else can.
>> Let's get into the the SAS apocalypse.
Uh you know there there's a line of thinking that says hey um now that the switching costs or now that AI is here the switching costs are very low you know there's no code moat there's there's no data mo there's no UI moat
and there's a set of SAS companies that are on the conveyor belt on the way to the guilty um and you know maybe it's Monday.com first and then maybe it's Atlassian and you know companies that aren't systems of record and then maybe
it's it's coming for them too. Um there
are other people say hey you're not going to vibe code you know Atlassian you're not going to vibe code these these you know incredible products with all these integrations and all these you know distribution etc. What say you and the SAS apocalypse? How do you make
sense of it?
>> I think both things are true. So I have a I would give you a different rubric to think about it, which is um what software is really fundamentally about beta and what software is about alpha.
And I think that that the software that's about beta is going to really struggle that you know this is this is software that made you more similar to everyone else. And this has been my
everyone else. And this has been my historical critique of the software industrial complex which is that the feedback loop for the people building the software is can I sell it? not did
it did it add value which is downstream of can you sell it uh and and so the you could think of almost like vibe coding the the advent of AI it allows you to
make software that's specific to you it's inherently alpha focused if you do it right uh but I so I think that the platforms that are already focused on alpha are going to continue
to have an advantage it's like actually going to be uh a wind that fills their sale up on the other side the stuff that's beta is is really going to struggle. And you
can almost argue like maybe the beta wasn't that valuable to begin with. One
one of the jarring moments for me was in COVID if you really look back at what were CEOs talking about in their earnings calls about software. They no
one talked about the $5 billion ERP implementation they did that saved their supply chain because all of them fell over like paper tigers in two weeks. And
what they were talking about was Zoom and Teams and how that enabled them to go remote. And you cannot think of like
go remote. And you cannot think of like that's crazy. That is that that should
that's crazy. That is that that should have been a sputnick moment for the software industry to say, "Wow, we haven't built that's valuable."
How depressing. Um and
on the flip side, for us at least, CO was a huge tailwind because specifically because we were able to help our our customers adapt to this reality at the speed of the disruption. It it I think it kind of separated the wheat from the
chaff. And I think we'll kind of see
chaff. And I think we'll kind of see that, you know, maybe there's a lot of things we've been spending on almost mimemetically, like, well, other people use it for this. This is a standard industry solution for X. Those things
are going to feel a lot of pressure. And
on the on the flip side, they're going to be software that's almost almost like a toolkit, an approach that allows you to express how you're more different than other companies. It's almost become software that allows you to express your
competitive advantage, your strategy is going to be a premium on the day two stuff like vibe coding. you can't do. I
think that's actually true. Like I think it's actually true that day two is much harder. A lot of it's unsolved and
harder. A lot of it's unsolved and you're going to have to figure that out.
But I don't think that's going to preclude the pressure on the beta on the beta software.
>> Yeah. In in terms of acrewing value right now, it seems like the hardware layer has the highest margins. Um
whereas in the internet economy, the the applications had the highest margins.
I'm curious if you think um AI will be like like the internet where sort of the entities that control the end user relationships acrew the most value or if you think it'll be more like the cloud
where the infrastructure layer is the is is is is the most accur the most value or has the highest margins how do you think about how it'll play out?
uh if you thought about the the stack as like chips, models, AI infrastructure, AI applications, what I see happening empirically is um the the models are
being commoditized and we're always under pressure. So the model companies
under pressure. So the model companies are expanding up sometimes they they almost call it in a dimunive way a harness, but it's actually they're building software around it that is AI infrastructure to do something like like
code. Uh and then the the people who
code. Uh and then the the people who started as narrow vertical AI solutions are kind of earning their way down the stack to realize like oh I need this actual AI infrastructure to be able to
scale to my customer base and handle more use cases. So our theory has always been the value is going to acrew in two places at the chips layer and at the AI infrastructure layer what we would call ontology but those those two layers I
think are going to be pretty defensible.
There's this funny chart in the economist the other day about what's going to happen to the economy and it gives three uh three prediction. Either
everything goes to the uh you know goes vertical a AGI uh either you know we're all uh dead or you know we're all economically dead everything collapses
or you know 2% growth um and so uh you know uh the economist is uh is is hedging just like many others. Um I'm
I'm curious how you what's your sort of mental model for what AI is going to do to the economy in terms of you know the productivity stats and GDP growth. Um
but then also the the the job market and I I mean AI as it achieves its goals of over the medium term and and we sort of you know start to reach the the potential that people have been talking
about. You know people say AI 2027 it's
about. You know people say AI 2027 it's or even if it's 2030 h how do you think it's going to impact the economy?
>> I have a lot of thoughts here so hopefully we'll hit them all and I won't forget them as we go through this. So
the the first bit is what always irks me about how we talk about AI is as if somehow we have no human agency. AI is
going to do X. No, that's not right.
Humans are going to use AI to do X.
There's a choice here. Do we want to invest in AI slop and essentially AI slot to borrow an expression from from John Coulson, Patrick Coulson? No. I
think these things are I don't want to invest in that at least. So what is our normative view of why AI is valuable?
How does how does it result in American prosperity? How does it make our society
prosperity? How does it make our society better not worse? And restoring the fact that we we have agency and therefore an obligation to steer this in a specific
way. So that's the first part of it.
way. So that's the first part of it.
Then if okay if we have agency what is that? You know my my view of this is we
that? You know my my view of this is we have a historic opportunity to fix the fundamental breakdown that happened in the 70s between wage growth and GDP
growth. uh that this should be if we
growth. uh that this should be if we look at just the the example we have about the intel warrant officer who's suddenly able to do so much. Well, I see that playing out on the ICU floor. I see
that playing out on the factory floor.
There is an opportunity to give the American worker superpowers with AI.
It's David Slingshot in a world where the Chinese Goliath has been this giant sucking sound of American prosperity.
uh if we do that, it's a basis for underwriting the re-industrialization of the country and that we're not going to do this symmetrically. That's why it's a slingshot. It's not like, hey, this is
slingshot. It's not like, hey, this is how they do it there. We're going to do this here. It's it's actually we're
this here. It's it's actually we're going to do this in entirely new ways.
Like Hadrien is a perfect example of that, right? We are re-industrializing
that, right? We are re-industrializing using technology, making these people 50, 100 times more productive than it could be otherwise. And it's going to lead to all sorts of of new
possibilities in particular because I think the great lie of globalization is that we can do the innovation over here and we're going to have the production go over there. Well, guess what?
Innovation is a consequence of productivity. If you don't make the
productivity. If you don't make the thing, you can't innovate on how you make the thing and what the thing is.
You see that with SpaceX. There's a
reason the R&D engineers are colllocated on the production floor. What is the feedback loop and cycle time they expect to come out of that? And you see that in the negative where we used to think Wooi was just some cheap set of pipe heading
arms for contract pharmaceutical research and now 50% of all clinical trials are being done in China. Uh and
and so I think we should view this as a national emergency and a national opportunity uh around AI. And what what concerns me a bit these these technology
revolutions are usually by like the vast vast majority are tool revolutions not concept revolutions.
It was not Galileo who invented the telescope. He used it to discover
telescope. He used it to discover planetary motion. It was the the future
planetary motion. It was the the future of these technologies, the microscope, the power loom, the telescope, the personal computer. Uh they are
personal computer. Uh they are determined not by the inventor of the technology but by the people who wield the technology. Today when we listen to
the technology. Today when we listen to the AI dumerism, we're listening to the inventors who are incredibly smart. But
just like their creations, they have their own jagged intelligence. you know,
just because they were smart at building the model doesn't mean they're going to be right about the implications of it.
Uh, and then we are implicitly giving up our own human agency and how to steer it. It is us as the wielders of it that are going to determine the future course of this technology. And I see, you know, maybe
technology. And I see, you know, maybe the most authentic thing about that uh economist graph is those range of outcomes are exactly what's possible.
And it's up to us to pick which one we want to be on. It's a choice we're making. It's not something that's being
making. It's not something that's being done to us.
>> Yeah. No, you you just said something so interesting that I think is is underexplored which is the the collocation of R&D and production which is something we very much understood that was sort of you know that's the
that's the Henry Ford style right like that that's how we used to build things in the physical world and then of course globalization led to this sort of separation of them and even you still see it in companies right it's like the engineering team in many companies is
not the same as the production team you can be a production company or an engineering company we see this a lot in our American dynamism portfolio what was the impetus for sort of that
philosophical division? Um, you know, I
philosophical division? Um, you know, I think a lot of people point to policy changes in the '9s, but what was like the real impetus from your research that that sort of led to this sort of divorce between production and engineering and
and how are you seeing it come back together again in companies today?
>> Europe has created exactly zero companies from scratch in the last 50 years worth more than a hundred billion euro. We have created all of our
euro. We have created all of our trillion dollar companies from scratch in America in the last 50 years.
>> The difference is founders. You know,
you have really good companies over there, but they're like 300 years old, 100 years old, whatever it is.
Uh what we we we kind of had the Europe Europeanization of our mega cap companies until recently. you know,
Intel at some point there was this fork in the road where they could they could have promoted their CFO to be the CEO or Pat Galsinger as CTO back then. This is
before he came back later to be CEO. Who
did they pick? They picked the CFO, the person that Wall Street would understand. Um, not the person who could
understand. Um, not the person who could actually determine the future roadap.
And by the way, it really looked like it was working for 10 years until it fell off a cliff.
>> But that was all financial engineering, not real engineering.
uh you know when was the the last Boeing CEO to be an engineer I think was 2004 you know there there was a way there so you think about there's a period of time in our economy where we understood that the engineering was leaving these things
Elon says the pathway to the CEO is through the CTO which sounds like a crazy heretical statement because like certainly for my generation the way we grew up that's not true >> that's not how that's not what we were taught
>> um now I'm I'm not saying that because I'm the CTO here don't read anything into that I just it just mean that like >> yeah we won't infer You're breaking news today.
>> Thank you. Andy Grove, who was the president of Intel, used to start his annual sales and marketing kickoff meeting by reminding all the salespeople. Just remember, it's the
salespeople. Just remember, it's the engineers who create all the value. You
guys just move it around, you know, and it doesn't mean the sales people aren't important or aren't necessary, but there is kind of a sequencing here. And I
think we kind of got very confused about that that we became very good at financial engineering and forgot about engineering. One thing one of our
engineering. One thing one of our portfolio CEOs said is that maybe salespeople are the are the least AIable in terms of being able to uh to be automated or or replaced. I'm I'm
curious how you think about um sort of the the jobs that tech companies um you know leveraging with AI how you're using in your your own uh you know in Palunteer. How do you think about that?
Palunteer. How do you think about that?
>> Yeah. Um the so one one part I was I was going to say from earlier that I think is relevant to this is you know Pascal said every human has a god-shaped hole in their heart and part
of the uh potential pathology from the labs is that they have filled that hole with AGI and so there are things that they assert as empirical that are actually articles of faith. They may be
true, they may not be true, I don't know but they get confused between what's an article of faith and what is actually an empirical reality. Uh, and so if you
empirical reality. Uh, and so if you viewed this through a very pragmatic, cleareyed view, say the salespeople, I'm not sure why the goal is replacing people to begin with. Like, isn't the goal to win? Isn't the goal to be
dominant in your industry? Um,
you want to be better. And so maybe being better is about a mixed mammal AI teammate. It's, you know, how do I build
teammate. It's, you know, how do I build the iron man suit for the sales people I do have? How do I make the best
do have? How do I make the best salespeople more productive and systematize what is it that makes them good for everyone else? Like there's all sorts of other ways of thinking about the problem. if your goal is winning,
the problem. if your goal is winning, but if your goal is AGI, it's it's the aesthetic of the fact that you couldn't replace the person with this model is offensive and you're just going to, you know, you're just going to keep driving
at that. And I think uh it could be
at that. And I think uh it could be could be a distraction. This is one way in which I think the Chinese do have a little bit of an advantage, which is um for first of all, just to be clear, I'd bet on us, you know, 100 times out of
100, but they're they have a pragmatic approach like the whole point of AG of of AI is to win. It's not AGI. Uh it's
how do I how do I improve my productive forces as they would call it. Now I
think that the good news is if you look at the people who wield the technology in America, that's what they're focused on. You know, the CEOs I deal with, none
on. You know, the CEOs I deal with, none of them have asked me, "Hey, I want to fire a bunch of people or how do I get rid of these people that maybe because we're too expensive for that sort of use case, but they come to me
and say, I want to dominate my industry.
Like I want to destroy my competition."
Okay, great. So the ambition is there and maybe you get more efficient by doing it but actually the whole point is to is to grow massively. So that that ambition sets the frame of how you're going to apply the technology and what
sort of solutions you find valuable speaking of China h how do we win the AI race particularly as it moves towards more physical AI and and robotics etc. What are the things to make sure we get
right or the things we need to we need to fix? I think our biggest risk as a
to fix? I think our biggest risk as a country is suicide, not homicide. You
know, I I have anyone who knows me knows I'm I'm a big China hawk and I think part of the the challenge with China is it's not enough for the CCP to prosper, America must also fall. Like look, if you want to buy our soybeans or not, I
don't begrudge you. That's a business decision. That's free trade. What?
decision. That's free trade. What?
Great. But when you're trying to smuggle in agricultural funguses so that we can't grow soybeans, that's a different ballgame altogether. And that that
ballgame altogether. And that that offends my kind of American Calvinist sensibilities of fair play. But so all that said, that would that would make it seem like I care a lot about homicide.
But I think our problem is actually one of national will and focus and like are we actually addressing the problems that we face here? Are we encouraging the agency and our people to believe the
world can be better? You know, this manifests in a sense of just kind of like nealism and polarization that that we forget what makes us what unites us and we focus on what divides us. Uh and
there's this kind of sense like hey nothing really works and doesn't really matter so let's just burn it all down.
Uh and a big part of like how I think of what pounder does in the world is it it is about the legitimacy of our institutions like whether it's doors falling off planes or basic government services working these institutions
should all work excellently in the absence of them working uh it breeds this nealism and then you you get the wrong reaction to it. So that's what that's what I think we should focus on
addressing. So now to physical AI the
addressing. So now to physical AI the point of having an ambition like let's reindustrialize let's be maximalist about this not some sort of half measure that's like a little bit of French shoring here or there or whatever it's
like no we invented all of these technologies we invented mass production we invented nuclear power thing after thing after thing it's like the idea that somehow the American people are not capable of this thing how is that
beggars belief right so I think it's actually about will and motivation and leadership >> yeah no I think that that is such a good segue into what you're doing in terms of
building culture because I I think this is something that um is overlooked. A
lot of people think it's a technical problem or a production problem and and I agree with you that I think it's it's a seriousness and a will problem. Um and
you have now been investing in film uh which is totally different than what you do at Palanteer. So I would love to understand you know why did you start a a film production company? Um and how do
you think that's ultimately going to change the culture around having more will about doing these hard things?
Well, my it really starts with my own assimilation journey. You know, I I came
assimilation journey. You know, I I came to the US as a as a young child. I
settled in Orlando and my assimilation journey as a four-year-old, 5-year-old was watching movies with dad on the couch. And what were the movies of the
couch. And what were the movies of the 80s and 90s? It was Hunt for Red October and Red Dawn and Rambo 2 and three. And,
you know, I like to say as a 5-year-old, I knew what it felt like to be an American before I knew civics. That was
way, way down the line. Uh, and I think a lot of people experience that again after a long period of time when they watch Top Gun Maverick. And so for, you know, we sometimes overintellectualize these things like there's a feeling to
it. Uh, even subtle things like I I
it. Uh, even subtle things like I I heard from the the guy who made the movie 300 that after 300 came out, Navy Seal recruitment went through the roof and he was kind of perplexed. Obviously,
it's it's a movie about Spartans. Like,
what does this have to do with Navy Seals? But it clearly inspired so many
Seals? But it clearly inspired so many people to be like, I want to look like that. I want to be that strong. I want
that. I want to be that strong. I want
to be that heroic, you know. And so the the virtue of entertainment as first of all, it's got to be entertaining. It's
not Pravda here. But then it it lets us reflect on ourselves and who do we want to be and what do we want to be like?
And if our entertainment is all Terminator, AI ruins the world, technology is a force of evil. It's all
dystopic future scenarios. That sets a sort of condition which I would juxtapose to my youth in Orlando growing up in the shadow of the space coast which was just like science and technology is amazing and it's we're
going to be living on other planets and you know as a sixth grader write a report on how are you going to get to Mars and it just inculcates a fundamental belief that the future will be better and that science technology
the will to invest in these hard problems is worth it. It's worth it. Uh,
and and I so I think we we have a moment to reclaim storytelling in a way that's both entertaining and inspiring.
>> Yeah. No, I I love that you point out that you grew up in Orlando. It's funny.
I I also grew up in Florida in the 80s and 90s and it was like, you know, people made fun of Florida, right? Like
they didn't understand there was anything good there, but Orlando, I mean, you say it's the shadow of the Space Coast. It's also Disney World,
Space Coast. It's also Disney World, right? It it's the best stories of a of
right? It it's the best stories of a of of a century. It's it's it's American culture. And so I'd love to I mean, were
culture. And so I'd love to I mean, were you a Disney kid? I mean like was that something that like also spoke to you of like these these stories of good and evil that are passed down through cartoons
like how did that >> Disneyland so also I mean there's a part of the story which is the the the business like why did we end up in Orlando you know after we we fled violence in Nigeria my dad had a
childhood friend who was living in LA who sold knickknacks at theme parks and he's like hey look I know this horrible thing just happened to you there's this upand cominging place with theme parks I don't live there I need someone I trust there. Uh, why why don't you go to
there. Uh, why why don't you go to Orlando? So, literally, it's not just
Orlando? So, literally, it's not just that was I a Disney kid. My parents job was to provide knickknacks in the theme park stores. So, like after school, they
park stores. So, like after school, they would take me to SeaWorld and I would pet the stingrays while they restock the shelves, you know. And so, I I grew up very much embibing the the storytelling,
the aspir. I mean, Epcot, Epcot was all
the aspir. I mean, Epcot, Epcot was all about painting an optimistic vision of the future and what technology was going to be like and the stories of of heroes and you know that there was both there was both evil and bad in the world and
there were clearly heroic actions that you could take and it was all super inspiring.
>> And do you I mean that that's what's so interesting too is like I feel like the the height of the sort of good and evil battle inside of Disney film was sort of the you know Lion King 90s, right? Like
I mean they were different films then.
How do we get back? I mean maybe it's not back, maybe it's forward, but how do we get back to those stories for children um for people to feel optimistic again? I mean, you know, in
optimistic again? I mean, you know, in some ways you don't hear, oh, I grew up in this city and and it's the height of optimism. You don't hear that about
optimism. You don't hear that about California anymore. Um what what will it
California anymore. Um what what will it take for movies to to transform that?
Well, you know, this is a a kind of a personal opinion, but I'm really excited that David Ellison is is going to have Warner Brothers because, you know, if you think about Hollywood, the original
studio heads, they were founders. Like
Jack Warner in the 30s, Germany was the third largest export market for American entertainment. And the Nazis actually
entertainment. And the Nazis actually deployed sensors into Hollywood to control what was being made. And every
studio capitulated except for Warner Brothers. Jack Warner was the only
Brothers. Jack Warner was the only person willing to stand up and speak truth and only a founder can do that because if you're a a professional CEO who's employed that's you can't you can't survive that.
>> Um and so I think in some ways there's a mirror to the present day Hollywood and the defense industrial base. It's
conformity. It's it's kind of lack of opinion. It's it's it's lack of a
opinion. It's it's it's lack of a normative view of what is it trying to communicate.
Then if you go a little bit further down the line, you look at the Vietnam era.
Like we had very cynical Hollywood content in Vietnam as a reflection of how we felt about ourselves.
>> Yes.
>> Uh in 73, George Lucas made American Graffiti because he was tired of it.
He's like, I'm tired of it. I just want to make a movie about boys driving cars chasing girls.
>> And it was a pallet cleanser that kind of like, yeah, the American people remembered like, okay, we we went through our period, our cycle of grief and cynicism, and we're we're ready. And
it set the conditions for the movies of the 80s and '90s that we all love. I
think we're we're we're also kind of tired of it right now. We're tired of the cynicism, the everything's going to be worse. And it you see that in the
be worse. And it you see that in the performance of stories. Top Gun
Maverick's the easy one to point to. But
but but the the content that's doing well right now is Americanoriented. It's
there are inspirational figures. The
heroes aren't anti-heroes that are drug addicts that you wouldn't want your kids to grow up to be. There's actually some sense of inspiration in it. and some
pride and in terms of uh who we are and how that reflects in the entertainment itself. So I think I think we're you
itself. So I think I think we're you know if you think about the next uh two to 10 years we're going to see a lot of content like that. That's what I see in the development pipeline from these studios themselves.
>> That's exciting. So so maybe talk to us about some of your projects or or things you're working on and and what you're most excited about. But then also yeah that's so interesting. We we've had these conversations, Eric and I, uh, with Mark and others about how, you
know, the pipeline for the last 10 years has been da we're sort of getting the end of the pipeline. You're seeing it in sort of the Oscar nominees this year.
You know, it's like they're they're not optimistic, but as you said, like maybe 10 years from now, we're going to see this pipeline of just like pro America, exciting optimistic enthusiastic golden age sort of content. What are you
seeing? And and and what most excites
seeing? And and and what most excites you?
>> Well, you know, I don't want to give away too much of my own development pipeline here. Um, but I would say like
pipeline here. Um, but I would say like you see like Call of Duty is being made right now uh with by Pete Berg and Taylor Sheridan. You see the entire
Taylor Sheridan. You see the entire Taylor Sheridan universe. I mean and and talk about Sakario. It was like 2014 Sakario is basically came to life with the uh new the Haliscoco New Generation
Cartel, right? Like like there there's a
Cartel, right? Like like there there's a sense in which um the storytellers have exactly the frame that we're that we're kind of excited about. I think
there's recent events are very interesting to tell stories about right now. Um
now. Um even a movie like War Machine which just came out from watching the trailers it was not yet clear. You could imagine like 5
yet clear. You could imagine like 5 years ago that that the storyline would have been something more like the US government build evil robots that the human soldiers had to defeat.
>> In this case it was more like aliens basically. Sorry to give away the plot
basically. Sorry to give away the plot if you haven't seen it, but you know, you have an alien robot and brave American Rangers have to defeat them and and do through their own ingenuity. That
that itself is I think showing you it's belies the shift in the narrative and storytelling that's happening. I think
world events remind us that there are actually there is actually evil out there.
Russian tanks can just roll across the border. you know, October 7th, just
border. you know, October 7th, just horrendous barbarism is still possible that these things don't maintain themselves.
Um, so what what would what would I like I think so putting this back in a geopolitical lens, you know, as much as I've been saying we shouldn't call China nearper, we should call them peer
because calling them near pier is like a shibilith that lets us off the hook.
When you look at operations like Maduro or Midnight Hammer, it's hard to think of more you have done to restore deterrence in the world. A reminder that we do have the will. Maybe because we
didn't have the will, you forgot that we had the capability. But we have both the capability and the will to do things that are quite amazing.
At the same time, it signals a very obvious truth, which is somehow none of the Russian and Chinese worked. So,
if you're a third party country and you're thinking about how what is the future of the world and how do you want to be allied and maybe you've been hedging because you've been seeing America in retreat, it's it's also a
reminder that the Chinese did not come to save Maduro and none of the equipment they provided actually seem to do anything. So, is that really an option
anything. So, is that really an option for you? Uh,
for you? Uh, so I give you the geopolitical answer, but I think okay, here are some some projects I I think I can share. So,
Oppenheimer was hugely successful and complicated, right? where it's like
complicated, right? where it's like it's threedimensional to the point of entertainment. It's not Pravda.
entertainment. It's not Pravda.
Uh I think there's a very powerful story in Hyman Rickover and the birth of the new Navy. We talked a little bit about
new Navy. We talked a little bit about him. But you know what I love about Rick
him. But you know what I love about Rick Overber is he was born in a shuttle in Poland. Uh came came over at the age of
Poland. Uh came came over at the age of six. One of these near almost near miss
six. One of these near almost near miss stories where they were on Ellis Island.
When you get to Ellis Island, you have 10 days for someone to come pick you up.
And so his mother sent a telegram, gave someone money to send a telegram to the father who was already here to come get them. The guy pocketed the money for the
them. The guy pocketed the money for the telegram. On day 10, someone happens to
telegram. On day 10, someone happens to arrive that they know from the old world who then runs out, gets the father to claim them, get buys them one extra day.
So on day 11, they get picked up. But
you know, this near miss where we almost didn't have Rick Overber. But Rick
Overber was a notoriously difficult personality. He was a 5 foot2 short guy
personality. He was a 5 foot2 short guy in World War II. He drove a coal ship.
Not he had no it was not a prestigious post. But after World War II he was sent
post. But after World War II he was sent to Oakidge uh at the the vestigages of the Manhattan project and he was inspired. He had this idea of putting
inspired. He had this idea of putting nuclear power inside of the submarines because before then submarines sucked.
They they could go underwater for like an hour. They were diesel powered. They
an hour. They were diesel powered. They
were loud. They they were basically surface ships that could occasionally submerge. And after that they became
submerge. And after that they became really exquisite. And and I think he
really exquisite. And and I think he built the first one in like five years, six years, the Nautilus.
But the Navy didn't want him to succeed.
They they not only did Aanimer think it was a stupid idea, the Navy did, too.
His first office was a women's restroom.
I kid you not, you know, it's like, how can we humiliate this guy to quit? And
he just kept going. And what I I think is interesting when you look at his memoirs, like it's not that he was immune to the humiliation. He felt every slight and insult. He documented them, but somehow he was able to channel that
into something he was going to push through and still succeed despite that. Zomwalt,
who was the chief of naval operations, the senior most uh uniformed person in the Navy, said the Navy has three enemies, the Soviet Union, the Air Force, and Hyman Rickover, his own admiral.
>> Uh the other thing that I think fits very closely with 18 thesis is like Rickover was a four-star admiral for 30 years. That is something we can't even
years. That is something we can't even contemplate today. We we we we almost
contemplate today. We we we we almost view our our officers as as cogs to keep moving around. Every two to three years
moving around. Every two to three years you have to keep moving.
>> Mhm.
>> As the first director of the nuclear navy of of of naval reactors. Um you
know he was in that role for a very long time. But that role even today is an
time. But that role even today is an 8-year stint which shows you the primacy of people that we understand with something this exquisite something where this much knowledge and continuity
matters you don't just keep pulling people out every two or three years.
Uh and our our re our ships our subs were are the safest in the world by a long shot. So every six months the
long shot. So every six months the Soviet submariners would get six months of respite at Sochi to recover their white blood cell count because they were getting irdiated.
>> We've had no deaths due to radiation.
>> You know he he built it with the specification this has to be safe enough for my son. He built it to a specification that is 100 times safer than the minimum safety standard. And
that is the sort of aspiration only a founder could have.
>> Yeah. This is gonna be a great movie.
>> What what else is there to do? I mean,
you're doing you're doing everything. So
So what what what else is on the radar for you?
>> Well, you know, I uh in some sense, maybe it's enough, but all these things have a throughine where it's really about American greatness and inspiring the next generation. It's driven home to me when I think about my kids and
recognizing that the America I grew up in is something that every generation has had to fight for. And I'm in that phase now where I'm fighting for the the prosperity that the next generation
ought to have. And so whether it's soft power and inspiration in movies or hard power and deterrence of adversaries and preventing World War II, it's all about American greatness and the prosperity of
the American people.
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