John Mearsheimer: U.S. Already Lost Iran War - No Off-Ramp in Sight

Welcome back. We are joined by Professor John Merchimer uh to discuss the war against Iran, which is uh definitely not going as planned. So, thank you very

much for coming back on. My pleasure,

Glenn.

So, uh well, as I said, the war definitely not going as uh Trump had hoped, but u it seems to be going as

many would have predicted. Indeed, uh

Trump himself had uh was met with a lot of warnings before he went down this road. And uh now of course it's unclear

road. And uh now of course it's unclear what direction he should take. Uh we

also see reports from the Israeli sorry from the American media that even Israel is now growing concerned. They don't

think is that Iran is going to collapse.

They don't think it's going to surrender. So what exactly if time is on

surrender. So what exactly if time is on Iran's side? why go down this road? And

Iran's side? why go down this road? And

uh the Wall Street Journal said something similar that Trump's advisor would like to find a quick exit from this war. So

this war. So what do you make of this? Is is this u reaching the end of the war or will Iran not permit this?

Well, it's quite clear that the war is not going well for the United States. uh

and that President Trump I think would like to put an end to it. Uh and the problem that he faces is he can't find

an off-ramp. Uh I think nobody can tell

an off-ramp. Uh I think nobody can tell a plausible story about how this war ends.

uh if we had decisively defeated uh Iran the way we decisively defeated both Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan in World War

II, then you can say the war is over with. We are the winner and we're going

with. We are the winner and we're going to impose uh terms on the loser. But

that's not what's happened here. uh they

haven't won anything approximating a decisive victory and in a very important way uh the Iranians have an incentive to

continue the war uh to turn it into a protracted war of attrition uh and they have the means to do that.

So the question then is how does President Trump uh get Iran to agree to settle this war? When you listen to

people in the administration talk, they sometimes talk as if we're the only player in the game. Of course, the Israelis as well, but the Americans and the Israelis are in the driver's seat.

We determined when the war started. We

determined when it ends. we determine

the conditions uh that the Iranians have to accept. This is the sort of view you

to accept. This is the sort of view you get from uh inside the administration.

But this is not the way the real world works. Uh the Iranians have a say in

works. Uh the Iranians have a say in this. And the question is h how do you

this. And the question is h how do you get the Iranians to agree to stop fighting? Now, some people might say

fighting? Now, some people might say that uh we are inflicting so much punishment on the Iranians that they

would be happy to quit. Uh Pete Hexith has been saying that today is going to be the day of the heaviest bombardment

uh that Israel uh and the United States inflict on Iran. Okay, let's assume they inflict more punishment today than they

have in any of the previous 11 days of the war. Uh, does that mean that the

the war. Uh, does that mean that the Iranians are going to throw up their hands and quit? I hardly think that's

the case. I think that Iran has prepared

the case. I think that Iran has prepared itself to accept massive punishment by the United States and Israel. So, we can dish it out, but the Iranians are not

going to throw their hands up. And in

fact, what the Iranians are going to do is they're going to up the ante from their side. As we go up the escalation

their side. As we go up the escalation ladder, they'll go up the escalation ladder. Uh if you start destroying

ladder. Uh if you start destroying critical infrastructure inside of Iran, they'll destroy critical

infrastructure inside the Gulf States.

and inside of Israel. And they can do it. They have lots of ballistic

it. They have lots of ballistic missiles. They have lots of drones. Uh

missiles. They have lots of drones. Uh

almost all of them are highly accurate.

And they're operating in a target-rich environment. Uh it's not like uh they

environment. Uh it's not like uh they can't find targets to hit. They can hit vulnerable and important economic and

strategic targets with relative ease. Uh

so they have a strong hand to play. When

I say they, I mean the Iranians have a strong hand to play and they have no incentive to settle this one on America's terms. Uh they have a

deep-seated interest in making sure they get something out of a settlement. Uh

sanctions relief, reparations, who knows? but uh they're going to drive a

knows? but uh they're going to drive a hard bargain because the more time goes by, the more desperate we are going to

be to settle this one. So all of this is to say I I don't see what the offramp is at this point in time for President Trump. I hope I'm wrong. I hope I'm

Trump. I hope I'm wrong. I hope I'm missing something and the war can just be shut down. But nobody's been able to tell me a plausible story uh as to how

you bring this thing to an end uh anytime soon. Uh I would just say one

anytime soon. Uh I would just say one final point, Glenn. I think if uh the effects on um the international economy

uh are significant, uh it looks like we're heading off a cliff and that is possible. I think at that point the

possible. I think at that point the Americans will uh bring the war to an end, but that will not be a victory. We

will have caved in to the Iranians uh if that scenario plays itself out. And that

is, as you well know, a very realistic scenario.

What you described or what the United States hoped or thought the war would be like, it it's what we refer to then as escalation dominance. uh this assumption

escalation dominance. uh this assumption that one can decide the pace of moving up or down the escalation ladder. Um

this seems to be something that or was reasonable once one is in a comfortable hegemonic position that is one one can dominate that is to dictate you know when the war starts who should be

involved what are acceptable targets when do we put an end to it but um uh but but it just seems that Iran can't

end this war because if they end it now except some ceasefire then I guess the main fear not unlike what the Russians are fearing is then that the US would

just be back again in a few months. So

um but but if there is no deal I mean if if you look at the Russian conflict if they can't get a deal which gives them security they will take territory to make sure but on the Iranian side if

they can't get any deal which gives them proper security to make sure this doesn't happen again. Uh you know they're not going for territory. It

looks as if uh well kicking the US out of the region by eliminating these Gulf States could be a reasonable pathway. I

use the word reasonable. Well, probably

not correct here. Uh but uh but but what do you think is the consequence for the Gulf States here? How vulnerable are they?

Well, the Gulf States are remarkably vulnerable. Um I mean first of all they

vulnerable. Um I mean first of all they have only a handful of um uh petroleum

sites uh where they you know reprocess uh where they process the the petroleum and the liquid n natural gas and so forth and so on. The the the petroleum

infrastructure uh is just very vulnerable. These are

big fat targets. And there's no question that the Iranians can take out the petroleum infrastructure in all the Gulf States with relative ease. They have the

short-range ballistic missiles and the drones to do it. Uh but the other set of targets that really matters are the desalination plants.

uh these countries in the Gulf States are uh heavily dependent on fresh water that comes out of the desalination

plants. Uh I was reading the other day

plants. Uh I was reading the other day that there's one desalination plant uh that services Riad, the capital of Saudi Arabia. And if you take that

Arabia. And if you take that desalination plant out, uh you're taking away 90% of the water that Riad depends

on. And overall it appears that the

on. And overall it appears that the country of Saudi Arabia uh depends on 70% of its water uh from

desalination plants. Uh Kuwait the

desalination plants. Uh Kuwait the number is 90%.

Um Oman the number is 76%. I I mean these countries are just massively dependent

on desalinization plants and and water.

you you can't live without water. Just

think about that. So you have this vulnerable set of targets, these desalination plants that the Iranians can easily take out. And then you have

uh the petroleum sites that I talked about earlier that are few in number, easily targeted and can be taken out.

You can wreck these states. You could

take, you know, Abu Dhabi and and just wreck it. Uh so

wreck it. Uh so the uh the Iranians have really serious options here. And then if you turn to

options here. And then if you turn to Israel, I don't think that uh Iran can do that to Israel. But as time goes by uh and as the Israelis run out of uh

defensive interceptors, you know, interceptors that can knock down these incoming ballistic missiles, the amount of damage that Iran can do to Israel

will be very great. And uh you already see evidence that the Iranians are pounding Israel. Uh and that pounding

pounding Israel. Uh and that pounding will get greater with the passage of time. So this is why it's so obvious

time. So this is why it's so obvious that the Iranians have real options. Uh

the idea that we have escalation dominance and that, you know, we can uh beat the Iranians as we go up the escalation ladder, I I think is a

facious argument. uh they have in a way

facious argument. uh they have in a way uh uh uh an assured destruction capability. They could destroy the Gulf

capability. They could destroy the Gulf States uh and that would have a profound effect on the world economy. Uh and

surely President Trump and his advisers have begun to realize that and that's one of the reasons I think they're interested in looking for an off-ramp now. But then the question is how do you

now. But then the question is how do you find the off-ramp? And I don't think there is an off-ramp at this point. And

I think what they'll do is they'll escalate. Uh and they'll think that

escalate. Uh and they'll think that escalation will solve the problem. Uh

this gets back to my point about what Pete Hegith is saying about today, Tuesday being uh the day when we will inflict the most punishment

uh on the Iranians that we have inflicted so far. Okay, we start walking up the escalation ladder. But then this

brings me back to my point about what the Iranians can do if they go up the escalation ladder with us. And the point

is they could do massive damage to the Gulf States. So they have options here

Gulf States. So they have options here and they can do massive damage to the international economy. Uh so I think

international economy. Uh so I think going up the escalation ladder is not going to produce uh uh a satisfactory uh outcome for us, for the United States

and for Israel.

Yeah. Given that they're so vulnerable with the disselination plants, it's a bit strange that the United States would have chosen to escalate by attacking the

disselination plant within Iran because now Iran can almost uh well can retaliate by the same means without

being seen as the the main aggressor essentially having an alibi to do so. Um

but what how significant though is the attack on the or the suspension of the trade in energy? Um because did you know many people make the point this also

linked into the entire international financial system with the petro dollar but uh but this is seems to be one of the areas where the Trump administration

is worried again they make the point now that if Iran tries to block the straight of our moose then well according to Trump's tweet they will hit Iran 20

times harder and now we hear Macaron also say well we're going to come and help defensively somehow to open up the straight over moose. Uh how do you see how important is the energy aspect here

or what kind of dimensions are there to it?

>> Well, the energy dimension is of enormous importance. 20% of the world's

enormous importance. 20% of the world's uh oil and gas comes out of the Persian Gulf.

uh it just matters enormously and everybody understands that uh if this turns into a long war it will have disastrous consequences for the world

economy. Uh again this is one of the

economy. Uh again this is one of the principal reasons that President Trump is looking for an offramp. Uh he likes to talk about opening the straits of

Hormuz. All I can say is good luck on

Hormuz. All I can say is good luck on that one. Uh if that was easy we would

that one. Uh if that was easy we would have done it earlier. Uh I don't think we can open the straits of Hormuzz. You

remember not too long ago, President Trump was talking about escorting tankers in the Persian Gulf. Uh and the Navy basically told them that was not

possible. Uh those naval ships, American

possible. Uh those naval ships, American naval ships would be too vulnerable. Um

so I don't think that uh they can open the straits. The other thing you want to

the straits. The other thing you want to remember is if they actually destroy uh the petroleum infrastructure in the Gulf States, it doesn't matter whether

the Straits of Hormuz is open or not. Uh

because uh there's going to be no oil coming out of the Straits of Hormuz. Uh

and if they destroy the desalination plants and the petroleum installations in the Gulf States, uh there effectively not going to be any Gulf States left. Uh

I mean the point is that the uh the Iranians have options here. Uh they can play hard ball and uh the consequences would be devastating for the Gulf

States. And as I say, then it wouldn't

States. And as I say, then it wouldn't matter whether the straits are open or not. But I don't think we're going to

not. But I don't think we're going to open the straits anyway. I don't think we're going to put naval ships uh in the Persian Gulf either. Uh so uh I I think

in a very important way um the Iranians are in the driver's seat. Clint, if I can just make a historical point uh that gets back to an issue that you were

raising before having to do with escalation dominance and air power and even decapitation.

If you go back to the period before World War I, as we all know, wars before World War I had no air dimension. Wars

were fought between armies and navies.

And it was in World War I where we first saw air forces employed by the fighting forces in Europe. Uh then after the war,

this is in the 1920s and the 1930s, this is before World War II, you developed independent air forces. And those air forces became very interested in

strategic bombing. And strategic bombing

strategic bombing. And strategic bombing is another way of saying long range bombing. And the idea was, and this was

bombing. And the idea was, and this was of course popular uh in uh the air forces of the world and among air force

thinkers, that an air force by itself could independently win a war. In other

words, you would no longer have to win that war on the ground or at sea. You

could just take your air force and you could hit the other country's homeland.

uh you could hit its economy, you could hit its population, you could hit its military forces, whatever, and you could bring that country to its knees with air

power alone. And in a very important

power alone. And in a very important way, we tested this um in World War II and we have tested this theory many

times since. Uh now there's still some

times since. Uh now there's still some people who believe you can do magical things with strategic air power which again is another way of saying with air

power alone.

But the fact is there are real limits to what you can do. There's no question that you want to have a powerful air force if you go to war. And there's no

question that in some cases strategic bombing helps win a war. But strategic

air power by itself cannot win a war. It

just can't. The historical record is unequivocally clear on this. So when you go to war against a country like Iraq in

2003, you definitely use air power. You

remember shock and augen. That was the American air force uh pounding Iraq before we sent the ground forces in.

Strategic bombing came before the ground forces went in. But the fact is to create regime change and win a decisive

victory in Iraq, we had to use land power. We had to send in ground forces.

power. We had to send in ground forces.

We couldn't do it with air power alone.

Fast forward to the present. This is a campaign where we have no boots on the ground. There's no land power. And we're

ground. There's no land power. And we're

talking about doing it with air power alone. We're talking about doing it with

alone. We're talking about doing it with strategic bombing. This is what the

strategic bombing. This is what the decapitation strategy in the opening stages of the war was all about. Uh and

when people now talk about going up the escalation ladder, when you talk about Pete Hexith announcing that we're going to punish uh Iran more today than we

have in any of the previous 11 days, what they're saying is that we're going to win this war with strategic air power, with air power alone. We don't

need ground forces. Well, the historical record again is unequivocally clear on this. You can't win wars, especially

this. You can't win wars, especially against formidable adversaries, with air power alone. It just doesn't work. So,

power alone. It just doesn't work. So,

here we are in a world where we have no boots on the ground, and President Trump does not want to put boots on the ground. I mean, serious boots on the

ground. I mean, serious boots on the ground. Are we going to conquer Iran the

ground. Are we going to conquer Iran the way we conquered Iraq? I don't think so.

So, of course, the end result is that we're relying on strategic air power alone. And what are we going to do?

alone. And what are we going to do?

We're going to punish we're going to punish Iran like it's never been punished before. There's no question about that.

before. There's no question about that.

You turn the American and Israeli air forces loose on Iran, they're going to do an enormous amount. They're going to inflict an enormous amount of punishment

uh do an an enormous amount of damage to Iran. No question about that. But again,

Iran. No question about that. But again,

the historical record is clear that countries can absorb that punishment.

Look at what we did in World War II.

Look at what we did in Korea. Look at

what we did in Vietnam. You can inflict massive punishment on civilian populations and the countries fight on.

Uh a and in terms of military targets, we're not going to get all those ballistic missiles and drones.

They're going to continue to fire ballistic missiles and drones at Israel, at the Gulf States, and at American military assets. Uh so strategic bombing

military assets. Uh so strategic bombing is not going to produce a decisive victory here in all likelihood

unless there's a miracle. And I I don't believe in miracles. I hope I'm wrong, you know, I hope this war comes to an end, but I don't think that's going to

happen. Uh, and I think the historical

happen. Uh, and I think the historical record is on my side. So, when Pete Hexith and President Trump, you know, talk about escalation dominance and

pounding Iran more than ever, uh, don't believe uh don't believe that that's going to going to work. Uh, it hasn't worked in the past and there's no reason

to think it's going to work now.

Yeah, this is a problem. How to put an end to the war on stars. I think it was uh Ottoan Bismar who made a point that uh was something along the line that it was easy to lure the Russian bear out of

his high but difficult to get him back in. You can say the same about the

in. You can say the same about the Iranians here though because they they didn't want this war but now that it's here it's it's very dangerous for them I think if it ends on terms which would uh

will allow the whole thing to play out yet again. So now not to draw too many

yet again. So now not to draw too many parallels with the Russians again, but I also think that for them now restoring their deterrent to make sure that no one goes down this path again is is a key um

a key objective. But this comparison to Iraq though, I mean even if even if one would introduce ground troops, Iraq is Iran is almost four times the territory

of Iraq and it has almost twice the population. This is a massive country.

population. This is a massive country.

The I don't know. I thought it was strange that the idea of introducing some a few Kurdish troops was was somehow going to overrun this country.

It's uh I mean as you said it would contribute probably probably significantly to disrupt and destroy things but uh but in terms of if if

there's an objective besides just causing death and mayhem then it is unclear. Is is this the source of the

unclear. Is is this the source of the miscalculation though? because the idea

miscalculation though? because the idea that you could regime change a country only with an air force. Uh cuz you know there had to be a plan. It appears to be

have been regime change. And um again in in this country we actually had in Norway we actually had a political leader of one of the political parties who who went out on Facebook or Twitter

and actually wrote that well now the Iranian regime has fallen because they saw that Kame had been assassinated. So

that's it. Now the government is over. I

mean, is this the kind of the thinking that, you know, you have one bad man, if we just kill the bad man, then the regime is gone. I It's very hard. It's

so remarkably stupid if if this is the case. Well, that fact that you have

case. Well, that fact that you have leaders, political leaders who think in this way, communicate in this way. It

makes you think no one's behind the wheel, I guess.

>> Well, a couple points. Uh I I think that the initial strategy and we have gotten at this issue in our previous comments but the initial strategy was uh

decapitation uh and then if the decapitation didn't work I I believe that we felt that we could punish them uh in ways that would

force them to throw up their hands and surrender. we would have escalation

surrender. we would have escalation dominance. Uh and this is another way of

dominance. Uh and this is another way of saying we thought we could do it with air power alone. Now very importantly

uh the administration was told by insiders two sets of insiders before the war that this was unlikely to work. You

remember that General Kaine, who was the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and was handpicked by President Trump to be the chairman, uh remember he brought

him out of retirement. He was only a three-star general. President Trump

three-star general. President Trump bought him out of brought him out of retirement, made him a four-star general and made him chairman of the Joint Chiefs. Uh so he was in a very important

Chiefs. Uh so he was in a very important way Trump's general. Much to his credit, General Kaine told President Trump that

we did not have a viable military option. This is before February 28th.

option. This is before February 28th.

Furthermore, the National Intelligence Council, which is separate from General Kaine, did a study before the war that said, uh, you're unlikely to get regime

change and bring this war to a quick end. Uh this was careful analysis done

end. Uh this was careful analysis done by the National Intelligence Council, done by insiders.

So there were two flashing orange lights, if not red lights, that were in the president's face that he just

ignored. And as I said to you before,

ignored. And as I said to you before, you know, we have a huge body of literature

on air wars and sanctions and regime change that anyone can easily access and easily figure out what the bottom lines

are here. It it's not a complex

are here. It it's not a complex literature in the sense that almost everybody agrees that air power alone or

strategic bombing doesn't win wars. Uh

that sanctions have real limits. That

regime change is wickedly difficult.

First of all, it's almost impossible without ground forces. But even with ground forces, the whole process is wickedly difficult. The literature is

wickedly difficult. The literature is unequivocally clear on this. Uh so when you marry what we know from previous

analysis by scholars and policy analysts with the fact that you had General Kaine and the National Intelligence Council warning the president not to do this.

And when 20% of the American people approved it, but the rest didn't, you think about that. Only 20% of the American people were enthusiastic about

this war. the other 80% either opposed

this war. the other 80% either opposed it or wasn't too sure to go to war, you know, in those circumstances is quite

remarkable. And you just sort of wonder

remarkable. And you just sort of wonder what was Trump thinking? Uh how could he have possibly done this? And when you look at where we are today, given

everything I just said, it's hardly surprising that we're in a real mess and there's no apparent way to get out of it. It's just not surprising what is

it. It's just not surprising what is happening now is consistent with the historical record. And just to add one

historical record. And just to add one more dimension to this, go back to the 12-day war last June. The 12-day war between Israel and the United States on

one side and Iran on the other side. It

was the Israelis and the Americans, not the Iranians, who wanted to end that war after 12 days. Decapitation didn't work

in that war. We didn't have escalation dominance in that war. Uh I mean what more evidence do you need before

February 28th to tell you that this is a bad idea? Uh but nevertheless uh Trump

bad idea? Uh but nevertheless uh Trump jumped in uh along with Netanyahu who of course was pushing him and promising him

that we would have a quick victory. And

here we are.

See, that's a great point. That makes

this even more extraordinary. The fact

that we already had this war in back in June for 12 days, and it was the same problems. I mean, the the weapon shortage, that was a key problem. That's

why they had to put an end to it. And of

course, because it was only with Israel, Iran was more willing to put an end to it. But how does it surprise you the US

it. But how does it surprise you the US didn't pack a bigger bag for this war though, and that they didn't have more weapons? cuz I heard they only prepared

weapons? cuz I heard they only prepared for a few weeks at most. Uh but this is um yeah or was was was it just assumption that if it didn't work then we can just

put it to halt again after 12 days like last time?

Well, you're assuming that President Trump is a rational legal thinker, right? you you're assuming that he does

right? you you're assuming that he does the careful analysis that you you would do or I would do if we were taking our countries into war, but that's just not

the way he operates. And it's clear from listening to him talk that he has all these pictures in his head that bear no resemblance to reality. He's constantly

saying things that are just simply untrue. And if he believes them, you

untrue. And if he believes them, you know, you can see why he just does foolish things. Uh he's recently been

foolish things. Uh he's recently been saying that uh uh first of all, Iran has weapons that are not accurate at all.

These are all inaccurate weapons.

Nothing could be further from the truth, right? They have ballistic missiles and

right? They have ballistic missiles and drones that are highly accurate. Not all

of the ballistic missiles, for sure, but many of them. and certainly almost all the drones. Uh but to say that they have

the drones. Uh but to say that they have an inventory of weapons that are all inaccurate is a foolish thing to say. Uh

and then furthermore, he made the outlandish comment that Iran has tomahawk missiles.

There's no way Iran would have took missiles. How could he say that? Uh and

missiles. How could he say that? Uh and

then he tells all these stories about, you know, how we decimated last year uh Iran's nuclear capability. We basically

erased it from the map. Uh but now we find out that that wasn't true.

that 60% enriched uranium that Iran had before the 12-day war started before we, the

United States, bombed those critically important Iranian nuclear sites on June 22nd of 1965.

uh that despite all that, the Iranians 60% uh uh nuclear 60% enriched nuclear

material is still there. Uh we didn't destroy it, but he said we did. So, you

never know exactly what he's thinking, but it does seem quite clear that the pictures, many of the pictures that he has in his head uh don't square with

reality. And in that circumstance, you

reality. And in that circumstance, you can understand uh how he could be bamboozled by someone like Prime Minister Netanyahu uh into thinking he could win a quick

and decisive victory. And by the way, if there's one person who was telling him that this was all going to work out uh in a magical way and we were going to

live uh happily ever after uh after a quick uh military victory against Iran, it was Prime Minister Netanyahu. He's

been arguing for a long time uh that the regime in Iran was vulnerable and all we had to do was hit it hard uh and it

would collapse and apparently uh more moderate uh leaders would take over in Iran who would be willing to be subservient to the United States and

Israel. But we just had to show that we

Israel. But we just had to show that we had the courage. This is Prime Minister Netanyahu speaking. We just had to show

Netanyahu speaking. We just had to show that we had the courage uh to really hit Iran hard to pursue a regime change

strategy. And Netanyahu for God knows

strategy. And Netanyahu for God knows how long had been trying to get the United States to do that. He's trying he had been trying to drag us into a war

against Iran by promising us that it would produce a great victory. But every

president before Trump, including President Biden, avoided falling into that trap because they all understood that it was a trap and that we would not

win a quick and decisive victory. Uh but

anyway, uh it appears that uh Prime Minister Netanyahu bamboozled President Trump, convinced him uh that we would win a quick and decisive victory. uh and

uh we have not won that quick and decisive victory.

We can say that's another great irony here that is the whole argument that the Iranians are, you know, an irrational actor. While we see now this kind of a

actor. While we see now this kind of a bit unhinged rhetoric coming from the White House because or only over the past 24 hours, I've seen Trump's claim

that uh the Iranians told Witoff that, you know, they would insist on developing nuclear weapons no matter what. uh that Iran was going to take

what. uh that Iran was going to take over the whole Middle East if we hadn't uh attacked first. Uh we had maybe 3 days before Iranians would have attacked

the United States. And again with this attack on the girls school killing 160 girls, very young ones as well. It

looked many of them were between eight and 10. I I again I went with assumption

and 10. I I again I went with assumption that this was at least well I think a safe assumption that it was a a mistake.

uh you know no one hopefully doesn't target and kill 160 young girls on purpose but I don't understand first the claim well there was an Iranian missile then find out it's a tomahawk his whole

administration then goes on you know moving away from okay Iran didn't bomb you know kill these girls uh on their own but then moving on to the tomahawk that yeah Iran could have it I mean

nobody else in the administration would go out you know with such an absurd statement uh just seems that you know governments always lie all governments but this really you know takes it to a

new level to the extent that the credibility not just of Trump but the United States could be at at risk and you know that's a you know it's a

nonmaterial um asset you can call it but it's still very vital it would seem though I think if you look at both Iran and

Russia whe whether you like the regimes in those two countries uh or not uh I think the leaders and here we're talking

about Putin in the case of Russia and of course Ayatollah Himei and now his son uh all the evidence is that these

regimes are rational legal that they're thinking strategically I mean just to segue to Putin for a second Putin is a first rate strategic thinker I don't

know how anybody could disagree with that uh the idea that he's some sort of fool who's detached from reality makes no sense. You don't have to like what

no sense. You don't have to like what he's doing. You can think that he was

he's doing. You can think that he was wrong to invade Ukraine. I understand

that. But uh he thinks in a very logical way. Uh I think he has a powerful

way. Uh I think he has a powerful strategic mind. And I think if you look

strategic mind. And I think if you look at the Iranians, you listen to the foreign minister talk, uh he is an impressive individual. Again, you don't

impressive individual. Again, you don't have to like uh the Iranian regime and you can view Iran as an adversary, but I think it's very important when you're in

a war and you're trying to assess the other side that you do it in a rational legal way. And if the other side is

legal way. And if the other side is smart and clever, that you appreciate that fact and take it into account uh as you put your plans together for dealing

with the adversary. But all I would say is that the United States when it comes to dealing with Russia, when it comes to dealing with China as well, and when it comes to dealing with Iran, uh you're

dealing with uh leaders in those countries uh who are smart and uh who know how to think strategically.

But then when you look at the Europeans and you look at the Americans, especially President Trump and Secretary of Defense Pete Exath, and you listen to

them talk, uh you say to yourself, it's not clear that these people understand strategy 101. Uh it's not clear that

strategy 101. Uh it's not clear that they're operating in a rational legal way. Uh sometimes I think it's quite

way. Uh sometimes I think it's quite frightening to hear President Trump talk about a particular issue because the things he's saying are just simply not

true. Again, the point about Iran having

true. Again, the point about Iran having uh uh tomahawk missiles, this is just not it's not a plausible argument aside from the fact that it's not true. It's

just not plausible. Uh and he tells stories like that all the time. So uh I think that uh when you look at our side

of the equation uh it's not a pretty picture.

Well you have um no no definitely you have written a book on this topic that is uh was titled why leaders lie. So the

truth about lying in international politics. uh how do you make sense of

politics. uh how do you make sense of this then or or why because I I remember from from your book um um that one of

the key arguments was that often we find more lying in uh from from uh liberal democracies. I I remember I cited that

democracies. I I remember I cited that once in political propaganda because we often portray propaganda simply coming from authoritarian states. But if you go back to Walter Litman, Edward Bernese,

all the original scholars on on propaganda, they all made the point that you know if you're a liberal democracy, then essentially sovereignty has been transferred to the people. There's more

need to to manage the masses. So there

was was more demand for propaganda. But

kind of we we we propagandize the concept of propaganda to only mean what other people would do. Uh but but how do you have any conclusions why how it came

to this? Because as I said this is the

to this? Because as I said this is the stories in the media is is just you know it it yeah it's beyond uh well belief.

It's it's not credible in any way.

Let me excuse me Glenn let me make a couple points.

First of all, in in the book that I wrote about lying, one thing you discover is that there are not many lies

told by states to other states.

And one of the reasons is that if you lie all the time, then lying becomes an ineffective tool. In other words, lying

ineffective tool. In other words, lying only works when the other side suspects that you're telling the truth.

So if you're a habitual liar, lying is just a waste of time. So I was actually shocked to discover when I wrote the book and many of my audiences refused to

believe the argument that states don't lie to each other very much.

And the argument I made was that you see more lying by state leaders to their own publics than you see cases of state

leaders lying to other leaders. And this

is counterintuitive and I found it hard to swallow at first, but I just gave you the logic. Now, as you point out, I also

the logic. Now, as you point out, I also found that in democracies, leaders are more likely to lie than they are in autocracies for the reasons that you

laid out. So, you see quite a few

laid out. So, you see quite a few instances of presidents lying to the public. Uh,

and of course, this book was written before President Trump. So, how does President Trump fit with this book?

First of all, uh, President Trump uh, doesn't lie on a lot of occasions because he actually believes what he is saying,

which is scarier than him lying, right?

I think he actually believes a lot of these statements that he makes that bear little resemblance to reality. I

wouldn't be surprised, for example, if he believes that Iran has tomahawk missiles. He he he he has a lot of false

missiles. He he he he has a lot of false beliefs firmly embedded in his brain. So

that's point one. Point two is I do think that he tells lots of lies. I

think he lies, one could argue, almost all the time. He He's constantly telling lies, but the fact is that they're ineffective because everybody

understands that he's lying. He he just says whatever he thinks. As I said before, he may believe some of those things and if he believes them, then they're not lies. But then there are

other occasions where he says things that he has to know are not true. But

the fact that he tells so many lies means that lying is not an effective instrument for him. Lying again is only

effective when people think that you're a trutht teller or that you're not going to lie. If you and I have a personal

to lie. If you and I have a personal relationship that had spanned 25 years and we've had a huge number of interactions, you Glenn and I, right?

And I've always been truthful to you.

It's easy for me to lie to you because you trust me and you let your guard down. But if you've dealt with me for 25

down. But if you've dealt with me for 25 years, we're friends, but you know that I lie all the time. I really can't get away with a meaningful lie because you

just don't trust me. You see the logic?

So, I think with regard to President Trump, the fact that he lies uh just doesn't make that much difference. It

doesn't buy him anything. And if

anything, because some people think some of the time that he really believes what he says, you think that he's not playing with the full deck.

Well, I'm I'm glad you well before pivoted a bit towards Russia because that seems to be a possible well an important component now. Uh well, for

for two reasons, I guess. One would be um uh well, how how do you see Russia's involvement here? There's been a lot of

involvement here? There's been a lot of noise in the media that uh the Russians are providing intelligence to Iran to yeah to hit American targets. I um yeah

I kind of assume that this was happening. I think I assume the Chinese

happening. I think I assume the Chinese were doing the same as they have a concern of course that Iran could be defeated. Uh but also of course because

defeated. Uh but also of course because well the United States is doing the exact same thing in Ukraine. But but

also how what do you think the the extent of the Russian involvement is?

But also how do you think this war is affecting uh our war in Ukraine at the moment?

I think uh to start with the latter part of your questioning that uh this war is wonderful news for the Russians. Uh

first of all, it means that the United States is wasting precious assets in this fight that it might otherwise give to the Europeans

or allow the Europeans to buy to give to the Ukrainians. Uh I think that there's

the Ukrainians. Uh I think that there's no question that this is hurting Ukraine's efforts on the battlefield

because we're expending huge amounts of munitions in this fight. uh you know, patriots, thads, things like that are

being uh used. Uh and and by the way, you notice that we're bringing uh THADs and patriots from East Asia uh to the

Middle East. Uh and this means that uh

Middle East. Uh and this means that uh we're weakening our deterrent uh against China. Uh we're weakening our

China. Uh we're weakening our containment policy visa v China. Going

back to the Russians, uh the Russians fully understand uh that this is going to have delletterious effects for the

Ukrainians. U furthermore, uh as you

Ukrainians. U furthermore, uh as you know, uh the United States has been working overtime, the West has been

working overtime uh to inflict pain on the Russian economy. Uh and this is going to have this war is going to have the opposite effect.

uh if you know the flow of oil and gas out of the Persian Gulf is greatly reduced that means the demand uh for Russian oil and gas is going to go up

and we already see evidence that the United States is willing to allow India now to buy more oil from the Russians

because India is hurting as a result of the cut off in the Gulf. Uh so

economically this is wonderful news for Russia and again in terms of the battlefield it's wonderful news. So um

uh so I think this is a net positive from for the Russians from that point of view. Uh with regard to what the

view. Uh with regard to what the Russians are doing to help the Iranians as you know that's hard to tell. Uh, I

think that it is quite clear that the Russians are providing intelligence for the Iranians and that that that intelligence is helping the Iranians

wage the war. Uh, and it's limiting uh what the Americans and the Israelis can do to defend against Iranian ballistic

missiles. Uh, so I think that uh is

missiles. Uh, so I think that uh is almost certainly uh being done. Uh, and

I wouldn't be surprised if at some point if Iran needs oil, uh, that the Russians provide oil or gas to the Iranians. It's

hard to say for sure what's going on there, but that's another possibility.

And I wouldn't be surprised if they provided some weaponry before the war and they'll provide weaponry during the war. What exactly they'll provide uh, in

war. What exactly they'll provide uh, in terms of numbers and quality, who knows?

Uh but uh I wouldn't be surprised if the Russians and the Chinese as well are helping the Iranians. Both of those countries obviously have a deep-seated

interest and seeing Iran defeat the United States and Israel in this war. I

mean, if you or I were playing China's hand or playing Russia's hand, uh, we would want to see the United States

suffer a humiliating defeat, uh, in its fight with Iran. So, the incentives here for Russia and China to help Iran are

great, and exactly what they're doing is hard to say, but it does look like uh they're helping out, especially with regard to intelligence. and that's

complicating our problem.

>> It seems another benefit for the Russians though would be to I guess improve their image within Iran because you know if you take a step back and

stretch out for you know viewpoint over the past centuries now the Iranians and the Russians have um you know they had quite a few wars behind them and there's every reason in the war in the world for

the Iranians to distrust the Russians as well. This is a I guess a good

well. This is a I guess a good opportunity for the Russians though to be seen as a savior instead of a nemesis or you know someone who who will you

know stab them in the back at the most critical hour. Um but uh it's um yeah I

critical hour. Um but uh it's um yeah I my last question was really about Europe though because it doesn't it it also has

well responded in some very strange ways. uh the the EU of course is you

ways. uh the the EU of course is you know is giving its uh full full support at least rhetorically. I think Mertz he positions himself now as the number one

Trump man to support whatever Trump wants to do. The British are also of course supportive but they didn't want to send any weapons then now they do want to send weapons but Trump doesn't want it because according to Trump they

already won. uh how how do you make

already won. uh how how do you make sense of the European position on this and uh you know how much what's the relevance of French participation you

think and uh how are how is Europe impacted by this war because you know we just cut oursel off or we like to say liberated oursel from Russian energy and now the Iranians are liberating us from

Middle Eastern energy. It's uh it's not much more uh you know coming our way it seems. I I think the e the economic consequences

for Europe uh if this war escalates and some of the scenarios we described at the start of the program play out uh the consequences of that for Europe would be

catastrophic. Uh and I think the

catastrophic. Uh and I think the European elites understand that. I I

think they wish very much that this war had never started. This is a war that is not good for Europe. But as is almost

always the case, the Europeans do pretty much what the Americans want them to do.

And they're kissing up to the Americans and uh supporting the American war effort. Uh failing to condemn the United

effort. Uh failing to condemn the United States and Israel for this brazen war of aggression, for assassinating the leader of a foreign country. The Europeans are

not condemning this. Safe for the Spanish. Uh and uh it's really what you

Spanish. Uh and uh it's really what you would expect from the Europeans. And

what drives this, as we've talked about many times before, Glenn, is the European fear that the United States will leave Europe or at least marketkedly reduce its military

footprint. Uh the Europeans don't want

footprint. Uh the Europeans don't want that. They want to keep NATO intact.

that. They want to keep NATO intact.

They want to keep the Americans fully committed to Europe. And the European elites believe that the only way you can do that is to lick America's boots. Uh

and in this case that means lick President Trump's boots. And so as you would expect the Europeans are following

the Pied Piper. Uh the question is do the Europeans matter uh in terms of winning this war? And the answer is no.

Uh I mean who cares whether the Europeans get involved or not? uh maybe

they'll uh help on the margins, but that just doesn't matter at this point.

There's nothing the Europeans can do uh to, you know, fundamentally affect the balance of power between Iran on one side and the United States and Israel on

the other side. I mean, President Mcronone talks like uh this is uh 1799 or 1805 where France is, you know, under

Napoleon and by far the most powerful state in Europe. It's it's Europe's Godzilla and France can do X Y and Z.

Those days are long gone. France has

very little military capability and it certainly has little capability to affect events in the Middle East. Uh so

it just doesn't matter very much. This

war is going to be settled between the Iranians on one side and the Americans and the Israelis on the other side. And

what's in the interests of those three actors is what really matters here. And

from Europe's point of view, the sad truth is that their interests are going to be largely ignored because the Americans are just not going to pay

Europe's interests much attention. we

don't care that much about Europe.

President Trump views the Europeans uh with contempt. Uh the idea that he's

with contempt. Uh the idea that he's going to go out of his way to help Europe uh is not a serious argument. Uh

in fact, if the Europeans get hurt in the process, I would imagine that President Trump will uh think that's a good thing. You know, he has contempt

good thing. You know, he has contempt for the European elites. So, Europe is in real trouble. uh it started with the

Ukraine war uh and this war just makes a bad situation much worse.

That seems like again I I always agreed with the idea that the United States is the pacifier and we and Europe's going to have a lot of problems fragmenting if uh not so much if more than when the

United States departs. But it it looks as if the efforts now to keep the US there is well will only fragment Europe faster because want to keep the US

thereby prolonging the Ukraine war which means we're turning we turn on the Slovakians the Hungarians uh you know ignore them or now that uh Mertz was sitting next to Trump and Trump could

just hammer away threatening Spain and you know Mers has to sit there obediently not say anything critical because he has to show loyalty to Trump and now of course They're alienating the

Spanish. So, it just seems, you know,

Spanish. So, it just seems, you know, always the worst of both worlds is what the Europeans are are going for. It's

quite Yeah, it's quite extraordinary to watch. Uh doesn't give one a lot of

watch. Uh doesn't give one a lot of optimism. Um

optimism. Um >> Yes.

>> Let me let me make a radical statement, Glenn.

I think that one could make an argument that it's in the Europeans's interest to in effect pursue the Spanish model visa v the United States to play hard ball

with the United States to tell the United States that uh you're going to greatly improve your relations with China. You're going to trade with China

China. You're going to trade with China and you're going to trade sophisticated technologies with the Chinese. And if

the Americans don't like that, well, we'll cut a deal then. But, uh, in the meantime, we're going to fundamentally change our relationship with China. Uh,

and furthermore, with regard to the Middle East, we're going to condemn what you're doing in the most powerful terms. And we're even going to look for ways to punish you. Uh, we're going to condemn

punish you. Uh, we're going to condemn you for starting a war of aggression.

We're going to condemn you uh for collaborating with the Israelis and waging a genocide. We're going to condemn you for assassinating Ayatolli

Hani. Uh pursuing a really hard ball

Hani. Uh pursuing a really hard ball strategy with the United States. And

given that the United States needs Europe in all sorts of ways, that will provide the Europeans with some leverage so that they can protect their own

interests.

Uh, and what we're saying here is that by constantly cowtowing to the Americans, by licking President Trump's

boots, you put your situation, you put yourself in a situation where your interests are not protected. And if

anything, your interests are hurt and uh you're getting yourself into more and more trouble as the years go by. Uh,

that's the way I'd look at it if I were a European. But again, this is a radical

a European. But again, this is a radical argument and the Europeans brains have been grooved to think that this is heresy that, you know, the arguments I'm making are wrong. They're just simply

wrong. We don't have to analyze them. We

wrong. We don't have to analyze them. We

just dismissed them out of hand. We've

learned all along that the only way to deal with the United States is to be nice and to be subservient. Uh that

might have been true at one point, but I don't think that's true with President Trump. And I'm surprised they haven't

Trump. And I'm surprised they haven't figured that out. Uh, I think the Spanish leader has figured that out. Uh,

President Trump is a classic bully. Uh,

in many ways the United States is a country that is a bully and long has been a bully. But President Trump is a classic bully. And the only way you deal

classic bully. And the only way you deal with a bully is you stand up to that bully. And if you show weakness, the

bully. And if you show weakness, the bully will walk all over you. And of

course, this is what President Trump is doing with the Europeans. He walks all over them. He doesn't pay attention to

over them. He doesn't pay attention to their interests. He does what he thinks

their interests. He does what he thinks is in America's interest and if that hurts the Europeans, tough luck for them. That's his approach. Uh and you

them. That's his approach. Uh and you would think that the Europeans would have learned this by now and would have altered their policies towards the

United States in fundamental ways. But

apparently that's not the case.

No, I just like say I don't think it's radical at all. I I always make the point as well that the most important partner for Europe should be the United States. But if you want to keep this

States. But if you want to keep this relationship then you know the Europe should do exactly the opposite of what it instincts tells it. That is not to put all its eggs in that one basket.

What you want to do is diversify work with the Russians, the Chinese, the Indians and all others. Because if you have this asymmetrical interdependence where all of Europe's relations depend on the US but Europe is not really that

important to the US. With this

asymmetry, the US can walk all over Europe and the relationship isn't any more sustainable. So if you want to save

more sustainable. So if you want to save the relationship, you need a balance of dependence, diversify as well. I mean,

this is the logic of the Russians. For

them, the R the Chinese relationship is the most important to have. But they

also realize there's a symmetry there that they would become much too dependent on China compared to China's depends on Russia. So they recognize if they want the Chinese relationship to

work, you diversify as well. also deal

with the Indians and all others and you know but I think the mindset in Europe is just well America's our liberal democratic partner so let's just show our loyalty let's cut oursel off from

the Russians cut oursel off from the Chinese you know threaten the Indians a little bit and now the Americans will reward us for our loyalty and you know sit in front of his desk call him daddy

and somehow everything will be fine it's it's very strange I don't understand where where the thinking is But um yeah

>> yeah yeah with with regard to India uh I I've given a number of talks in India recently and I was recently in Mumbai and my advice to the Indians I hate to say this as an American but if I were an

Indian uh I would not get too close to the United States. Uh as I like to say the United States is a rogue elephant and uh uh if India gets close it will

pay a certain price. It discovered this last year when we put when President Trump put 50% tariffs on India. Uh and

uh uh I think that that basic logic which applies to India applies to the Europeans as well. You just do not want to get too close to the United States because when you do that, you give the

United States all the leverage and the United States will use that leverage.

That's certainly true of President Trump. So you want to give the United

Trump. So you want to give the United States as little leverage over you as possible and you want to maximize the amount of leverage that you have over the United States. This is my point

about trading with China. The United

States has a vested interest in making sure that European states don't trade sophisticated technologies with the Chinese. Okay. But that tells me that

Chinese. Okay. But that tells me that the Europeans therefore have leverage.

They can threaten to trade sophisticated technologies with the Chinese. The

Americans will not want that. And the

Europeans can exact the quidd proquo from the Americans uh if they cut off the flow of uh cutting edge technologies to uh China.

Well, thank you very much, John, for taking the time. As always, uh I always learn a lot listening to you. So, uh

thank you and I hope you come back on soon. Thank you for having me, Glenn.

soon. Thank you for having me, Glenn.

Uh, I enjoyed the conversation. I just

wish the subject wasn't so depressing.