Not just Sudan - How the UAE have wrecked Libya, Yemen and Egypt | Andreas Krieg | UNAPOLOGETIC

So most of Sudan's gold now is run is being exported legally or illegally through the UAE onto global markets. Uh

and Egypt is basically a beggar state that is unable to really shape the region. It went from one of the the big

region. It went from one of the the big leading countries in the 20th century of the Middle East into a a beggar state.

They had asked a you know very infamous gentleman called Eric Prince to set up shop in in the Emirates. Very few people in Egypt now think that the the coup of 2013 by CC was a good thing for Egypt.

Right.

>> What would have happened to to Sudan specifically if the UAE weren't funding the Janja for the last 15 years?

>> But the Emiratis are the spoilers in all of that. They don't want a consolidated

of that. They don't want a consolidated Yemen. They would prefer two Yemens and

Yemen. They would prefer two Yemens and one that's fully under Abu Dhabi influence. And obviously the UAE being

influence. And obviously the UAE being implicated in that because they're the main financial and military and logistical backer of the RSF.

>> Are you rolling?

>> Yes.

>> Good. Um,

>> that's off the record.

>> Yeah. No, it's No, no, it's not. It's

just because sometimes we use these cutaways in the first 30 seconds of the show. Cool. We're good to go.

show. Cool. We're good to go.

>> Okay.

I'm going to clap. Hi, good day and welcome to another episode of Unapologetic. I'm your host Karim and

Unapologetic. I'm your host Karim and I'm very pleased today to have in studio Andreas Crick. Andreas, welcome to the

Andreas Crick. Andreas, welcome to the show.

>> Thanks for having me.

>> Uh, Andreas is no stranger to people who follow Middle East I either on text.

He's also appeared in a few of our shows. Um he's a columnist for us. He's

shows. Um he's a columnist for us. He's

an associate professor at King's College. His expertise is really

College. His expertise is really understanding and thinking about the Middle East. Um its actors, its ideas.

Middle East. Um its actors, its ideas.

Um and he's one of the foremost scholars in that. Um Andreas, I'm very excited to

in that. Um Andreas, I'm very excited to have you here with us today. Um as we were just getting into the lift as he was kind of coming up to our studios, he asked me, "What do you want to cover?"

Because it sounds very broad from the notes I sent him. And it is broad. Um

it's an interesting it's an interesting discussion for those of you who are interested in what we are about to speak about because really we're unpacking the last 15 years of the Arab region but

through the prism of the UAE statecraft.

>> Um so we're going to touch on Sudan which people are may have I mean people there's obviously two types of people seeing the show those who are quite familiar with the subject matter and those who are interested but not yet. So

so so sure. So I think many many people have heard about the UAE's kind of backing of the rebels in Sudan and what what has occurred with that. But the

story starts way before that, right? So

if you were telling the story, >> where would you start?

>> Where would I start? You probably have to start in the mid-200s really. Um

because the UAE today is a country that is run by um you know it's a family business run by Abu Dhabi's royal family the al- Nan and most specifically the the Bani

Fatima which is Muhammad who's the president Mozite Tahn bin zite the national security adviser and Mansour bin zite these three in particular they're kind of the key actors in in the

UAE and their rise to power really shaped what the UAE is today because the UAE or Abu Dhabi more specifically hasn't been such such an assertive player in the region or even in the Gulf

up until really the rise of Muhammad bin Zad and his brothers into power in the in the mid early mid 2000s. Um and so Muhammad's rise, Muhammad's rise through the ranks of the military into the

position that he is in today as the president of the United Arab Emirates.

That kind of journey is also the journey of the UAE from a small state uh somewhat under the umbrella and shadow of Saudi Arabia into I would argue

probably the most agile and also most assertive uh country in this part of the world and I would probably even say the most powerful country um even when

compared to Israel uh and not because they're necessarily quite big or because they have a big GDP or because they have uh you know a big population they have obviously financial wealth which is

important but they have understood a way for good or for bad how to translate financial power and their what the nation has to offer into influence in the world not just regionally but

definitely regionally but also globally I mean they're a global player and I would say they probably have elevated themselves from being this kind of small state in the Gulf to a regional middle power >> so I mean you've said that they possibly

have more power even than Israel um the other big actor is Saudi Arabia especially right now I mean that's going to probably we are going to spend the next two hours sort of unpacking why that's the case but that's probably

quite like for people listening to this and they think >> you know Abu Dhabi Dubai it's these flashy cities that we started off as small little backwaters in the 70s and now that's grown up

>> um I think specifically before we actually like I mean I think part of painting this picture is just getting to just how sinister some of the actions of the UA have been in the last 15 years.

you've written an article for us, an opinion column where you speak about how they've set up sort of an axis of secessionist actors.

>> Um, and so you speak about these things and and I mean what we want to get to is >> the UAE in many ways are are responsible for vast parts of the instability in

Libya, Yemen, Sudan and others. Um, how

did and why did it go from this place that was, you know, this nice building all these islands and attracting capital and westernizing superficially to this

kind of actor and and and just explain that to us, but also give us an idea um of just how sinister and devastating their actions have been with regards to this.

>> Well, obviously making a value judgment of whether something is sinister or not is quite subjective is true. So you ask the Emirati about it, the one thing they will always come back as an explanation legitimizing what they're doing is the

word is which is stability. They always

come back saying this is about stability which is kind of paradoxical if you think of the consequences of Emirati intervention in Libya, in Yemen and obviously in Sudan and elsewhere which you know most people in those countries

would say actually has been kind of detrimental uh for regional and local stability because has undermined stability. Uh the UAE's intent is one

stability. Uh the UAE's intent is one thing. I think the UAE under Muhammad

thing. I think the UAE under Muhammad bin Zid uh who as a leader has shaped the country into what they are today looks at the region through a prism of

threat and insecurity. So it's a very deep-seated insecurity inferiority complex uh through which they analyze the region and they saw the development

spee es especially after the Arab Spring as a sort of um development that could undermine the regime security in Abu Dhabi. They saw the rise of civil

Dhabi. They saw the rise of civil society and the rise up of civil society winning against the authoritarian autocratic regimes of the AR regimes if you will of the Arab world. They saw

this as a fundamental threat to their own regime's legitimacy. And so they have seen unlike other countries I mean Qatar is the polar opposite of that obviously they looked at what happened during the Arab Spring as an opportunity. They thought this is an

opportunity. They thought this is an opportunity to change uh the dynamics social political dynamics in the region.

And the Emirati saw this counter, you know, quite polar opposite. So this

there's a fundamental threat to their regime security. And so what they did,

regime security. And so what they did, why they did what they did is because they don't like, and that's when I say they, it's Muhammad bin Z in particular

and his brothers do not like the unpredictability of civil societal mobilization. Um, you know, and it's not

mobilization. Um, you know, and it's not just the revolutionary end of that because that's what they focused on in 20101 and so on. It's is everything. It

starts with him with you know what happens in the mosque where people meet uh and have discourse that is socially relevant potentially politically relevant. Um goes into you know what

relevant. Um goes into you know what happens on social media goes into uh general you know journalism. It goes

into any sort of discourse that could potentially you know implant the seeds of future mobilization that could in its extreme form lead to some sort of revolution.

And that's how the UAE, how Abu Dhabi looks at civil societal mobilization.

It's a fundamental threat uh to regime security. And it's something that they

security. And it's something that they want to suppress in its earliest form.

It started initially in at home. Um it

it really started in 2010 as a clampdown on civil society in the United Arab Emirates, particularly in Abu Dhabi, but then later on in the other seven emirates.

Um and then they exported this across the region into other countries. Libya

being the first one that had to experience this sort of counterrevolutionary push. Um later on

counterrevolutionary push. Um later on they exported into Yemen uh into Egypt as well in 2013 after you know they where they were very instrumental in the in the coup d'etar against the the then

Muslim Brotherhood government of Morsei where they backed the military uh taking back power and so there is a pattern that evolves. So we have Libya. Um so

that evolves. So we have Libya. Um so

probably we should start with Egypt 2013 moving to Libya going to Yemen and now obviously Sudan and everything in between.

>> Okay. Yeah. And I mean that's where I wanted to get to. You said why they did what they did. Let's let's start unpacking what they did. I mean, we're also going to just so that we can kind of let the audience know what we're about to speak about is once we get through this, starting with Egypt and

then Libya and then Yemen and Sudan, we're going to obviously speak about the the genocide that's been unfolding um and how that repositions the UAE and then discuss the the bigger discussion,

I guess, of the US. I'm not sure if it's complicity or guardianship or allyship in this project. Um, and I think that's important because we've been hearing the

US, US presidents for for the last 25 years have all been saying since George Bush's war in Iraq, uh, you know, that we need to start focusing less on the Middle East and more on China. And they

have started to focus more on China, but they haven't stopped focusing on the Middle East.

>> So, we're going to try to get to where, but I mean, yes, Egypt, what did what was Abu Dhabi's counterrevolutionary activity, and what did they do? So in

2011 the the Libya the the Amiratis and the countries were asked by the UK and other NATO countries whether they would support the NATO operation in Libya.

That's really when the Amiratis were asked to kind of contribute.

>> So we speaking about Libya first.

>> Well Libya is really where the Arab Spring begins for nothing happened in 2011 that would really help the the counterrevolutionary narrative to unravel. But in 2011 this small state

unravel. But in 2011 this small state Abu Dhabi was thinking okay there is an opportunity to be part of shaping this future. They weren't quite sure yet in

future. They weren't quite sure yet in 2011 where it would end. They didn't

know it would be, you know, that you would have civil society overpowering and and toppling all these regimes. They

also didn't understand necessarily that political Islam would play a strong role in it and that these Islamist organizations in these countries who had been for decades already the only opposition on the ground that they would

play an outsized role if you will in the in remodeling the the future social political future of the Arab world. Um,

so in 2011 they entered the Arab Spring and because they wanted to be relevant to the West and it was really just about Libya. But what happened in Li from 2011

Libya. But what happened in Li from 2011 until 2013 is really where especially in 2012 where they realized that you know where this insecurity complex really kicked in where they realized okay the

countries are the driver's seat. Um, you

know the country the countries had all these relationships with different non-state actors and also different uh Islamic groups across and Islamist groups across the region. um they were involved in, you know, in shaping the

outcome of the Syrian civil war. They

were involved in in Egypt where they had a relationship with the Muslim Brotherhood. They were involved in in

Brotherhood. They were involved in in shaping the political climate in in in Libya as well, in Tunisia, and so on and so forth. So, I mean, there's always

so forth. So, I mean, there's always been that rivalry between Qatar and the UAE over, you know, who's going to lead.

They in some ways quite similar because they're neighbors. They're deep-seated,

they're neighbors. They're deep-seated, you know, tribal issues that go back decades and centuries. Um, but

essentially there's a bit of rivalry going on there. But beyond that rivalry, I think the Emiratis um then realized in 2012 how dangerous the new order that was emerging could become. So in 2012,

we had got the Muslim Brotherhood uh uh uh and their candidate Morsey being elected as the president of Egypt. Um

and that was a a massive shocking yeah that was a shocking moment for the Emiratics because they realized okay the biggest population wise biggest Arab country is now ruled by someone that

they consider to be the the arch enemy uh polit of political Islam the Muslim Brotherhood. The fear of the Muslim

Brotherhood. The fear of the Muslim Brotherhood in in Abu Dhabi also has to be understood against the context that unlike other Gulf states, the Muslim Brotherhood had a a sort of you know a a

network that reached all the way into into the UAE. So they were the the Muslim Brotherhood had created sort of uh you know a base within the UAE

through you know decades of providing um or you know people who came to Abu Dhabi to build the state to build the bureaucracy to build the education sector. These were all individuals and

sector. These were all individuals and not all but there were a lot of individuals who had relationships with Muslim Brotherhood. So they were

Muslim Brotherhood. So they were involved in in in building the the Emirati state. We had some locals who

Emirati state. We had some locals who subscribed to the ideology of you know of of social political change um and reform through the form of Islam. So

there was a reform movement in in the UAE that had a relationship to the Muslim Brotherhood. Al-Isla the the kind

Muslim Brotherhood. Al-Isla the the kind of reform movement um was a an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood. So the Muslim Brotherhood whatever happened in Egypt which for them for the Emiratis was kind of the the mothership of this network in

the region had a direct impact on mobilization in in in the UAE. So and

you had one of these Muslim brothers now becoming the president of Egypt in 2012 with direct ramifications for for Emiratis um who had subscribed to the

same ideology. So they saw this what

same ideology. So they saw this what happened in Egypt as a direct threat to regime security. Um and so we see that

regime security. Um and so we see that clampdown in 2011 already on on the Muslim Brotherhood and further clampdowns on the Muslim Brotherhood in the years to come and as in Egypt the Muslim Brotherhood comes to power in

2012. Um the UAE identified the Muslim

2012. Um the UAE identified the Muslim Brotherhood as the greatest threat uh to national security. Um clamping down on

national security. Um clamping down on any sort of civil societal group that had any link to political Islam and even those who had any link to Islam whatsoever. So it's a very broad brush.

whatsoever. So it's a very broad brush.

I mean until today I don't think there's any country including Israel that uses the Muslim Brotherhood scarecrow and boogeyman to the extent that the Emiratis do it. I mean for for the Emiratis if they want to smear and

slander someone they will say this he's a guy he's Muslim Brotherhood or she's Muslim Brotherhood in the same way that now the Israelis are saying this guy is Kamas and this guy is Kamas. This is I mean kind of how the Emiratis started

this war against the Muslim Brotherhood.

And so in Egypt in 2012, big shocking moment and they they put a lot of effort behind trying to topple that regime. And

obviously Muslim Brotherhood government haunted by decades of uh of mismanagement and inferiority complex um were very very cynical about um and

possibly rightly so cynical about the Egyptian military and where the Egyptian military was going and were fearful. And

what the Muslim Brotherhood then created in Egypt was a regime that in itself wasn't just didn't live up to uh to to the standards and to to their to their objectives and created something that

for many Egyptians wasn't what they voted for in 2012 and was certainly not something that they went to the streets for in 2011. And so what the Emiratis were seeing, they saw a potential to

drive a wedge into the social political relations in Egypt by saying we can actually try to disrupt political discourse in Egypt to create a rift between the government run by the Muslim

Brotherhood and the people of Egypt. And

so they engaged with a liberal secular group um in in northern Egypt at the time, the Tamarud, which were you know they wanted a secular liberal uh Egypt.

They thought their ambitions weren't accomplished during the during the revolution. They didn't like the Muslim

revolution. They didn't like the Muslim Brotherhood. They were a very small

Brotherhood. They were a very small group in 2012 and then between 2012 and uh and late 2012 and uh June 2013 they

grew into this massive movement u being able to obviously draw on the various grievances that Egyptians had and were able to bring people to the street. And

what we see here is that the the Emiratis were kind of strategically uh engaging with media companies, with social media companies, um to kind of spread, you know, weaponized narratives

about the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt in in in during that period in early 20 late 2012, early 2013 and were able to contribute to a countermobilization to

the Muslim Brotherhood that led to the events in June 2013 where you had nearly a million people on the streets protesting against the government and thereby also obviously we there's a lot

evidence for how the Emiratis then engaged and uh you know engaged build relationships with the military intelligence and kind of creating the pretext for the military to stage the

coup Mosi uh sorry CC at the time staging the coup against Mosi in June 2013. So the Emirati become very

2013. So the Emirati become very instrumental in that. Instrumental in

building these counter networks to the Muslim Brotherhood, instrumental in shaping perception in Egypt, instrumental globally to ostracize the Muslim Brotherhood and and talking it

down and were then through their relationship with Egyptian military able to create a pretext that would lead to a change of regime within Egypt, the most populous country uh in in the Arab

world. So that was an an eye openening

world. So that was an an eye openening moment to Abu Dhabi saying actually we might be small but our financial power if done if if curated orchestrated and

delivered strategically we can actually achieve quite something. We can you know punch way above our weight and change social politics in the region. They

realized in 2013 there was a moment where the revolution could be turned into a counterrevolution and that's exactly from which that's where this unfolds where the counterrevolutionary

um ambition of the Emirates of Abu Dhabi in particular unfolds. So they win in Egypt. Um obviously Qatar being the big

Egypt. Um obviously Qatar being the big loser. We see a change handover of power

loser. We see a change handover of power in Qatar from the father Emir to Tamim which also meant that Qatar became far less activist as they were in previous

years and a vacuum was left in the Arab Spring as the Arab Spring was anyway not necessarily delivering for a whole host of different reasons. People were

fearing that their grievances weren't addressed and the Amiratis were very good at exploiting these grievances in curating networks running against the revolution and saying we need to go back

to what they say quote unquote stability which is going back to some sort of um you know an original order where authoritarians can control and contain what civil society is doing.

>> Okay. So I mean you you you mention that you know the the status quo has been in the region and this goes back to for many years. um authoritarian regimes who

many years. um authoritarian regimes who if you go back for the last 70 years were either are anti or pro- USA and and and both sort of the the the the pro-

USA sort of allyship bank on the USA for security and sort of the anti so speak about them so the you know the the theocracies in Iran Saddam Hussein

Bashel said anti-USA you know they they get their power from stamping down on suppression and and dictatorship and their power comes from allyship back in the cold war to to to to the USSR. But

just coming back, I mean that's just to I've just mentioned that so that you know the audience gets an idea of where of of of the relationship between authoritarianism and stability that you mentioned.

>> Um now there's people hearing this and and they'd be like there were you know 3 million people in the streets uh by some estimates. I mean the news would falsely

estimates. I mean the news would falsely report there were 17 million or 33 million. Numbers were definitely not

million. Numbers were definitely not there but it's between a million and 3 million people on the streets in Cairo in 2013. Um, could the Amiratis have

in 2013. Um, could the Amiratis have mobilized 3 million people? Um, were

they acting alone? Um, were they acting with the Saudis and the Israelis? Um,

and so let's discuss that. But then also their actions later on in in in Libya and Yemen and uh Sudan move away from just mobilizing societies to being a lot

more militaristic um and and supply chains and those kind of things. So

there's a big shift. So first address, you know, how could, you know, is it feasible that the the Amiratis, this tiny state could mobilize these Egyptians? And and maybe this is just

Egyptians? And and maybe this is just wishful thinking. Um, just clarify what

wishful thinking. Um, just clarify what your because I'm guessing it's a nuanced answer, but then how they pivot from that to, you know, running militias.

>> Yeah. So obviously running a civil societal mobilization and influence is is a network. It's aworked activity, right? It's not linear. It's very, you

right? It's not linear. It's very, you know, you don't know how it's going to unfold. A lot of things had to happen

unfold. A lot of things had to happen for it to be successful in in 2013.

Obviously, it wouldn't have been able, the Emiratis wouldn't have been able to do it without the help of the Egyptian military. Uh they wouldn't have been

military. Uh they wouldn't have been able to do it without compromising certain elites in Egypt. They wouldn't

have been and financial financially compromising them. They wouldn't have

compromising them. They wouldn't have been able to do it without uh protesters being directly paid uh by proxies of of of the UAE. Um, and obviously ideologically speaking, the fear of the

Muslim Brotherhood is not just an Emirati fear. I mean, the other actor in

Emirati fear. I mean, the other actor in the Middle East that didn't want the Arab Spring to succeed was obviously Israel. I mean, the Israelis have always

Israel. I mean, the Israelis have always seen the quote unquote Arab street as being irrational, emotional, and certainly anti-Israel. And that was a

certainly anti-Israel. And that was a threat to and has been an a threat to Israeli security all, you know, since the the creation of Israel. So the

Israelis had a certainly a vested interest in making sure that the Emiratis succeed in this. And that's

that that fear of the Arab street, the fear of the Muslim Brother, the fear of political Islam, the fear of um you know of um sort of freed emancipated Arabs

thinking freely and acting freely, being able to vote and their voices being heard is like the antithesis to stability in the mind of the Israelis.

So they certainly had a had an interest in that. Um but I would say a lot of

in that. Um but I would say a lot of things came together in that summer of 2013 and Emirati money was the key. The

the Emirati were key in the orchestration of it. So as I said it's aworked activity. A lot of different

aworked activity. A lot of different things have to have to happen. It's not

like sort of people think like oh the conspiracy theories there's like haben zite is you know paying directly checks and making phone calls and whatnot.

Obviously it's not like that. There's a

lot of intermediaries and proxies that were paid for by the Emiratis for for them to be able to do this and the Egyptians Egyptian military and the Egyptian security services were a very instrumental part in this who were

compromised and and obviously had an interest to cooperate with the Emiratis.

But why I put why I think the Emiratis were the mastermind behind it is because they had a clear vision. Nobody else at the time had a clear vision of how to change the the regional order and that

includes the uh Obama administration as well. Uh I think it's very important to

well. Uh I think it's very important to to bear in mind. We always say the Americans wanted to do this and that. I

mean the US didn't have a clear vision for the Arab world. It is we we're talking about a period where the United States already was in a state of gradual withdrawal from the Middle East, right?

The pivot towards Asia. Um where

obviously the US hasn't succeeded. I

mean we're talking about it later on.

But nonetheless, the idea was let's delegate this issue of regional security to local proxies. and the local proxies that were there traditionally have been the Israelis obviously but also

increasing the Gulf states UAE Qatar Saudi Arabia and this hasn't changed until today. So over the last 12 years

until today. So over the last 12 years we've seen the Americans doubling down on this disengagement and working through proxies and and and and partners such as the Gulfies and and also Israel.

So um it's you know they have might have a shared vested interest but it's really the Emiratis who were the ones who knew how to fill that vacuum at the time in 2013 and they succeeded and the

confidence that came from it the confidence that you can use and that's what strategy what is it all about strategy is about uh generating creating power um out of you know what is available to yourself how can you use

what is available to yourself and translating that into influence and the Emirati had found a way to do this and obviously most of what they had available able to themselves were were financial resources and they were found

a way to translate these resources into power into strategic depth and hence what happened afterwards the moving into Libya in 2014 not even a year after

followed the same playbook where again you know you had a an someone with an authoritarian tendency someone again in uniform general

um who was an old Gaddafi era um field marshal I think he calls himself failed milit military leader, but someone who had links with the CIA, someone who had American citizenship, someone who would

be palatable to the American audiences in Washington, who also was promising like CC to bring back stability and saying, you know, actually if you want stability, you need to crush some eggs.

the idea that you know if what happens obviously what in 2013 was about initially about mobilizing the people in order to create an opening that then could be exploited by the military but what you essentially creating is a

military dictatorship that contains freedom of thought, freedom of speech um and also any sort of form of civil societal association and mobilization.

And the same sort of playbook was then played out in Libya uh in in first in I think it was also in June 2014. It was

nearly a year later um where they had engaged. So Hafta was staging tried to

engaged. So Hafta was staging tried to stage a coup on YouTube I think on the 14th of February 2014. Some people call it the uh uh the coup of of Valentine's

Day or something like that. Yeah. And it

didn't succeed. It was extremely poorly done. He clearly didn't have any

done. He clearly didn't have any support. Nobody watched that video. It

support. Nobody watched that video. It

was a a video he put on YouTube of saying, you know, calling for the overthrow of what he called the Islamist government. But certainly I think this

government. But certainly I think this coup triggered um the Amiratis to pay attention and say who's this guy is that is he a potential ally that we can work with and so hence they did and we see

from February till June 2014 we see this entire campaign professionalizing and again that's not just Emirati money but it's also orchestration networking connecting Hafta to the right people and

money obviously did play a role and giving him the sort of advice that he needed to make much more of a professional uh approach at overthrowing the government which he then framed I

think operation dignity um in trying to overthrow the government. um he didn't succeed and he tried again in 2019 he didn't succeed but what he did succeed in doing unlike in Egypt 2013 where CC

was able to seize the state and the regime Hafta was able to seize half of Libya a very sizable chunk of Libya and one that is extremely lucrative uh for a variety of different reasons mostly

because of for oil and gas um and he was able to use um sectarian thinking within Libya because obviously Libya is traditionally been divided into three regions the Fzan Tripolitania and Syrian

A and and using Sinika and Sinika mentality and mindset as a form to mobilize people around Hafta for to allow him to create a military dictatorship effectively that acts as a

substate actor in Libya and followed the same playbook didn't achieve as much in terms of strategic depth but it has certainly created a foothold for the immatis that nobody can push them away from.

>> Okay. So I think I mean the key to understanding interference right and whether it's a positive or a negative or why why it's harmful why it's not harmful is trying

to imagine what the opportunity cost of these non-interventions would have been >> right um so I mean it's we can leave that all for later but I think as we're telling the story we need kind of some interjections

>> right so just how I mean because there's there's been people listening to this and they they they'll be skeptical of the Muslim Brotherhood as well how could we tell that the Muslim Brotherhood maybe they wouldn't have been as dictatorial as CC, but it wasn't going

to be this democratic revolution which the people asked for anyway, right? And

Libya was seemed to be a country which was obviously because of the war that starts when the the NATO sort of comes in and Gaddafi is is killed which which we have to remember starts again as

organic uprising to Gaddafi. It's not

it's not entirely interference. I mean

interference definitely plays a role in formenting a civil war but you know would would would Libya be in civil war anyway? Um these are just sort of things

anyway? Um these are just sort of things so we can understand the opportunity cost um that has occurred because of the interventions rather the Maratis.

>> Yes. So going back to Egypt my alternative history right what what if you know had had CC sorry had Morsei stayed in power which direction would the the the government have taken a

Muslim Brotherhood government we don't know what we can say though is that because of the very deeply seeds you know in in inferiority complex that the Muslim Brotherhood had being a

suppressed sort of opposition group is they were um paranoid about everyone anything. So they took themselves being

anything. So they took themselves being on the receiving end of it, they took some steps in early 2013 that made them look increasingly authoritarian as well because they they wanted to you know level the playing field making sure that

the the intelligence and also the military is not trying to take that power away from them. They really wanted to consolidate power and that consolidation process was certainly not one that you know you would say oh

that's a very liberal democratic approach. Um, so you know, we don't know

approach. Um, so you know, we don't know if that power that Mossi accumulated in 2013 whether that power would ever have been surrendered again to to the public.

We don't know that. Maybe not. Um, so

I'm not saying without intervention Egypt would have been much much better off. We don't know that. But we

off. We don't know that. But we

certainly would have had more of an opportunity for a for discourse to happen, more opportunity for potential mobilization also against the Muslim Brotherhood that could have led not to a

coup by the military. Um, and I think any sort of military intervention is like is into politics always leads to terrible outcomes. I mean, it creates

terrible outcomes. I mean, it creates short-term stability, but long-term it kind of destroys countries. And so,

that's what we're seeing. I think

there's very few people in Egypt now think that the the coup of 2013 by CC was a good thing for Egypt, right? Uh,

it it has it wasn't efficient. It and

this when when milit military people do authoritarianism, they do it 100%. They

go full in and that's what what we've seen. I mean the sort of police state

seen. I mean the sort of police state that CZ has created second to none. He

has been able to subvert not just uh the military um but he subverted military intelligence, the intelligence services, ministry of interior to where now the regime is just about self-preservation.

It's all about making sure we don't succumb to any sort of pressure internally or externally. Uh and Egypt is basically a beggar state that is unable to really shape the region. It it

went from one of the the big leading countries in the 20th century of the Middle East into a a beggar state that has to go begging at the doors of the of of Qatar, Saudi, UAE for money. Um I

don't think it would have been that bad had you know whatever direction Egypt would have taken on Libya. Yes. I mean

the revolutions are messy, right? And

political transitions are messy. I can't

think of any. Yeah, probably what happened after the fall of the Berlin wall in Eastern Europe was probably an example of transition that was fairly smooth. Uh fairly smooth because there'd

smooth. Uh fairly smooth because there'd been a little bit of you know there were European countries embracing another European ideology. But to the problem

European ideology. But to the problem with the Arab world was that you know you can't just inject a western idea of democracy and say oh that's that's the form of governance that you that it that

works for you. That would have been as some form of colonial imposition. So the

process of revolution had always should have had a a process of political theory and political consolidation in there where you think what is the best form of governance for us. It doesn't it

wouldn't have been necessarily a liberal democratic western liberal democratic model. Could have been any other sort of

model. Could have been any other sort of model. Um I personally am of the opinion

model. Um I personally am of the opinion that actually some form of constitutional monarchy might be the best form of governance for this part of the world. But it's for for regional

the world. But it's for for regional actors to determine that. And so in that process of determining what is the best form of governance that's a messy process and Libya wasn't it came out of the civil war into relative stability

but that formation that consolidation process that was in full swing in Libya was completely undermined by the Emirati intervention in 2014 and Hafta since has been the greatest obstacle to actually

you know consensus building in the country and also building what essentially what the Emiratis were claiming they wanted to do which is building stability.

>> I think I mean tell us more about Haftar. tell us more about how you know

Haftar. tell us more about how you know UAE money firstly how is that money given to him what did he use it for um and just how he's consolidated the state

and how that's made Libya well it's not it's not a congrent state anymore >> um but just tell us more about Haftar because I think that's key to understanding the type of actors uh and

we'll get there when you speak about the RSF and uh and who the the the UAE has funded in Yemen but just sort of the tell us the style um and type of of of kind of

consolidation he's consolidated.

>> No, Khalifa's consolidation follows the same playbook as I said like CC consolidation of power authoritarianism.

He's creating a mouhabarat state as we say in Arabic which is based on intelligence services very repressive people if you're not with me or against me people are being disappeared so

extremely repressive um it's not really Amirati money that much that make the difference on the ground I mean Libya is a very rich country Libya has its own ways of of generating money but the Emiratis were able to help the Emiratis have and I think that's their greatest

source of power by the way is the network of networks of corporate entities that can provide any sort of service that's relevant for statecraftraft from logistics, commodity

trading, oil trading, um mercenaries providing private security uh and and and basically all the capacities of state that you would expect a mature

middle or great power to have. All these

capacities have the Amiratis have been curating and building through private commercial networks. And these

commercial networks. And these commercial networks were offered to Hafta from logistics that obviously allows Hafta to fly troops uh back and forth that allow the Emirati to bring in

weapons into Libya which is extremely important uh over the years. Um advise

consulting advice in the you know how do you build a state in terms of political consultancy again supported and and they were introduced

to by the Emiratis. We have um oil trade again very important to actually keep the Benghazi government in eastern Libya alive was only possible because of

Emirati support. We see uh you know the

Emirati support. We see uh you know the Emirati oil firms coming in and supporting them. Um you know hooking

supporting them. Um you know hooking Hafta up with diplomatic contacts outside of the UAE because that's another important part. I mean the UAE is a is a very well-connected country.

So using their connectivity to Russia for example that Russia Haftala ling extremely important even way before Vagnner group comes in in 2019 uh we see Hafta already reaching out to the Russians that's an introduction the

Emirati made for him so they give him diplomatic cover they give him legitimacy um the the Amiratis obviously allow the training they provide training for their armed forces or their security

sector whatever you want to call it for the militias consolidating those giving them arms training them um and So everything that you know we in the UK or

the United States would have as in-house capability that we offer in terms of development to our partners. The Emirati

is offering this through corporate entities and corporate networks because the Emirates is a is a state as a state is you know bloated but doesn't do very much. I mean as other Gulf states as

much. I mean as other Gulf states as well they they're not very efficient in terms of state craft and governance.

where they are efficient is where they draw on the market and they have really opened their jurisdiction up to attract the sort of companies that then could be lended lend out or or provided to to their partners and that's what they've

done and Hafta in the course of that has been able to build a parallel security sector of militias a network of militias which he calls the Liyan the Libyan national army it's not Libyan it's not

national and it's not an army because I'm saying it's it's not Libyan because there's a lot of people from from the south and subseran Africa who are serving in it um mercenaries. Um it's

not uh national because it doesn't represent the nation of Libya. I mean,

if at all, it it represents the the eastern part of Libya. And it's not an army because in the end of the day, it's a it's a consol a very loose network of

brigades um that are spread all over uh all over eastern Libya and each brigade fights for themselves basically. So,

it's really not what we consider to be an army, but it has the monopoly over violence, if you will, in the eastern part of Libya. And obviously in 2019 they used that network in in a in in a in another second attempt to capture

Tripoli and they failed which was a very very dangerous moment because had Tripoli fallen into the hands of the LNA would have been very you he would have been in a position to claim that you know he's now the legitimate

representative of Libya which he's not.

I think it's quite happy, it's quite important to understand that the western community, US, Europe do not acknowledge Hafta as a partner to do business with

and they still support the UN back process. But you know they the the

process. But you know they the the Europeans and the Americans have withdrawn from Africa anyway. They would

have they beck whoever they think can win. I think if Hafta had ha been

win. I think if Hafta had ha been successful in 2019, I think the West would have rallied around him and said, "Okay, now that's the new status quo.

We'll accept it." And it was very important for I think it's important for Libya that he didn't win and that the process is still a sort of dual process with Hafta being the most powerful c

partner and player in the region uh in in in the country um but not the only one. So he has to still compromise and

one. So he has to still compromise and obviously Hafta now is old but he's built a regime that is very much built around his family. his two sons are running most of the businesses. And

again, when we say the Emirati are renting out their businesses or businesses based in the UAE to their partners, it also means that these businesses then build relationships with other businesses on the ground. And so

you create already a nepotistic authoritarian relationship uh authoritarian network between um you know between a regime on the ground in

this case after and the UAE as a partner uh in um you know as as the sort of patron of that rel in that relationship.

>> But I mean a final question and then we'll move away from Libya but I think this is key to also understanding the situation. What's what's western Libya

situation. What's what's western Libya like? um how are they propped up and how

like? um how are they propped up and how are they supported and how did they ensure that Haftar's sort of you know charge on Tripoli in 2019 was not successful

>> no western Libya um debate I mean that's the the other interesting I mean >> western Libya itself is problematic but I mean just just simp >> sure I mean Tripoli obviously has its own government which is the UN back government it's the one that everyone

engages with when they say we're engaging with Libya uh the funny thing is it's you know it looks fairly binary I mean for the last 10 years or so people have looked at Libya as a through

a binary lens of saying okay is there's Benghazi versus uh versus Tripoli. Um

and it is binary it looks binary but for the Emirati it's not that binary.

They've also built a relationship with a lot of figures in you know whether these are uh leaders of uh of certain militia groups in in western Libya but also built relationship with the Baba uh and

other prime ministers and political figures in western Libya as well. And

this is where the Imiratis again that's where they're much better than other countries and especially other Gulf countries is the fact that they have this I don't want to call it pragmatism

but they have this um sort of sense of spreading their wings and spreading their networks as widely as possible casting the net as as as broadly as they possibly can in case Hafta was to lose

then they still have a potential backup that they can engage with and we see that in Sudan for example we also see this in Yemen um because it's a These are corporate ways of engaging. Uh the

market drives much of it. So these are private corporations that find ways into eastern and western Libya. They don't

look into they don't look at Libya in a binary way. Um but western Libya now is

binary way. Um but western Libya now is you know it's both sides are fairly stable but western Libya is far less repressive uh in a way that you know there isn't a mouabarat state that would

go after people chopping people's heads off. Um there aren't any tribal militia

off. Um there aren't any tribal militia that are being used as a pritorian guard as this the case in Minazi where Hafta is using a Ptorian guard of Matalis in particular who are you know very very

radical um it's a very very strange thing to say but they're basically very radical Sufis um who go in and uh and basically use violence to really suppress any form of opposition that

doesn't exist in in in Western Libya.

So, Western Libya is I wouldn't call it a liberal democracy by Western standards obviously, but uh it doesn't matter.

It's still something where I I I do think it has trans it's transitioned more naturally to a form of you know non authoritarian governance than than eastern Libya has.

>> Um let's move on to I guess the next logical stop would be Yemen, not Sudan, even though interference with Sudan starts from a long time ago. Um but

we'll catch that up later. So uh and again the interference in Yemen starts pretty soon after 2011. So just you know what's what's what's the story in Yemen?

>> Well the story in Yemen right I mean Yemen we have also you know an uprising ali Yemen is far more of a it was never a consolidated authoritarian regime as

the one of Mubarak was or Gaddafi was >> um it was far less centralized.

Alibabasal who was the strongman was not really overthrown. I mean he he remained

really overthrown. I mean he he remained in in power but that we've have we have a process of process of a national dialogue where different Yemeni factions come together in 2012. Um also due to the pressure of the street he's trying

to make some concessions. Uh Yemen is an extremely divided country. Not just

north versus thou south south, but you have, you know, you get the highlands, you get the lowlands, you get the Hadraud in the east, you got Mahra, you have a variety of different um provinces who have their own sort of uh identity

and character. And because of the

and character. And because of the geographic obstacles, it's not it was a country always very difficult to unite.

And obviously for for many decades in the 20th century, Yemen was a separated country. There was a northern Yemen and

country. There was a northern Yemen and a southern Yemen. Um but all of that all of these fault lines that existed obviously came out after the revolution um in in 2011 2012. Um and one actor

that has been a bit of a nuisance already pre-Arab spring were obviously the Houthis in the north who you know are Shia Zadis who are you know have tried to find ways to reinstate a a

monarchy based on the monarchy the Imamad that that that ruled Yemen for quite some time. Um and so we see the Houthis you know becoming more and more active also visav the Saudis and they're

becoming more and more of a nuisance. Um

obviously capturing Sana in 2014 uh which was a you know which was a which was a big turning point for the region because after all Yemen isn't far away.

It's not a a conflict of choice like Libya or Egypt because Yemen was right in Arabia. It's a you know it's right on

in Arabia. It's a you know it's right on their doorstep. And so the Saudis

their doorstep. And so the Saudis becoming ex, you know, increasingly worried about what's going on there. Um,

and we we have a change of government in 2015 in in in Saudi Arabia as well with Salman becoming king. Uh, Muhammad bin Salman, the crown prince uh then taking

over as defense minister, new emerging figure, nobody really heard about him outside of the kingdom. And he tried to make a name for himself. decides in

March 2015, we have to go to war in Yemen to oust the Houthis from SA and push them back into the mountains. And

at this point, obviously, Saudi Arabia is a highly invested country in Yemen.

There isn't a faction within Yemen that the Saudis haven't done business with before. So they've engaged with people

before. So they've engaged with people in the Hadraud, people in Mahar, they've, you know, people uh in the south, people in the north, royalists, socialists that there's literally not a

faction within this, you know, rig of different entities within uh Yemen that the Saudis hadn't engaged with at this point, including, by the way, the royalists, which were the predecessors of the Houthis. Um this war obviously

doesn't have a strategic endgame. The

Saudis are saying, "We're going to bump them back. It's going to be a matter of

them back. It's going to be a matter of weeks. we're going to bomb the the

weeks. we're going to bomb the the Houthis back into the mountain and then then Yemen will be free again and that did doesn't doesn't happen. So after a month quite clearly the the the air campaign which was mostly run by the

Saudis, the Emiratis and a little bit the Bahrainis doesn't really achieve the objective. The the the Houthis are

objective. The the the Houthis are digging in. Um and since then really

digging in. Um and since then really Yemen has been in a state of war one way or the other really. um and

the the Emirati really becoming a a part of that war supporting officially the Saudi war effort against the Houthis.

But if you see where the where the Emiratis enter how they enter the war and where they enter the war on the ground particularly when they land in Aiden in the south it's quite clear that the >> you say they land

>> well actually they land in it it was basically a very impressive military amphibious landing in in Aiden. Uh which

is something that no my recollection no Arab state has done. I mean no Arab military has been able to actually stage something like this. And

>> so this was actual Amirati army.

>> Yeah. No Amirat Exactly. the Emirati

military coming in. Um, you know, most people would say the Emirati military is the most efficient Arab military. Um, as

in terms of bang for buck, probably the best sort of military in the region. And

they showed that they were quite good.

They seized Aiden. Um, and much of the activity that the that the Am I engage in in Yemen is not really about fighting the Houthis. They kind of leave the

the Houthis. They kind of leave the Saudis to it and let the Saudis really do all the heavy lifting there because obviously that war is going on on the border between Saudi and Yemen. um the

countries are helping in the south of Saudi Arabia on the border supporting that but they're not really getting into into the war in Yemen. And then in you know over you know 2015 the Emiratis are

building they're basically realizing that they're kind of out of their depth and the transformational moment I think for the Emiratis for their thinking about again commercial actors and how they should use commercial actors was a

strike I think it was in September uh in autumn 2015 a strike a missile strike a hoodie missile strike on an Emirati base in southern um in southern Yemen which

kills more than 50 Emirati soldiers.

It's the single most uh destructive um deadly event in the history of uh of the Emirati military. Uh which was a

Emirati military. Uh which was a shocking moment. Most of the people who

shocking moment. Most of the people who died were from the northern emirates.

They weren't from the south. So he also had a a particular sort of um flavor to it in the Emirates themselves because people in the northern Emirates were saying why is would they be using us as cannon for um certainly a a

transformational moment uh for the Emirates where they're saying okay we can't continue the war at this current effort with the with a particular cost connected to it. So they're partially withdrawing but they're not withdrawing

from Yemen at all completely but what they had done and they remember that they had done that. So in the in in the wake of the Arab Spring 2010, they had

asked a you know very infamous gentleman called Eric Prince to set up shop in in the Emirates uh to help out with securing you know oil infrastructure and whatnot and potentially the regime if it

ever came to an uprising in Abu Dhabi.

So you have that you already have that precedent. You have Eric Prince with his

precedent. You have Eric Prince with his history, his vision, his philosophy in the country. you have mostly Latin

the country. you have mostly Latin American contractors who are based in the Emirates for security services, not for military war fighting. But the idea then was why don't we use that the

capacity that we have there and build a much more offensive uh uh environment for for these companies where they're allowed to actually do war fighting as well which is a big break in the way in

the direction and the trajectory that the industry was taking globally. the

the the industry after Iraq and Afghanistan, they would provide security. They don't provide military

security. They don't provide military services. And the Emiratis bring in the

services. And the Emiratis bring in the mercenaries and start delegating a lot of that war fighting in Yemen to mostly Colombians and other Latin American mercenaries that used to be based in in

the in the Emirates and bring them into Yemen. They also bring some Israeli

Yemen. They also bring some Israeli mercenaries in and mercenaries from other countries.

>> And who and these guys are fighting the Houthis?

>> No, they're not fighting the Houthis.

They're mostly in the business of fighting those who the Emiratis consider to be the threats to to themselves.

>> Commercial interests.

>> Well, it's about commercial. No, but

there's an ideological commodity because again the narrative is we're fighting the Muslim Brotherhood. So, we're going after um you know after those faction al-Islah itself, Al-Isl being a very powerful player and also party in in

Yemen and being affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood and Alisah in in the UAE. The UAE is saying, "Oh, we're

UAE. The UAE is saying, "Oh, we're fighting the Muslim Brotherhood there."

And so they they're actually doing it.

So they have, you know, they built up assassination squads that uh that go after people, mercenaries, going after individuals.

>> You can pick up just to so while the Saudis are fighting the Houthies in their cold war with Iran, >> the Emiratis specifically have like lent support to that rhetorically, but have gone in to kind of target who they see

as their key enemy, which are Muslim Brotherhood interest groups. Well, that

that's how it starts, but it really it it goes after any they're they're realizing that first of all, they have a strategic interest in the in the literal space into the literal waters as well as

the the the sort of um uh uh the coastal areas of Yemen. They don't have any interest in northern Yemen where it becomes very messy, where the terrain is very inaccessible, where fighting the Houthis is always going to be a not an

impossible task, but near impossible task very similar to the the sort of environment that you find in Afghanistan. if you look at the

Afghanistan. if you look at the topography, the geography of the place.

And so the Amiradis was saying, okay, we want to keep costs low and we want to maximize uh >> bang for buck, >> bang for buck, if you will. And so the strategic value in Yemen really lies in

Aiden as a strategic port. Um but also the hinterland uh to that port is a logistical uh is an you know is a logistical has a lot of logistical opportunities for the Emirati wider reg

vision which I would call mercantalist.

I think Yemen has played a very important part in that. And so they're saying we can fight the Islamists here.

Um we can fight any actor under the ban of fighting Islam. We can fight any actor politically, so politically, civil, societal who can become a threat to our vision of controlling the south

of Yemen. And so they set up their own

of Yemen. And so they set up their own brigades of local Yemen fighters and they create that umbrella of the the Southern Transitional Council uh which

is you know still today a mostly Emirati funded umbrella organization. um which

neat more or less neatly plugs into the grievances of southerners in Yemen who used to be part of southern Yemen who always had that uh since independent since the you know reunification of

Yemen in in 1990 had that idea of reuniting of of basically bringing seceding and bringing southern Yemen back. So again it's it's a sec very

back. So again it's it's a sec very strong secessionist vision very strong in terms of fighting political Islam and al-Islah and at the same time they want

development and the STC uh has their own fighting wing and the Emiratis help them kind of build their own uh security sector and their own governance infrastructure in southern Yemen and

again you you create a non-state actor that operates as a proxy on the ground with a very strong indigenous um narrative. I mean, it sounds like from

narrative. I mean, it sounds like from everything you're saying and you've used you've used the word mercantalist, right? And it sounds like there's two

right? And it sounds like there's two things that there's >> and I think this this epitomizes itself once we get to Sudan, but but by all means, don't move to Sudan yet. Just

have more things to say about Yemen.

Please do.

>> But it sounds like the UAE is on this operation to to sort of start this mercantalist mafia >> in countries where they can legitimately or illegitimately or illegitimately

scapegoat the Muslim Brotherhood. M

>> but specifically and this is more after Egypt pray on like these countries that are that are now in massive instability because of you know fall a lot from the Arab Spring or for other reasons you know um

>> uh I mean is that more or less what you're saying? So what I'm saying is uh

you're saying? So what I'm saying is uh you know yes instability after the Arab Spring.

>> Yes.

>> But also a geopolitical vacuum that nobody fills. The Americans are

nobody fills. The Americans are effectively withdrawn but also giving a green light. Both Obama and then later

green light. Both Obama and then later Trump one and Biden uh and Trump 2 again have you know they follow a grand strategic path which is consistent whether they're Republicans or Democrats

in the way that they're saying the region isn't as important as it once was. We do want to keep a lid on further

was. We do want to keep a lid on further escalation, but managing the crisis is great, but we don't want to do it. And

the Gulf States can do it. And the

Emiratis very much fill that void. They

fill the void in the same way that Qatar, I think, filled that void directly after the Arab Spring. The

counterrevolutionary um sort of dynamic that that I'm describing since 2013 that the Emiratis are leading again happens within a vacuum where the Emirati where the Americans are saying fair enough. as

long as they they create some sort of stability and we're not being dragged in. Let them get on with it. Uh and so

in. Let them get on with it. Uh and so they they're letting it happen. And the

Emiratis are very good at exploiting these vulnerabilities and obviously because they have the financial backing and and the financial sort of means they're able to kind of curate very

effective sort of non-state actors on the ground. Uh I should also mention

the ground. Uh I should also mention when we talk about Yemen here um so we've got the Colombian mercenaries uh we have delegation to local Yemeni factions but there's a third component I

think that becomes now very relevant as we talk about Sudan is that obviously the Bashier government at the time so Bashier is still being the Sudin president at the time uh was trying to

make some money and he rented out u ori himself actually rents him out but the the RSF is a is a militia that uh used to come out of a a man on horseback. The

Janja in Darur in the early 2000s became very infamous for being involved in the Sudanese or Durian genocide. Um they

become a semiformal paramilitary group.

Bashia gives them a status of a paramilitary group run by this the family of uh Hemeti. Um and so Bashi and Hemeti think how can we make some money

let's rent out the capabilities our militias to the Saudis especially but especially also to the Emiratis to fight with them >> like 2015 2016

>> 15 2016 they're offering their services to uh to the Emirati. So again you see now what is happening the Emirati military still being there but the footprint is quite light after that

event of losing more than 50 soldiers.

Um and most of the fighting is done by locally Yemeni groups. They're setting

up mercenary groups as well as then the the RSF affiliated affiliated um sort of Sudanese fighters as well and that is an important part of the broader network

because that connection is one that obviously becomes very relevant after 2019.

>> Okay. So I mean what's the I want to get to Sudan but just before we get there what's the current status of Yemen? I

mean like in in terms of the emirate footprint and also just give us I mean as you mentioned you kind of painted a picture of where both I hate to use these terms but east and western Libya

are like what's the current status of >> of Yemen and and you know how how deeply entrenched are the Emiratis >> still um and I mean what's I mean because we now in the last two years the

Houthis have become very famous as the guys who are you know bombing Israel and for a while they stopped the the ships from going through um but I mean there's a lot more what's going on. So just we

don't have a lot of time just but just you know sort of like the the four minute summary of summary like the two-minute summary of what's the current status of Yemen.

>> No Yemen is still highly de highly divided. I mean loads of fault lines if

divided. I mean loads of fault lines if you were I think it's much more difficult to draw a map now of Yemen as it is like drawing a map of of Libya for example. It's a rig rag of different

example. It's a rig rag of different spheres of influence. So the STC works together with the um Hardy government if you will uh which is Saudi

backed to kind of form the UN the the UNbacked government uh in in Yemen. But

that's only on paper. There is actually no united Yemeni government. We've got

the Houthi government in the north that still sits in SA extremely repressive obviously now very infamous for their striking of maritime shipping lanes making them the kind of the baddies uh

of the world in many ways. um and

obviously striking Israel um doing that fairly successfully. They've become

fairly successfully. They've become because of that war in in Gaza and their response to it in the collapse of Hezbollah and weakening of Hamas. Uh now

they are kind of the the pioneers and the on the front line for Iran's axis of resistance. That's happening in northern

resistance. That's happening in northern Yemen. In the south, the STC is really

Yemen. In the south, the STC is really consolidating its power. I mean, they're officially backing the Saudi back government. Um but in reality, they're

government. Um but in reality, they're building their own networks. there, you

know, the Zubed, who's their their um, you know, the pre the president of the STC becomes an actor in his own right.

The Emirati, like with Hafta, they introduce him to the Russians, to the Chinese, to the Israelis. The STC is becoming a, you know, the STC is

becoming a quasi state actor. Um, that

is though on paper not hasn't succeeded succeeded yet, is is in a process of practical gradual succession. Um and

then we have you know disputed territories in the east like Mahra for example where else the Omanis are being dragged in. The Saudis are being dragged

dragged in. The Saudis are being dragged in. What is important to note on Yemen

in. What is important to note on Yemen though is that the Saudis have seen the Emiratis increasingly as a nuisance and as a competitor rather than a partner.

So they entered the war in 2015 together. But for the Saudis today, the

together. But for the Saudis today, the Emiratis are an a nuisance and a competitor and a rival that undermines Saudi interest because the Saudi interests are still in Yemen to keep the

country united under one government. And

the Emirati is very actively pushing the STC agenda which is secessionist which is about uh kind of dividing Yemen up into two. And so the Emiratis are

into two. And so the Emiratis are certainly not making friends and certainly are not contributing what we would consider to be regional stability.

>> Okay. I mean I I did want to I did say that's the last question before moving to moving to Sudan, but there's a there's a note that just sort of a follow up from what you've said. So I

mean I think the difference here is is that in in Libya, you know, they they have sort of funded and created Haftar's Bastion, >> right? And and and and in Yemen, it's

>> right? And and and and in Yemen, it's really a Saudi le interventionist war.

>> And the Emiratis have seized an opportunity and now they're coming. I

mean, but it's also interesting because as when we get to Sudan, we'll notice that there's also a cold war happening in Sudan between Egypt and and and and Amiratis for geopolitical reasons. So,

they they they're running into these geopolitical fault lines as their their adventurism >> kind of comes into play. Um again, the question I want to ask that was just a

note was uh again what's the opportunity cost of and in this case it's not really the UAE intervention because it's Saudi.

>> Yeah. Um, but let's let's just imagine we like for for the Saudi intervention if the Saudis don't intervene as heavily as they do, I mean maybe Yemen gets run by Houthies would be the Saudi >> propaganda

remark, right? What's what's wrong and

remark, right? What's what's wrong and and rights about that?

>> No, first of all, the Saud one of the greatest things for the Am I quite good usually I mean I think Saddan is a PR disaster, but until now they've been quite good at pushing their narrative and one of the narratives they've been

pushing is the Saudi war in Yemen. So

most of the media have accused the Saudis for what's going on in Yemen, right? They have used the Saudis as a

right? They have used the Saudis as a kind of a front >> cover. Yeah.

>> cover. Yeah.

>> And cover to do their own activities.

And you know, you're still saying it's the Saudi war in Yemen. There is a Saudi war in Yemen. That Saudi le war has ended uh you know, 5 years ago. Um the

Saudis obviously still engaged diplomatically. They're still using the

diplomatically. They're still using the Omanis as the main interlocator to speak to the Houthis. But the Saudis are interested in a in a comprehensive deal that sees a united Yemen, even sitting

and speaking to the Houthis. It's the

Houthis who don't want to come to the negotiation table. Um, but the Emiratis

negotiation table. Um, but the Emiratis are the spoilers in all of that. They

don't want a consolidated Yemen. They

would prefer two Yemens and one that's fully under Abu Dhabi influence or at least a uh a Yemen that is divided uh where it's a federalist state and there's a federal state of southern

Yemen that's run by a promirati SDC.

That's what they want and that certainly runs diametrically counter to what the Saudis want to achieve. I mean the opportunity cost here I think would be a Saudi I think the Saudis hold most of

the files. The Saudis have the strategic

the files. The Saudis have the strategic depth uh in Yemen and I think the Saudis are pragmatic enough to engage all the other actors. I mean the other actors

other actors. I mean the other actors who are you know very important for Yemen is is obviously Oman. Um the

Saudis speak to the Omanis, the Omanis speak to the Saudis. I think the Omanis, you know, they have their disagreements with Saudi Arabia, but on the whole, I think there there could be a national dialogue could be had in Yemen where you

bring the different factions together, including the Houthis. The Emiratis are staunchly uh opposed to it. They're

opposed to a national dialogue.

>> Do you think they the the main reason why that's not happening?

>> I would say this is one of the main reasons. I think it's pro. Yeah, maybe

reasons. I think it's pro. Yeah, maybe

it is the main it's one of the main the other main reason being Iran and the Houthis. Okay. So I think the the

Houthis. Okay. So I think the the biggest spoilers right now in Yemen is Iran and the UAE on opposite sides really. But the SEC is not fighting the

really. But the SEC is not fighting the Houthis and the Houthis are not fighting the SEC. It's really what's happening

the SEC. It's really what's happening right now is this the Saudis are being squeezed out and that's how the Saudis would re see it.

>> Okay. I mean I'd love to actually go more about Yemen and and everything else but we need to move on. So Sudan

>> no fast forward to Sudan. No, as I I mentioned, so the Hemeti the Heimetti is so this Janja warlord leader of in Dur um you know again infamous um for

committing atrocities in the in the early 2000s or at least his militia were involved in atrocities in Dur. Um the

Amiratis have invested in Sudan way before um you know this the the revolution of 2018 2019. So the Emirati had seen Sudan as a you know a bread

basket. Um and you know for agricultural

basket. Um and you know for agricultural reasons the UAE don't have a lot of arable land. So they they for

arable land. So they they for agricultural reasons wanted to have land and have invested into land and agriculture farming in Sudan. Um also

commodities the Emiratis have as I was saying the MBZETs Emirates have grown as a um as they've grown with their geostrategic power they've also grown

into the main gold trader gold hub in the world and Sudan obviously has a lot of gold and so that relationship as as Dubai becomes more and more relevant the UAE also invests heavily in Sudan and in

in into gold and and commodity trade uh and so most of Sudan's gold now is run is being exported legally or legally through the UAE onto global markets and

the Hemeti family businesses are involved in that and they have been involved for you know way before Bashia actually fell. So the Emirati interest

actually fell. So the Emirati interest in Sudan predate um the the current setup and they they go back to the Bashia days where the Emirati thought Sudan has a lot to offer in terms of

commodity in terms of logistics and and and and agriculture as well. Um that

being said, Bashia was someone who did run uh a how would you call it?

Certainly a dictatorship. It's a

military ideological military Islamist dictatorship if you will. There were a lot of Islamist networks in the military in the security sector that supported Bashia. So it's quite funny that the

Bashia. So it's quite funny that the Emiratis were you know could for you know while they were active pushing back against Islamists in Egypt and in Libya and in Yemen they were quite happy to have a relationship with Bashia who

actually falls in the category of being another of their enemies. Um but they were quite pragmatic uh about it and and really built that relationship with the Janjawid militia uh which then became

the RSF. And so as we when we then fast

the RSF. And so as we when we then fast forward to 2018 2019 with the revolution happening in in Sudan um the the again the revolution is being captured by the

military um the Sudanese armed forces in partnership with the RSF. So their

paramilitary group the RSF together with uh the SAF basically capture it create this transitional military council um and um you know at at that time the

transition process seems to have been military-led again something that the Emiratis like the Emiratis like strong men in uniform and we've seen that with Hafta see that with Cece uh and so they

they they initially get on well with Bourhan who is the the the leader of the SAF faction but obviously they have that very intimate relationship with Hamati.

Most of their family money is in in the UAE. So there's a very strong personal

UAE. So there's a very strong personal relationship between the Hamati family and the UAE. If you look at the US Treasury and how who they've listed and companies they've listed in the UAE um

and sanctioned, there are businesses Sudanese businesses all linked to himself and his family. It's quite

interesting. Um and so you know during that during that uh revolution or and and then the years following the Emiratis become a main with the Saudis

together become a main backer of that military transition hoping that they can squeeze the the Islamists out. It was

all about making sure the Islamists don't come to power and they can't exploit that revolution. So they said let's build them a military rel dictatorship. So in in 2019 2020 they

dictatorship. So in in 2019 2020 they they kind of give it a civilian sort of look by you know having the prime minister Hamok as a civilian leader but that was more of a front when in reality what was built was a military

dictatorship of RSF and SAF working together. 2021

together. 2021 um we see a coup um happening after COVID or we could say during COVID uh where the military fully takes over all

the achievements which was a peopleled revolution in in Sudan all these achievements were undone um the military takes over uh with quite a lot of repression the RSF being extremely

repressive um and that goes on for another one two years um until 2023 when in April um we see the RSF's staging a coup from within that military dictatorship against the SAF. And that

kind of leads us to the civil war that we're in now, which for the last two years has probably created the worst humanitarian crisis in the world. And

I'm saying that at a time when we have that terrible genocide going on in Gaza.

So um you know, all of that uh together.

And the Emiratis have not just emerged out of a sudden as the main backer of the RSF. They have been the main backer

the RSF. They have been the main backer of the RSF at least, you know, for the last 15 years if not longer. and and so the RSF today um or over the last two

years has really been the most atrocious of two very atrocious opponents. I think

we have to be very clear about this. Um

you know just because we speak out against the RSF and just because most of the media and most of Western government speak out against the RSF and the atrocities that they're committing, they're not speaking out on behalf of Bhan and the SAF as being the the savior

in all of that. I mean they were very instrumental in in undermining the revolution uh and creating uh a military dictatorship and Bhan is certainly not an angel in all of that. Um but obvious

in terms of atrocities though the the atrocity the the violence against you know civilians against women against children mass killings uh really in the most brutal way you can possibly imagine

and then broadcasting that onto social media that sort of stuff we've seen mostly or only been done by the RSF. So

accusations now of genocide against the RSF and obviously the UAE being implicated in that because they're the main financial and military and logistical becka of the RSF.

>> Okay. just I mean it may seem like a basic question but I think it's it's it's for me but also for the audience clarify for me why exactly the the amirates were supporting the Janja weed

15 years ago and then obviously in the last four five years and it may the history may may go beyond that but the issue of of helping um RSF backed

generals and others smuggle gold into into into Dubai where it's then legalized um so just explain the whole goal connection because I think that's very important. But then also, you know,

very important. But then also, you know, what's the legacy? Like why would why would the UAE when they're trying to some would say legitimately buy some land in Sudan to help its agriculture and set up commodity buying etc. which

is what states do.

>> Um why would they you know start supporting the Janja um and I I mean and beyond the answer and maybe this is the answer that you know the Janja were going to be a counterbalance to Bashir.

>> Yes. Um so yeah >> now Bashia and the accusation here is and I heard this Emirati saying that saying the justification of why they're backing the Janja or the RSF as opposed

to Bhan who they did back in the past is that oh yeah Bahan is still penetrated by the remnants of these Islamist Bashia time Bashia era Islamist networks very

little evidence for that I mean you know Bourhan is not a is not an Islamist um but certainly isn't I mean he is a very form anti-Islamist ideologue. But I

think Sudan is only peripherilally about values and ideological. I think it's really about hard interests. It is about gold. It is about commodities. Um and so

gold. It is about commodities. Um and so the Janja, the RSF and Hemeti himself, this warlord becomes so instrumental uh because he has the access. He captures

the most important gold mines in uh in Sudan. So if you if you want to rise up

Sudan. So if you if you want to rise up as the leading gold capital of the world, which is Dubai, you do want to have access to these resources. So it

was really about minerals and commodities.

>> So from from then >> from then. So the much of that gold trade starts you know from from then and it's family business it's business is tied to ai who are involved in it. Um

and the Emirati based logistics companies who bring the gold in it's melted down and what what we have is a beautiful carousel now where so gold leaves Sudan is being translated into

cash you know laundered if you will. uh

that cash in any form whether it's cash cash uh or crypto can then be translated in the UAE in in a value chain with which you can actually purchase weapons

and these weapons then go back into into Sudan. Um another thing that you know I

Sudan. Um another thing that you know I just very much very briefly alluded to is the fact that the Emiratis have become also the major becka of Vagnner Group the Russian mercenary group which

is a network of different companies.

It's not just a mercenary battalion. I

mean, these are different companies providing security and military services for the Russians. Um, they but they're also a commodity trading network. There

are a lot of different logistics companies involved and and commodity trading uh companies. If you unpack some of the companies and they're linked to Russia, they're always also linked to uh

especially when they operate in in the in af in Africa, they're always also linked to the UAE. They either use the UAE as a jurisdiction where they have their local headquarters or they use uh

Emirati firms for logistical support to fly in um you know flying material men uh in to Africa and especially Sudan and flying gold out of Africa. So there are

some gold mines in uh in Sudan who've always been who've been operated by uh by Vagnner affiliated commodity traders

and companies and he so there is a link between Vagna UAE and and Hemeti and so it's it's it's a very complex network of networks of different corporations and

companies that goes that predates the the revolution in Sudan which then makes it all about commercial interests. But

beyond that, I mean, why are the Emirati so interested in becoming the main conduit for Vagna group at the time when we're fighting the war in Ukraine against Vagnner, against the Russians is because it makes the UA irrelevant. I

mean, going back to the point that they are a small state aspiring to become a middle power. If you are the main

middle power. If you are the main conduit for the great power of Russia to get get access to Africa, then you are irreplaceable, indispensable. And that's

irreplaceable, indispensable. And that's what the Emiratis have achieved for themselves. Um, and the Vakna story

themselves. Um, and the Vakna story doesn't start in Sudan, it starts again in Libya, right? And it was again the Emiratis who paid initially for it was Emirati money that brought Vhagna into

Libya in in 2019. So this this all happens in parallel while we talked before about Yemen and and and other places. In parallel, the Emiratis are

places. In parallel, the Emiratis are using that hub of Hafta in Libya to build a base from which they can then channel arms, fighters, non-state actors

into subsahara and Africa, including in Sudan. So all of that is happening at a

Sudan. So all of that is happening at a time when we nobody really cares about Saddam, right? Nobody knows what's going

Saddam, right? Nobody knows what's going on in Saddam. Most people who look at the Middle East don't even care about Sudan. I think way before we see the

Sudan. I think way before we see the images that we're seeing today where everyone does care about Sudan and the Emirati are already there. They

implanted themselves again through corporate networks. And um the

corporate networks. And um the interesting thing about this carousel is that it's not just Sudan UAE, it's also Sudan, UAE, Libya. So in 2020 in COVID

when everyone here uh in around the world was thinking about the first lockdown and this vir new virus coming nobody paid attention to anything else.

The Emirati flew I think 60 plane loads worth of weapons into eastern Libya into into Hafta territory that then is still unaccounted for. Some of it was probably

unaccounted for. Some of it was probably used by the LNA. Um but apart from that um what's most likely we we can trace some of where these weapons ended up

ended up in Sudan. So you have Hafta create building a massive arms depot with Emirati supplied weaponry and then uses his own logistics um to basically

channel these arms into Chad and into Dur and into Sudan. Uh and so all this is connected and all of it again if you look at what the one connecting piece in all of this is it's Abu Dhabi or the

UAE. It's the juris the one jurisdiction

UAE. It's the juris the one jurisdiction that in Africa is indispensable for commodity trading for lo private logistics companies uh for mercenarism

and private security um and you know obviously agricultural stuff and uh and and also some other mineral trade but the UAE are the key hub in all of that.

In any of these conflicts in the Horn of Africa and a subsan Africa you will find an Emirati angle to it. I want to speak a bit about the Wagner group and sort of

how, you know, the Emiratis being a conduit for Russian interests, how that rubs up against their relationship with the USA. But before that, I mean, you

the USA. But before that, I mean, you know, as we've been doing with with Libya and Yemen, what's the opportunity cost of non non UAE involvement? What

would have happened to to Sudan specifically if the UAE weren't funding the Janjaweed for the last 15 years and developing that relationship? Just how

devastating has that relationship been for Sudan?

>> Extremely devastating over the last two years obviously. Uh but I think we have

years obviously. Uh but I think we have to go back in time going back to the revolution. I think without Saudi and

revolution. I think without Saudi and Emirati money and backing for the transitional military council of that consisted of RSF and the SAF. I don't

think we would have seen um you know the the the squashing of this liberal you know people's mobilization in Sudan. And

I think the revolution could have taken a very different shape. We might have seen even a civilian government emerging. Um so I think that's where it

emerging. Um so I think that's where it really starts. That's where I would

really starts. That's where I would start blaming Saudi Arai involvement for that which was very very counterproductive. And I do think the

counterproductive. And I do think the Saudis having have quite a lot of regrets now that they were part of that in in in 2019. Um but obviously the the backing of the RSF has taken a much more

sinister turn in the fact that you know we're now having a genocide. I mean the atrocities that are being creating a repressive regime is one thing uh but creating a a militia and funding a relia

sustaining a militia um in in what can only be described as a genocidal campaign in Darur and in Sudan is is obviously you know that's only possible because Emirati the Emiratis are still

funding it there's no way that the RSF obviously the RSF has again goes back to the wider network regionally the RSF was in Yemen as I said before paid for by the Emiratis they brought some of the

weapons back into uh into Sudan obviously so some weapons were available but the the logistical support that they're having the monetary support that they're having because again all the

commodity the gold laundering means the RSF has quite a lot of money and Meti is now a billionaire um they are getting PR support as well from uh various entities from from various information networks

that the Emiratis are having whether these are media companies or social media bots and trolls um so you know all that backing makes the RSF extremely

potent and then beyond that their access to uh you know to to drones and high-tech makes a huge difference against the SAF which is a obviously state military that has an air force and

the fact that the RSF has now its own air force unmanned um and nobody knows who's flying these drones. I mean some people suggest it might be Amiratis. It

might could be uh mercenaries that are being provided through the UAE to the RSF. That means the RSF is no longer

RSF. That means the RSF is no longer just a militia on horseback. I mean,

they're actually high-tech warriors, if you will, using high-tech against the SAF. And so, without Emirati support, we

SAF. And so, without Emirati support, we wouldn't have the the stalemate that we're in right now. I mean, the SAF would have been able to win this war quite quickly against the RSF, but the the Emirati have created effectively a

military stalemate.

>> What do you I mean, do you think that that stalemate is ongoing? Do you think the Amiratis have overreached? Because

obviously they we're discussing >> I mean, to a large extent, we're discussing the Amiratis now because of the actions in Sudan. They clearly have gotten a lot of bad rap and PR which they've managed to successfully evade

for a long period of time.

>> Um so I mean how do how is that horrible conflict can it be reigned in in some way? Um and do you think it will?

way? Um and do you think it will?

>> No. Again it goes back to the United States. There is one terrible trace um

States. There is one terrible trace um or characteristic attribute whatever you want to call it that the Emiratis have.

It's part of their strategic culture. I

mean you need to understand Abu Dhabi in particular the Banias which is the original tribe from which the Alahan come from um they come from the inland of of Arabia right they're beded tribes

from the inland they're very different from the tribes who were living on coastal areas like in like in Dubai for example or in Qatar or other parts of

Arabia um were who were more pragmatic who were more um tolerant more open-minded um the bedins the banars of Abu Dhabi were the opposite of that. It

was all about masculinity, was force, it was very transactional, never very transformational. And they're very

transformational. And they're very transactional in the way that if you hit them once, they'll try to hit you double as hard. Everything is about

as hard. Everything is about retaliation. It's about it's about

retaliation. It's about it's about pushing back against resistance, even if it's not smart. It's not it's not acting in an it's and and this is what we're seeing right now with all that criticism

that's being thrown at the at the Emiratis from all angles from Western partners from the media where instead of acknowledging that they've made a mistake in instead of acknowledging that this is not going anywhere they're

doubling down instead of becking down they're basically doubling down and that is part of that mentality where they where they feel like they can sustain the pressure um because they think they

could still uh win and winning for the Emirati looks very different from how we would describe traditionally a victory.

A victory where you're trying to basically capture an entire country, you control it, you put your flag on top of the presidential palace and say, you know, we won this war, uh, mission accomplished. That's not how the

accomplished. That's not how the Emiratis play. So, if you then again go

Emiratis play. So, if you then again go back to Yemen, you go back to Libya, you realize what the Emiratis have done, they are trying to create a situation where they're the most important player

at the table. Doesn't mean they need to put their flag anywhere. Um, as long as the the RSF is there so deeply ingrained in the conflict that they can't be

unseated and without them being pushed out entirely, then the RSF basically provided provides the Emirati with a sort of victory because the Emiratis are now indispensable. The Emiratis are at

now indispensable. The Emiratis are at this negotiation table. Nobody can speak to the RSF. So if you wanted a consolidated negotiated settlement of the war in Sudan, the UAE will have to

play a part in that. the same it's the same tactic they've been playing in in Libya where you know they're so deeply invested in Hafta Hafta has been so deeply uh ingrained now in the fabric

locally in Libya that no negotiated settlement over Libya would can exclude Hafta so this is how victory looks like for the UAE so they're not going to give this up what they're trying to do now is

trying to convince the Americans that only them only Abu Dhabi can actually bring all the parties together and they will they will provide uh uh the Trump administration with their whatever a

10th, 11th, 12th victory. You know,

Trump is after uh the next war that he solved. So, Sudan might be the next one.

solved. So, Sudan might be the next one.

And the Mirata are promising him, you know, we'll just get it done. Uh and

then we'll create a stalemate from which we have a better bargaining situation, bargaining position. We'll bring

bargaining position. We'll bring everyone around the table and then we'll create a peace in Saddam. That's what

the the Americans are being promised and that's why the Americans and the Trump administration are not really calling out uh the Emiratis at this point.

>> Okay. Um, so I mean we've mentioned I told you about want to discuss the, you know, by by being a conduit for Russia.

They're rubbing up against the Americans. They they're rubbing up

Americans. They they're rubbing up against the Saudi the Saudis in in Yemen. Um, they're rubbing up, we

Yemen. Um, they're rubbing up, we haven't discussed why, but they're rubbing up, we can discuss it now, against the Egyptians um because of what's happening in Sudan.

>> Um, when you take all of this into context, then first just just explain to us what the what what the issue is with Egypt and and Sudan and and the UAE. Um,

but is this is this overreach on a broader way? And when you think about all of

way? And when you think about all of these things, who is their biggest ally?

And I mean, I guess the the answer comes maybe it's Israel.

>> Um, explain to us why if that is the your answer or if it isn't, why that is the case or is not the case. Um, just as a natural allyship and and and why they're allies. I mean you've kind of

they're allies. I mean you've kind of mentioned already that it's because right in the start before we mentioned all the details right that you know Israel would hate uh Arab street which is more representative and the UAE have

been you know actively working against that but is it is there something beyond that um or is that still the heart of the relationship?

Now the very complex question. So the

the Israeli the Israeli Amirati relationship obviously again predates the Abra. I mean they've been under the

the Abra. I mean they've been under the table relations for a while. Um there is a there's an ideological alignment.

That's I think how it starts. The idea

that for the for the Israelis they like Arabs when they are contained when they have full control over civil society and obviously they fear the Palestinian cause more than anything um

traditionally. And so the immatis have

traditionally. And so the immatis have always been um not if not opposed to the Palestinian cause then at least um they never were supporters of the Palestinian cause especially Abu Abi has not um it's

something that they care about um but not not deeply uh and they were very happy to contain any sort of pro Palestine mobilization and they've been able to clamp down on it in the UAE

quite finally since the 7th of October.

Um um but the the ideological alignment is about fear of political Islam. Both

of them share that. Fear of the Arab street. Both of them share that. Um

street. Both of them share that. Um

Israel is also a country that supplies a very very relevant military and security technology especially in the AI and high-tech space. The Emiratis want to

high-tech space. The Emiratis want to get access to it. They did. They did get access to it. um if you want to build a police state uh that controls his own people and their minds, then you need to have that sort of Israeli technology

tested on on Palestinians. And so again, Emiratis have invested into that and they've been buying Israeli technology.

The Israelis, what they need from the Emirates is strategic depth. They now

for the first time are able to build sort of hubs in the UAE that allows them to have direct proximity to other Gulf States, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Qatar, Oman,

uh Yemen, uh but also project out into the Indian Ocean. so strategically

relevant. We've seen relationships being built between the Israelis and the Emiratis in Yemen where uh allegedly Israelis are now in in have been seen especially uh people in the signal

intelligence uh in in uh in various islands in off the coast of of Yemen. So

the the the Israelis are using the the Emiratis as conduits to get access to territories Israelis never had traditionally access to. So that that's that is very relevant and that's why it's an interdependent relationship

where both sides are are winning and it's probably more about and then Israel ultimately wants investments. They want

money uh FDI. The Emiratis initially were able to bring a couple of billions of dollars of of investments in into Israel. that has mostly been frozen

Israel. that has mostly been frozen since the 7th of October because the Emiratis are very conscious that this relationship with Israel has been extremely unpopular in the wider Arab world, but also domestically despite the

fact that they're controlling their own public, despite the fact they've built a police state, um they have not been able to contain that domestic criticism and dissent against that relationship with the Israelis.

>> Okay. Um and then just clarify for us why, you know, it's a why the the Imiratis are upsetting CC with the actions in Sudan. Now, the relationship with Egypt is a complicated one, but one

that's easily explained. So, CC

obviously owns owes his success to the Emiratis. So, that that's certainly a

Emiratis. So, that that's certainly a long-standing relationship. But beyond

long-standing relationship. But beyond that, the Emiratis have been a major backer since CC came into power. They

put billions of dollars into into the Egyptian economy. And I think CC, you

Egyptian economy. And I think CC, you know, has become, like I said before, a beggar state. He's very much reliant and

beggar state. He's very much reliant and dependent on that money flow. Uh, and

he's he keeps on begging. He needs

bailouts. And again the Emiratists usually step up um to to the occasion and put money into Egypt. And so there is a relationship which is very difficult for the Egyptians to sustain because on the one hand their their

president comes and begs them for uh begs the Emiratis for money while the Emiratis working against Egyptian interests on all corners. So on the Libyan side uh you know the Hafta relationship that initially the

Egyptians support it. Um but the relationship between Haft and the UAE is a major concern for border security on the western side of Egypt. In the south, the Emiratis are working with Ethiopia,

key uh rival of of the Egyptians.

They're working with the RSF against the SAF. RSF being a major rival uh of the

SAF. RSF being a major rival uh of the Egyptians and the SAF being a key partner for the Egyptians. On the

eastern side, you know, if you look into the Sinai, the Emirati is working uh with the Israelis. Again, the Israelis have become obviously major threat on their on the eastern flank for the Egyptians. So in every any conflict that

Egyptians. So in every any conflict that surrounds currently and occupies the debate on national security in Egypt, the Emirati on the opposite side of it.

And at the same time, the Emiratis are putting money in. So Cece can't afford to actually call them out because he's really reliant on their cash. And it

makes him look weak. And in the in the in the face of a lot of Egyptians who are proud uh being Egyptians, they feel like not only have we become a beggar state, but we are, you know, we're begging and at the same time we're being

uh you know, someone is kicking us under the table, which is the Emiratis from from from all angles.

>> Okay. So, I mean, I mentioned earlier on, so they they they rubbing up against the Saudis and the US. I mean, chiefly because I mean, these are the powers who, you know, I mean, and Israel as

well, but they're not really rubbing up against Israel. um who you know could

against Israel. um who you know could exercise the most leverage on them. Um

so how are they how are they managing that relationship and do you think it's going to be do you think their state craft and the way the trajectory it's gone on is sustainable given that that you know this is going to forement or

has been I mean it's also not formenting relationship with Saudi Arabia there's parts that are good for the Saudis and and and and not and I guess it's similar with the US but just in your what's your analysis on how these three actors are

going to kind of figure out the region >> so Abu Dhabi is obviously pursuing strategic autonomy right they're saying we're picking and choosing we have a very deepseated relationship with America. But there's a lot of things we

America. But there's a lot of things we disagree with America on. They they want more support from the US that they're not getting. Hence why they've built

not getting. Hence why they've built that relationship with Russia, which has been very problematic for a lot of Western partners, also for the United States. They've built a deep sea detect

States. They've built a deep sea detect relationship with China, again, something that the Americans don't necessarily like. They've buil

necessarily like. They've buil relationship with non-state actors in in in Africa that the Americans don't necessarily like. When I say the

necessarily like. When I say the Americans, especially the institutions, the military, um the Trump administration is more agnostic about it because they don't really care about anything. Uh it's really about it's

anything. Uh it's really about it's domestic policy, foreign policy is a tool to basically uh you know, tick boxes and and and either get a Nobel Peace Prize or get a medal or say we we solved another war makes him look good.

And so as long as the Emiratis make Trump look good through cash injections in the United States or by offering him an offramp in Sudan that then Trump can claim as I solved the war in Sudan. I

think that's all Trump really cares about. Um and um the so the thing is the

about. Um and um the so the thing is the Emirati have created a web of interdependence. That's really what it's

interdependence. That's really what it's all about. I call this network ccentric

all about. I call this network ccentric statecraft. All these corporate networks

statecraft. All these corporate networks have created an interdependent relationship where the Emiratis have a relationship with all the key players in this part of the world. So the the Americans are interested in a player that can give them access and the

Emiratis can give access to various players and I think that is a sustainable part of their strategy. I

think in Sudan there, you know, the public pressure and the atrocities by the RSF have been very counterproductive to that. Uh I think they're now being

to that. Uh I think they're now being called out. The Emiratis have to now

called out. The Emiratis have to now make a decision whether they want to double down or back down. Um my guess is they're not going to back down and they will try to translate this current

achievement in India for on the battlefield into a potential stalemate that then can produce a diplomatic offramp. The question is whether the SAF

offramp. The question is whether the SAF and Bhan wants to be instrumentalized in that way or not. But that's how they are selling it at least to the Americans. Um

Europe doesn't matter to the UAE. The

UAE see Europe as a bunch of small and middle powers equal to themselves and they play hard ball. they play hard ball with the UK, they play hard ball with the French. Um, and if they don't get

the French. Um, and if they don't get their way, they they use whatever leverage they have and it's quite significant because UAE is still a country that has u you know that is a very important producer of energy.

Europe is very much energy dependent on the on the region and Europe needs investments and that's something that the UAE can deliver. So I think in terms of levers of power I would say the UAE is in a more powerful position than the

Europeans in that bargaining uh situation. Plus the Europeans don't have

situation. Plus the Europeans don't have any networks anymore in Africa or the Middle East. that they are reliant

Middle East. that they are reliant overly reliant on these partners in the Gulf, particularly the UAE to unlock some of these problem.

>> Okay, we we we've covered a lot um and I just want to kind of start wrapping this up, but I think it's it's obviously we mentioned the genocide in Gaza. Um the

Abraham Accords, these are big uh issues um obviously and the Abraham Accords have been around since you know Trump's first uh in office from like 2019. So

just I mean how do you think the the I mean we know the Emirates's position on on on the genocide in Gaza. They've

probably less than any other Arab nation said I mean said the least right and they've been they've been the most supportive of Israel in terms of diplomatic ties and everything else probably with I mean not with the

exception but a close second is Morocco.

Um so where do you think the the how do you think the genocide impacts the the Emirates? It sounds like it doesn't. I

Emirates? It sounds like it doesn't. I

mean, outside of bad reputation or PR problems. Um, but I mean, we don't know what's going to happen. That genocide

has not yet stopped. We're not sure if Trump's plan is going to come to fruition at all or if it does come to fruition just in namesake, but not, it seems unlikely it will be in any sort of reality form.

>> There's talk that, you know, there may be an international force. There's a

discussion happening where Turkey may start committing troops. Um, I'm sure the Turks would want that. I'm not sure if the Israelis would actually allow it to happen. Um I'm not sure if Trump has

to happen. Um I'm not sure if Trump has the sustainability to to you know the interest to make sure it does happen. Um

so I mean we have to address those things specifically but just where does the the still unknown outcome of this horrible action in genocide where does that where will that leave the the

emirates position? Um yeah

emirates position? Um yeah >> I think the Gaza has fundamentally undermined the UAE standing in the region. The Arab

Accords were obviously among Arabs always contested because they went there was never an angle that helped the Palestinians. There was it was never

Palestinians. There was it was never about Palestine. It was always about UAE

about Palestine. It was always about UAE uh and Israel. It was very US- ccentric.

It it has been and remains an out of jail card for the Emiratis in in Washington. We shouldn't underestimate

Washington. We shouldn't underestimate that. any criticism that anybody brings,

that. any criticism that anybody brings, legitimate or not, against the Emiratis, whether it's their funding of of Vagna or their support for the RSF or, you know, their relationship with China,

which are all concerns for most uh American policy makers, lawmakers.

Many of them are are saying, "Okay, yes, it's not great, but let's not forget they're the only ones that have that relationship with Israel." And Israel still, you know, Apac and the the the pro-Israel lobby in America is still

extremely powerful. And so the UAE have

extremely powerful. And so the UAE have been a able to piggyback along the Israel lobby and that's been very very successful. And I think they there's

successful. And I think they there's this trade-off where the Arab Accords have undermined the reputation of the UAE in the region certainly since you know 2023 and the 7th of October and

Israeli action in Gaza. Um where the Emiratis are nowhere to be seen as a critical actor. I think they they've

critical actor. I think they they've made the annexation of the West Bank the kind of red line now. They've

established and said that is not going to happen. and all the de facto Israel

to happen. and all the de facto Israel is already uh you know doing land grabs.

Um but overall the the Emiratis have not found a position that allows them to actually leverage the Abram Accords in any way to create a a an outcome that

would help the Palestinian people or and for that matter let's not call let's let's say we don't care about Palestine but creating an outcome that's good for regional stability because after all Israeli action against Qatar Israeli

action against Iran were all things that were detrimental to uh Iranian interests as well and the UAE initially liked a bit of degradation of Hamas, the degradation of Hezbollah, a bit of

degradation of Iran, but within means.

And so this completely unhinged Netanyahu government that is going going to lash out, I don't know how many wars they were involved in. I mean, they've been they've been striking Yemen, striking Syria, Lebanon, obviously

Palestine, Tunisia. Yes. Tunisia.

Palestine, Tunisia. Yes. Tunisia.

Exactly. I mean, they they've been so and and Iran as well and Qatar. If you

look at that, I mean, that's not in the Emirati. That is the sort of

Emirati. That is the sort of uncontrollable instability that is the Emirati don't want. So, but they haven't been able to use that leverage, not in Washington and and not with the Israelis to actually achieve an outcome that

favors them. And even on Gaza, yes, the

favors them. And even on Gaza, yes, the UAE are leading on uh humanitarian aid, but that's because they have that special relationship where they can get stuff through the uh uh uh through the

gate in in Gaza because the Israel is allowed to go in where they don't allow others to put human donated. But that's

about the extent of it. After all, it was Kasa who really brought this uh this uh this to this this war to Yeah. Yeah,

I mean this I mean it's not to an end. I

mean still there.

>> They they they made sure the discussion occurred between the right people.

>> Yes. At least they put people together and I think the first step was taken. Um

uh Emirates were nowhere to be seen. And

even now when we talk about the international security force in Gaza where the immortality initially said we will contribute forces. Now they're

saying we won't until there's a framework in place which there isn't.

Trump is not really doing anything to to move this whole process forward to the next stage. So the Abraors are still a

next stage. So the Abraors are still a great out of jail card I think in Washington. that's what it was meant to

Washington. that's what it was meant to be and meant to do. Um, but Israel and unhinged Israel now is for the Emirates and that's what the Emirates are saying increasingly just as bad for regional security as is Iran. So for them they're

two pariah states and that's kind of where the Gulf of consensus now is where the Gulf the Gulf states Arab Gulf states are trapped in a in a in a sandwich between two paras Israel and Iran. And that's how the Emiratis look

Iran. And that's how the Emiratis look at it as well. But the Emiratis have not done anything to sever relations with Israel. I mean the Amir Accords are in

Israel. I mean the Amir Accords are in place. Um, yes, some some of the

place. Um, yes, some some of the diplomats have been called back. Uh, but

after all, the embraces are still uh still there and I think the any amirati you speak to will tell you that they're currently not negotiating an exit or they're not using it as leverage. I

think they they will not they will leave it as it is.

>> It makes sense for them to leave it as is because then they see it as the the partner that's still most likely to to go for it. So, I guess then they can use their exit as leverage as opposed to

>> their default being in it as as leverage. Um I mean in in the last two

leverage. Um I mean in in the last two years I think many people watching what's been happening in in in Gaza and thinking how can the Israelis get away with with this have had I mean two

questions in their mind who like who's leading who is the is it the the Israelis and Ape as you know John Mshima has been one of the most foremost >> people putting forth this this position that the Israelis have completely bought

Washington and they can do what they like and so reluctantly or unreluctantly depending on who you are in Washington, you go along with it. Um, a more, you know, traditional idea is that Israel is

an imperial is imperial extension of the USA's policy. Um, and is, you know,

USA's policy. Um, and is, you know, formenting instability in the region, um, which suits the US imperial ambitions.

>> Um, it seems like just just listening to you that a lot of Abu Dhabi's behavior is independent, autonomous. Obviously

they they do consider real politics and how people are going to respond to it but but I mean where do you stand on that on that discussion? How much of this do you

discussion? How much of this do you think is Washington allowing Abu Dhabi and Israel to go ahead and do what they want? Because at the end of the day,

want? Because at the end of the day, while it may be a bit inconvenient, you know, these are their their chaotic interventions are sort of in our

interests. Or do you think Washington

interests. Or do you think Washington and is getting very concerned about these these two actors and what they're doing and are like really trying to like es especially the Pentagon and the

military and the strategists like we need to really try to you know create intervention and a pivot. What do you think? Well, I mean there's a difference

think? Well, I mean there's a difference between different institutions in Washington, right? So, I mean, if you

Washington, right? So, I mean, if you call it the deep state as in the the establishment, the you know the in the the formal uh institutions of Washington, the military, those who

involved in military and security policy and foreign policy and strategy obviously see this as a problem. They

see the Emirati activities in Africa as a problem. They see their their

a problem. They see their their partnering with Vagna and Russia as a problem. Um but the Emiratis have been

problem. Um but the Emiratis have been trying to emulate the Israeli approach which is capturing Washington not by formal institutional relationships but

by informal networks of you know lobbyists, think tankers, people who can shape the narrative close to the White House that whoever's in the White House will be basically their perception will

be shaped by the Emiratis. And they've

been quite successful at it. I think

they, you know, after Israel, they've been really creating a a second lobby that was very powerful. Um, the only thing is that most of that power still lies with the Israelis because the the

the Emiratis have invested into the same outlets that the Israelis have invested in, whether it's the same think tanks because they share the same fear about political Islam and and and and the and Arabs more generally, or the Arab

street, if you will. Um um and so the UEE can't use that network they've built in Washington independently because the Israelis already subverted the same network. They shared that network and so

network. They shared that network and so that makes the Amirati slightly less powerful when they want to use this network against Israel. Hence they

haven't. Um I think what we've seen though is an emerging Gulf lobby that is somewhat independently operating. That's

includes the the cut networks, the Saudi networks, some of the Amirati networks.

And I think they have been very very powerful in capture in in pushing back some of the most extremist uh thinking and and narratives that the Israelis have tried to inject into Washington.

And we're seeing a push back now. I

think America first and the MAGA crowd very anti-Israel um for good reason because of what Israel is doing and what how they're abusing the Americans, how Israel has become somewhat the tail

that's wagging the dog. Um that's not the case with the Emiratis. theaters are

not a a tail that is wagging the the American dog. Um they are just more

American dog. Um they are just more strategically autonomous in some respects. Um I think they're more

respects. Um I think they're more strategically autonomous than Israel actually quite funnily enough. So um

autonomous in the way obviously both Israel and America Israel and the UAE get most of their weaponry from the United States. Um they still rely but

United States. Um they still rely but the Emiratis are still a net contributor to American power I would say as are the other Gulf states. I mean UAE, Qatar and Saudi Arabia put trillions of dollars

into the United States. So they're great investor, but they also absorb a lot of the burden that the Americans don't want to share anymore or sorry that they don't want to burden anymore. They share

this burden with these Gulf States and they're absorbing it. That's great for American power. And so most policy

American power. And so most policy makers in America look at the Gulf States as an as as a as a willing porn, as someone that they can work through or work alongside. Israel on the other hand

work alongside. Israel on the other hand is no longer that sort of country that absorbs the burden. It's actually

creating burden for the United States.

And I think that's we've now been at this tipping point where the old narrative of Apac and the Pro Israel lobby of saying they're a they're an extension of American power in the region and they're helping us to do

things that we don't want to do. Um this

narrative no longer holds and in Washington people are questioning because actually it's the it's the contrary. It's Israel that is dragging

contrary. It's Israel that is dragging and has been dragging the United States into consecutive wars whether it's now against Iran, Hzbollah and whatnot, but dragging dragging them into into wars in

Iraq. Netanyahu in particular has been

Iraq. Netanyahu in particular has been on the record for decades of of engaging neocons. So, I think the Gulf fees in

neocons. So, I think the Gulf fees in general are seen as a more long-term a more favorable partner to the United States because not only are they paying for their own kit, but they're also putting money into the United States and

help the United States absorbing some of that regional burden. And the problem here is not the Goffees or the Israelis.

It's an it's a reluctant United States unable unwilling to lead on the Middle East. Some people say it's a good thing.

East. Some people say it's a good thing.

uh most people I I I personally think the neoonservatives, neocons of the you know Bush years and following were the most destructive force in the Middle East. So good for them not to invest uh

East. So good for them not to invest uh anymore in the Middle East and leading policy on the Middle East. The problem

though is it leads it leaves a vacuum that nobody is credibly filling. Uh we

don't want the Iranians to fill it. Uh

we don't want um you know the UAE to fill it and they can't. Um so we're left with this kind of mish mesh and extremely networked order that is

extremely fragile. Um and the US I don't

extremely fragile. Um and the US I don't think is is is not coming back.

>> When you say coming back not not they're not going to invest further in the region.

>> They they they will lead from behind.

>> Okay.

>> Yeah.

>> Okay. I mean so I mean it seems like it seems I mean you as you mentioned the vacuum and you mentioned this a few times. It's Abu Dhabi seems to be

times. It's Abu Dhabi seems to be filling all the vacuums or at least they're trying to that's their that's their that's their goal. Um we started off this this discussion I mean not exactly but it was mentioned in the

first 10 15 minutes about how you know were kind of pushing for the reform that the Arab Spring was going to bring or the revolutions were going to bring and were heavily invested in that and seemed to be doing you know I mean I wouldn't

say successful >> but you know it was definitely playing like to their interests in the start or at least what their hopes were not their interest necessarily. Um and now it

interest necessarily. Um and now it seems like Abu Dhabi has you know is on top. Um, how is it is it just a case of,

top. Um, how is it is it just a case of, you know, Tamim and Hammad the change that happened there? Uh, how how influential was the siege that the Gulf nations put on Katar in 2017 on that?

Um, you know, is or is it just a case of, you know, building or or trying reform is just a lot more difficult than funding militias and being destructive?

Like what's the how do you think that >> outplayed the Iranians and the Russians?

disruption is always more more much easier than building something like creating something. Creating stability

creating something. Creating stability is much more difficult than creating chaos.

>> Um but I think the countries themselves I mean they they would tell you that they have transitioned in their mindset from where they were during the Arab Spring. That is certainly Tamim

Spring. That is certainly Tamim as opposed to but it's also the lesson learned of the country is quite early on if you think about it now. I mean the counterrevolution let's say started in 2013 12 years ago. The Emiratis are

still not learning any lesson. they

continue on that trajectory. The

countries learned after two years of experimenting during the Arab Spring that it wasn't going to work and that it will upset the region and that it will create instability and then they basically course corrected and did a U-turn. The Saudis did it in Yemen after

U-turn. The Saudis did it in Yemen after a couple of years realized not going anywhere. They U-turned, course

anywhere. They U-turned, course corrected. The Emiratis haven't course

corrected. The Emiratis haven't course corrected yet. I think the Emiratis

corrected yet. I think the Emiratis still continue on that trajectory. I

think the Gulf crisis or the you know the Qatar blockade which was UAE essentially for this for the reasons uh that we outlined basically the Qatar was seen as a major sponsor of of the

revolutionary trend. I think that was

revolutionary trend. I think that was the first and the one of the biggest defeats for for the Emiratis. The fact

that essentially Qatar didn't back down they continued on their policy. Um

overall they continued to be the country that they have been throughout. it was

the Emirati who had to basically come down and uh and and and turn a little bit. Um I think after the the Alula

bit. Um I think after the the Alula Accords which brought the Gulfies back together were a big turning point especially now because the countries are no longer not isolated. They're actually

the most included in all discussions.

It's now the Saudis and the Emiratis who don't get along over Sudan, over Yemen, and even over Syria. And it's the countries and the Saudis who work together on Syria for example and even

on Gaza and the UAE are the odd one out.

So I think uh you know what happened after the Alula and after the failed blockading of Qatar is that the UAE have become more sidelined in some some on some issues. Obviously they're still

some issues. Obviously they're still part of a lot of the discussion in the Middle East and and Gulf discourse. But

the Emiratis are no longer they're certainly not omnipotent and they have been confronted with their limits of their power. But it hasn't stopped what

their power. But it hasn't stopped what I call the axis of secessionist across the region to operate because all of that has been delegated. It's a network that's self- sustaining um which isn't

based on Emirati uh you know Emirati capacity and Emirati uh formal institutions. It's it's private networks

institutions. It's it's private networks that the Emiratis are running. That's

their greatest source of power. And

that's why I'm saying and these these networks penetrate all aspects of the region in a way that none of the other countries have even networks like this.

they are at the table in most of the conflicts or at the table uh in of most of the conflicts in a way that the UK isn't for example or France isn't or the European Union isn't or even the

Americans aren't and that is influence it might not be hard power but it's influence and that that influence is something that makes the Emiratis certainly a force to reckon with and I think they have an opportunity on Sudan

to U-turn and still come out on top in all of these other conflicts.

>> Okay, final question. Um, so I mean I I used to I remember reading probably about eight or nine or 10 years ago just is when MBS first came on the scene and he was not he was still the crown prince.

>> Um, I mean still he's the crown prince but before he was even the crown prince.

>> Um, and uh, you know it was MBS who's modeling himself as MBZ. Um, I think that's we we that that era is now gone.

I think MBS is now his own person. I

think he is much younger naturally speaking. Saudi Arabia is a much bigger

speaking. Saudi Arabia is a much bigger and richer country than the Emirates.

What do you think I mean both personalitywise but also because of just natural geopolitical sort of clashing what do you think the future of the Saudi and Emirati relation

like where where do you think this relationship will be in the year 2040 or 2050 where do you think it's going >> well with developments and AI I don't know where we all going to be in the year 2050 to be honest so I'm not going

to make predictions uh it's very difficult to make predictions about this uh but I would definitely say that the trajectories that both both countries are on the UA and Saudi Arabia are ex

increasingly rubbing against each other.

Um, and so there it it's gone from competition to rivalry, back to competition, but it's going to continue along a trajectory of sometimes it will be rivalry where they're going head-to-head, sometimes it will be just

competition. Um, because they're also

competition. Um, because they're also competing in the same economic space. I

mean, Saudi Arabia is at a they need to they need FDI, they need foreign direct investments, they need an opening up of of the economy. They're also betting on technology and AI uh in the same way that the Emiratis are. But the Emiratis

have that infrastructure that the Saudis don't have. The Emiratis have a much

don't have. The Emiratis have a much more agile market and a private sector, much more agile than the Saudis. Um they

have a bureaucracy that's more agile in the UAE than the Saudis. So, it's a competition that the Saudis will will find very difficult to compete in. Yes,

Saudi Arabia has the the PIFF the public investment fund which is you know underwritten by the biggest oil company energy company in the world the RMCO which is still a very powerful tool but

it will there isn't these their interests are they're not in this space they're not not diametrically opposed but they're they are zero sum interests so it's very difficult to create win-win

situations in this space and the Emiratis as I said before their bedin mindset is extremely competitive and confrontational the Saudis of course Obviously they also have their own

legacy of being bedrin but it's it's more complicated than that. Saudi Arabia

uh Saudi Arabia is generally a country that is trying to find obviously they are confrontational at times but then they they learn their lesson and they usually back down under pressure. The

amiratis have Abu Dhabi has shown that they don't back down and so I think that relationship is what used to be a bromance between NBZ and NBS that time is certainly gone. Um once NBS becomes

king, it will be a very different dynamic and I think the power that again there is an opportunity in the in UAE being ostracized at the moment by the rest of the region. If Saudi could fill that space with through leadership,

through vision particularly on Palestine, I think that could really push the Saudis onto the next level where most Arab and Muslim countries will affiliate themselves with Saudi

Arabia, not with the UAE because the UAE appears to be on the wrong side of history on this, especially on Sudan.

So, and hence why we're seeing so many Saudi commentators pushing back against the Emiratis in a way that we haven't seen. I mean, Saudi social media is full

seen. I mean, Saudi social media is full of criticism of the UAE. Um, especially

over Sudan, but also over Yemen. Um, so

that competition is going to continue.

Where it's going to lead, I I don't know because we don't know. I don't know where the region will be in 20 years time. So many, you know, unknown

time. So many, you know, unknown unknowns.

>> Okay, cool. Uh, Andreas Creek, thank you so much for your time. I feel like we've discussed a lot, but we also have have not discussed so much. We haven't even discussed Syria, for example, which I think is arguably possibly the most

interesting thing given everything that's happened there in the last year.

Um, you know, with the exception of possibly that I mean it's really hard.

It's it's there's a region that's so much happening. Um, but I mean I'd love

much happening. Um, but I mean I'd love to have you here again to discuss a bunch of things. Um, possibly even with other people. Uh, so thank you for your

other people. Uh, so thank you for your time. It's been a it's been a good 2

time. It's been a it's been a good 2 hours or so. Um, and best of luck with everything that you do.

>> Thank you. Appreciate it.

>> Thanks.