Slop vs Craft

I think you want to stay out of a symmetric battle for who can slop harder. If there's a competitor and

harder. If there's a competitor and they're spamming a lot and you're like, "Well, our only solution is to spam harder." And you're just in an arms race

harder." And you're just in an arms race of who can create the most garbage to make the graph go up.

>> I I think don't do it. I think you have to find a way to stay out of trying to produce the most lowquality crap.

>> This is Dalton plus Michael. Today we're

going to talk about slop versus crap.

Maybe another way to describe this is like what does it mean to have good taste? Why don't we kick this off? You

taste? Why don't we kick this off? You

and I were talking about claude code.

You've maybe gone down the smallest of rabbit holes. How is cloud code changing

rabbit holes. How is cloud code changing how you think about slop versus craft?

>> Sure. So I think for context, I've been doing a fair amount of programming over the past uh nine months. Mh.

>> Um, like I was messing with cursor and wind surf a while ago and it was cool and >> you know I've been having fun with it and then of course cloud code came out probably a while ago but it it really took off mimemetically

>> Q4 of last year and definitely over like Christmas break is when everyone >> went nuts with it. And what I would say is >> it's really fun.

>> It's like a video game and you like type stuff in and it just feels powerful like you watch the screen fly by. It's like

programming with the best programmer you've ever met who's like really nice and really fast and it's so energizing to watch the code fly by on the on the

screen and um see all the tokens it's burning and just like you know it's it's super cool. So I would recommend it.

super cool. So I would recommend it.

Yes. And this is not yet another you know VC podcast talking about how great Claude Code is because here's where I'm going with this. It is great. No, it is

great. But I easily could imagine a

great. But I easily could imagine a younger version of myself >> not really sleeping or taking care of myself and then being convinced that all

of this junk that I was making with cloud code was really good.

>> Yeah.

>> It reminds me of like I remember setting up Linux when uh when I was super young >> and I used this version of Linux called Gen 2. Okay.

Gen 2. Okay.

>> Where you would compile the whole thing from scratch. And so when you were

from scratch. And so when you were setting up Linux, it would just be like stuff would be flying by on the terminal and I felt like a really elite guy that I was like handcompiling my own Linux kernel.

>> Yes.

>> And in retrospect that was like not >> maybe I should be telling a story, but like it felt really cool >> to compile your own Linux kernel when in practice I

>> literally nothing beneficial happened for that. Okay. And so where I'm going

for that. Okay. And so where I'm going with this is there's such a temptation that even I felt >> Yeah.

>> using these super powerful tools to basically make slop.

>> Yeah.

>> So let's define slop. Like I'd like to hear your definition like what what >> Yeah. What do we mean by slop here?

>> Yeah. What do we mean by slop here?

>> Very simply in my mind slop is products that don't actually help the user. They

can seem great in your mind. They can

great when you're demoing. They can seem great when you're raising money. But

when we put it in front of the intended user, we do not see the user getting their problem solved and then being happy. It's like, oh, it's just missing

happy. It's like, oh, it's just missing one thing.

That's a that's it's the it's the feature treadmill where you're like, oh, it's bad, but just let me add 10 more features.

Like, and again, it's so tempting. The

tools are so good. You can just keep adding features to something that's kind of crappy >> and have a very large surface area very fast.

>> Have a lot of crap.

>> Yeah. So that's kind of what I think about with with slop. What do you think when when you see slop?

>> By definition, this is subjective. And

so one person like you could say anything slop and people can debate it and that sounds very tedious. I think

the best definition is that in your own objective mind, >> you know, it's not that good.

like >> like especially after you've like you know taken a break and taken a walk or gotten some sleep and then you really look at what you're doing with fresh eyes or people that you trust and you're

like actually this isn't that good >> because in the in the in the Linux example I gave come on like the hand compiled Linux kernel was not actually better than the one I downloaded from Red Hat.

>> It's the same thing. And so I think you have to have this like objective perspective about if something is actually good. Basically, you can't

actually good. Basically, you can't practice self-deception. That's what I'm

practice self-deception. That's what I'm trying to say. Slop is where you're sort of actively selfdeceiving. Yes.

>> That your thing is good when you kind of know it's not that good.

>> You know, as an aside, whenever I work with a company and they say like, "Oh, our competitor gets funded or newcome gets funded." And they're super afraid.

gets funded." And they're super afraid.

The first thing I do is just like, "Have you used the product?" Yeah.

>> Have you used it? Like you can't even really determine whether something is good or bad by not using it. Like if

you're taking all of the clues but you don't try it, you're not getting any signal.

>> Yep.

>> So we have some examples of slop um which are fun. Um first one, web 2.0.

>> Yeah. SEO spam. Okay. So the real insight when Google was taking off is that if you could rank number one in Google for something on >> you like would make so much money.

>> Yeah.

>> Right. If you if you could like spam your way for your e-commerce site to be the number one Google search result, you would Yeah. You'd make tons and tons of

would Yeah. You'd make tons and tons of money. So, guess what happened?

money. So, guess what happened?

>> Or content and you put a little Google ad on it, >> right? Yeah.

>> right? Yeah.

>> So, guess what happened is a lot of people built slop farms. >> Yes.

>> To game Google so that they can end up at the top of search results and make money in various ways.

>> And they had very nice early graphs.

>> Yeah. They made a lot of money. I'm not

going to I'm not going to name any of the names of these companies. You can

ask Chad GBT about this.

>> A lot of money. Not a lot of money relative to successful companies. A lot

of money relative to >> It looked like it was working.

>> Yes. It looked like it was working.

>> So they were spamming the hell out of Google. Yes.

Google. Yes.

>> And some raised like VC money for this.

>> Yeah. Yeah.

>> Um many I might argue.

>> Ultimately none of those are going concerns anymore. Like it was like a a

concerns anymore. Like it was like a a brief moment in history where you could spam Google and make lots of money and then you were done. Uh this this is something I've been calling it with PB.

He calls them turkey startups. You ever

seen the graph of the life of a turkey >> where it's like getting better and better and better and then one day it's over.

>> That's a turkey startup. It's a turkey graph. Oh man. You know, you know what

graph. Oh man. You know, you know what I'm talking about.

>> Yes. It's a little brutal.

>> It's like where you're like, "Oh, you know, my startup's going great and then it's just like over.

>> Google changed algorithm."

>> Yes. So, an SEO slop company is the definition of a of a turkey startup. For

me, when I think back to mobile consumer, there were so many products where when you would dig deep, someone would subscribe to them for a year and

their activity would end after 30 days.

And like the business model was like, okay, like I love this business model. I

was like, all right, we're going to acquire the user for this much. If we

get them to buy the annual subscription, we we have one year LTV. That's pretty

good. And if we get them to like somehow forget and subscribe for two years, well, I mean that's silly. And then we just run that play across 100 million users. Yep. And all the graphs look

users. Yep. And all the graphs look great. And remember like the early app

great. And remember like the early app store was a lot of slop. It'd be like I >> was lightsaber.

>> It was just like >> crap. And people made money in the short

>> crap. And people made money in the short term. But again, none of those became

term. But again, none of those became durable businesses because it was it was slop. And Apple didn't want slop in the

slop. And Apple didn't want slop in the app store either. Like no one was that excited about this stuff. It was

effectively a scam.

>> It it was a scam and and there were users understand when things are scam.

So you get like a negative word of mouth and then you know you but to your point like the SEO thing you look in the first 10% of the race you look like you're winning.

>> Y >> and it's like that's why it's like so interesting because it's like man it's so desirable to look like you're winning in the first 10% of the race. You can

sometimes just forget that you have 90% of the race to run. I just thinking about this um out loud. It's almost like the same shills that are selling courses were

into all this stuff. Like like basically on the the dark corners of YouTube of like get rich quick.

>> They love this stuff. Like everything we just mentioned, >> there were totally people that were like, "This is the secret to wealth."

And it was some version of like whatever the latest scam was. Yes.

>> To like fool people.

>> Get in early and get out with money before >> Well, they made money selling courses.

So again, that's the irony is selling >> selling content to explain to people how to make slop >> is probably a better business than making slop. So

making slop. So >> So then crypto happened which was slop free right?

>> I mean I think that the the thing with that is it was so intoxicating in the same way. Again I you know to speak to

same way. Again I you know to speak to myself when I first learned about you know Bitcoin I thought it was super cool. I remember telling you about it.

cool. I remember telling you about it.

It was hard to think about anything else for a little while. This was like in 2013 and 2014 because it seems so revolutionary.

>> Yes.

>> Again, it reminds me of the feeling that I've had messing with a lot of the vibe coding tools like cloud code is just feeling like I'm seeing the future and feeling almost like a euphoria about it and an excitement.

>> Yes. And because I've been through multiple cycles before, current Dalton, I was like, "Yeah, haha." Um, chill, dude. That Yeah. Yeah. Um, and that and

dude. That Yeah. Yeah. Um, and that and that's kind of where I ended up with the crypto stuff, too, which is to realize there was an incentive >> to do lowquality stuff with crypto like

ICOs or or you know, there there's a lot of things like that. And ultimately, you know, Enduring Value was not created in as many of those as was created by Coinbase and and what have you. I think

the the moment that crypto really kind of jumped the shark for me. I remember I was working with the company in the batch who made something like a Discord

plugin or something and it was an interesting seed that something could have grown from.

>> Yeah.

>> And then they were the the plan was to ICO and monetize it and be done. dump on

retail.

>> And I was like I was like, "You you guys have something like you might be able to make something." And

they're like, >> "What are you talking about?" Like

that's the game.

>> That's not the game we're playing.

>> Yeah.

>> And I was just like, "Oh, come." And and again, to put a fine point on this, I still think there's like really cool things that are going to be built with crypto, >> obviously. But backwards facing

>> obviously. But backwards facing objectively, a lot of the startups were the equivalent of like the crappy Facebook apps or the crappy iPhone apps or the SEO sites where they kind of got

some activity, maybe they made some money and then there's it's a turkey.

Like there's nothing left.

>> Well, I think that's that's the interesting thing is that like maybe the difference between when we started and now is the venture world has gotten so much bigger and there's so much more money. Yeah. Whereas I feel like a lot

money. Yeah. Whereas I feel like a lot of the things that were like this back in the day had to bootstrap.

>> Yeah.

>> Whereas like some of the things like this now, a lot of schlop can raise funding.

>> Yep.

>> And so like that confuses people like well how can it be schlop if it's raising around right? Like

>> well this is where it goes back to the thing I said earlier which is you have to have your own good judgment.

>> Yeah.

>> And just because like if you're looking around you're like everyone else is scamming maybe I should scam too.

That's not a great way to make life decisions. And so I do think this is

decisions. And so I do think this is where taste comes in is that if we, you know, I'd love to hear your definition of taste, but in my definition here, taste just means having a strong

barometer, having a strong compass of what is good and what is not good and not producing things that you know in your heart are bad, right? Or like not helping people or hurting people. You

make such a good point because I feel like there's like a artistic definition of taste which like I'm not much of an artist like I don't really can't really

engage with and then there's just like a pure like value generation, right? Like

almost in the kind of the core of the economy like is what is what you're doing positive some? It's weird because like I think in a classic definition of taste people are like well some people have it and some people don't. I think

everyone has the ability to look at something honestly and ask whether it's >> well again the irony I'm you know you've heard me say this before but anyone that insists what good tra t taste they have it's like definitionally that's how you

spot the people that don't have good taste is that they talk about how great they are all the time >> well I think that's so funny because like like when people are like oh taste is like where the buttons are on the screen or like how cool my dark mode is

like to >> like you know like but to recognize great taste in other people it's people that have high standards >> and that they really care. Yes.

>> About anything that they release, they're proud of. Yes.

>> And they would stamp their name on it and just be stand by their work and the user gets value out of the work.

>> Yeah. Because there are a lot of people if you stand by the work >> but you don't care whether the user gets value, that's art. Yeah. Which I think is great. It's a perfect category of

is great. It's a perfect category of things to do. But that's not building businesses. Yeah. Like at the end of the

businesses. Yeah. Like at the end of the day, value has to be created to the user. Interestingly enough, one would

user. Interestingly enough, one would argue we're in a slop war right now.

>> And maybe one would say like this is what happens in any new platform kind of zone, right? Like you got a a lot of

zone, right? Like you got a a lot of easy to slop out things and then things kind of get sorted out.

>> Yeah.

>> How do you think about the slop war? Who

wins?

>> I would almost compare it to the Facebook platform hop wars.

>> Yeah. where a lot of people were competing with Zinga. Zinga was buying people or compete with Farmville.

>> Yes.

>> And ultimately no one won that was playing that game.

>> I mean, Facebook won.

>> That's true.

>> And so, yeah, the people selling tokens are like, "Yeah, this is great.

>> Slop's great.

>> Everyone should use cloud code to make like whatever they want."

>> But if you're the people consuming all these tokens, >> I think you want to stay out of a symmetric battle for who can slop harder. If there's a competitor and

harder. If there's a competitor and they're spamming a lot and you're like, "Well, our only solution is to spam harder and you're just in an arms race of who can create the most garbage to make the graph go up."

>> Yeah.

>> I I think don't do it.

>> I think you have to find a way to stay out of trying to produce the most lowquality crap.

>> Yeah.

>> Whatever that is, whether it's features, whether that's content, because again, if you look at this to back test it, usually the winners in any space stayed out of these symmetric spam battles, right, man? Well, it's funny because I

right, man? Well, it's funny because I always like to think about, you know, there have been phases where I've worked in consumer and I've cared about my topline user growth and then phases

where I've worked in consumer and I cared about retention. There all kinds of things you can do when you're only looking at topline revenue growth or topline user growth or topline dus.

There are all kinds of tricks. Why don't

we just send more push notifications >> cuz that's what users really want.

>> Send more email. Let's let's send them deceptive email. You know, there's a

deceptive email. You know, there's a problem with your account that'll make our GAUs go up. We could go up with like dark patterns all day long, right? Um

and and whenever I've had to work on retention, it's like funny cuz it's like you have to start with like, well, am I helping user? Is it actually working?

helping user? Is it actually working?

Oh, if it is working, well, why do these users not see that it's work? Like

everything comes back down to serving someone. Whereas I feel like when I ever

someone. Whereas I feel like when I ever I worked on the topline graph, I was serving myself. The user was a side

serving myself. The user was a side story. The user was someone to be I

story. The user was someone to be I don't want to say exploited, but certainly someone to be extracted from.

>> Whereas whenever I worked on retention, it was like >> it's hard to make these users happy. I

got to like I got to really do more work. If you find yourself looking at

work. If you find yourself looking at the graph that allows you to take more from users than you give, I think that's how you lose the slot war. If you find yourself looking at the graphs that other people don't want to look at, that's how you win. Yep.

>> Yeah. I think the last thing I like to talk about when it comes to slop and why I would encourage kind of early stage founders to be very careful is pre-slop there was always there was already kind

of a high likelihood of people getting to pivot help.

>> Yep.

>> What I worry about is like clog code and slop might accelerate that already pretty aggressive.

>> Well, because you can oneshot anything.

So basically, if you're if you're low conviction >> and you decide to pivot, >> you can just >> have the new thing >> send it a Tech Crunch article and say to clone it.

>> Yeah.

>> You like, oh, like clone this new startup. And so it's even more tempting.

startup. And so it's even more tempting.

>> Yes.

>> To just randomly change your idea over and over again and to build plausible prototypes. Again, I'm I'm saying these

prototypes. Again, I'm I'm saying these are like pretty good. Like it's good. I

like cloud code. And so

>> it's like we're giving >> you're getting a really powerful weapon like don't hurt yourself with it, right?

I think it's easier >> to because you can crank out really good prototypes so fast >> to have lower conviction on what you should be working on and to constantly change your mind to seek the next shiny thing.

>> Well, and we always talk about this, but in pivot hell, the shiny thing is often the thing you know the least about >> because like you know why the things that you experience or you use are hard to build.

>> Yep.

>> So, it's kind of like it's so much easier to go so much further astray from things you know anything about. You only

have so much energy. Yep. Before you

wake up, look at your startup and you're like, "This is not working. I got to stop."

stop." >> Think about it. You could you could oneshot, hey, build a Salesforce clone.

I was been reading tweets about that.

Okay, here's your Salesforce clone.

>> Y now what? Try to get three startups to use it. Oh, they don't like using it.

use it. Oh, they don't like using it.

Oh, maybe I should build.

>> And wait, if it was so easy for you to clone it, like why won't someone clone you? And like like like basically you

you? And like like like basically you can start poking at this and end up in a very sad, low conviction place.

>> Yes. In conclusion, don't play in the slop war.

Figure out how to focus on creating value for users and maybe be a little bit less addicted to graphs that go up but where no value is being created. I

love graphs going up. Me too. Right?

Like graphs should go up, right? But

like graphs that go up where no value is created come down. They they have a life of a turkey.

Great chat. All right. Thanks, Michael.