The Transatlantic Empire Is Already DEAD | Amb. Kishore Mahbubani

Asia transformed massively in just one century. From a region carved up by

century. From a region carved up by colonial empires to the powerhouse of today's emerging multipolar world breaks the SEO Asen. So many of the key pillars

of the new global order are now anchored right here in Asia. To discuss the continent's stunning success and its future, I'm joined today by the prolific Singaporean diplomat and academic Dr.

Kishor Mabumani, the author of Has China won? the Asian 21st century and living

won? the Asian 21st century and living the Asian century. Dr. Mabubani,

welcome.

>> My pleasure. Uh, by the way, you can call me uh ambassador or professor, but I'm not doctor.

>> I I'm sorry. I'm sorry. I I I saw I I read to that video. It's

>> okay. Actually,

>> yeah. Yeah. um ambassador Mabadi which very nice because he served actually in the United Nations twice Singapore's ambassador to the UN.

>> Yes.

>> And um can you tell me a bit is my assessment that Asia is really the new going to be the new one of the new centers of this multipolarity. Do you

share that assessment?

>> No Asia is not just going to become one center. It's going to become the center.

center. It's going to become the center.

uh and but of course within Asia there'll be multiple poles by the way uh Asia itself will be multipolar

not not just part of a multipolar world and certainly you know the the key point I emphasize in my writings is that the

200 years of western domination of world history have been an aberration because from the year 1 to the year 1820 the two largest economies of the world

were always those um you know uh China and India.

>> Mhm.

>> So uh it's only in the last 200 years that Europe took off and North America took off. But this western domination

took off. But this western domination was always an aberration. It has come to an end and it's ending uh very fast. And

I always give one one statistic to illustrate this. If you compare the

illustrate this. If you compare the combined economy of the European Union with China, in the year 2000, the combined economy of the European Union

was eight times bigger than China.

Right. Today, they're about the same size.

>> Yeah.

>> And by 2050, Europe will be half the size of China. And you know for the Europeans uh they got to understand that when you go from being eight times

bigger than China towards becoming half the size of China in 50 years, you have to learn to treat China with more respect.

>> Instead of making this condescending comments that European leaders still make about China, which is which is crazy.

It it is it somehow doesn't leave the European mindset that they still believe everything rotates around them. But now

reality is catching up very fast. One of

our colleagues Glenn Dies made this argument in a book that Europe needs to to get get back to this idea that it is really just the western peninsula of Eurasia. Do you believe that this will

Eurasia. Do you believe that this will will have to come sooner or later this this kind of reintegration of Europe into Asia?

>> Uh certainly. I think I I think it's important for Europeans to understand that if you look objectively at the world today, Europe represents the past.

I mean, it does by the way represent a beautiful past. And so I actually

beautiful past. And so I actually believe that Europe is going to become in some ways a very nice museum for the world. Uh but and uh the United States

world. Uh but and uh the United States of America represents the present, but Asia represents the future. That's where

all the future uh growth is going to come from. And it's better for the

come from. And it's better for the Europeans to adapt to this change in advance rather than to resist it. uh and

certainly uh acceptance means that you got to make real concessions uh for example in places like IMF and the World Bank and not insist that the

European voting share must still remain disproportionately high.

What do you think stands in the way um of the of this order now changing peacefully? Because we are seeing

peacefully? Because we are seeing currently a lot of violence. We see a genocide in Gaza. We see the war in Ukraine. We see a preparations of the

Ukraine. We see a preparations of the United States to go to war with Venezuela. What is it in your view that

Venezuela. What is it in your view that makes this moment now so violent?

>> Um well I think I would say actually overall I mean that certainly the war in Ukraine is a tragedy and the Russian

invasion of Ukraine uh is illegal. it

should be condemned but at the same time it's a war that could have been prevented if the Europeans had shown some degree of geopolitical competence

and the the the European geopolitical incompetence is also uh responsible for this war because the Europeans completely ignored some real

and legitimate security concerns of Russia uh in the buildup uh to the war and certainly the Gaza war was a is a

tragedy and certainly a war in Venezuela would also be a tragedy. But if you look at Asia by and large, what is stunning is that a China has managed to grow its

economy dramatically as I have just demonstrated becoming the same size of European Union despite being 1/8 the size in the year 2000. But China has

achieved this rise peacefully and normally when great powers emerge they never emerge peacefully. I mean Graham

Allison in his book uh you know destined for war has said that Americans should not wish that China should be like America because when America emerged as

a great power in the 1890s it was very violent.

uh declared wars on Spain uh conquered Philippines, conquered some of the neighbors. So clearly China's peaceful

neighbors. So clearly China's peaceful emergence has been a a gift to the world. Uh and that's why the west should

world. Uh and that's why the west should appreciate this and accept the fact that China's rise has been peaceful instead of trying to thwart China's rise and

therefore create a lot of problems for the world.

Do you from your experience also as a diplomat who had to interact a lot with the Europeans and the Americans, the West in general, >> do you think they can do that? Do you

think they will they're able to to jump over their own shadow and and actually say like, "Okay, fine. This time we're going to try to approach others on eye level."

level." >> Um, sorry, repeat that again.

Do you think the the West is able to finally realize that they have to approach others on eye level and not through this insane kind of berating

them constantly for for all alleged things?

>> Well, I mean I would say the more thoughtful people in the west understand that the world has changed and the west has got to stop uh talking down to

Asians for example, right? But many of the leaders cannot admit it. You know,

you remember uh President Joe Biden famously said when he was president, he said that the Chinese uh uh have the goal of becoming the number one power in

the world. But he said it ain't going to

the world. But he said it ain't going to happen on my watch. You know, no American president wants to be president of the United States when it becomes the number two power in the world. So you

know that shows that a sense of lack of reality because at some point in time I don't know when Chinese economy will become the largest economy in the world

and it's better for to prepare for it in advance and accept it rather than to keep denying it. You know earlier on for example I mentioned

uh the voting shares in IMF you know uh even though both EU and China about the same size they have about 17 18% of the

world GMPP but the EU share of IMF voting shares is 27% and China's share is 6%. Now in theory

according to the uh the voting shares in IMAF are supposed to represent your share of the global global GMPP. So EU

has got to cut down its voting share from 27% to 17% and China's got to increase its share from 6% to 17% and then you have uh a voting share that

reflects the world of today not the world of yesterday. But that's a pre concrete example of how the Europeans are refusing to accept the fact that you

know uh Asia has risen and you got to adapt and change. Do you think it is more realistic to try to nudge the west to actually adapt these institutions or

what does it make more sense to just build new ones? Because it seems to me that if especially within bricks the idea at the moment is to let's build the new infrastructure and just if the west ever wants to join maybe in the future

they can but let's go ahead.

Well, I think you know I think most Asian states actually surprisingly are happy to live with the current global order that was created by the

west uh in 1945 at the end of World War II. So you look at all the major global

II. So you look at all the major global institutions, the United Nations, United Nations family of institutions like World Health Organization, the World Trade Organization,

IMF, World Bank, you name it. all they

all they were all created by the west at the peak of its power at the end of World War II. Now in theory with Asia rising Asia can say hey we don't want these western institutions we want to

create our own but actually the Asian Asians want to keep these institutions but of course these institutions got to adapt and accept Asia's return. So for

example within the UN uh you have a UN security council you know uh in theory it has 15 members but in practice as Singapore discovered when we were

members of the council in 2001 2002 that there actually five members who control the council the P5 and which which is of course United

States Russia China UK France and the 10 members are just the 10 are the elected members are observers basically the the council is controlled by the five. But

you know the that's not a bad thing to have a veto five permanent members you know with a veto but you got to represent the great powers of today and

not the great powers of yesterday.

Uh that's what the security council was designed to have. And so for example you take UK for example right and I mean I'll compare UK with India. Okay. And

the reason I compare UK with India is that a 100 years ago the British could rule India effortlessly. It's shocking

that a 100,000 Englishmen could rule over 300 million Indians. Amazing. Right

now that world is of course won't happen again. But even as recently as the year

again. But even as recently as the year 2000, the British economy was 3.5 times bigger than the Indian economy.

uh today of course the Indian economy is bigger but by 2050 the Indian economy will be four times bigger than the

British economy. Now when that day comes

British economy. Now when that day comes it will be absurd to have the UK as a permanent member of the UN security council and India not as a member. So if

the if the British want to be gracious about it, the British should say okay, India is now a much more powerful country than me, the British should graciously give up their permanent seat

in the UN Security Council to India, you know, and I wrote when I wrote this article for the Financial Times, I thought the Financial Times wouldn't print it. To my surprise, they printed

print it. To my surprise, they printed it. So I think the more thoughtful

it. So I think the more thoughtful British realize that the time has come for the British to give up their seat in the UN Security Council to India. But

that's the sort of thing. These are the sort of changes you need to make. So you

keep the institution of the UN but you change the composition.

But in order to do that the Brits would have to do it voluntarily and actually the other four security council members would have to accept that too because the United States could veto it. France

could veto it if they said like no you're not leaving the club. Um is it realistic to believe that the institution that these these these declining powers have the ability to

actually say like fine we need for the greater good of everybody we need to disempower ourselves and empower the others because we we don't often see that in world politics do we? Yeah,

you're right. Uh in France could veto and uh you know the um um you know United States could veto.

You're right. But at the same time they also got to figure out that the challenge to the UN security council.

The danger for the UN security council is that they they may keep their present composition but they can lose their credibility. No one will listen to them.

credibility. No one will listen to them.

Say who are you? Who do you represent?

Why should you British still be in the council? So to to pres to keep its

council? So to to pres to keep its credibility, it's got to change the composition.

>> So that's the dilemma that the current members of the P5 have. Do they keep the composition and lose their credibility or change the composition and and and gain the and keep their cred keep their

credibility credibility? But what what

credibility credibility? But what what I've done uh is in my book the great convergence I've also suggested a comprehensive formula for reforming the

UN security council. I call it the 777 formula. So you will have seven uh

formula. So you will have seven uh permanent members in the UN security council.

uh and then the seven will be of course United States, Russia, China, the European Union will have one seat combined and then you'll have uh as a

new members India, Brazil and either South Africa or Nigeria from Africa. So,

seven permanent members and then you will have uh seven semi-permanent members because you know for every new member that wants to come in right

there's always a neighbor that says why not me right when Brazil wants to come in Argentina says why not me when India wants to come in

uh Pakistan says why not me right so for every member that wants to come in there's a neighbor that says why not me so the countries that Why not me can become seven semi-permanent members of

the security council whereby they rotate every uh uh 8 years and come back in. So

they get something also you know they also benefit and then you have seven elected members. So I believe something

elected members. So I believe something along the lines of 777 uh can work. Uh in fact the Quincy

Institute of Washington DC uh is trying to adapt my formula and suggest it as a way of reforming the UN Security Council.

>> In order for that to pass you would need to change the UN charter, right? And

that would have to pass through the GA and the general assembly and the security council. Um

security council. Um >> so it would need for the general assembly for it to pass it would need just a simple majority or uh more. uh I

think probably a two/3 majority but I think if if you if you have a formula that makes a lot of winners from this formulas you see right right now the current formulas for change uh create

losers and not winners from among a lot of people but the formula I've suggested creates about 30 to 40 winners from this formula and so the winners

therefore have a stake in voting for it how to sell it to those who would need to agree to decrease increase their their relative. So actually actually you

their relative. So actually actually you know you know what the for the smaller states it's actually better for them if they don't have to compete with the middle

powers in the UN security council because if you look carefully at the history of the UN security council some of the middle powers like Brazil for

example keeps coming back every 8 years every 10 years you know and then the smallest states don't have a chance to get elected they have to run against the

Brazils and the Indas and and Japans and all that but under my formula the middle powers in a separate category >> so the smallest states will have to

compete among themselves and they have more scope to join there you know so there'll be more space for the and if you look at it effectively

there'll be more opportunities for smaller states to get elected under my formula >> it there's no question the UN needs reform your formula would be a good idea the the central question is how to do

it, how to how to get it through. Um,

and I wonder if ASEAN as well, I mean Singapore being one of the of the key parts of ASEN also has some lessons to offer on how a multipolar world can be

structured where where you know it's not all about just top down uh decision making but but the consensus model. What

do you think about that?

Well, I think Asean is definitely a role model for the world because I mean we haven't discussed some of the other changes happening in the world and I always say that the the new world that

is coming is what I call a 3M world you know and the 3M meaning that it'll be multi-ivilizational,

multi-olar and multilateral >> and uh the reason why the world needs to study ASEAN is that ASEAN is the most

successful multi-ivilizational club in the world. In fact, no other region of the world is as diverse as Southeast Asia is. Indeed uh you know

among the close to 700 million people in Southeast Asia you have 250 million Muslims uh 150 million Christians 150 million

Buddhists Mahayana Buddhist Hinayana Buddhists you have tawist confusionists uh Hindus and you also have lots of communists in Southeast Asia. So it is

by far the most diverse region of planet earth yet it has preserved itself as an oasis of peace and prosperity. So what

ASEAN has done is AEN has provided a multi-ivilizational laboratory for the world so you can understand how different civilizations

can live with each other in peace. And

that's what the 21st century is going to be all about because a western civilization has got to learn and live live learn to live in peace with stronger Chinese civilization, stronger

Indian civilization, stronger Islamic civilization. And the reason why ASEAN

civilization. And the reason why ASEAN is the only one that can offer a model because if you look at the European Union for example, the European Union has been around much longer than ASEAN

but it is still remains a Christian club >> and you know Turkey has applied to join for I don't know 30 40 years now and the fact that the European Union cannot even

admit one Islamic member shows that the European Union is psychologically not preparing itself for a multi-vilizational

world but AEAN is teaching the world how to live in a multi-vilizational world.

>> One other thing that the west seems unwilling to give up is this thinking in black and white and friend and enemy in ally or or uh adversary. Um but AAN and

and and Asia in general doesn't go that route. The rest of the world world

route. The rest of the world world doesn't go the route the the way of forming more and more alliances. How do

you see the security structure actually that what what can we learn about how Asia um organized its security structure?

>> Well, one thing you notice that um relatively speaking in Asia the major powers are not building alliance structures, you know. So, China

China is not building an alliance structure. Uh India is not building an

structure. Uh India is not building an alliance structure.

uh Indonesia is not building an alliance structure. Of course, some Asian states

structure. Of course, some Asian states are allies of the web of United States.

I mean, Japan, South Korea, Philippines, Thailand, but at the same time, they're also pragmatic. Uh even though they're

also pragmatic. Uh even though they're allies of the United States, they're still keeping up their good ties with China. Although, as you know, right now,

China. Although, as you know, right now, Japan and China seem to be having a very difficult Yeah.

>> patch, but they've gone through difficult patches before, and they've come out of it. So I hope they'll come out this uh difficult patch too. But the

notion of uh creating exclusive alliances uh is not part of the Asian tradition because it's we are much more inclusive.

We say that we'd rather have people who are different from us in the same club because we have to live with people who are different from us and not similar to us. So within ASEAN for example the west

us. So within ASEAN for example the west for example under the western system you have to be a democracy before you can join the western alliance right but you

know some of the states in ASEAN are democracies some are not democracies we say okay you choose your political system we don't we don't pass judgment on it we accept you for what you are and

we will live with you you know and that that's the that acceptance of diversity uh is a big asset of uh uh Asia rather than the western tradition of creating

like-minded alliances.

>> Do you think the pressure on Southeast Asia and other regions will increase to actually you know um have more balanced um security ties meaning like less less

less eggs in one single basket like Singapore for it seems to be especially like a bit in in this tension of like are we an integral part of the US

alliance system or are we not? Um do you think in my view I think it would the pressure will increase to for places to be more neutral in the sense of >> h having having more more partners but

how do you see it?

>> Well I think certainly in in the case of the uh most Asian countries for example I mean there's no question you know my book has China one which you mentioned tries to explain why the US China

contest will definitely accelerate >> over the next 10 to 20 years. This is

normal because the world's number one power will never give up its position gracefully. It will always try to push

gracefully. It will always try to push down the number one emerging power. So

the fact that United States is pushing down China is logical predictable behavior of any number one power. So we

should not be surprised by it. But

what's interesting is that unlike in the case of the cold war when the United States was very successful in recruiting allies both in advanced European

countries and also among developing countries I mean in the cold war countries like Indonesia, Pakistan, Egypt and to some extent even

China were allies of the United States in the cold war. But this time around in the contest within United States and China almost all the major countries in

the world especially in the global south have said we're not taking sides we want to be friends with United States of America we want to be friends with China and I think that's the pattern that's

the pattern and certainly among the 11 ASEAN countries they have made their position very clear they want to be friends with United States and they want to be friends with China and they want

to take sides and that in general also reflects the global the position of the global south countries too.

>> There is this to me very um uh very um telling very very telling video about the foreign minister of India Mr. and

Jan Carr in a in a um interview about one and a half two years ago when the western interviewer really pressed her pressed him on uh when push comes to shove will you be with the west or with

China? Will you be with the west or will

China? Will you be with the west or will it be with China? It seems not to register in in the west that you can have friendship or not not defined

relationships with several solidates. Do

you also observe that?

>> Yes. Yes, certainly. And India will emerge as a strong independent pole in a multi-olar world. You know, I already

multi-olar world. You know, I already gave you the example of how India's economy is growing very rapidly compared to the British economy.

Uh and uh in the case of India, it's already the fifth largest economy in the world and very soon within four to five years, it will become the third largest

economy in the world. And so uh the clearly 10 years from now you know you'll be United States and China will be the number one number two positions and India will be the number three

position and and so in there's no reason for India to align itself with either the United States or with China because it's big enough strong enough to be an

independent third pole and frankly the rest of the world will be happy to see India as an independent third pole.

Because if the independent death poll doesn't take sides, it provides political cover for other countries also not to take sides in this US China contest.

Very concrete question, but do you think it is about time that we start reforming a very old part of international law called the law of neutrality in order to

adapt it to to the this modern um version of being multi-aligned?

Well, I think the the I don't think that they will be necessarily neutral, you know, they will be in in my

view the word non-align is still very uh much more accurate because on some issues clearly countries will work closely with United States for example

you know because United States is still a leading country in many areas and the world will still have to work with the United States and in other areas they'll work closely with China.

>> So, so they're not necessarily being neutral. They're being non-aligned and

neutral. They're being non-aligned and willing to work with everybody. The

interesting thing is non-alignment was never codified in international law, at least not not in any way similar to the way neutrality was codified. Do you

think the UN should work on on on non-aligned principles and norms in order to make them more useful? Well, I

think what what's more important is for the states to show their positions in their behavior, >> right? And and behavior is much more

>> right? And and behavior is much more important as an indication. So, for

example, you know, the the the European states for example, right? uh they could have also chosen uh to be an independent

pole and in the geopolitical contest between United States and China they could have chosen to be friends with United States and be friends with China

right and in that will that will be a a sensible thing for Europe to do because in many ways in the long run uh the biggest challenge for Europe is not

going to come from Russia Russian tanks are not going to invade Germany or France anymore. In fact, the biggest

France anymore. In fact, the biggest challenge to Europe is going to come from the uh demographic explosion in Africa, right? And you know to in the

Africa, right? And you know to in the year 1950, Europe's population was double that of Africa's. Today, Africa's

population is 2 and a half times bigger than Europe's. By 2100, Africa's

than Europe's. By 2100, Africa's population could be 10 times bigger than Europe. So Europe Europe has got a very

Europe. So Europe Europe has got a very important vested interest in the economic development of Africa. because

and and so every dollar invested in Africa is a gift to Europe because it creates jobs for Africans to stay in Africa.

>> So when when China in China is now the biggest investor in Africa. So when

China invests in Africa, Europe should send China a thank you note and say thank you for investing in Africa because you are creating jobs in Africa.

But instead of thanking China for investing in Africa, the Europeans have shown their geopolitical incompetence by slapping China, criticizing China for

investing in Africa. So this is a classic case of shooting yourself in your own foot when you criticize China.

So I find when I listen to the European leaders like Elizabeth Vander Lion uh Kaya Kalas or Anna Linda back the

former foreign minister of Germany I find that they they they don't step back and do a a very rational pragmatic

long-term strategic calculation of what are Europe's interests in the long run and what should Europe do to protect itself in the long run. So I'm

actually in some ways the best friend that Europe has cuz I'm trying to tell the Europeans look at your own interests and your own interests dictate that you

should not necessarily take the side of the United States against China because your interest geopolitics is a combination of two words geography and

politics and because the geography of Europe is different from the geography of United States it makes sense for Europe to say, "Okay, when it comes

to our geography, we need to work with China to create jobs in in Africa, right, and not join the United States in blocking Chinese investments

uh in Africa." And I and and in some ways, you know, uh Donald Trump should be seen as a gift to Europe because Donald Trump is saying, "My mission is

not to make Europe great again. My

mission is MAGA to make America great again." And so Europe should say, okay,

again." And so Europe should say, okay, if your mission is to make America great again, our mission is to make Europe great again. And therefore Europe

great again. And therefore Europe Europeans should become more pragmatic in the way that they uh handle their geopolitical issues. But the, as Henrik

geopolitical issues. But the, as Henrik Kissinger told me in his last one-on-one conversation, the quality of mind of European leaders

has gone down a lot, and they're not able to engage in long-term strategic thinking in the way that previous uh generations of leaders could do so.

Well, the United States was also very successful in in uh building these transatlantic ties and actually fostering a lot of European leaders who who view more value in continuing the

transatlantic ties and strengthening the US than strengthening their own their own domestic capacities which is which is a tragedy. But let's put that aside.

Do you um do you think that this will come back into balance over over um long or short or um do you foresee especially

for Europe more um more turmoil ahead?

You know there was a famous British statesman Lord Palmyon I think his name was who said that countries don't have permanent friends they don't have

permanent enemies they only have permanent interests now in the cold war there was a conver it wasn't a values

that brought United States and European Union together there was a convergence of interests both felt equally threatened by the Soviet Union and they

say, "Okay, if you have a common enemy, you cooperate, right? The Soviet Union was right there at the border of Europe.

In fact, the Soviet tanks were very close to Germany. So, it made sense for Germany to form a close alliance with

the United States of America. Now, China

is 12,000 kil there's a the gap between Brussels and Beijing is what 12,000 kilometers or more. China is not a threat to Europe. So you know so in that

in that case if you want to look after your own interests as as by the way Donald Trump is actually to be fair to him looking after American interests

very well right he's taking care of American interests so I think so so therefore Europe should also learn

to take care uh of its own uh interests and decide where its interests converge and where its interests diverge because

in the long run. Geopolitical alliances

are not based on values.

They are based on interests as L Palmer said and the European Union needs to do a complete strategic reboot and figure out where its interests lie because

without doing the strategic reboot you know the European Union is Europeans are making mistakes. For example, there

making mistakes. For example, there Susan Gleser, New Yorker writer. She

wrote recently that the current European policy is to is one of practicing strategic selfabasement.

>> Now that's her words strategic selfabasement. Now strategic

selfabasement. Now strategic selfabasement means cowtowing.

Now you never get the respect of anyone when you cowtow. So the European Union should Europeans should therefore work out their own independent foreign policy

and not rely just only on you know uh relying on others to save their interests.

>> Your words ambassador in the ears of the Europeans or the European Union at least um I have to be very mindful of your time and I thank you very much for um speaking to us. people who want to

follow um you is there a place where you regularly publish your um your analysis?

>> Well, I mean I I I use all I have a website www.mubani.net

website www.mubani.net but I also have Twitter uh Facebook uh LinkedIn uh and Substack.

>> Okay. Um I will put I have I have I have all they can uh they can turn to any one of them. I will put the links to all of

of them. I will put the links to all of them into the description of this video below. Ambassador Mubani, thank you very

below. Ambassador Mubani, thank you very much for your time today.

>> Thank you. Thank you very much. Thanks a

lot.