Unpopular Ideas That Became Billion-Dollar Businesses
By Y Combinator
Summary
## Key takeaways - **AI verticals are crowded; seek contrarian bets.**: The AI gold rush is over, making it harder to find unique ideas. Founders now need a distinct insight and a contrarian bet to stand out from increased competition. (01:45, 02:35) - **Non-obvious ideas feel dangerous but are valuable.**: Non-obvious ideas can seem scary, risking years of effort with no outcome. However, these are often the areas with less competition and significant potential. (03:44, 04:47) - **Laws lag technology; leverage the gray areas.**: Laws written before major tech shifts, like the smartphone or crypto, may not reflect current reality. Founders can find value by navigating these outdated or unclear legal landscapes. (09:53, 15:25) - **Flock Safety succeeded by selling to local governments.**: Despite VCs' aversion to hardware and small markets, Flock Safety found a massive opportunity selling safety cameras to neighborhood groups and city governments, proving that focusing on customer needs can overcome conventional investment wisdom. (26:44, 30:01) - **Sci-fi founders tackle 'impossible' ideas.**: Founders pursuing extremely difficult, 'sci-fi' ideas like AGI or reusable rockets often face skepticism and negative press. Their success hinges on sticking to their vision despite widespread doubt. (33:50, 36:25)
Topics Covered
- Competition is for losers; find your secret.
- Non-obvious ideas feel dangerous and scary.
- Laws lag behind innovation; challenge outdated rules.
- Contrarian bets are signals, not risks.
- Flock Safety: A $50M TAM idea became a $7.5B company.
Full Transcript
If you only want to work on things that
are hot, you're going to find yourself
working on derivative ideas that end up
being obvious, that end up having 5, 10
100 competitors. It's great for that
number one, number two, but guess what?
Like number three through number 98 of
all the people in that market, their
startups are going to die. Nine out of
10 people might tell you you're stupid
or crazy, but then one out of 10 people
might be exactly the person who believes
what you believe. run out and try to
find things that humans really
desperately want and need and then
you'll figure out the rest.
Welcome back to another episode of the
light cone. As Peter Teal says
competition is for losers. And as we
look at all the AI startups we're
working with, increasingly AI
competition is back. So how do you
actually deal with it? You know, well, I
think if we go back to 01 again, uh what
we would say is we're looking for how do
you think from first principles, how do
you actually deal with that competition
by being contrarian and right? Har, how
do you think about it? Yeah, something
I've been thinking about recently is um
probably just over a year ago, we talked
about how we were finding it um easier
than ever to fund companies that were
looking for a startup idea and that they
could pivot and find an idea. And it
felt like the two causes of that were
one there was just so much green field
like AI was new. Um there were so many
verticals to go after that hadn't been
picked over yet. And the models
themselves were changing like there was
such a there was a step function
increase in new models every few months
that just caused the idea space to
expand. So you could both there was
green field and you could always count
on a ch big change coming that would
shake things up um and create more
ideas. And I think clearly we've seen
the benefit of that like there are so
many vertical AI agent companies that
are doing tremendously well. But I kind
of feel like the vibe is shifting a
little bit now where when I'm talking to
founders doing office hours trying to
help them find ideas, it's not as easy
as hey like go figure out like a a
vertical where there's like a workflow
to automate like insurance or banking
because there's multiple startups in
each of these verticals now. Um and
there actually hasn't been like a model
that's shaken things up um for a while
now. And so I think it's becoming more
important to think about what's your
actual like unique insight that is going
to enable you to find a good idea and
what's like the contrarian bet you're
going to make um so that you can
actually stand out from all of the
competition.
>> So, how, do, you, actually, discover, a, secret
if you will, you know, something that
you know and believe that nobody else
believes yet?
>> Maybe, we, could, do, some, case, studies., So
maybe like why don't we talk about some
of the companies we've seen um that made
a contrarian bet when they were coming
up with their idea initially and like
maybe that will shake out some things
people can learn from. I think a helpful
comparison to the previous technology
shifts that we've had in in the world.
Like if you look at the history of when
we invented the internet, when we
invented uh the smartphone, each time
there's a, you know, roughly two-year
window where it was really easy. There's
there's essentially like a like a modern
day gold rush, right? Where like the a
whole new class of startup ideas like
just opened up. Everybody rushed in
launched all the obvious ideas and then
you know roughly two years after that
the obvious ideas begin to have been
picked over and you have to like look
deeper for a secret.
>> I, mean, I, think, it's, deeper, than, merely
like is it obvious or non-obvious.
Non-obvious sounds like in your body
might feel like you know neutral but
actually non-obvious feels dangerous and
scary like I could devote my life to
this waste 10 years on this and have no
outcome. And you know, I guess the way
that manifests, I think, is that um
there's just like ways of thinking that
are out there that we pick up in media
or in like sort of the conversations we
have with the people around us that um
we don't examine. So, you know, I was
doing office hours recently with uh
someone in the marketing space and they
came to me and said, you know what, like
nobody
has ever made a company large enough
doing like just what we were doing. The
weird thing was you we have AI now. Like
this is sort of the perfect moment where
no one's doing it. That means there's no
competition.
In fact, everyone else who has been in
the space uh you know prior to the AI
revolution has failed. So there just so
many dead bodies stacked up around this
idea. You how do you know that you're
not the right person to go and actually
blow this wide open? Especially because
there is still this giant new
capability. You know, we have age of
intelligence. The rocks can talk, they
can think, and they can actually do the
work of real human beings. You know, you
might be one of the only people who has
the guts to go into that space and
actually apply this. And his numbers are
going up. The customers are sort of
pulling it out of him already. Um
sometimes I'll talk to people about his
startup and people say, "Oh, I need that
tomorrow." So, you know, this is like
the perfect example of, you know
sometimes the market will be giving you
indications of product market fit, but
then you'll be using these mental models
from, you know, are people on X talking
about it or is Techrunch talking about
it or, you know, what will my friends
say at a party? They'll say like, oh
you're working on a tarpit idea. So, it
sort of interacts with this idea that
like competition is back and competition
is bad. It's that like the obvious
things uh you know you're just going to
pile up 10 20 like you know some of
these spaces seem like they're like five
or six or maybe a dozen or like two
dozen different startups all of which
have a real shot at it and then now's
sort of the moment to again focus on the
secret again. Yeah, Jared, to your
point, the like new tech platforms
create this like two-year window. And
so, we were talking about this earlier
like both mobile, like iPhone launches
Android comes soon after it. Um, in the
immediate like year or two before that
like there were a lot of like sort of
obvious ideas to go after like photos
Instagram sort of grew out of that era.
But like the actual big winners turned
out to be companies like Uber, Door
Dash, and Instacart.
>> Those, were, so, nonobvious., It's, like
folks who weren't around then don't
remember how nonobvious that was. Like
when the iPhone came out, there was like
a million articles, a million like
social media posts about like what kind
of companies you could build with the
iPhone. And like I don't think a single
person thought that like Uber would be
the consequence. I think the one in this
context is really interesting to talk
about actually might be Door Dash
because um sort of essentially what
we're saying is right now competition is
back. There is more competition to find
a good idea AI idea than ever. Door Dash
entered a very crowded space. Like food
delivery, food delivery in general had
been around for a while. Mobile was
probably like um a catalyst for even
more food delivery apps. So by the time
Door Dash launched, you already had
Postmates. Um iterations of it. I was
just talking and Seamless were huge
companies.
>> There's, actually, a, YC, company,, Order
Ahead, that Gary and I worked with that
was actually doing quite well at the
time. Um wasn't actually delivery. It
was um let you pick food up from the
restaurant which at the time actually
pick up.
>> It, seemed, like, a, bigger, market, maybe
than food delivery at the time.
>> They, were, farther, ahead, like, they, had
way more locations for instance.
>> Yeah.
>> I, mean, interestingly, like, it, I, think, it
happened even before that with uh it was
uh Lyft before and they were called
Zimride before and then funny enough YC
had a company called Ridejoy
>> that, was, exactly, a, competitor, against
Zimride
>> and, they, were, like, neck, and, neck.
>> Neck, and, neck., Yeah., And, um, Zimride
decided to try to do uh peer-to-peer
local uh rides. You know, Zimride and uh
Ride Joy were sort of both picking off
people from Craigslist. And the idea
there was like, oh, I'm driving to LA
this weekend. You know, this platform
would match you with other people and
help you get, you know, a ride to Tahoe
from SF or LA. Uh and then suddenly
Zimride realized well wait a second like
what if we actually did this at a much
smaller scale because we have smart
everyone you know 70 80% of people out
there started having smartphones. So
instead of having this like long
drownout email back and forth to like
meet at this time so we could get a ride
and then you know I'll pay up for gas
money. It became something that could be
used every single day uh for short hall
rides. And that was like sort of the
first moment that people thought, well
maybe you could have a lot of people
more or less like a a mobile workforce
um entirely driven by the phone. And
then I think that's that happened like
sort of contemporaneously to Uber with
their black cars. But the funny thing
was, and maybe this rhymes with uh the
lot often the office hours that we have
to do all the time. It's like I remember
meeting with the Ridejoy guys. I was
like, "Hey, this Zimrite thing seems
like it's working pretty well. We're
seeing um a lot of other companies that
you know I think we had uh just met a
poor Vamea at Instacart and he was doing
it for grocery delivery. Basically the
market was sort of pulling it out of all
of these startups and that was exactly
the moment where um interesting
interestingly I think those founders
said we're worried about uh the laws. It
seems illegal and we don't want to do
anything illegal.
>> And, they, weren't, wrong., I, remember
talking to the Lyft founders um the week
before they launched Lyft and they were
extremely worried that they would go to
jail and they decided to like roll the
dice and launch this thing anyway. I
think a big reason why other people
didn't launch Lyft and Uber before was
that it's like it was basically illegal
to do that and they were worried that
they would go to jail.
>> What's, funny, now, is, uh, it, does, seem, like
the world will sort of change the laws
as it were if it turns out that um the
end user, the end consumer wins by that
much.
>> Totally., I, mean,, a, lot, of, great, startup
ideas are sort of in this gray area of
like the law is not totally clear. It's
a little bit murky whether it's legal or
illegal. Even open AI is like that
right? I mean, they they crawled the
entire web without permission. You could
argue that that's fair use or you could
argue it's like massive copyright theft.
I guess all of these sort of buttress
this idea that like non-obvious is not
merely like, you know, purely
intellectually, you know, not clear that
this is going to work. It actually is a
little bit more subtle than that. It's
like, oh, I feel like that's might be a
little dangerous. Like there might be
something that, you know, I don't feel
comfortable doing. Um, and then really
really great founders sort of sense that
as actually uh signal.
>> Coinbase, was, like, this, as, well., Were, the
Coinbase folks like I mean that's always
operated in a gray area of legality.
>> Coinbase, to, me, feels, a, little, bit, less, I
don't feel like crypto was well
understood enough for it to be clearly
legal. actually they they actually
couldn't take that approach because they
actually needed to get a banking partner
um in order to even be like have the
service launched, right?
>> I, would, say, that, uh, Brian, started, off
recognizing that a lot of the use cases
maybe way at the beginning part you had
um cipher punks like people who were
like radically into like libertarianism
and this idea that you should not have
centralized banking. Uh but they took it
to an extreme where they wanted totally
anonymous identities. I mean it was more
you know Bitcoin really very early on
was a lot more Silk Road than what it is
today. So I actually think that Brian
Armstrong early was like the exact
opposite of
>> you, I, mean, he, was, contrarian, in, another
way. Like if you hung out with a lot of
people who were really really into
Bitcoin uh in, you know, 2010, 2011
2012, the majority of people you ran
across were cipher punks who said, "F
the state, uh, you know, f the laws and
we're going to, you know, have sort of
this radical freedom through Bitcoin."
>> And, there's, Brian, Armstrong, like, doing
deals with banking companies and working
with regulators.
>> Yeah., That's, what, his, contrarian, bet
was. it was that it's worth doing all of
this like extra work at a for a time
where it wasn't clear the market even
wanted it. Like it was very clear the
cyber punks and like Silk Road all
wanted like crypto and anonymous
payments. It wasn't clear that regular
people would. And so why it didn't seem
like a valuable thing at the time to go
and talk to a bank and do a partnership
and go through all the like KYC and AML
laws because like you'd only do that if
you thought that regular people would
want to trade crypto at some point.
>> And, those, things, actually, make, your
product worse, right? like like forcing
people to go through KYC like greatly
increases the friction
>> and, beyond, that, they're, like, they're, the
exact opposite of what the current
market what like the current market
could not have been more enraged about
like Brian and Coinbase's approach to
crypto at the time.
>> Yeah., I, mean,, you're, just, going, to, run
across people who say like it'll never
work. But when markets are brand new and
nent like, you know, often when you're
that early, the thing that passes as
you know, obvious is uh clearly wrong
actually. So that might might have been
like a very profound version of that.
before anyone cancels us for telling
saying that uh you know founders might
get something out of doing illegal
things like I actually don't think that
people should by default go out and try
to do illegal things like I think the
through line is not that you should do
illegal things or you know it's that you
should think about from first principles
what are the things that markets and
people need
>> totally
>> and, then, I, think, basically, ina, in, the
case of you know Uberx and uh it became
very clear within like sort of the first
few months of that uh coming out
especially in San Francisco where
literally we have some of the worst taxi
cab like sort of infrastructure and
really difficult transit. I mean
basically like that came out of
necessity. And then the quality of life
inside San Francisco went from here to
here the second that you could actually
just freely move around very easily
without the uncertainty of like call a
taxi cab and they would just literally
not show up
>> not, show, up, like, half, the, time., I, know.
>> And, it's, like, how, do, you, actually, like
live in a city and get around like you
know that I I think that you know these
services literally made San Francisco
10x more livable in a lot of ways. So
you know I I think it's like don't just
run out and do illegal things like
that's actually clearly net bad like
it's more what are things that uh people
users want and then thinking from first
principles also does actually involve
thinking about well what are the
downsides right um and how do we
mitigate those things
>> I, think, I, think, the, through, line, is, that
the laws were dumb and didn't make sense
and if you thought about it from first
principles you'd realize that these laws
were actually holding these particular
laws were actually holding back society
rather than helping it because they
ridden in an era before the smartphone
when like illegal taxi services were
actually kind of a scourge of society
because you'd have like random people
driving around like claiming to be a
taxi but then they'd like kidnap people
and like there was no accountability and
like tracking. But now that everyone is
in like a smartphone based system, there
actually is accountability and tracking
and Uber is was like is actually able to
operate it safely and the taxi medallion
system that like ruled the country just
didn't make any sense anymore in a
smartphone era.
>> Yeah,, I, think, that's, the, key, point., The
key point is, yeah, don't go out and do
things that the law explicitly says you
cannot do. But finding laws that were
written in a time before some big tech
shift that changes everything and just
don't reflect reality can be really
valuable. I mean, again, going back to
crypto, crypto is a prime example of
this. Like you have lots of securities
laws that were really well-intentioned
and designed to like protect consumers
from scams and um and buying things they
didn't understand. And so like a big
part of the SEC rule is like you have to
break things up into like brokers and
intermediaries and clearing houses, but
a lot of the rules in the crypto world
just don't make sense like um and so
they almost have to be like rewritten
why there's a lot of legislation going
through now. But I think that's if you
can find things where like the laws
don't really cover the world as it
exists today and you sort of brave
enough to see what happens if you try
that can be
>> that's, our, ground., The, reality, is, like
uh actually like that's the role of
government like this is why we have a
legislature. You know one of the things
we're trying to fight for right now is
for instance open banking. So, you know
I think all of us sitting here and most
of the people watching, I think, would
take things like Plaid for granted.
Like, of course, I want Plaid. Like, you
know, that's my data. That's my money.
And so, you know, what do you mean like
a giant bank has the right to charge
exorbitant fees uh to get access to that
data. But, you know, that's being
adjudicated right now. like the Trump
administration actually has to make some
decisions and is an open comment period
right now around uh whether or not you
know a giant bank can prevent tiny
startups like you know YC startups or
the startups that people are going to
start here. Can they charge a crazy
amount or use their terms of service to
actually block access to this stuff? And
so my hope is that you know a
functioning government will sort of
think about all these things. you know
what the banks might be saying in order
to get regulatory capture right now is
that oh it's not safe we're thinking
about the safety of the consumer but
when you really dig into it it's like
they just don't want people to be able
to switch off of their banks you know
they they don't want the money to go to
a lower fee place like this is their
moat right regulatory capture absolutely
is one and then the thing that is cool
about um a modern democracy I think
people would debate whether we're we
have that on the one hand. On the other
hand, like you know, I think on in
individual cases, that might be, you
know, the wrong thing happens here and
there. But in aggregate, like over a
long enough time period, if you can get
your product and your service into the
hands of enough people, you know, we do
still live in a dem democratic society
where, you know, representatives will
vote and will like change the laws and
that's very much good news. So first
principles plus democracy equals open
markets and freedom which like what
that's what we're fighting for but it
does happen.
>> I, guess, when, different, question, is, what
are some of the current contrarian
things that founders should be looking
at right now since what we're saying is
there's more competition now as opposed
to a year ago. There hasn't been to your
point harsh a big model improvement or
one preview has been all about a year or
so. That was the big stepping function
for model capabilities and there hasn't
been anything thus far. I mean there's
been incremental things with 03 and all
that but nothing like that that makes it
harder for startups to find new new
ideas. What are the new things that are
also in this gray area that founders can
look into
>> potentially, one, framework, for, finding
them at least is not like a prescription
for exactly what is to look at what are
like emerging playbooks for ways to
build startups that might be wrong or it
might be time to flip them. Like to give
you a concrete example like Door Dash I
think was a prime example of this
because when Door Dash started there was
actually another YC company Spoon Rocket
um doing food delivery where they would
actually like cook the food um in these
kitchens that were spread around the
city.
>> Yeah., They, operated, ghost, kitchens, all
over
>> SF., Uh, Sprig, was, another, one, right, and
actually in that moment those companies
I think came out of this meme of like a
full stack startup. There was this
period where it was seen as just
building software is not ambitious
enough and like the big opportunities
are, going to, be, in, going, full, stack, like
don't just build a food delivery app
actually have the kitchen and make the
food and that's where all the
opportunities were and I think that was
becoming more established as like the
playbook around 2014ish era and so in a
way that like Door Dash is contrarian
bet was actually say we're just going to
do deliver we're just actually going to
have like an app and a marketplace and
we're not trying to be a full stack
startup which was obviously the right
bet in hindsight and So what might be
some of the the sort of consensus
playbooks for building AI companies that
have emerged over the last year that
like might be wrong might be worth
taking the other side of?
>> I, guess, when, I, can, think, of, that, has
come up there's the compound startup
notion that Parker Conrad from Ripling
really made it popular. I think it
hasn't been as adopted. I think people
try but it's actually in practice really
hard. I think it's one of those that for
certain AI startups, it is actually
possible to execute on it and not have
to wait two years to ship the product
which is what I think Ribbling roughly
took for the first version.
>> Maybe, an, example, of, a, startup, is, uh
Campfire. This is a YC company that's
building basically a AI native version
for CFOs to compete versus Netswuite.
And it turns out that Netswuite is a
pretty big piece of software. It's very
hard to compete. can't just do like um
kind, of a, point, solution, in, order, to, be
adopted. So one thing to reevaluate
instead of doing the standard SAS
approach of let's just build the best
point solution that's actually built the
whole thing which is not something
typically done as an advice that we give
for early stage startup because you just
end up not shipping for a long time and
not getting customer feedback. maybe in
cases like this is the right answer and
campfire they've been closing a lot of
now big accounts and it's taking a bit
of time to get there but it seems to be
working.
>> Yeah,, they're, killing, netswuite, which, is
wild like how can a startup that you
know has a dozen people kill Netswuite.
This is like hard to believe on the one
hand on the other hand like this is the
timeline we're on. So the other thing
that's cool about campfire that we're
seeing in a lot of enterprise startups
is uh you know with codegen increasingly
you can actually bring the switching
cost closer to zero and that was
actually the you that's how you can how
you know how can campfire switch someone
off of Netswuite on a time frame that
matters like even with the idea of a
forward deployed engineer like before
codegen like it'd be like six weeks of
like writing custom like scripts to like
convert one data a schema to another and
you know often very specific like if if
it's dynamic schema on one end that's a
lot of custom work that's painstaking
and if you get something wrong like the
end result doesn't actually work and
then you have a churned customer. So
that's a a very like that's some good
news for people especially doing very
complex enterprise projects with like
conversion like we're seeing more and
more examples of enterprise sales that
just wouldn't work or it would be you
know 6 months to actually get someone to
say yes and sign and then another 6
months to get a data uh a data
conversion or data integration done. If
the demos are very good, like that six
months could be like two weeks. And then
if you can codegen and get very very
good at a suite of tools to convert like
data from the schema to yours, you could
have like time to value in like less
than a month when it used to take a
year. So that's like very good news for
startups out there that are doing
enterprise.
>> I, think, for, deployed, engineers,, we've
spoken about a lot, but like that might
be one that's worth wondering if that's
going to shift back as well. Like if you
think like Palunteer obviously was like
invented it was an incredibly contrarian
thing at the time that they did it. This
sort of like blur the line between
consulting and and software. It's now
certainly become the adopted playbook.
We talked about it with Bob Mcgru a few
episodes ago. Um
>> and, he, was, actually, fairly, skeptical, of
it himself even though he's one of the
people who invented it which is
interesting., remind, us, how, say so, when
we see
>> well, he, was, saying, essentially, that, like
he thinks it's like being greatly
overused and he would like thinks it
should be used very sparingly and very
unusual situations as opposed to being
like a default playbook which is
interesting.
>> It, has, certainly, become, the, default
playbook. It is actually working
incredibly well. I think we're seeing
like the companies are growing at like
aggressive growth rates because they're
employing the forward deployed engineer
model. But yeah, if if I had to if I had
to guess one thing that if I were trying
to just purely pick what's like the
contra like what's the one thing to be
contrarian about like judged by just
what's become the most entrenched
default playbook it might be the forward
deployed engineer approach
>> actually, yeah, you, have, a, good, company
that is flipping it on its head this gig
ML
>> yeah, I, think, gigger, is, taking, the
concept of the forward deployed engineer
which is everything you said that you
you want to basically transform sort of
like your customer schema and business
logic into sort of your schema and and
logic.
>> It's, like, consulting, work, basically,
>> right?, But, instead, of, a, human, forward
deployed engineer they they have they're
just using codegen to do it actually
they they've, built, their, own, AI, forward
deployed engineer and a big part of the
reason they can win deals faster than
their competitors is that the human
deployed engineer still takes weeks to
get the thing going which is like really
fast compared to like historic
enterprise consulting arrangements but
like the AI FD can do it in minutes and
so I think that's like the kind of the
flipping that plate like it's not really
an FD at all really it's actually just
product um just like your customer
inputting in specs and you like deliver
them a product instantly. But I think
that could be an example of a contrarian
bet that will pay off really well.
>> So, I'm, hearing, a, request, for, startup
which is uh AI for AI FD
>> maybe
>> meta.
It's just abstractions all the way down.
>> Flock, safety, could, be, a, really
interesting one to talk about.
>> So, the, story, of, flock, safety, I, remember
I was still at initialized. We were
looking at companies at demo day and
then funny enough that morning um all
the cars on my street in Noi Valley were
broken into and you know it was a a
professional crew. They came in and uh
broke into every car on our street. They
took all the bags out the back of the
car and then you know my house at the
time had like a little al cove that was
dark and so they brought all the bags
into our driveway and then rummaged
through them all and I you know had to
cancel my meetings that morning to talk
to the police and you know I had a Nest
camera that was like captured the whole
thing and I was like you can't do
anything like it was a pro crew like
they were three people it was like with
mechanical like military style precision
and the police basically said sorry you
know unless you have a license plate.
uh we can't do anything and so uh that
made the first principles investment
very easy for me because uh you know
Garrett Langley came in he's founder
from Atlanta he had a successful exit
previously uh but this was hardware so
they were selling a uh camera about this
basically had a Raspberry Pi with a
camera in it and then a solar array and
uh you know computer vision had you know
with imageet had been around long enough
that you could run it at the edge in the
device and solar had gotten progressed
just to a point where it was just good
enough that you could run these like you
know sort of in perpetuity. And so that
was his pitch like we're going to go to
neighborhood groups like neighborhood
associations and you know they already
had started I think in Piedmont and in
Atlanta in the Atlanta larger greater
Atlanta area. There's a lot of things
that um from a VC VC standpoint like VCs
didn't like hardware. Uh they don't like
things that you know sell to potentially
small markets. I mean I think in the
investment memo I put together like I
just called that out directly. It was
like, well, if you multiply out the
number of neighborhood groups and the
ACV for those ne neighborhood groups
uh, there's no way that I mean, maybe
the max was like 50 or $60 million a
year or something
>> like, that, the, actual, TAM, of, this, thing
was like only $50 million a year.
>> I, mean,, speaking, as, a, VC,, like, maybe, the
best exhortation I can give to the
people listening is like do not use that
like you know, it's merely uh an
indicator. It's like useful to know, but
like neither investors nor founders
should use that as like cross it off the
list right?
>> And, he, was, being, run, out, of, Atlanta,
Georgia. Right.
>> Right., So, it's, like, three, things, that
make it made it like basically
unfundable. But, you know, I mean
that's why like I think I was hanging
out with Brian Singerman at Founders
Fund for a little bit and you know, one
of the things we always talk about is
the more rules you have about investing
uh, the more ways you can basically talk
yourself out of making a lot of money in
ventures. So, I don't know. I mean, to
the extent that that is useful for
founders, like I think that that's true.
Like, you know, we did a whole episode
last episode about how, you know, you
should be aware of the seven powers and
moes, but it would be the stupidest
thing in the world to use that as your
only criteria for whether or not you
should work on a company. And likewise
you know, I think increasingly even in
our office hours, we find ourselves
giving that advice with uh founders.
It's you know it is much better to go
from first principles from uh what does
society need what do users need you know
what ideas look could only happen now
and then the rest like you can kind of
figure out right like the same calculus
you could do for Coinbase very easily
like the you know total market for
Bitcoin you know was not trillions of
dollars it was like probably on the
order of tens to hundreds of millions of
dollars at the moment that Coinbase
really started thinking and the
coalesing around that. Some of this is
the good news. It's that like the people
who actually change everything are the
founders actually. And so if you only
want to work on things that are hot
you're going to find yourself working on
derivative ideas that end up being
obvious that end up having 5, 10, 100
competitors. And then, you know, it's
great for that number one, number two
but guess what? like number three
through number 98 of all the people in
that market are going to die. Like their
startups are going to die. So yeah, this
is just a little bit of a profound
version of that story. I mean, flock
safety today solves 10% of all reported
crime in the United States. It's
>> crazy., I, feel, like, that's, a
generalizable lesson of flock safety
which is um at any time if you have some
startup idea and you go to talk to a
bunch of VCs about it, a lot of them
will give you feedback. And I could
imagine that if Garrett had gone and
talked to a bunch of VCs, they would
have told him like, "Oh, this isn't VC
fundable, selling to local governments
hardware, like you should do B2B SAS."
It's cool that he didn't like he ended
up in a market where like he had very
little competition perhaps because
everybody else like thought it was too
weird.
>> I, think, if, you're, just, really, razor
focused on your customer and the actual
need, like it just became so obvious. I
mean, I literally got a flock safety in
front of my house and even though it did
not end up catching um that crack band
of thieves, I felt way safe when I had
it in front of my house. And um I think
that that's what happened with their
communities, you know, especially like I
remember doing office hours with Garrett
and he's like, "This is insane. We
actually caught um you know, someone who
had kidnapped a kid."
>> Wow.
>> Right., And, so, when, you, look, at, the
actual human impact, I mean, going back
to what we were saying earlier, it's
like don't run out and try to do illegal
things. Run out and try to find things
that humans really desperately want and
need and then you'll figure out the
rest. Honestly, like if you're just
really really focused on people's
problems and how severe those problems
are, like you know, you'll figure out
the rest. It's like you'll figure out
the business model, you'll figure out
the distribution. And like you know
Flux Safety later had to figure out that
these crimes that they were solving
they would be on the evening news. And
all it took was, you know, a media team
that would reach out to the evening news
anchor and say, "Hey, by the way, this
was uh solved by Flock Safety. Here's
some video that you can run that's
B-roll of like, you know, this this
crime was solved by this, you know, new
technology." And then it started
spreading virally. like one town would
have a crime solved often like sometimes
like pretty intense like violent crime
and then literally the neighbor the the
city next door like the police chief
would say like what is this I need it
right now and so you can't learn that
from like reading blog posts or like
going on X and like sort of or even just
like asking Chachi PT about it like you
actually just have to try a bunch of
stuff and then everyone's story is very
very different um but you I Garrett and
the flock team are really unique in that
respect. It's like just like first
principles in terms of what you're
building, first principles in how you
get more customers, first principles in
terms of what your business model should
be. I think that that's just a much
better way to think about it. And then
the the difference is that you can't sit
in your chair sit sitting in front of a
computer and uh divine these things per
se. You actually have to get out of the
house. You actually have to talk to
customers. You know, that's where like I
think the goal setting at YC helps a
lot, right? It wasn't like from uh a VC
meeting. I think Garrett sat and figured
out that he needed to change his go to
market. You know, I think that he
probably looked at basically how do I
work backwards from my growth goal? And
then he realized that uh selling in
neighborhood groups wasn't going to be
good enough. So one way or another, they
really needed to get over to sell to
city government, which sounded
impossible, but they could definitely do
it. And that's that's been like one of
the big engines of their growth.
>> And, just, fast, forward,, what's, their
current valuation?
>> Yeah,, it's, worth, $7.5, billion, now., And
um they're making way way more than $60
million a year. Um and it actually
required a number of uh business model
pivots. But you know the core of what
they built like you know what they built
on demo day and what they show showed me
was exactly I mean pretty similar like
the like the tech itself is the same. Uh
what they did have to do is figure out
that they couldn't just sell to
neighborhood groups. They still sell to
neighborhood groups but what really
cracked it for them was selling it to um
you know police departments and actually
officially being used for it. Diana, do
you have another example of places to
look for contrarian bats?
>> I, think, one, category, is, sort, of, the
sci-fi founder is really going after
ideas that
most people are scared to build because
they're just so freaking hard. And
sometimes science and physics are laws
may need to be rediscovered to be
possible. One example that really comes
to mind is uh open AI. It wasn't clear
whether AI was going to be a thing when
it got when Sam started out of YC and it
took many years. It seemed to be mostly
a tinkering project for researchers.
They were publishing papers. They were
doing kind of side quests. I mean they
had the uh Rubik's cube solver. They
were solving Dota. And it was unclear
how all these would come together to
what OpenAI became today. And also
something that people forget is that
when open AI launched it got mostly
negative press. There were some people
like a small like group of like techno
optimist people who thought it was
really cool but by and large most people
especially the AI researcher
establishment in academia and in other
companies mostly just like was extremely
negative on the idea that a bunch of
like
>> 20, and, 30, something, Yeah., could, create
AGI. They're like, you know, we're the
experts in this. We've been doing this
for like 50 years. If there was a way to
do it, we would have already done it.
These kids don't know anything. They
haven't published any papers yet.
There's no peer review here. Yeah. Not
publishing papers was a really big
critique. And you know, especially
around the scaling laws like I think
there was this aspect of they're
spending how many millions of dollars on
GPUs on projects that uh will not cause
more papers in the world to arise.
papers were like the thing that uh they
were trying to you know sort of you know
paperclipip optimize for which was
totally the wrong thing like the thing
that uh really great builders optimized
for is like outcomes for customers and
users is the same thing when Elon
started SpaceX. He wasn't the first
billionaire to start a spaceflight
company. And I think he was like the
fifth billionaire to like try to start a
spaceflight company. And so all the
press was like, "Oh, look, another
billionaire like there to squander his
fortune on like rockets."
>> And, the, whole, idea, of, building, reusable
rockets was blasphemous. Right.
>> Yeah.
>> I, think, he, went, and, talked, to, um, rocket
scientists and they were like this is
not possible.
>> Yeah.
>> And, after, many, years, and, many, launches
that didn't work out.
>> Yeah., And, and, then, every, time, a, rocket
blew up like there would be another huge
wave of negative press. So like for both
of those companies like it required the
founders to like stick to their guns in
the face of most people telling them
that they were like stupid or crazy for
like a long time.
>> I, mean, nine, out, of, 10, people, might, tell
you you're stupid or crazy but then one
out of 10 people might be exactly the
person who believes what you believe and
then you're contrarian and you become
right because it's necessary to actually
attract and be a magnet in the world for
all the people who agree with you. Uh I
hope you all take a moment to really
think about how do you know what is real
and correct in the world and re-examine
all the sources of these things and if
it's coming from users coming from your
own personal experience or the
experience that of people who you
directly talk to uh great like that's
probably pretty good verifiable stuff
that you should use as a substrate of
your reality. Uh but if you're doom
scrolling on X, you're you know sort of
listening to famous people like you know
to be frank even including us you know
we're all N equals 1. The only people
that matter are the people who you care
about who have certain problems and your
ability to solve it and your ability to
attract all the other people who want to
solve those problems too. So with that
we'll see you next time.
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