What are we scaling?

I'm confused why some people have super short timelines yet at the same time are bullish on scaling up reinforcement learning a top LLMs. If we're actually close to a humanlike learner, then this

whole approach of training on verifiable outcomes is doomed.

Now, currently the labs are trying to bake in a bunch of skills into these models through mid-training. There's an

entire supply chain of companies that are building RL environments which teach the model how to navigate a web browser or use Excel to build financial models.

Now either these models will soon learn on the job in a self-directed way which will make all this freebaking pointless or they won't which means that AGI is not imminent. Humans don't have to go

not imminent. Humans don't have to go through the special training phase where they need to rehearse every single piece of software that they might ever need to use on the job. Baron Millig made an interesting point about this in a recent blog post he wrote. He writes, quote,

"When we see frontier models improving at various benchmarks, we should think not just about the increased scale and the clever ML research ideas, but the billions of dollars that are paid to

PhDs, MDs, and other experts to write questions and provide example answers and reasoning targeting these precise capabilities. You can see this tension

capabilities. You can see this tension most vividly in robotics. In some

fundamental sense, robotics is an algorithms problem, not a hardware or a data problem. With very little training,

data problem. With very little training, a human can learn how to tell or operate current hardware to do useful work. So

if you actually had a humanlike learner, robotics would be in large part a solved problem. But the fact that we don't have

problem. But the fact that we don't have such a learner makes it necessary to go out into a thousand different homes and practice a million times on how to pick up dishes or fold laundry. Now, one

counter argument I've heard from the people who think we're going to have a takeoff within the next 5 years is that we have to do all this cludgy RL in service of building a superhuman AI

researcher. And then the million copies

researcher. And then the million copies of this automated Ilia can go figure out how to solve robust and efficient learning from experience. This just

gives me the vibes of that old joke, we're losing money on every sale, but we'll make it up in volume. Somehow,

this automated researcher is going to figure out the algorithm for AGI, which is a problem that humans have been banging their head against for the better half of a century, while not having the basic learning capabilities

that children have. I find it super implausible. Besides, even if that's

implausible. Besides, even if that's what you believe, it doesn't describe how the labs are approaching reinforcement learning from verifiable reward. You don't need to pre-bake in a

reward. You don't need to pre-bake in a consultant skill at crafting PowerPoint slides in order to automate Ilia. So

clearly, the lab's actions hint at a worldview where these models will continue to fare poorly at generalization and on the job learning, thus making it necessary to build in the skills that we hope will be economically

useful beforehand into these models.

Another counter argument you can make is that even if the model could learn these skills on the job, it is just so much more efficient to build in these skills once during trading rather than again

for each user and each company. And

look, it makes a ton of sense to just bake influency with common tools like browsers and terminals. And indeed, one of the key advantages that AGIS will have is this greater capacity to share knowledge across copies. But people are

really underrating how much company and context specific skills are required to do most jobs. And there just isn't currently a robust efficient way for AIS

to pick up these skills.

I was recently at a dinner with a AI researcher and a biologist. And it

turned out the biologist had long timelines. And so we were asking about

timelines. And so we were asking about why she had these long timelines. And

then she said, you know, one part of work recently in the lab has involved looking at slides and deciding if the dot in that slide is actually a macroofage or just looks like a macroofage. And the AI researcher, as

macroofage. And the AI researcher, as you might anticipate, responded, look, image classification is a textbook deep learning problem. This is death center

learning problem. This is death center in the kind of thing that we could train these models to do. And I thought this is a very interesting exchange because it illustrated a key crux between me and the people who expect transformative

economic impact within the next few years. Human workers are valuable

years. Human workers are valuable precisely because we don't need to build in the schley training bloops for every single small part of their job. It's not

net productive to build a custom training pipeline to identify what macrofages look like given the specific way that this lab prepares slides and then another training loop for the next

lab specific microtask and so on. What

you actually need is an AI that can learn from semantic feedback or from self-directed experience and then generalize the way a human does. Every

day you have to do a 100 things that require judgment, situational awareness, and skills and context that are learned on the job. These tasks differ not just across different people but even from

one day to the next for the same person.

It is not possible to automate even a single job by just baking in a predefined set of skills let alone all the jobs. In fact, I think people are

the jobs. In fact, I think people are really underestimating how big a deal actual AI will be because they are just imagining more of this current regime.

They're not thinking about billions of humanlike intelligences on a server which can copy and merge all the learnings. And to be clear, I expect

learnings. And to be clear, I expect this, which is to say I expect actual brain-like intelligences within the next decade or two, which is pretty [ __ ] crazy.

Sometimes people will say that the reason that AIs are more widely deployed right now across firms and already providing lots of value outside of coding is that technology takes a long time to diffuse. And I think this is

cope. I think people are using this code

cope. I think people are using this code to gloss over the fact that these models just lack the capabilities that are necessary for broad economic value. If

these models actually were like humans on a server, they'd diffuse incredibly quickly. In fact, they'd be so much

quickly. In fact, they'd be so much easier to integrate and onboard than a normal human employee is. They could

read your entire Slack and drive within minutes. And they could immediately

minutes. And they could immediately distill all the skills that your other AI employees have. Plus, the hiring market for humans is very much like a lemons market where it's hard to tell

who the good people are beforehand. And

then obviously hiring somebody who turns out to be bad is very costly. This is

just not a dynamic that you would have to face or worry about if you're just spinning up another instance of a vetted hi model. So for these reasons, I expect

hi model. So for these reasons, I expect it's going to be much easier to diffuse AI labor into firms than it is to hire a person. And companies hire people all

person. And companies hire people all the time. If the capabilities were

the time. If the capabilities were actually at AGI level, people would be willing to spend trillions of dollars a year buying tokens that these models produce. Knowledge workers across the

produce. Knowledge workers across the world cumulatively earn tens of trillions of dollars a year in wages.

And the reason that labs are orders of magnitude off this figure right now is that the models are nowhere near as capable as human knowledge workers.

Now you might be like look how can the standard have suddenly become labs have to earn tens of trillions of dollars of revenue a year right like until recently people were saying can these models reason do these models have common sense

are they just doing pattern recognition and obviously AI bulls are right to criticize AI bears for repeatedly moving these goalpost and this is very often

fair it's easy to underestimate the progress that AI has made over the last decade but some amount of goalpost shifting is actually justified if If you showed me Gemini 3 in 2020, I would have been certain that it could automate half

of knowledge work. And so we keep solving what we thought were the sufficient bottlenecks to AGI. We have

models that have general understanding.

They have few shot learning. They have

reasoning. And yet we still don't have AGI. So what is a rational response to

AGI. So what is a rational response to observing this? I think it's totally

observing this? I think it's totally reasonable to look at this and say, "Oh, actually there's much more to intelligence and labor than I previously realized." And while we're really close

realized." And while we're really close and in many ways have surpassed what I would have previously defined as AGI in the past, the fact that model companies

are not making the trillions of dollars in revenue that would be implied by AGI clearly reveals that my previous definition of AGI was too narrow. And I

expect this to keep happening into the future. I expect that by 2030, the labs

future. I expect that by 2030, the labs will have made significant progress on my hobby horse of continual learning and the models will be earning hundreds of billions of dollars in revenue a year, but they won't have automated all

knowledge work. And I'll be like, look,

knowledge work. And I'll be like, look, we made a lot of progress, but we haven't hit AGI yet. We also need these other capabilities. We need X, Y, and Z

other capabilities. We need X, Y, and Z capabilities in these models. Models

keep getting more impressive at the rate that the short timelines people predict, but more useful at the rate that the long timelines people predict.

It's worth asking what are we scaling with pre-trading? We had this extremely

with pre-trading? We had this extremely clean and general trend in improvement in loss across multiples orders of magnitude in compute. Albeit this was on a power law which is as weak as

exponential growth is strong. But people

are trying to launder the prestige that three training scaling has, which is almost as predictable as a physical law of the universe to justify bullish predictions about reinforcement learning

from verifiable reward for which we have no welfare publicly known trend. And

when intrepid researchers do try to piece together the implications from scarce public data points, they get pretty bearish results. For example,

Toby Board has a great post where he cleverly connects the dots between the different O series benchmarks and this suggested to him that quote we need something like a millionx scale up in

total RL compute to give a boost similar to a single GPT level. End quote.

So people have spent a lot of time talking about the possibility of a software in the singularity where AI models will write the code that generates a smarter successor system or

a software plus hardware singularity where AIs also improve their successor's computing hardware. However, all these

computing hardware. However, all these scenarios neglect what I think will be the main driver of further improvements at top AGI continual learning. Again,

think about how humans become more capable than anything. It's mostly from experience in the relevant domain. Over

conversation, Baron Miller made this interesting suggestion that the future might look like continual learning agents who are all going out and they're doing different jobs and they're generating value and then they're

bringing back all their learnings to the hive mind model which does some kind of bash distillation on all of these agents. The agents themselves could be

agents. The agents themselves could be quite specialized containing what Karpathi called the cognitive core plus knowledge and skills relevant to the job they're being deployed to do. Solving

continual learning won't be a singular one and done achievement. Instead, it

will feel like solving in context learning. Now, GBT3 already demonstrated

learning. Now, GBT3 already demonstrated in context learning could be very powerful in 2020. It's uh in context learning capabilities were so remarkable. The title of the GPT3 paper

remarkable. The title of the GPT3 paper was language models are a few shot learners. But of course, we didn't solve

learners. But of course, we didn't solve in context learning when GPD3 came out.

And indeed, there's still plenty of progress that still has to be made from comprehension to context length. I

expect a similar progression with continual learning. Labs will probably

continual learning. Labs will probably release something next year which they call continual learning and which will in fact count as progress towards continual learning. But human level on

continual learning. But human level on the job learning may take another 5 to 10 years to iron out. This is why I don't expect some kind of runaway gains from the first model that cracks

continual learning that's getting more and more widely deployed and capable. If

you had fully solved continual learning drop out of nowhere, then sure, it might be game set match as SAT put it on the podcast when I asked him about this body disability. But that's probably not

disability. But that's probably not what's going to happen. Instead, some

lab is going to figure out how to get some initial traction on this problem and then playing around with this feature will make it clear how it was implemented and then other labs will soon replicate the breakthrough and

improve it slightly. Besides, I just have some prior that the competition will stay pretty fierce between all these model companies. And this is informed by the observation that all these previous supposed flywheels,

whether that's user engagement on chat or synthetic data or whatever, have done very little to diminish the greater and greater competition between model companies. Every month or so, the big

companies. Every month or so, the big three model companies will rotate around the podium, and the other competitors are not that far behind. There seems to be some force, and this is potentially talent poaching. It's potentially the

talent poaching. It's potentially the rumor mill SF or just normal reverse engineering which has so far neutralized any runaway advantage that a single lab might have had. This was an narration of

an essay that I originally released on my blog at dwarcash.com. I'm going be publishing a lot more essays. I found

it's actually quite helpful in ironing out my thoughts before interviews. If

you want to stay up to date with those, you can subscribe atash.com.

Otherwise, I'll see you for the next podcast. Cheers.

podcast. Cheers.