Why I Don't Buy the Simulation Hypothesis (Nor Materialism)
By Curt Jaimungal
Summary
## Key takeaways - **Simulation Hypothesis: Glitches Aren't Proof**: The argument that glitches like the Mandela effect or UAPs provide evidence for a simulated reality contains a Bayesian inference error. These phenomena being consistent with a simulation does not mean they should be expected, nor does it prove the hypothesis. [16:46], [18:51] - **Simulation Hypothesis: Quantum Mechanics Misused**: Appealing to quantum mechanics, specifically the observer effect, as evidence for simulation is problematic. This argument relies on a debated collapse model and assumes conscious observers cause collapse, ignoring other interpretations. [19:26], [19:55] - **Simulation Hypothesis: Bostrom's Argument Flawed**: Nick Bostrom's statistical argument for the simulation hypothesis relies on the principle of indifference, which is dubious. This principle incorrectly assigns equal probability to outcomes without a proper measure, leading to potentially flawed conclusions. [23:19], [25:58] - **Physicalism: Theories Don't Progress Linearly**: The idea that scientific theories progressively improve and converge on truth is not guaranteed. Just as 'rock, paper, scissors' or Efron's Dice show non-linear relationships, one theory isn't necessarily better than a previous one without a clear topology and understanding of the 'true' theory. [32:22], [33:38] - **Physicalism: The 'I' Problem**: A core tenet of physicalism is that physical facts determine all other facts, including mental phenomena. However, physical facts describe all observers equally and cannot inherently describe which observer is 'I', posing a challenge to the theory. [36:30], [37:03] - **Physicalism: Defining 'Physical' is Tricky**: Physicalism's definition relies on a clear distinction between the physical and the mental. However, if 'physical' is defined as 'not mental,' and 'mental' is ill-defined, then the definition of physicalism inherits this vagueness. [37:09], [38:15]
Topics Covered
- Simulation theory faces a 'computer' problem.
- The simulation hypothesis relies on dubious statistical reasoning.
- Physicalism struggles to define 'physical' without the 'mental'.
- Scientific theories don't necessarily 'get better' over time.
- Physicalism's definition is a moving target.
Full Transcript
All right. Thank you all for coming out tonight. If you don't know me, I'm Michael
Barnwell. I'm director of the University Honors Program. And tonight is our annual
Peggy and John Day University Honors Lecture Series event. This event started in 2017 with
a gift from the Day family. Peggy, or Margaret, she goes by Peggy, Margaret Peggy Ranft Day was
a 1977 graduate of Niagara University, and she was on the varsity tennis team. She was on the
volleyball team. She was a photo editor for the yearbook and the newspaper. And after she
left Niagara in 1977 with a degree in natural sciences, she went on to become a lawyer. She's
become a guardian ad litem for children in need. She's served on the board of Special Olympics of
Vermont. And she has been a Board of Trustee member at Niagara University for, I think,
2006 to 2015, so almost a nine-year stint as a member of the Board of Trustees.
She and her husband John have been great supporters of Niagara University establishing
scholarships, and as I said, in 2017 they established this lecture series. So a huge
thanks to Peggy and John and the Day family for establishing this. If we can give them a hand.
And because of their gift, I was able to bring in someone I'm super excited about. Curt Jaimungal
is a trained mathematical physicist from the University of Toronto. He dabbled in stand-up
comedy. This led to his filmmaking career where he's been a producer, a writer, and a director.
He has a 10,000-person Substack, and he's best known to me anyway for being the podcast host,
or being the host of the podcast Theories of Everything, which if you're like me,
I was looking for podcasts about theories of everything. I'm sure you are like that. And
years ago, I heard his podcast, and when I knew I could invite anybody this year, I reached out
and luckily he said yes, which he told me he usually does not accept these invitations.
But I think I know why he accepted this, because his previous podcast right before today, if you go
on his YouTube channel, which will be up, if you want his YouTube channel or his podcast channel,
his previous podcast was with David Deutsch. And if you don't know who David Deutsch is,
he's probably the most premier physicist in the world today. If you've heard of quantum computing,
he's credited with being the father or the inventor of quantum computing. And his very
next podcast to come out is with Roger Penrose, who was a Nobel laureate, is a Nobel laureate,
and was Stephen Hawking's dissertation advisor. So not a student of Stephen Hawking. Stephen Hawking
was a student of him. So in between probably the two most famous physicists alive today,
it only made sense for him to come to Niagara University to deliver the Day University Honors
Lecture Series. So I'm happy that he accepted the invitation. We're happy to have him here.
Now, as some of you know, I kind of want to convince you that we live in a simulation.
So when Curt asked me what we should talk about, what he should talk about, I'm like,
well, let's talk about simulation theory. Let's talk about materialism, panpsychism,
different theories of reality. So I do regret to inform you that he did tell me that we will only
be talking about materialism and simulation theory tonight. So all of you panpsychists out there,
and I know who you are, we will not be touching panpsychism or idealism per se. But anyway,
he's known for building up theories but also unfortunately for me, known for taking down
theories. And I think that's what he's going to do tonight to both physicalism,
which some of us like, or materialism, and unfortunately, for my sake, to simulation theory.
And if you're not clear what simulation theory is, basically,
I mean, I'm not in bad company. Some of the big thinkers believe we live in a simulation. The
idea is that maybe instead of this reality being real, we're actually in a big computer game. And
just like your characters in your Sims games or your Madden football games or your Fortnite games,
just like they bump into things and have to walk around things and they get hurt and
they act according to the laws of physics and everything in those games seem real to them,
there are some very strong arguments, which I think Curt will go over, that our whole existence
is really a big simulation. And so if you've taken me in my class, I've tried to encourage you to
think that the chances we live in one are higher than most. If you've seen the movie The Matrix,
The Matrix is kind of a simulation theory kind of idea. So anyway, that's what we're going to hear
about tonight. We're going to hear about whether we're in a simulation or whether we're just in a
plain old boring material world with stuff. And well, let's hope that's not true. So anyway,
with no further ado, I turn it over to Curt Jaimungal. Curt, thank you for joining us tonight.
Thank you. You all have a lovely campus. Now, I feel terrible because, Michael,
you asked me to come give this. You told me, you confided in me that you like the simulation
hypothesis as I was looking into it. So anytime someone says, “Do you believe so-and-so?” Who
cares about what so-and-so is, you want to know what are the arguments for so-and-so,
and do those arguments, do they land? I was going through some of the arguments for the
simulation hypothesis, and I'm going to explain why I don't buy into them,
and same with physicalism, which some people know as materialism.
Firstly, what line here do you see as longer? Now, forget about these little arrows on the
side. Just speaking about the lines. Option one is the top line. Option two is the bottom line is
clearly larger. Option three is, oh, they're the same size. Who says the top line is larger? Raise
your hand. Okay. Who says they see the bottom line is larger? Raise your hand. Who says they're the
same size? Raise your hand. Okay. So all you people who said that they're the same size,
you are lying to me because I tricked you. So I made this such that the top one is slightly
larger because I knew, so I watch Judge Judy every night. And Judge Judy said,
she says this all the time. She says, “It's going to be so much easier if
you're honest with me.” So this is going to be interactive. You've seen this before,
and you're pre-thinking, okay, I know this illusion. No, you saw the top one as larger.
So there are some mistakes that only intellectuals make. For instance, what just occurred. Also,
intellectuals like to say, “between you and I,” it's supposed to be me. They apply
Gödel's theorem indiscriminately. I have a video about that. They'll say this begs the question,
but they mean this raises the question. And another mistake intellectuals tend to make is
that they believe the Matrix was a documentary. This part is true. It happens to me all the time.
Okay, I speak to people on this podcast about their theories of everything,
their theories of reality. And roughly speaking, it comes down to monism, which means that there's
all just one single fundamental substance. What that substance is differs from thinker to thinker
or theorizer or philosopher to philosopher. So one route is to think all there is is just
matter. And that's called materialism. You may have heard that term. There's also materialism,
which means you're materialistic, which means you buy clothing and so forth. That's not what
this is referring to. This just means that all there is is this dead matter. This has been
rebranded to physicalism because fermions are what matter is, physically speaking,
in terms of physics, and there's also photons like bosons and so forth. So you have to rebrand
it to physicalism. So Kanye rebranded to Ye. It's not clear even here. Similarly,
is that an improvement? Is that indicative of a breakdown? So we're going to explore that.
The next route is idealism, which says that you front-load the mind. So
actually there's just one substance and all it is is somehow mental.
The world is made of consciousness. Who here is a materialist? Okay, who here is an idealist?
So I didn't know before I started this podcast, there's like an unspoken, there's a tension
between you two and there's like the, it's like the Bloods and the Crips. And then there's the
panpsychists who are these wide-eyed kids from the community center who's trying to say, “No,
everyone, you all believe in the same thing. It's all…” Okay, then there's dualism, which says, no,
there are two substances. And to most philosophers who are educated, they tend to think of that as a
synonym for, you're just an 18th-century imbecile, because we've moved on from dualism. Then there's
people who believe that there's a simulated reality. So reality is a computer simulation,
like how a video game imitates reality. When you believe in this, that's called the simulation
hypothesis. We are going to focus on two, physicalism and the simulation hypothesis.
So this is a video game and I'm going to try to, I'm noticing the audience is quite young.
So this is Taylor Swift, this yellow one. And then these are the other ones. These guys are Swifties,
and so that's what this is imitating, okay, poorly from the 1980s. This is,
for the millennials, just your boss, like your fantasies of what you want to do.
Then there is this, which is a recent video game of what you Americans think of when I say I came
from Toronto. You picture this. So, look, 1980s, 1991, 2025. This is the mythology that people who
believe in the simulation hypothesis want you to accept. Look, video games are increasing in
their fidelity, in their graphical content. It's not unreasonable to think in 10 years,
in 100, in 200 years' time, we're going to get to something that is indistinguishable from this
world. If that's the case, then do we know that we're in this world? Or perhaps we're already
in a simulation? There is also the other argument that, okay, sure, graphical quality has increased,
but bugs have also increased. If anyone here plays video games, this is from Starfield.
Hey, watch it! Careful! Are you alive, bud?
Welcome to the GalBank archives. May I see your credentials, please?
Now that last guy, when I was crossing the border, I think I saw someone that looked just so,
maybe that's not a glitch. So what is the simulation hypothesis? It's that our experience
is a computational process running in a substrate external to our universe in something analogous
to a sophisticated simulation. Experience has to do with conscious experience. Computational
process is something that a Turing machine can do. So a Turing machine is just something that
reads zeros and ones and then changes them. And it's quite remarkable that this screen here and
your cell phones, all of that just comes down to zero and one manipulations. Simulation means
to imitate the causal structure of reality. So what is this substrate referring to? Well,
who the heck knows? What does something analogous mean here? Who the heck knows?
And what is this causal structure being referred to? Who the heck knows?
So let's get to some quotations to build our intuition. “Our creator isn't especially spooky.
It's just some teenage hacker in the next universe up.” That comes from philosopher David Chalmers,
essentially saying that God is an incel. Which I think that's from Aquinas. That's actually a
quotation, Summa contra, book three, chapter eight. “If you assume any rate of improvement
at all, games will be indistinguishable from reality.” It's Elon Musk and Neil deGrasse Tyson,
of course. “I wish I could summon a strong argument against it, but I just can't find any.”
So let's help poor Neil out here, as Lord knows he could use some philosophical sophistication.
First, speaking of mathematical sophistication, does anyone know, is this true, that any rate
of improvement at all would have you tend to infinity? Something, if you keep adding a positive
number, does it always then result in positive infinity? Does anyone here know the answer?
No. No, okay. So, correct. Okay, this is from the channel called Math vs Science. If you add a half
plus a quarter plus an eighth plus a thirty-second plus a sixty-fourth and so forth, you think, well,
it's just going to constantly increase and why won't it get to infinity? This is a visual proof
that it doesn't. Now, mathematicians don't like visual proofs, but there's an algebraic proof as
well. But this gets your intuition going. Okay, so Elon is incorrect that any rate
of improvement at all would mean that you get to something that's indistinguishable.
Why believe in the simulation hypothesis? Well, some people say there are glitches. This world
is quite odd. Some people have experiences. There's such a thing as the Mandela effect,
maybe you've heard of it, where large swaths of people all believe the same false memory. NHI,
which is related to non-human intelligence, stands for non-human intelligence, related
to UAPs and UFOs. Some people say, if we were in a simulation, we would expect all of this
oddness that reality has. Some people say, look, in physics, we have quantum mechanics, which says
that a particle has no position until it collapses after you've measured it. So that reminds them of
rendering. Because in video games, you may not know this, but it's extremely expensive
to run these simulations. What they do in video games is they see where's the player looking,
because there's always a perspective, a camera, and then they render only that.
And what's behind you and on the sides and so forth, that's not rendered. And these sim babies,
these simulated babies, they imitate video games, and so you only render what people observe,
and that saves computational resources. These are the reasons to believe that we're in a simulation.
Nick Bostrom, a philosopher, has an argument, a statistical argument. This is the strongest, that
look, if our future civilizations have sim babies, create these little simulations, which have
consciousness in them, then the probability that we are in a simulation, given that we can observe
anything, is near 100%. I'll get into the reasons why, but it has to do with something called the
principle of indifference, which says that we're a typical member of this large group. Most of the
people in this group are simulators. If you count them, then we are most likely in a simulation. And
of course, you can have recursive simulations. So once you create a simulation and these people
here in this simulation are conscious, here base reality, whatever that is, creates SimBaby number
one, and then that one can create a hundred other sims, and that one can create a thousand other
simulations and so forth, until you get down to us, which I've just placed here as 99,123,157.
So what are the counter-arguments to what I've just laid out? Okay,
let's take this one. Glitches and NHI provide positive evidence. So we would expect to see
them if we were in a simulation. Now, is this the case? This is making an error in Bayesian
inference. So what this person is doing by making this statement is saying the probability that we
would see this evidence given the hypothesis that we're in a simulation is high. Therefore,
we're in a simulation. By that logic, if you were immortal, surely you would expect to be alive
right now. You are alive right now, therefore what? Are we to conclude that you are immortal?
So if there was an evil demon that possessed your cat and you would expect to see the behavior
that your cat knocks off fragile items off of a countertop. You see that behavior. Does that mean
your cat is satanic? So you get the idea. This is supposed to be flipped. You're not supposed
to look at what maximizes the evidence given the hypothesis, you're supposed to look at what is the
probability of this hypothesis given some piece of evidence. Okay, so that's using faulty logic.
It's also not clear to me that you should expect near-death experiences and these synchronicities
and these other glitches that the proponents of the simulation hypothesis say should exist
if we're in a simulation. So firstly, the fact that something is "consistent with"... so sure,
these Mandela effects, these synchronicities, these odd near-death experiences, and so forth,
are "consistent with" a simulation. That doesn't translate to "we should *expect*
to see them if there's a simulation." Secondly, there are reasons to expect the contrary. Well,
if graphical fidelity is increasing with time, then why aren't glitches
decreasing with time? Or if we want to go the other route, where I just showed Starfield,
why are the glitches of the sort where some group of people have inconsistent memories? Why aren't
they where this table just disappears or Michael starts floating and clips through the wall? Those
are the sorts of glitches I would expect to see. Okay, so I don't buy reason number one.
How about reason number two about observers rendering when measured
because of quantum weirdness? Now, anytime someone makes an appeal to quantum mechanics,
that should always raise your… Well, should be dubious. This is highly debated. Firstly,
this assumes a certain collapse model of quantum mechanics. And not only does it assume collapse,
it assumes that the measurer collapses or conscious observer collapses.
There are other interpretations of quantum mechanics where you have spontaneous collapses.
So you don't need a person to collapse something. Okay, so this is highly debated.
So next, what about these sim babies that they imitate video games and they only render what's
observed? Yes, okay, but video games render consistent histories. I don't know if anyone
here has played No Man's Sky. Has anyone played No Man's Sky? Great. There's a whole universe
worth of planets in No Man's Sky, and it's quote-unquote procedurally generated. However,
if two players visit the same planet, it is the same planet. So there are consistent histories.
This contradicts the Mandela effects. Also, if the whole point was that you're rendering
only what a player observes, look, in video games, you don't render what's behind you,
what's at the side of you. But in collapse models of physics, once something has been observed,
it collapses forever, everywhere for everyone. So that contradicts the previous collapse model.
What about the saving on computational resources? Okay, our reality uses quantum
mechanics. It doesn't use classical Turing machines. Like I mentioned,
there's these zeros and ones and you rewrite them. That's called classical computation.
But our rules of reality are quantum. So why are we not rendering classically?
Classical computations are far, far more efficient than a quantum computation. Also,
why is the universe so large? Why is so much engendered? If we're trying to save on resources,
why is there such creation? Does our parent universe have an Engender and Diversity Office?
Okay, what about this computer? So what does computer mean? The simulation hypothesis keeps
making appeals to "we're in a computer simulation." We've already said, well,
they say, sorry, this is the proponent of the simulation hypothesis. "Well,
let's imagine it's a classical computer." No, this reality doesn't run by classical rules. Okay,
so they say, "well, let's just imagine it's a quantum computer." Okay, but we also know
quantum mechanics is not the final theory because there's gravity, so it should be something that
combines the two called quantum gravity. So is it a quantum gravitic computer? Then there are
various types of quantum gravity. So is it a loop quantum gravity computer? Is it a string
computer? Let's suppose it's a string theory computer. Is it string theory or is it going
to be super string theory because that's their supersymmetry in the world, supposedly? And then,
okay, but what about beyond that? Then if we find out that it's supercalifragilisticexpialidocious
string theory computer? Like what are… Is this philosophy? Is this what counts as philosophy
now? Like, let's just imagine… Let me give you… Let's imagine a black hole was your
second cousin and Neptune was your face cream. "Oh, you're so insightful, Curt. Like, oh, man!"
So this sounds like… To me, it's a tautology. It's just saying this simulation will work if we
assume there's a machine that can make it work. Okay, so I'm not terribly convinced of that.
How about Bostrom's statistical argument? I'm sorry, Michael. If civilizations have these
sim babies, then the probability that we're in a simulation, given the fact that we are alive,
that we can observe something, is near 100%. Okay, before we get into that, this argument relies on
something called the principle of indifference. It turns out most people believe in the principle of
indifference. But let me give you some reasons to not. So if you have a six-sided die, what are the
chances that you roll a six? Who has an idea about that? What are the chances that you roll a six on
a six-sided die? Raise your hand. One out of six. One out of six. Great. Okay, and of course we're
assuming that I'm not tricking you, even though I displayed a history of tricking you all, and
we're assuming the die is not weighted. Okay, but now what if I say, okay, there are two options.
Either the die is going to land on something that is five or greater than five or it's going
to land on something that's four or less than four. Okay, so there are two options here. Now,
what is the chance that it lands on a six? Do you still say one in six? Okay, so most people think
intuitively, yes. However, I've just partitioned it such that there are two options. So we think,
we say this. So you know Bob Lazar. You've heard of Bob Lazar. I may take this out of the final.
How many people here know who Bob Lazar is? Okay, Bob Lazar said, oh, what was it? He said something
about, oh, gosh, it was something about plutonium or something. He made some claim that "this
so-and-so exists." And then someone said, "oh, it was later proved to be true!" And then he said,
"well, there was a 50-50 chance because it was either true or not true." Okay, that's not,
just because there's two options, it doesn't mean that it's a 50-50 chance. Here I just gave you two
options. It's either five or greater than five, or four and less than four. Those are two sets.
Okay. Van Fraassen has a great rebuttal. It's quite subtle. So he says, look,
let's imagine there's a factory. This factory makes cubes. The cubes are anywhere from zero
feet in length to one foot in length, in the side length. You go in here with your arm and
you pick out a cube. What are the chances that the cube that you have has a side length of 0.5
or less? Intuitively we think, well, that's 50 percent. But then you could say, well,
what are the chances that the area of one of the sides is 0.5 feet squared or less? And you can do
this and you get inconsistent results. Okay, so the principle of indifference is quite dubious.
Now this argument that Bostrom gives relies on the principle of indifference. Okay,
here I didn't explain why. So the argument is, look, every single person, let's just imagine
every single person here except one is base reality. Let's imagine Michael's base reality.
And he created his wife and you created three other people and so forth. So everyone else
is a simulation. Then you think, what are the chances that… I already told you Michael's base,
so that unfortunately spoils this. One person here, you don't know it's Michael,
one person here is base reality and created the rest of you. And you think, what are the chances
that I am in the real reality versus created? You think, well, it's however many people there are
here, let's say there's 50 people, so then there's one person's real, so it's 50 out of 51 and most
likely simulated. That's how the principle of indifference goes. But again, it's dubious.
Okay, then there are also some reasons to say that we're not a typical member, so the principle of
indifference relies on something that you're a typical member of. I said here there's base
reality, there's sim 1, sim 2, and so forth, and you get down to us. But then I placed a little
arrow here, and I put a dot dot dot. We are so far not capable of making simulations that are
conscious. So this arrow with a dot dot dot should not be there. Thus, we're actually at the end of
this tale, which makes us not typical, which means the principle of indifference that Bostrom relies
on doesn't work. Note, many of these points get particularly technical and I didn't want
to fatten my slides as I personally prefer slim slides. I also don't want to be accused of slide
shaming. So the full notes as well as full slides are on my Substack, curtjaimungal.com
Also, my undergrad, I studied theoretical physics. I'm not great with my hands. I don't know how to
build. Like, this is astounding. I could never do any of this. I had an engineering friend in
a neighboring university, and I asked him a question that I thought was reasonable.
He said it was foolish, but it had to do with putting something into a car. I said,
“Why isn't this feature in a car?” I don't recall what it was. And then he said, “Curt,
every time you put something new into a product, you've created another point of
failure.” And I thought, oh, okay, I thought that wouldn't have occurred to me. You can
manipulate equations all you like and you don't think about points of failure. However,
if we look at this now, this base reality creates sim, creates sim 2, and so on and so forth.
If there's a failure at any one of these, say sim 5, let's say sim 5 crashes, everyone else crashes,
that cascades downward. Turns out Keith Harris and others have calculated this and they've
redone even with Bostrom's own assumptions of the principle of indifference and so forth and got
this down from the 99% to something like 10%. So I remain unconvinced of the simulation hypothesis.
What about physicalism? So what is physicalism? Everything supervenes on the physical. Let's just,
so in philosophy, and you always have to use the word supervenes at some point, and people think,
"oh, you're so clever, like, you know what you're talking about." So let's just forget about that,
because it turns out supervenience-physicalism, has a form of dualism that people who are
physicalists don't enjoy. It entails the possibility of a dualism. And remember,
those are 18th-century, obtuse, uneducated people, at least that's what they think. So attempt number
two is you completely fix all the facts, the physical facts, including mental phenomena, and
then all the physical facts fix the rest of the facts. And you know this is legitimate, and it's
getting serious because they bust out the Greek symbols and that always increases your credibility
as you look like a mathematician. And of course we'll have more attempts. So you would be right
to be like this guy and wonder, when you say the word physical, what is it precisely that you mean?
So let's get some quotes to get our intuitions going. Francis Crick said,
“You're nothing but a pack of neurons.” “The brain secretes thought like the liver secretes
bile.” And the next one's from comedian Emo Philips. “I used to think the brain
was the most fascinating part of the body. Then I realized, well, look who's telling me that.”
Why believe in physicalism? Well, our scientific theories are improving. Physics,
physical theories, physics theories are getting better and better. Physics theories
are converging. They're converging on the truth. The true theory. And physics gives the unique
description of reality. Point number two, this is just a restatement of the definition of physical,
but a complete physical description fixes all the rest of the facts. So
we have consciousness and so forth, but that's all fixed by the physical facts. There's nothing
more to reality than just these physical facts. Physical facts are, by the way, third-person,
so they're not expressed from your point of view, and they determine everything else. Of course,
we can put an asterisk around determine because there's randomness. That doesn't make a difference
here. Quote-unquote physical is fortunately clearly defined. So there's a sharp distinction
between the physical and mental. Many people will just collapse the mental to the physical,
of course. Physics is the study of the physical, and physics is getting at the fundamental theory.
Now, almost every counter to a physicalist or a materialist, but like I mentioned, there's some
rebranding that's going on, tends to come from an idealist perspective or consciousness-based
perspective. So the physicalist doesn't buy into that because they already don't believe in the
axioms of the other person. They tend to speak past one another. I will show you some arguments
then, if you're a physicalist, that are not from this consciousness perspective. So our scientific
theories are improving. Let's tackle that. Physicists, okay, look, if you're a physicist,
you need to be rigorous. When we say a theory is progressively getting better, what do we mean?
Let's imagine we have theory A, which has been superseded by theory B, and theory C is better
than theory B. Can we conclude that theory C is better than theory A? Who says yes? Raise
your hand. Be honest. Okay, who says no? We cannot conclude this. Raise your hand. Okay,
why can't we conclude it? Probably forgot about things in theory A once you're into theory D, and
so you forgot about things theory A was helping once you created theory C. Okay, let's imagine
perfect memory. There's nothing about forgetting here. Does anyone have a reason why Theory C would
not be better than Theory A? Okay, well, there's something called Efron's Dice, and in the interest
of time, I'll place a link on screen and in the description. There are die (so single of "dice")
so die A, die B, die C, that where die A can beat die B, die B can beat die C, but die C loses to
die A. In fact, you see this with "soo sum see" or "rock, paper, scissors." Rock beats scissors,
paper beats rock, but then scissors beats paper. So I may be a minority, but I think our theories
are far more complex than a die and certainly far more complex than rock, paper, scissors. So you
cannot conclude this. This is a certain property called transitivity, in case you're wondering.
What about physical theories are converging on the true theory? Again, physicists, we're trying to be
rigorous here. What does convergence mean? Unless there's a mathematician or some mathematicians and
physicists in the audience, you may not know what this word, the following word means, but
there's something called a topology that you need in order to establish that something's converging.
And it's not clear what is this topology on the space of all theories. Furthermore,
you would need to know the true theory to begin with to know that you're converging toward it.
Okay, what about physics gives the unique description of reality? Okay,
but in physics, there are plenty of dualities. So dual descriptions, two theories that look
completely different, but they're the same physics. There's also something else that's
rarer called trialities, but you can even imagine a quadrality and so forth. It's not clear there
is a "the" unique description. Now, the counter to what I just said would be, "well, look, Curt,
in the final theory, the dualities would disappear and we'd just get this single little guy here,
this little theory, perfect theory." Even without dualities, this problem of the unique description
of reality ontologically persists. So you've all heard of the "Is and Ought Gap." It's not clear
how to go from how the state of the universe is to what we should do. I think there's something
called, well, I'm coining it, called "The Formula To is Gap." You can't look at a formula and then
infer what is the reality this formula is describing. One of the reasons is that there
are multiple metaphysics that are compatible with any given formula or set of formulae.
Okay, now here's another one that I haven't heard before. So the physicalist believes that this
is something like our brain. There are these neurons and there are these directed graphs,
so these edges that have arrows and there's some information processing going on and
I've simplified it. But this is our brain. Presumably, if you lose a single neuron,
you're still conscious. And that happens all the time. You lose neurons all the time. So
presumably, this little subset here is conscious. Presumably, if you lose a different neuron,
you would still be conscious. Presumably, that would also be conscious. That would
also be conscious. But these are all within your brain already. So are you saying that there are
these nested hierarchies of infinite overlapping consciousnesses in you currently? It's quite odd.
So, I don't believe the first point. The second point, the complete physical
description fixes all facts. Third-person physical facts determine everything. Okay,
not exactly. Christian List in 2023 articulated something called the first indexical argument
against physicalism. It's quite thorny and in the interest of time, I will put these slides
in the description and I'll also be editing this and placing it online so you can see
and you can go through this if you like. I'm not going to read this, but to summarize it,
it just says that physical facts describe all observers equally. However, it cannot ever
describe which one "I" am. Now, you're supposed to read that, not as Curt, but you. When you say "I",
which of these physical facts are you picking out and how? Okay, so I don't buy number two.
What about physics is fortunately clearly defined? Okay, so this one, this argument here is not a
sharp philosophical argument, but it will work on the naive, the person who's naive in their
philosophical training, which happens to be most hard-nosed physicists. So this will work on most
physicists. It's not a slant at them because most philosophers are naive physicists, and so forth,
we can't all be experts at everything. That's a simulation resource constraint. So let's see
here. Some people say the mental, if you ask the hard-nosed skeptic, what is consciousness? They'll
be like, “Don't talk to me about consciousness. That's ill-defined, unfalsifiable mysticism,
it's incoherent, it's meaningless, it's nonsense.” Yet at the same time, one of the definitions of
physicalism is physical is what is not mental. Or notice earlier when we knocked on this,
we said this is physical because it's dead matter, which means you would have to contrast it with the
alive matter. And if by alive you mean something that has these experiences, these feelings, but
you're not able to define that, then you've used in your definition of physics something which is
ill-defined. So your original definition of physics inherits all of this ill-definedness.
What about physics as the study of the physical? Well, most of you can probably
see this is a circular definition. Let's define physics in terms of the physical. And what about
the fundamental theory? Now this, there's a philosopher named Hempel from the 1960s who
articulated this objection. If we're saying that the physical is what current physics describes.
Firstly, there are many interpretations of quantum mechanics. We don't know what are
the quote-unquote beables, what is quantum mechanics referring to. We don't know that,
but let's assume we did. We still don't have the final theory now. We don't have the standard model
mixed with general relativity or particle physics mixed with gravity. We don't know how to solve the
measurement problem. There's dark matter, there's massive neutrinos, and so forth. So no one thinks,
almost no one thinks current physics is final. So when we're saying it's the physicals,
whatever physics describes, then are we saying it's the future ideal physics,
the completed physics? But then this actually just becomes undefined. What do you mean? Even worse,
"future physics" could conceivably include irreducible mental properties. It's conceivable,
and that's something that the physicalist wants to avoid.
So I happen to think definitions matter. Comedian Mitch Hedberg asked this. “Is a
hippopotamus a hippopotamus, or just a really cool apotamus?”
Those are two different things. Thus, I remain unconvinced of physicalism.
Now is there hope? This is a Catholic university, so Christ saves all. Does Christ save all
arguments? Saves all people? What about arguments? Eh, sort of. You can always save something
by addendums. So you can always add to your definition of what the simulation hypothesis is,
"well, what if we add this condition?" "What if we add this to physicalism?" "And what if we add this
nuance?" You use the word "nuance" when you're positively disposed to it. You say "fanciness"
when you're not. I started to go through this, and there was something like 60 other parts
that you have to buy if you want to buy into the simulation hypothesis and physicalism.
So comedian Colin Quinn said this. He said, we're constantly getting told or getting
bullied into buying what we don't want to buy. So you're with your friend. Your friend says,
“Hey, do you want some wings? You're going to eat some wings if I order wings?” You're like,
“No, I don't really eat wings.” “Yeah, but you'll have one or two, right?” “Yeah,
I'll have one or two.” “Okay, we'll give four dozen wings. We'll split the check.”
That's what's happening here. You thought all I'm going to order is this simple simulation
hypothesis, the simple physicalism. No, there's so much more that goes along with it.
So I agree with the greatest philosopher of our time about reality and simulations,
which imitate. The greatest philosopher of our time to conclude is of course Marshall
Mathers. I believe him when he says, “I'm Slim Shady, yes I'm the real shady, and all you other
Slim Shadies are just imitating.” Now I would add the extra bars. It could be y'all are sim
babies. Because ontology has been underdetermined lately. Perhaps the truth is physicalism. Maybe.
Thank you.
Would you have been as harsh against panpsychism and idealism if I had tried to push those?
Perhaps idealism. Panpsychism, I'm not as familiar with.
All right. Sorry, sorry, everyone. Panpsychism was never going to
happen. I know you wanted it. So we have some time for questions. David?
So are there any modern philosophies of dualism or is it all just old school?
There is at least one. William Hasker, I believe, is a dualist. Now, there are different forms of
dualism. Property dualism, which says that it is still one substance but they have irreducible
properties. So this one substance could have mental properties and physical properties. And you
can't derive the mental from the physical, they're somehow separate. That David Chalmers proposed a
form of property dualism. I don't know if he's a believer in it, but he proposed it. There are
some people who believe there could be one initial substance that through a form of emergence gives
rise to another substance, and this substance no longer reduces to the first because it's a form
of strong emergence. So we're all familiar with weak emergence where we see the murmurations of
birds and they make these beautiful patterns, and none of the birds are trying to follow this exact…
They're not even aware they're making these patterns. They're following some small local
rules, but somehow these small local rules, when applied with many, become this large pattern that
wasn't there from the small local rule exactly. That's called weak emergence because it was there
from the small local rule. It's just you have to apply it. But strong emergence says "No,
something new can genuinely emerge." Maybe that's where free will comes in or consciousness.
Yeah. Rough guess on the substrate?
Yeah, rough guess on your substrate. I think you're right that we still don't…
I'm a Star Trek fan, so we still don't know everything that humans 200, I mean,
200 years from now are going to wear spaceships. So what do you think the
substrate is? And like you also pointed out that when we actually mess with quantum stuff,
we don't know what we're actually doing or affecting. We could be affecting our own
simulation and trying to mess with supercomputers. So what do you think the substrate is made out of?
If we're not running on silicate and we're in the simulation, what is everything made out of?
So I'm undecided on that. And if I was decided,
I tend to not give out my opinion except privately. But I am undecided on it.
Another question? Yeah, Alex, Dr. Berland? Oh, any students? It's your chance to ask
more questions against the simulation to get at me. All right. Okay. Dr. Berman?
I mean, there are a couple of ways I could ask this. And I guess I now have to pick one. And the
one I'm going to pick just from the perspective of someone who studied theoretical physics,
do you see this debate going? Not necessarily in the sense of answering the question,
but are other interesting ideas coming out of it? Like, just as someone who studies
philosophy, I kind of look at these theories of reality and say, we're never going to know,
so I'm going to do social political philosophy because that's something
I can relate to. Or somewhat a place I can make an impact. But I'm naive when it comes
to things in physics. And I'm just wondering, as you explore this, does it open up ideas?
If we go back to one of these slides here, the one that I had to rush through,
I mentioned two other people. So I say, look, a complete physics would describe Curt, Emily,
Jacob, as examples of people's names, other people. But actually, Emily and Jacob, in my mind,
are referring to two physicists, Emily Adlam and Jacob Barandes. Jacob has the argument, they both
believe this. I spoke to them both on the same podcast. They, Jacob is a philosopher of physics
and said, but actually if you look at the ROI, just from the perspective of how much it takes
to fund a philosopher and how much you've gotten back out of it, quantum computing came from asking
philosophical questions. So that's David Deutsch. So quantum computing, which is the new rage,
decoherence theory came from David Bohm. The Bell tests, which you may have heard the Nobel Prize
was awarded for these Bell inequalities that talk about entanglement. That came from John Bell, who
was a philosopher of physics, asking philosophical questions. So yes. However, I will say that it's
not just philosophers who are untrained in physics. And you can think of this as quite
obvious. If you didn't know about… You could have theorized all you want about the four elements.
And you could have had a complete metaphysics around that and built it up. And it would have
been completely wrong as soon as Newtonian mechanics came out. And then you could have
thought, well, let me start theorizing about the substance of space and then the separate substance
of time. And then Einstein comes about and says, no, we're supposed to unify them and it's not
quite space and time and gravity doesn't work like you think. So to make a contribution to physics,
you or one would need to be trained in physics. And that just, that makes sense. No one is
expecting to make a contribution to a field that they're unfamiliar with. Or most people aren't.
I do. That's helpful.
So you had an initial list of the different philosophical categories
or schools. Where would you put Newton and Einstein? Newton is very different
to me. I can handle Newtonian physics. I can't handle Einsteinian physics.
Well, Einstein said, “I believe in the God of Spinoza.” He said that three or four times. I
actually looked up every single one of those references. I don't know if he believed in
the God of Spinoza. It sounds to me like he's just, like Einstein's not a fool. So he's not
just going to say something he doesn't believe. But the God of Spinoza is also something to be
revered and to be worshipped as well. It's just the God becomes synonymous with the universe.
But that's not the only property of God. And anytime Einstein was saying, “I believe in the
God of Spinoza,” it sounds to me, from reading the actual quotes, like Einstein is saying,
I believe the universe is synonymous with God. But there was more to just the physical universe
in Spinoza's eyes. Spinoza didn't think that the physical universe is all there is. That's just one
aspect of God. But anyhow, if Einstein was to be placed on that list, I imagine Einstein would be
a monist just from that perspective because he would say there's the one substance. I imagine
Newton would be a dualist. But I don't know. Newton came out just after Descartes. Most of
the dualism people think of when they think of dualism is Cartesian dualism. And then they have
to snicker under their breath like, "oh, that person didn't know what he's talking about."
But it brings me also to the similar point of
yours is about practicality. It seems like Newtonian physics is a heck of a
lot more practical in everyday life than Einsteinian physics.
Okay, so when I said theories don't get progressively, or it's not clear that
theories are getting progressively quote-unquote better, the counter-argument to what I just said
is it's obvious theories are getting better in physics because we're making more precise and
precise measurements. What are you talking about? Well, that's a different claim than
making a claim to ontology. So a theory can be useful. It could be used as a tool,
but then you're just looking at your theory instrumentally. I'm sure you've heard of
instrumentalism, which says that our scientific theories aren't actually speaking about reality
necessarily. They're silent on the metaphysics. We're using them as tools. So you could say that,
but at which point it's no longer a metaphysical position. It's an epistemological one.
I did, I was just, first of all, saying you're interested in dualism and physicalism. You
can take philosophy of mind next semester. Dr. Edward and I, he's a dualist. I'm a physicalist
and we debate. So you should take that. You're welcome also, Curt. To you, Curt, I guess, well,
this is really for Michael, I guess. I don't have a horse in the race, particularly with
the simulation hypothesis. But I doubt that you doubt the principle of indifference. If you do,
I want to gamble with you. You're saying, what I hear you saying is sometimes it's hard to put
a measure on the space so that you can apply the principle of indifference. That's different from
doubting the principle of indifference, right? And it seems like in the case that Bostrom's painting
where like, look, here's a bunch of work, here's a bunch of conscious experience. Most of them are
in a simulation, a tiny minority are not. Do you have any special reason to think you're in the
tiny minority? If not, a very banal principle of indifference says you're probably in a simulation.
Yeah, but I don't buy the principle of indifference. So give me a scenario.
Let's roll dice.
I think the honest answer is to unknown probability
distributions you should say, “I don't know.”
That's the principle of indifference.
No, the principle of indifference would assign a
probability distribution to it. A uniform probability distribution.
That's the way to say "I don't know it."
You could lose money on that though. You could look, I could gamble with
you and make you lose money with a weighted die. In the short term.
Yeah, but the principle of indifference, okay, great point. So the principle of
indifference is applied to cases where you only have one shot. It's like Eminem,
you only got one shot. So that's why if you have multiple, then you can use a
frequentist approach and just say, well, let me look at what the frequency was.
Did I understand you correctly when you were referring to Bell's theorem and the
contribution of philosophers to physics to do great work that everyone should be a
double major in philosophy? Is that the right takeaway? If they want to do great things?
I think philosophical thinking can sharpen your mental toolkit. And it
can also teach you to read hugely boring papers.
Jeez. We should probably end it there. So I want to thank our speaker, everyone.
If you're interested in these topics at all, please check out his YouTube channel
or his podcast, Theories of Everything. And thank you again for coming. This is great.
Before we wrap, I want to thank of course Michael Barnwell. I also want to thank Peggy
and John Day. As recall, this was the special once-a-year honors lecture made possible by
their generous contributions. I'd also like to thank Tim Ireland, Jamie Carr,
and Sheila Bednars, as well as Niagara University for hosting this event. Niagara is a Vincentian
Catholic university known for combining intellectual rigor with a deep commitment
to service and justice. Its campus sits on the highest ridge overlooking the Niagara River,
just a short drive from Niagara Falls and Buffalo. It's a stunning location. I was just there. I'll
play some footage on screen. It inspires both reflection and discovery. For the past two years,
U.S. News and World Report has ranked Niagara the number one best value school in the North,
recognizing its dedication to providing exceptional education at an accessible cost. With
strong programs in the liberal arts, business, education, nursing, hospitality, and sports
management, Niagara University's close-knit, mission-driven community empowers students to
learn with heart and lead with purpose. Learn more at niagara.edu and go Purple Eagles!
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