Why Singapore Kills Its Homegrown Champions | Inderjit Singh

So today's guest is Mr. Injit Singh, founder of UTEK, one of the world's largest semiconductor assembly and testing companies, and Tristar Electronics, one of the largest electronics distributor in Africa. He's

also a former member of parliament for Angoku GRC. Few Singaporeans embody the

Angoku GRC. Few Singaporeans embody the spirit of both enterprise and public service the way that he does. At the

height of the Asian financial crisis, he mortgaged his house to start companies that will go on to become global players. And while still running them,

players. And while still running them, he spent nearly two decades in parliament, working to make Singapore a better place for entrepreneurs and ordinary citizens alike. Always guided

by the belief that growth must ultimately serve people. He's known for speaking his mind, being one of Singapore's sharpest critics, yet also one of his fiercest believers. Because

beneath every tough question he asks is a conviction that Singapore can always rise to new heights if it keeps his can do spirit alive. Welcome, Mr. Indit.

>> Thank you, Kel.

>> I think a bit with a with a wild card question. What important truths do very

question. What important truths do very few people agree with you on?

>> What do very few people agree with me on?

>> Yeah. What important truths?

>> Uh I think one of the biggest uh battle I fought in parliament let's say was uh how we grow the economy whether we grow at all costs.

>> Mhm.

>> Or whether we have an inclusive growth uh strategy.

>> Yeah. Yeah.

>> And so this is one thing that I spent many years uh you know uh u fighting for the right balance.

>> Mhm.

>> So I think that is one thing there are many people who still believe that no you know go for all growth. In fact I read recently comments from some of our ministers. They say we going to go for

ministers. They say we going to go for growth at all cost again.

>> I see >> at all cost means it cost of the people you know which is something that I don't I don't agree because people get left behind >> and uh and and so we are seeing some of the effect. So I would say that that is

the effect. So I would say that that is a is a is a main thing.

>> I mean the other one was on uh giving everyone an opportunity.

>> Uh when um towards the end of my parliamentary stint, you know, uh I started uh talking about hope and opportunity. If our young

Singaporeans don't see this, why would they want to treat this as a home?

>> We don't want this to become a hotel. We

want people to treat it as home. Yeah,

but >> in a home you must see hope and opportunity.

>> So this another thing that I I believed a lot and so many of the things that I used to do in parliament and now is how to create that opportunity and uh you

know a bit of a balance and uh not so much of uh I would say inequality.

>> So I think these are the two areas that uh that I'm very passionate about. We'll

continue touching upon like this theme throughout the conversation. But I think before we go into I think the politics side of things, I would love to hear I think a bit about I think your background because I think before you started utek you started a silicon

salvage project in TI where you reuse I think all the discarded silicon that f internal test standards for other applications to generate a $230 million per year business for the company. So

you're clearly very deeply entrepreneurial. What was your biggest

entrepreneurial. What was your biggest influence that made you so entrepreneur and were there signs like since young?

>> You know uh growing up my background from we were a poor family. My father

was a watchman in a factory.

>> I spent 20 years of my life growing up.

So we had a tough life.

>> So it was a lot about uh survival and getting out of the of that level of uh life lifestyle that that we had.

>> Mhm. and and so so so for me to do that then you really have to do things differently from from others.

>> Uh I was fortunate that um I did very well in school uh primary school uh but instead of choosing Ara I decided to go to neighborhood school.

>> Ah >> yeah I could have gone to I did not right. Mhm.

right. Mhm.

>> So then after O levels um uh I could have gone to uh established colleges at that time. I chose to go to a brand new

that time. I chose to go to a brand new college, Tamasi Junior College. So I was a pioneer batch down there.

>> Oh >> okay. So when you're a pioneer you got a

>> okay. So when you're a pioneer you got a chance to experience doing things from scratch.

>> Yes.

>> Almost entrepreneurial, right?

>> Yeah.

>> And then uh then went on to uh military uh I learned that it's all about mindset. Yes.

mindset. Yes.

>> Tough training that we went through those days.

>> Yeah.

>> And if you want to go through two and a half years of tough training, you really have to have the right mindset. I

started with the wrong mindset. I

suffered. Changed my mindset. I did very well. I wrote a bit of it in my book

well. I wrote a bit of it in my book about this story, you know. So, it was mindset. So, this is my second

mindset. So, this is my second experience. And then uh when I started

experience. And then uh when I started university, I went to N US. I wanted to do engineering.

>> Went to N US.

>> After our first year, we were asked to decide whether you want to go to NTI.

75% went there or remain in N US. I was

very passionate about doing electrical engineering. I ended up going to NTI.

engineering. I ended up going to NTI.

>> In NTI, I was a pioneer also.

>> So again entrepreneurial thinking right.

I started the students union down there.

Yeah.

>> Started the triple E club and many other things we started from from scratch.

>> Wow.

>> So so I would say that is my background before I even started work that I've got the the pioneering entrepreneurial experiences >> uh from young and then in school and in the university. How did you decide to

the university. How did you decide to start like I think like this young right because I think even let's say when you were very early when you made a choice between a neighborhood school and now not a lot of people would have made the choice that you made what drove that decision >> you know these days uh because my

children also we looked at which school they go to we want to go for good schools right those days I think my parents we were more of uh which is nearby >> ah

>> where our siblings are that was the main decision >> and uh and so did not look at I must go to elite school and do did not and by by the way my parents uh had no basic

education. They came from India no basic

education. They came from India no basic education.

>> Wow.

>> So they were not people who really like now we think differently but they did not for them education good Singapore any school is a good school for even those days right for them.

>> So so it worked out I guess you know uh and uh so that that was a choice we made. So when you go to these places you

made. So when you go to these places you learn how to adapt and >> be the best you are not to be maybe the best student in school. No, but I think you really leave the maximum of like every school to go to even even back

then.

>> Yeah. So the other thing uh on uh the silicon salvage you mentioned right that's a name I gave by the project I created.

>> Yes.

>> Um maybe I talk a bit about my experience in TI. So when I uh was in my third year in NTI >> we used to have to do a six months industrial attachment program

>> N US uh normal program is 3 months but 6 months is a long time.

>> Mhm.

>> So I went to Texas Instruments to do it.

First day I went down there, my boss told me, I'm going to give you this project programming by the coding. I

started uh writing programs to test DMs IC.

>> He said, I'm going to give you this project. It's very difficult. Uh

project. It's very difficult. Uh

engineers have not been able to solve it.

>> Yeah.

>> Uh why don't you take it after 6 months?

Uh you know, if you can't finish, we'll hand it over to engineer after you leave. So I'm still a student.

leave. So I'm still a student.

>> In three months, I completed the project and then they didn't know what to do with me. Yeah.

with me. Yeah.

>> So I started automating their library and other software projects I did >> before graduation was a recession year they offered me a job

>> and throughout my engineering and I'm an analytical thinker engineer as an engineer I have one one philosophy that I believe is that there's no problem that cannot be solved.

>> Mhm.

>> So that is a mantra that I believe.

>> Yeah.

>> And and and so I look beyond the norm that people uh look at. So when I was in Texas instruments, I was solving engineering problems that other engineers could not solve. So I had to move one department to another to another

>> and uh within uh in 13 years I did nine different jobs.

>> Wow.

>> Lateral yeah >> promotions and at the end I was running the whole operation in Singapore. But

when I was mid-level engineer the company was losing a lot of money.

>> Dams lots of losses. They form a worldwide um uh quality improvement team >> to how to improve profitability.

>> Right.

>> So I came from operations.

>> Yeah.

>> There were marketing people, there were strategy people. So we all met every

strategy people. So we all met every quarter to discuss how to improve profitability.

>> Everyone expected me from operations uh to talk about how to improve yields, how to improve productivity, how to reduce cost of operations.

>> Yeah. So I started looking at the numerator rather than denominator cost.

I look at how can I create new revenue.

>> Yeah. New revenue lines.

>> I was an expert in uh in testing right and we were testing uh DMs that >> at very tight conditions.

>> Yeah.

>> That will be you able to run in missiles and we applicable in spaceships.

>> Yeah.

>> But we were changing our computers every five years maybe. Mhm.

>> So if I could reduce my testing parameters actually I can actually use this in computers in telephones in answering machines.

>> Yeah.

>> So I thought about new applications.

>> Yeah.

>> And whether I can make revenue out of rejects that we are throwing away.

>> Mhm.

>> So and I was inspired by the rack and bone men or karanguni men as they call in Singapore. These are the people who

in Singapore. These are the people who collect trash.

>> Yes.

>> And they became very rich you know with big cars and so on.

>> So I was inspired how to convert trash into into uh treasure. So that was my inspiration that you know I can I do this and when I made a presentation in one of these quarterly meeting

>> twothird of the room laughed at me.

>> Mhm.

>> But there was one Japanese boss was quite high up and he allowed me to continue with this project.

>> So when you do something different that people don't believe that they there were a lot of naysayers and they'll laugh at you >> but I pressed on and then you know the rest is history. I created this business that became a norm. You know in fact in

the industry many of them started looking at creating uh revenue out of rejects >> at this central threat of you believing that anything can be done right like when do you start to have this realization? Was it in engineering?

realization? Was it in engineering?

>> First of all when I did my OCS you know in the army uh tough things I I I started as I say >> hitting it perform badly.

>> Yeah.

>> Change of mindset and I I could do a good job. Became one of the top in my

good job. Became one of the top in my platoon.

from bottom to the top, you know. So, so

that was one thing that that kind of uh but then I think the most important of course is my engineering education, you know, which is we solve problems. >> Yeah.

>> And and so I think that became the the foundation for me. I practiced it in Texas instruments.

>> Yeah.

>> And then subsequently all my whatever I did. Yeah. And I think this carried over

did. Yeah. And I think this carried over into UTEK as well because I think you mentioned that the reason why UT tech stood out was that you value added to your clients by analyzing not just um testing but also analyzing why the tested products fail.

>> So what was it that about this that other players might have missed or end up not doing that gave an opening for you?

>> I would say that uh you know as I said I started my career in tax instrument testing products and so on. So I could uh understand where they fail why they fail.

>> All right. And so this is you know uh it's called failure analysis.

>> You don't just test and then accept the failure. You want to understand why it

failure. You want to understand why it failed.

>> Mhm.

>> So I went into very deep understanding of why it failed. So and I had assembled a team from Texas Instrument who were like that.

>> We understood the product. We understand

everything not just what we do on the surface but the depth of it.

>> And so I had one example. So this is u uh TI Acer had a semiconductor company joint venture in Taiwan. and uh and I went all the way there to offer ut

services to I met with the president of the company >> and I offered him my services. My price

was higher than what the Taiwanese man uh service providers were providing. He

told indit you are more expensive than these guys.

>> How are you going to get my business? I

told him the difference is >> I'll be able to solve the problems that these people cannot solve.

>> And then I got a business actually.

>> Yeah.

>> So this value ad is beyond just what everyone else has. Mhm.

>> So in UT that is what we did in uh throughout you know it was uh value add >> uh that that that that we did better than others don't just do the service but go beyond that and offer that to the

customer delight the customers.

>> So so in in just um in three years we had 38 blue chip customers. We I had customers who moved

customers. We I had customers who moved from stats which is a government owned >> Yeah.

>> over to me. Brockcom for example was a big customer that just shifted over. Oh,

>> because our reputation become that we were providing a lot of value and it was worth uh doing. So we had good Fujitsu, Simmons, Brocom and like good customers.

So this analyzing that you did in terms of like how did these products like fail was this something that other companies could have because they could. So so

back to my silicon salvage right that >> I could have just gone down there and talk about how can I can improve yields and productivity and do better operator but I looked at it uh differently. So

all these other service providers they may they are probably looking at I just provide you this service you give me your test program I provide this service I return back the pass and the field goods to you. Yeah,

>> but I went beyond that. Same mindset

with me and my team. We looked at you know that don't just do what everyone else can do. Yeah.

>> Uh you know and then let's pro let's do this even if let's say customers don't pay but we want to go beyond and we give them enough information that can help them improve their their products because the product the design and and

wafer fab as theirs. We do the end part of it. So more information we give them

of it. So more information we give them the more valuable they see us.

>> Yeah >> everyone could have done it but I think the the mindset was >> they are paying us for this we just do this. when you add on this layer of

this. when you add on this layer of analysis and I think understanding of like wider the products field like what how in terms of the customers how how did they benefit is it like improvement in terms of you

>> yes yeah so we could advise them that actually if you change some of the test parameters >> or we were building for it we if you change some of the material content of this thing yeah >> you're going to have better yields and

then your profitability can go up >> or let's say we could not we identify what went wrong >> and then they can go back in so we are the end stage >> wafer faps are before us wafer fap process.

>> Yeah.

>> And then before then before that is a design designing of the chip. So this

three steps right.

>> Yes.

>> Val IP design >> wafer fab and so we at the end we could provide them information what they could change in the process in the wrap.

>> Yeah.

>> What they could change even in the future design that they do. So this pro will give them robust products that can win in the market and will save them cost also >> if they don't have so many rejects at the end.

>> I see. Yeah. Oh, that's really interesting.

>> I had in-depth knowledge. My team that I brought in had in depth. I trained many of them who came and joined me. Yes. In

UT and so, you know, >> so we all had that kind of in-depth and we used it as value at.

>> Yes.

>> Yeah. So, you already understood like what the entire chain of like the process.

>> We understood. Yeah.

>> You know, when we were in Texas instruments, the team uh we were already doing R&D and in in the packaging uh area. Yes. So, I had a team people who

area. Yes. So, I had a team people who joined me also.

>> So, we went into that kind of a depth.

to not just production, >> yes, >> but R&D also.

>> And in fact, my team in Singapore uh together with the team in Japan and the US, there was a team that >> did a late on cheap package design.

>> Yeah.

>> We got a Ichimura emper uh price given by the emperor of Japan to us. I still

have that that that price at home.

>> Yeah. So, you know, so we were went to we went to that level.

>> So, we had the expertise and uh and uh and and so that helped us a lot as we moved on. We were we help customers

moved on. We were we help customers design packages you know they just told us I got this wafers can you do the packaging we designed that for them also >> so so was very very uh we went very deep

>> throughout this whole process I think uh the whole UT tech journey was was like mind-blowing I think when I when I first read about it there was this one I think key SGX and NASDAQ listing whereby

essentially SGX closed the door on you but after Nasdaq gave the green light um SGX said yes um did they actually give you a reason like why they didn't want No, I understood why they uh but you know that's where they tried to do

catalyst later on. You know, I think at that time there wasn't a catalyst. It

was only one one B.

>> Mhm.

>> So NASDAQ basically will look at potentially high growth companies, stack companies that can grow uh very fast. So

that's you know that's a mindset down there >> even if you're not profitable today but you have the potential you know they allow.

>> Yeah.

>> Uh the SGX uh guideline at that time was you must already be profitable for three years. But my company was just about 3

years. But my company was just about 3 years old. We were already profitable

years old. We were already profitable from second year onwards, you know. Uh

but revenue is small. So I think they did not see the potential. They just

look at the past data.

>> NASDAQ look at the potential also. Past

data plus uh potential also.

>> Yes.

>> So uh so when we uh I mean it was amazing numbers you know we were growing very very fast. uh and so when they closed the door uh of course you know we

then went to NASDAQ and we actually spent a lot of money and NASDAQ approved >> after NASDAQ approved then SGX came to me they found out and see whether can we do a joint list this thing you know with a wraparound that means we don't have to

do the additional work of preparing the prospectors that's a lot of money and a lot of time >> they will just use a NASDAQ perspectives and then just add their cover page and say you're still listing in Singapore so

we agreed uh we agreed to do that so I would say that uh the system at that time was uh you know uh you must have track record of profitability and must be very big and they don't they did not

look at the way NASDAQ high potential high growth tech companies we were there >> so we got they recognize SCX and I think >> catalyst was meant to do that in

Singapore but I don't think so they have succeeded yeah because we don't have don't see that kind of companies on >> do you hear anything about what happened in terms of the machinations behind like

why they decided to change is is it like the main driving force was just that SGX heard that NASDAQ gave a green light and they were like okay let's completely change operation in terms of >> No, it was right because I think when

they they saw the the valuations that we were able to get and that time it was a tech boom also right and uh >> and so they did not want to lose out on a local company

>> going completely to NASDAQ it would have been not a nice thing also embarrassment also right that >> that Singapore company had to go to NASDAQ and so let's he had been to join this thing.

>> It would have been nice for everyone.

Yeah. So I think that was maybe what drove them but I won't know what the inside thing is.

>> I understand. You also mentioned in your book that and interviews as well that about 35 38 million I think from the 138 million that you raised came from I think Singapore investors. Um I think don't have to name any names but were there like Singapore stakeholders or

investors that maybe switch sides when some investors try to get out of their their stakes like what what exactly happened there in terms of the I think the terrible event >> when I had to had to leave.

>> Yeah.

>> Ah yeah. So uh I I I mentioned and and you also had in your in your video that you did was about how uh conflict of interest came in with some of of these players.

>> Yeah. Yeah.

>> But yes, unfortunately there were big Singapore players.

>> Mhm.

>> Government own who switch sides.

>> Wow.

>> Okay. But it's got to do with personalities >> and uh I think maybe that should be sufficient. Yeah. I uh I mean this

sufficient. Yeah. I uh I mean this battle could have been fought better but I think I was >> left to fight it on my own.

>> I see.

>> Yeah. And considering the fact that I think the the circumstances and there were Singapore funds involved, do you have a chance I think since that incident happened to get back control of your company like did they approach you?

Were there opportunities >> to UT? Yeah. To to hit to go back to UT and hit >> No, I had moved on and I started my next company, Infinity Solutions.

>> Mhm.

>> Which uh you know I sold in 2015.

>> I I have moved on >> and I wouldn't have gone back.

>> I see. you know because the controlling stakeholders are the same >> right so why fight battles unnecessary battles >> so I I did not did not think about it neither did they approach me

>> I see I had laid such great foundations that the company just went on to momentum and did went to list after I left on sx right >> yes >> yeah so the didn't have to do a lot but

the hard work was already done by me but I strong foundations >> and in your book as well I think in the very very early days of like UT you mentioned that government agencies actually give you like a hard time.

Yeah. Could you could you maybe elaborate on that? I think especially for the younger audience and all this like to better appreciate how things were back then and how things have changed.

>> Put it simply the mentality and it exists today also.

>> Mhm.

>> It's a MNC support strategy.

>> Mhm.

>> And uh many of times um EDB has lots of resources.

>> Mhm.

>> They've got the best people. they got a lot of money >> and they are given the task to support economic development.

>> When it comes to companies like UTE which is uh which is a tech company with a lot of investment enterprise Singapore or at that time was Spring Singapore.

>> Mhm. uh they they were not allowed to handle EDB wanted the best cakes and left the maybe not the greatest one for in terms of type of potential companies

to the rest of the agencies.

>> But then when you have the people in EDB thinking um MNC mindset >> the support is mainly for mindset and they just don't know how to support

>> uh local companies. So that mindset I think still partially exists may improve a bit >> but we have to watch this very very very carefully. So that was a problem at that

carefully. So that was a problem at that time that I'm not a multinational.

>> I'm a local Singapore company. No one

believed that >> I I did a press conference after I raised the funds and before we started >> that we starting UT we'll spend half a billion dollars in Singapore.

>> Yes.

>> Factory equipment people.

>> And by the way UTE they spent more than half a billion dollars. I announced that was in the papers. Everyone was shocked including EDB where did this come from?

>> Yeah.

>> And I think that was another thing that why wasn't EDB involved?

They thought that you know we must go through them but no I did on my own without any support. So subsequently I had a lot of trouble.

>> Mhm.

>> Uh from uh from some of these government agencies uh that I fought many battles you know being an MP did not help me. I

you know uh it was worse because I cannot use my position for benefit. M

>> so mine was purely a private fight and I had to do uh lots of I give you one example.

>> Mhm.

>> Uh so one of the things that I I did in UT which I also was in charge in Texas instrument we did R&D there R&D grants that the government gives.

>> Yeah.

>> Right. So when I was in Texas instruments >> Mhm.

>> I may apply for $5 million grant.

>> Yeah.

>> For $5 million research share with them. I get officers from EDB telling me why don't you take 10 million >> Yeah.

>> and do a bit more.

>> When I did the same thing in UT and I went to EDB and ask for this kind of grant.

>> Mhm.

>> You know, I want to maybe a $2 million research grant.

>> Mhm.

>> They say, "No, no, we only will give you 20% of what you spend."

>> I see.

>> Not why didn't you take 4 million double, you know?

>> Yeah. So I had that kind of uh reaction from them because they didn't believe that we'll do >> 20% all the effort to do reporting I told the EDB officer who came I said

forget it government can keep the money I will still do my R&D but without government help >> and we went on and we did a lot of those things so UT did a lot of new package development and so on. Yeah.

>> So it's an example when I wanted to do things in my factory that I bought microp police went bankrupt. I bought

over the factory >> wanted to use it because now I needed a 250,000 ft build building and I were not going to occupy all along all in one day.

>> Yeah.

>> It take me years to build up.

>> Yes.

>> But I bought a 400,000 square ft building.

>> Yeah.

>> I had a lot of space >> sitting idle.

>> Mhm.

>> Government regulations says that oh you only can allow 20% or 30 I can't remember to the rest you must use. But I

was going to use 20 30%. I wanted to lease out the rest to make some money for the or did they not allow >> or cannot 20%. They must stick to the rules and so on. So these kind of rules

are wrong. I'm starting up at the end in

are wrong. I'm starting up at the end in fact even that 400,000 square building was not enough right they went on and they have to buy other building move to other building but it takes time. Yeah.

>> So the civil servants need to think about where the track is going.

>> Yeah. and then just support you know nothing wrong because I have empty space leave it idle is waste for everyone.

>> Yeah.

>> So I had to fight battles like that.

>> Wow.

>> So many many battles like this. Yeah.

>> And it was not just those two like new >> there many many many more. Uh so funding to uh not getting good support from government agencies like EDB and then this building thing and so on.

>> Mhm.

>> That was my experience and that's why I said as I when I became an MP I'm going to fight for entrepreneurs formemes.

Yeah, I spent 20 years doing that in parliament. I had a personal experience

parliament. I had a personal experience >> and we had to change things.

>> Wow.

>> So, so that is why I did all the things that I did in parliament.

>> I see. And even this I think 30 million I think initially you said the Singapore investors put you say that initially they turn you away and only after you got a Taiwanese money.

>> I could not get any Singapore money. I

could not. So I went to Taiwan.

>> Uh fortunately I had good Taiwanese friends who I through my past networks in TI. Mhm.

in TI. Mhm.

>> So they had arranged for me to do a road show. I took one day leave from Texas

show. I took one day leave from Texas instrument went there. One room full of 50 or 60 people I can't remember now.

>> Yeah.

>> And I made a presentation only my name was there and I told them the people are going to join me. Mr. A, Mr. B and their background but I could not reveal because they were all working Texas instruments right?

>> Yeah.

>> So so but then they were very knowing tech was booming. They wanted to get get into the egg.

>> Yeah.

>> And I had more money than I needed. Uh

my goal was 100 million. Yeah.

>> More than I needed. I said

>> Singapore company. I unless I can get at least 30% ownership from Singapore.

Yeah. I'm not going to start. I don't

want to. It should not be a foreign company.

>> So I got about 15 to 20% from me and my team which we pay later before IPO. Then

after that >> came back uh the the then they found out I've raised so much of money. Then they

came and they wanted in. I see. And of

course I say I need 100.

>> Why not some more? And and so we took $138 million at one go.

>> Yeah.

>> Record at that time.

>> Yeah. Exactly. Because I think that even let's say to even if you extrapolate to today, right, whereby you have Singapore based funds that are trying to invest in local companies and trying to help them scale. I think a very big problem in the

scale. I think a very big problem in the in the local ecosystem is that there's actually not a lot of suitable candidates in which you can put a lot of money into.

>> Yes. So was this something that that they shared as a consideration to you?

Because I imagine that back then there was only a few I think companies that grew to your scale. So why weren't they more willing to I guess take a bet on you. Did they share any reason?

you. Did they share any reason?

>> Okay. I mean you see we um we had very few examples. Simbong who was a great

few examples. Simbong who was a great example before me. I mean he was uh one who inspired many entrepreneurs in Singapore. So but there were very few

Singapore. So but there were very few examples like him.

>> Uh so someone like me came from a multinational. No one believed that you

multinational. No one believed that you know you can do it right. So I think the ability to spot talent is was not there among the you know these people.

>> Yeah.

>> Uh but then uh so uh when we started speaking about it uh government realized the need.

>> Mhm.

>> Uh they started they spent a billion US dollars starting the technology innovation fund >> which invested in VCs to bring VCs into Singapore that will then invest in Singapore companies. So that came later

Singapore companies. So that came later because you know this was not happening.

I think one of the story thing that had inspired that would have been my experience.

>> Y >> that you know money had to come from outside if let's say we have it down here with government support. So I'm

sure there are other examples. So but I think that kind of got them to think that you know we have to change and today we got lots of funds here in Singapore government funds and so >> maybe let's move on a bit and talk a bit about I think like Singapore I think in

the in the semiconductor ecosystem that you are in right. Um I think a lot of viewers who who watch the channel will be aware that Singapore started chartered semiconductors as well as that chartered semiconductors maybe let's

start with that which is a TSMC competitor with a foundry model and I think maybe the question here is that considering how important founders are right with Maurice Chang at TSMC and how successful you make you to be despite

ners if you were leading charter semiconductor with all the information that you know what would you have potentially done >> okay this is a I'm sure some of the people who will listen to this will be

upset you So there's a strategic error that that the u I would say the board or maybe even tamasi made

>> was that uh both charted semic charted semiconductor is a technology company deep tech >> mhm >> deep tech sometimes you have to invest a

lot of money and you will show a loss in your P&L statement. Yeah.

>> And uh but you question is you see that money as cost or as an investment for the future.

>> Yeah.

>> All right. I think this is where whoever was involved could not see it that it's an investment and and TSMC continued to invest.

>> Yeah.

>> They all were almost the same invest and they move up the technology ladder.

>> Yeah.

>> Charted I believe. Okay. And I mean they can tell a better story than me is that they did not invest in technology the way it they should have >> because they must have looked at it as a cost.

>> Mhm.

>> And the other thing is that the CEO that they appointed to charted >> was a finance person not a technology person not an engineer.

>> So he's a good man. I know him >> but he does not understand tech. M

>> and the decision then him and the board could have made the I'm I'm guessing >> Mhm.

>> wrong decision of not investing in the right technology to keep up.

>> And I think that's where then they lost one generation of technology to TSMC, USMC.

>> Yeah.

>> And it was they felt that it's too late to catch up and that's when they sold sold off.

>> So I would have >> invested in technology seen it as investment not as cost.

>> Mhm. I would have put uh technology man as a person in charge and have more technology people on the board less finance people on the board.

>> Yeah, >> I think this is probably the strategic error that happened in charted. So sapi

we lost it if global foundaries is successful now >> right the I think Abu Dhabi base >> they moving on and uh that was a jewel that we lost

>> um success in I think this government that initi not given I think even let's say with um global foundaries for instance they still have not managed to I think be at the very frontier of I

think the semiconduction I think behind Samsung as well as >> TSMC so it's not just a matter of in terms pouring vast sums of money because the backers of global foundaries have

some of the largest >> of course backers in the world. So it's

arguable whether capital itself is just a limitation. So what what do you think

a limitation. So what what do you think was missing in terms of that leap for for something like charted semiconductors? Could Singapore have

semiconductors? Could Singapore have initiated a strategy like that of like acquiring a lot more semiconductor companies like what global foundaries did or was it that they should have invested a lot more into tech? Maybe we

can get a bit technical here because we miss a a leap in terms of the technological frontier in terms of I think TSMC and Samsung invested into ASML and the EUV technology right I

don't think that chart Sam was involved in that was that the crucial mistake almost >> I think it was a very crucial mistake because then that is you know how it allowed the those who invested to move

up that one generation uh ahead of new tech in processing I mean wafer fat cost of producing of wafer is very expensive so the processes that you do uh and and

that are efficient that do not take a lot of uh processes >> uh and you still can come up with a good wafer that I think is a call down there.

So what so or any other process research that you do >> was very important for you to stay ahead of of the curve and so I'm not so sure about charted whether they did it or not. I mean they may have missed that

not. I mean they may have missed that and therefore they could not they they could not catch up. So you are right instead of selling maybe acquiring >> acquiring design companies

>> acquiring not big companies but those who in the forefront of research.

>> Mhm.

>> That could have been a better strategy than to just sell off at a cheap price.

I think >> so acquiring because they did not invest >> they could have acquired.

>> Yeah >> that is definitely a good strategy. fact

that you understand I think the whole chain with your work at UTC for instance um I think one of the the key considerations for I think any design companies for instance Nvidia or uh MediaTek for instance um in different

economies let's say Hong Kong um is that you need a very strong almost domestic electronics um industry do you think that we could have made the move up to to a value chain in terms of moving into cheap design and IP like how do you see

that playing out >> I think that is another thing that did not work out well for Singapore >> so when I was in Texas Instruments I I mean was running the I was running the operation. Even before I ran the whole

operation. Even before I ran the whole operation, it was just manufacturing, packaging and testing. I put up a case for us to bring design of IC design into Singapore.

>> Ah >> worked very hard with the management in the US. I think if let's say we had got

the US. I think if let's say we had got good government incentives for this >> Mhm.

>> maybe would we would have had a chance.

Guess who did we lose out to? We lost to Bangalore India. Oh,

Bangalore India. Oh, >> so TI placed their design center in India and they did very well on that. By

the way, I used to fly down there to go and go and audit their designs so that they ready for production in in the future. You know,

future. You know, >> big teams, thousands of design engineers and so on. So, so we we we should have done a lot of work in this area of design.

>> I I think there was an attempt but not enough investment.

>> So, we we lost. So design process engineering in wafer fax that's another big area of of investment or equipment right so these are the thing that go to

the ancillary areas that fit into the system that could have also helped us >> and uh so so I think these are the things that we lost sight

>> and there was I think another uh uh reason was I think I whether I I've said it before somewhere in my speeches that uh we have the uh the economic planning process through EDB where they do

research on what are the future techs that are coming.

>> Yeah.

>> And then you know spend some time teaching building the infrastructure and then going to that tech. I think there was a bit of this also miscalculation on

on the government agency side that the next big thing is going to be photonics or life sciences >> and let's focus on these are maturing semiconductor electronics maturing.

>> Yeah. So we start start shifting focus.

>> I my assessment is that government uh uh economic planning abandoned >> semiconductors >> for future things that

>> we did not really take off in photonics we never really took off.

>> Life sciences I think we are doing okay but local companies not many >> pharmaceutical they all here just the MNC. So it was always a M andC mentality

MNC. So it was always a M andC mentality that in most of economic planning approach. So we abandon abandoned and so

approach. So we abandon abandoned and so did not invest enough from even from the government side.

>> What made you have this impression? Was

this was this communicated to you or were there like signs that you >> the signs were there? I could see that you know that uh that uh you know we have regular meetings and uh know regular seminars and they they talk

about what's next. What's next? Right?

It's a long-term planning. What's next?

So if you make a wrong assessment you lose it. I would have thought that we go

lose it. I would have thought that we go deeper >> rather than go to the next technology or next big thing.

>> Yeah.

>> Semiconductor we have got strength, we got capability. Go deeper and deeper and

got capability. Go deeper and deeper and deeper like what Taiwan did.

>> Samsung did.

>> Yeah.

>> Right. But Korea by the way uh was far behind us.

>> Uh I when I was in Texas instruments, Hyundai wanted to start DAMS. >> They used Texas Instrument taught them.

Mhm.

>> I was tasked to go and qualify their production line.

>> Yes.

>> I went there and they were so far behind us. This was like maybe late 80s 90s.

us. This was like maybe late 80s 90s.

>> Yeah.

>> And today they have overtaken. So they

went deeper and deeper and they became very big. So I think we

very big. So I think we >> we don't have that. So who are the decision makers who did not decide to go deeper? I think when government agencies

deeper? I think when government agencies so they are not pure private >> isn't it? Charted semiconductors that's not pure private.

>> Yes. So there's a lot of influence even at the board level that you don't have the right people down there. So we that is our problem. Um you mentioned for instance when you tried to get TI to

transfer some of his I think chip design um capabilities to Singapore there was I think some hurdle there and I would love to delve a bit deeper into this because um when you look at let's say the industrial strategy of Singapore um I

think when you look at let's say whether it's Taiwan or it's Korea there was always a deliberate decision to to have some form of technological transfer transfer agreements um with all these I think semiconductor companies whereas

let's say for instance when I read about charter semiconductors partnership with Sierra right We were actually not able to get the foremost technology to be transferred to Singapore. I think Sierra transfer they are foremost but the others we in terms of the partnership we

didn't manage to get that we may not have the bargaining power of those other countries because of our limited size.

Right. So do you think that there's something that could have been shifted in terms of how we actually embark on our industrial policy in this >> of course I think if let's say you wanted to focus on creating the future multinationals of Singapore

>> Mhm.

>> then you would have done gone out of your way give the incentives to keep them down here. Mhm.

>> I give you one example of where the MNC mentality played out, right? Um

>> um Micron Technology.

>> Yes.

>> Uh this was maybe 2000, I can't remember. I spoke in parliament about this.

>> They almost went bankrupt. They had like few uh months of money left >> and um and thanks to EDB.

>> Yeah.

>> Loan them I think 200 million or $300 million. was quite big at that time.

million. was quite big at that time.

>> Wow.

>> To keep them afloat >> in Singapore.

>> In Singapore to keep them I think the money how they use was up to them.

>> Yeah.

>> But keep them afloat. But the condition was you have to future expand in Singapore. Do more with FE which they

Singapore. Do more with FE which they did by the way. So it was a multinational support.

>> Yeah.

>> So imagine let's say I take this 200 or $300 million and I gave to Chartered to go and get technology transferred to you.

>> Yeah. give incentive to this first I'll >> you could have been different >> correct >> so so this is only one example of multinational mindset and which until

today we do that all the pharmaceutical company all multinationals >> it's driving our economy >> but Singapore based multinational that becoming big not many those that are

there are still Singapore technologies uh engineering those government owners but >> yes >> we did not have that kind of today I we don't have that approach that we do

with M andC for the local I've seen it throughout my radio years.

>> That's a very I think stunning example in terms of I think the disparity in terms of mindset in terms of what course of action they took. If let's say you in the operation of the masc I imagine that given the semiconductor industry

cyclical nature right um and chart semiconductor I would imagine is is a drag in terms of their overall portfolio returns right um it would have potentially made sense to let go of chonders if you just >> pure financial decision

>> yeah exactly >> not a strategic decision right >> yes exactly so if if you were in the operation would anything have changed your mind >> I would of course we'll have to have a board that also has got enough technologies and people who understand

the industry that this is going to be a jewel of the future future.

>> Yeah.

>> Right. So I think uh if you go on pure financial uh you know so they did that with chartered they did that with stats >> also you know those were all sold off and I think to I can't remember who

stats went to but yes so I think you know u you see I started UTC at a time where people say it's impossible to have a semiconductor company in Singapore at that scale

>> right so people gave up on having manufacturing facilities in Singapore >> but I believe that it could be done and it can last a long time it's still here Yes.

>> Lasted a long time, right? So the

mindset at that time, oh no, is you know lost cost.

>> Let's not base any more money and and so that's a mindset uh difference, right? M

>> so I think uh if let's say they had uh the right people looking at the long-term vision >> not interference from the strategic planners in the government side who see

that oh we better shift to pharmaceutical shift to shift to this thing and let's this one we may not want to waste so much of time on it >> things would have been different >> were you involved in any discussions about this in terms of the shifting

considering that you are one of I guess leading experts in Singapore in the semiconductor industry >> post no before that when I was in TI initial part of UT I was involved in a number of things

>> uh but you know I was involved in the economic strategy uh economic restructuring committee that was started after the 2001 elections >> it was a very big exercise I was involved I was actively involved I was

chairing one of the committees also >> and and and one of the big recommendations I made which was adopted was entrepreneurship-driven economy >> y >> this is one was my my committee's recommendation >> yes

>> and uh and also reduce government involvement in businesses that private sector can do.

That was another recommendation that we made.

>> Yeah.

>> Simply because when the government gets involved then the decision making are influenced by government.

>> For sure. For sure.

>> So purely private sector driven then I think we have like ut purely private sector driven.

>> Yes.

>> You know we made we were very successful.

>> So so I was involved at that level but beyond that after that I you know all my involvement was in parliament.

>> Yeah. And I think with all my speeches in parliament, many of the civil servants were were unhappy with me and didn't want to engage me. But I I did one thing.

>> I had problem finding money.

>> Yeah.

>> So I wanted to change the financing landscape in Singapore.

>> So this is even before >> the economic restructuring committee work.

>> Yeah.

>> 98 I could not find money. I became an MP >> and I said I want to solve this problem and I was on the board of Spring Singapore.

>> Mhm. And what I did was I gathered a group of volunteers.

>> Yeah.

>> Bankers, uh, VCs, entrepreneurs, maybe 15 or 16 of us.

>> Yeah.

>> Uh, secretary was spring because I got them to >> and I started looking at how can we improve financing of SMMES and startups.

>> Mhm.

>> And I traveled around the world.

>> Yes.

>> I went to Silicon Valley. I went to uh Canada. I went to Japan, Korea, Taiwan.

Canada. I went to Japan, Korea, Taiwan.

I looked at all the things and when some people in the government found out and MTI found out about it.

>> Yeah.

>> Indit is heading this committee and we don't know anything about it.

>> Yeah.

>> So the civil servants asked spring to ask Indigit to invite them into the committee. Their idea was to come down

committee. Their idea was to come down here and try to discourage me from doing this because it's not government initiated.

>> Yeah.

>> Was completely my initiative.

>> Yeah.

>> Of course for me you know we all work together. I invited them no matter how

together. I invited them no matter how much they try. Mhm.

>> I pushed it through.

>> Yeah.

>> And finally came out with the recom set of recommendation.

>> Yes.

>> So interestingly the economic review committee was moving.

>> Mhm.

>> And I was involved and then someone heard about my work.

>> Yeah.

>> Our current president Tam but he was one of the deputy to Liang when they did this economic strategy committee.

>> He called me and said I heard that you're working on something.

>> Yeah.

>> Uh for financing because we knew financing was tough.

>> Yeah.

>> He said can you present to me? Yeah.

>> So I told him okay I'll present. So I

went to present to him.

>> Oh that's great.

>> He looked at all the recommendations that I came out. He said these are fantastic actionable items. >> Yeah.

>> Say in the ERC very few actionable items. There are many broad statements but actionable. So I told him thank you

but actionable. So I told him thank you so much.

>> I will complete my report.

>> Yeah.

>> Can you please uh get a group of civil servants to be the implementation committee for what I have suggested?

>> So we have many recommendation. you can

dig out the the the report.

>> Yeah.

>> He laughed at me and he said interjit you want to implement this you chair the implementation committee otherwise you'll get killed.

So these are the kind of thing he also knew smart man and so I ch the implementation committee at the same time we formed action committee for entrepreneurship which was recommendation we made.

>> Yeah.

>> So Raymond Lim was chairman I was one of the founding with a group of people >> and we formed crucibles. Yeah,

>> internationalization, culture, education and one on finance.

>> So he told me to chair the finance crucible.

>> So I moved my uh theme financing committee into action uh crucible for finance.

>> So I did next few works on implementing some of the things through that. That's

the history of and I can say when I could not find money.

>> Yeah.

>> I dare say that today there's a lot of money but not enough good projects.

>> Mhm.

>> If you cannot get the financing there must be something wrong with you or your team or your idea. Go and revise it.

>> Right.

>> You will be able to find money. We've

got lots of funds on the angels and big funds and so on.

>> Yeah.

>> So we we completely transformed the environment. I I cannot take credit for

environment. I I cannot take credit for this. government also involved.

this. government also involved.

>> Sure.

>> They started with a $1 billion fund and they started pushing in many areas action as a lot of things.

>> Yeah.

>> So the but that was the beginning.

>> Yes.

>> I after my difficulty I wanted to do this. Ace came AC helped to project this

this. Ace came AC helped to project this thing further.

>> Yeah.

>> And today the environment has changed.

>> This collaboration I think between uh yourself and I think the politicians is very important to be able to realize some of these things.

>> Yes. And

>> so that was my uh I I I so I wanted to change.

>> Yes.

>> Because of my experience of difficulty >> and I was in a unique position.

>> Mhm.

>> I knew what to do because I've experienced it.

>> Yeah.

>> And I was a bridge with government. I

was not >> the decision maker in government.

>> Yeah. But you were still MP then.

>> I was an MP.

>> Yeah.

>> And so I brought some credible voices in parliament and also outside parliament.

>> Yeah. that you know they consulted me on many of these uh many of this these things that I talked about in in in parliament. Yeah,

parliament. Yeah, >> that was an opportunity. That's why I say I will not use this opportunity to change which was my mindset. How can we make Singapore environment transform

formemes and for >> I give you uh two examples.

>> Mhm.

>> So I used to give my speeches in a lot of details I used to speak about >> the civil servants were very tired because every time when I gave they had to answer right the budget debate.

>> Yeah.

>> But interestingly there's one man who called me one day >> our finance minister Mr. Richard who >> passed away bless his soul.

>> And he said in Indjit, you have lots of ideas.

>> Yeah.

>> You know my my officers, my civil servants don't have enough ideas.

>> Yeah.

>> Can you come to my office and brief them on all your ideas?

>> Yeah.

>> So I I went to his office. He had all his directors all sitting down there.

>> Yeah.

>> And I spent about two hours sharing all my ideas. I mean some were good ideas,

my ideas. I mean some were good ideas, some not implementable in government, but I shared whatever I have. So

>> there were people who at least you know listened and gave me the opportunity.

>> The other example I can give you is that uh how to incentivize uh people to invest in startups.

>> Yeah.

>> There was an enterprise uh investment scheme that was our former deputy prime minister Hink.

>> Mhm.

>> He was permanent secretary in MTI.

>> Yeah.

>> He was in charge of doing that for I think for budget.

>> He called calls me one day and said I want to talk to you about some ideas on how to implement this thing.

>> Yeah. He came all the way to my office to meet up with me and rather than calling me down there and so we sat down and discussed and he he did a good job.

Yeah.

>> But at least he consulted. You know,

Richard who consulted things should get consulted. So

consulted. So >> yeah.

>> So I because I had the experience.

>> They believed what I said. I was not just making noise and trying to show off.

>> Yeah.

>> I I I knew what I was saying. They

listened and they gave me an opportunity.

>> Yes.

>> So all of these were at the right time.

Yeah.

>> That allow us to change many things. I

think all these examples are really useful because you need the the collaboration between whether it's the politicians and I think the private sector or other stakeholders to actually come to a consensus as to how to actually move forward and for instance

where for instance for the semiconductor example you mentioned that you you could really see signs that the governments in terms of economic planning was really moving away from this were there any kind of I guess committee meetings like

that or discussions with people like you who are leaders of the semiconductor industry to think about you know whether this was actually even the right move I don't remember other than the economic

review committee I I don't remember. So

in fact uh after that they had economic strategies committee lots of committees that came about that that could have done a bit of this work but I don't remember being consulted uh for for for this thing. I think

this thing. I think >> there came a point when they were very tired of listening to my criticism and then you know they didn't want to listen anymore. Maybe that's what happened. So

anymore. Maybe that's what happened. So

no I was not involved. They may have involved many other people to be fair to them but know I was not involved >> forever you know at some stage yes but and not everyone Richard who believed

Huket believed but not everyone believed Raymond believed so not not everyone believed >> and maybe we can talk a bit about stats as well because besides charter semiconductor Singapore also started sets which is similarly to UT a chief

assembly and testing company which became actually the fourth largest player in the world by revenue. You

mentioned that UTC was able to evaluate um by diagnosing what certain tests achieve when they fail. Do you know like what modes did stats have and like how is it different from UT from your perspective?

>> No, I actually I cannot say that they they failed in the areas that we succeeded but uh what we succeeded was to bring over some blue chip customers from them to us.

>> Yes.

>> So Brocom for example was a very big company at that point of time.

>> Yeah. uh we managed to convince them and they switch from uh maybe they they did not move everything at first >> but then they actually came to to us.

Similarly, there were some other customers that we managed to get.

>> Yeah.

>> So I'm I I think we may have provided services that they that they were happy with. The support that we gave them was

with. The support that we gave them was good. We could invest very aggressively.

good. We could invest very aggressively.

Yeah.

>> We decided very fast, right? I mean me and my board and my b listened to me at that time.

>> Yes.

>> So I think these were all the factors that caused us. I wouldn't say they messed up but I would say that maybe we did a great job and we were able to pull some of these people over.

>> Yeah.

>> Yeah. I would love to hear a bit more I think about the dynamics right because I think that you are essentially cop competing with stats in a sense >> and stats is actually I guess semi-government one what were the

dynamics like in terms of being in this playing field I think in most for most entrepreneurs when they think they're competing against a government company >> yeah so so I think first of all uh when

I was planning uh UT I started planning this in like 95 while I was still in TI >> so I looked at the kind of investment that's needed and I see unless I can raise 100 million I'm not going to start it. That was my goal 100 million US

it. That was my goal 100 million US because you really need to invest aggressively.

>> The capability, the technology I knew my my team knew.

>> Yeah.

>> So, we have that now. It's just a matter of raising enough to be able to put in a plan >> that can support. So, so this is something that I know that we we knew

that we uh we we could do uh on on the other side. I think the um uh

other side. I think the um uh chartered what's the question >> with stat I could do what the customers wanted that stat may have legacy systems that

will take long time for them to shift I could invest in the latest things so that was my strength >> I had the money I knew what to invest in and I could uh so so I think you know uh I was not we were not afraid of it

>> but I think stats I believe was complacent these guys are going to fail >> I see they thought that that EDB thought this guy's not going to make it >> when I announced half a billion investment in 5 years they must have all

think impossible not going to happen >> but we did so I think there was this mindset I you know just a disturbance and not going to make it you know and imagine the time 98 semiconductor

industry was bleeding and all so many did not believe that a new player can come in there other players >> can come in and and win >> but we were entrepreneurs we were different from many of them right so

>> do you There were preferential treatments in any way in terms of whether it was getting grants.

>> Oh, I I had to buy a commercial building, >> pay commercial rent.

>> Yes.

>> Completely on commercial terms. No preferential treatment at all.

>> Yeah.

>> You go, you can do the research. I'm

sure they got they got a lot of preference. I I I almost acquired when I

preference. I I I almost acquired when I did my second company, the former national semiconductor in Singapore, Topayo plant.

>> Very big plant.

>> They wanted to exit Singapore. I think

the US government was telling you bring back everything then we'll excuse all the tax. There was something like that.

the tax. There was something like that.

>> So they were ready to go and I we were at a due diligence stage.

>> Yeah.

>> When I look when I did the due diligence I found out that their annual rent was $2 per year.

>> Oh.

>> And I was paying a million dollars on per year on my on my rent. So to be fair to attract them they get good deal and they continue to get good deal if they can negotiate micron for example. Right.

So, >> so this the playing field uh was definitely uneven.

>> Wow.

>> In many areas, grants and all meant uneven.

>> So to survive that was not an easy thing but you know you really have to be determined and find a way to to survive.

Yeah.

>> Do better than the rest which is what we did. is I think the testament to to you

did. is I think the testament to to you in terms of laying the foundation as to why UTEC continues to persist today because um I think for instance stats was eventually sold off and the transaction actually to sell off is

interesting because it was really the fourth largest player by revenue back then and the buy offer was actually from a Chinese state back player which was sixth largest so ordinarily I think in normal circumstances the the reverse

would be happening right which is the larger player um buying the smaller player furthermore around I think 70% of the revenue at that time was from the US so it's not that there was a limitation in terms of the local market in terms of what steps could grow to be. Could you

maybe elaborate a bit more about what could have been the rationale for something like this happening and you mentioned previously that one consideration was I think um the semiconductor industry was maybe not really sexy already. Do you think that

this was actually the main driving factor behind why stats were sold off or could have could there have been other considerations? Yeah, there was another

considerations? Yeah, there was another thing that happened uh uh in Singapore and Tamasi went from an investor in companies to a financial investor

>> almost like the GIC model. I spoke about it in parliament if you dig out my speeches that >> that we need to have too >> that will focus on investing in companies rather than become a financial

advisor. So if you look at the structure

advisor. So if you look at the structure of Tamasi today >> many of the people in key position they all financial players they are not people who >> Mhm.

>> Now Tamasi has lots of funds that supposed to invest in this thing but I think at the higher level they are financial player just like GIC >> Mhm.

>> they have become almost like that that was a transformation that happened >> around that time. So that was another thing >> do we invest in more companies or do we just become a financial investor and you know

>> Mhm. uh they did mess up you know uh

>> Mhm. uh they did mess up you know uh they went to invest in um the telco in Thailand that was taken and they messed up down there right taking majority share

>> so they were financial player advised by maybe don't know who but then they made the decisions were quite different from the days when all of them built the

ja built Singapore Airlines different consideration they were building future companies >> mh >> but then I think the maset today is finan potential investor.

>> Yeah, that's a change.

>> If let's say you were I think whether you were on a domestic capacity or if let's say you were heading stats, what would you have done differently? Would

you have tried to acquire maybe UT?

>> Yes.

>> Mhm.

>> Right. Because we were we were doing very well.

>> Yeah.

>> And uh and we were not not that big.

Right. So acquire you take there others available for acquisition also. M

>> and uh so I think that acquire invest more rather than invest less.

>> I think that would have been the the right strategy.

>> It's a really important point that you raised in terms of domestic shifting from I think a grow of homegrown companies towards one which is more like trying to maximize financial returns.

How do you think that this affected um all these homeown companies that even let's say like stats or like CSM or other homegrown companies that they actually manage? How do you think that

actually manage? How do you think that this changes the dynamic a lot? you know

it it does change the dynamic because uh they are looking at at financial parameters rather than long-term strategic goals. So to to to create a

strategic goals. So to to to create a future multinational may need 10 to 15 years horizon >> and uh but 10 to 15 horizon in a financial uh space

>> maybe you know they want to have x number of returns by maybe a period of time so I think the considerations will be will be quite different.

>> Yeah. Yeah.

>> So versus let's say if you go back to the days when we started all our Singapore based GLC's was that they were creating something that needed was needed a telco an airline >> an engineering company.

>> Yes.

>> You know and uh and and so so they they were looking at different creating some value. But but if you're a financial

value. But but if you're a financial player you don't look at those things anymore. You just look at the overall

anymore. You just look at the overall sense of whether can I get the kind of returns that I I need to get.

>> Yeah.

>> So the thinking will be will be quite quite different. Mhm.

quite different. Mhm.

>> So now I I know Tamasi has got a number of funds that are supposed to invest in startups and and companies but I don't know how they are performing. No

visibility.

>> Uh my sense is you know depends on who's managing this thing. You may may or may not see >> a big investment. I to be fair I I'm not paying attention. So they may have got

paying attention. So they may have got some great investments that they did.

>> I know that they invest in companies that already successful. Grab and all these other players. Yeah,

>> Tomas puts a lot of money down there, but they did not put anything when they were early in very early stages. Did not

bet on them early. You you bet on winners so who are already winners. You

do not bet on someone who could become a winner in the future.

>> Yeah, >> I think that is a mindset right now.

>> You mentioned about how um in a very with the very pioneer generations of leaders, let's say you talk about SIA or NOL or these other companies which started there was almost like a mentality of win the category at all

cost. of course I mean with certain

cost. of course I mean with certain amount of financial kind of like um limit um because I think Luin used that you either make SIA successful or we'll shut it down right so there's almost a

founder mentality there which is that we need to win this um and I think the alternative here is that there's almost a financial management portfolio optimization kind of approach >> um how do you how do you think that this

I guess contradiction can almost be balanced today >> very hard to to say uh I think we need to look at who were the people who made that shift who were in charge at that point of time what were their consideration it could also be

government's influence that >> we need to have certainty of returns so that we can you know finance future of the f so that could I think that would be a lot of government thinking and then who was in charge of it uh probably made

that that that decision so for many years in parliament actually and if you refer to my I thought about tamasi too >> so I said tamasi now has become like a gic it's okay I mean that's a government

strategy >> but now we need another one more player that's independent of tamasi >> right >> to be investing in the future generation

>> we we never did it what the government did was put funds under tamasi >> yes >> so when the parent is a financial player >> then it's a different different thing that's why I wanted a separate entity >> that managed by a different group of

people >> not influenced and they are allowed to take risks >> yes >> if they had done that I think maybe would have been a bit different >> what was the response like when you raise this up in parliament because if you are Tomasic and were managing like a few hundred.

>> They didn't like it. They didn't like it. So what they was they felt no tamasi

it. So what they was they felt no tamasi is capable of doing this.

>> Mhm.

>> I I didn't believe it >> because at the end of the day >> the same way that I mentioned early on when we started >> EDB was in charge of multinationals.

>> Yes.

>> But they were also in charge of certain sectors of semiconductor.

>> I'm a local player. I wanted support. A

multinational multinational got the support. I cannot get the kind of

support. I cannot get the kind of support because mult the mentality was I support this >> and I don't uh you know and I this one I not so important because

>> when I can get big companies to set up down here employ 2,000 people >> it's a very big achievement >> when I work on a U tech that may fail if

it fail I lo you know I will be questioned on my judgment I think this is a mentality that that that that played out >> if you have the mask I'm mentioning a few hundred billion dollars even if let's say you have a new company that

becomes let's say unicorn right 1 billion is a drop in ocean compared to the vast amount of they're managing so I I'm curious like what were the kind of responses they they gave back to you that that try to assure you that

>> oh no they say you know we are we've we've got funds and we're going to invest so if you go back at the responses that I got in parliament would have been like that they will do it they will invest they'll invest

>> but let's see I mean I again I'm not I'm not watching the scene in the last 10 years after I left parliament whether did they invest in very companies that could be like a Utech.

>> Yeah, >> I'm not so sure. I've not seen but maybe they have. you mentioned other

they have. you mentioned other interviews for instance like let's say we had net which was far ahead of other countries and I think you mentioned that uh when you talk about mobile money Kenya I think was one of the first to

implement it I think back in 2007 and when we dig into actually the history of Singapore there were many many things that were far even let's say easeling when when the idea of tap and and go that was that was really far and radical in it day and you also mentioned that

Singapore was one of the first few to talk about smart city and smart nation so you were actually involved in I think politics even even back then what do you think led to those bats initi is being taken and is it still do you still feel

that that's the case today?

>> So I think the ideas are all great ideas uh and also some of them were very successful but the world has moved ahead very fast.

>> Yeah.

>> So you today you look at mobile money Kenya started 207 and pesa >> you go to China today they don't accept dollars and cash anymore right so it's all v what mobile money >> we are not there yet.

>> Mhm.

>> Correct not. So I think you know uh we are great on ideas.

>> I think our weakness is implementation is not that great.

>> So then the question is uh who are the people who are implementing these things.

>> Come back to the same thing right who has influence over these kind of industries. It

industries. It >> all goes back to government.

>> I see.

>> Right. So so if you look at like UT was completely private sector. We just moved on our I had great I mean no matter what we say about the Taiwanese they were gung-ho >> willing to take risks.

>> Yeah.

>> When I wanted to buy the 400,000 ft² building.

>> Yeah.

>> The board members who are from Singapore say don't do it. It's too big for you.

Taiwanese told me I told them I can buy it for the same price if I buy 250,000 ft².

>> Yeah.

>> Taiwanese told me don't worry you go for it. We'll support.

it. We'll support.

>> So that's a that's a that's a mindset.

Yes.

>> Different. Right. So I think this is something that we have to develop if you really want to win. I think there were a number of policies that that you stood up against like there's a streaming COE population white paper and even things

like leave upgrading. Um and I think in your in your other interviews you mentioned that during your tea session with the PAP back in 1991 you went on a tech of government policy even though other candidates at the time were

sharing about how good the policies were in the final interview you mentioned how you did not lose the debate with bigu if you don't mind sharing like what were some of these points of contentions

>> you know uh in the before politics in politics after politics the same person >> I I I say and do what I believe in >> sincerely not just to show you know

>> for sure >> so so so you know when I went for tea party I I mean I could not just go and praise a policy that is from my I was a grassroot leader by the way

>> I spent uh what 13 years in Siglak >> helping the MP down there so I was very close to the ground >> I knew the ground reality so based on ground realities I could I understood that you know some things did not did

not work >> so so when we came to policy I just spoke my mind >> so it was not the for the sake just criticizing right?

>> For sure.

>> One of the principles I followed throughout my career in politics was constructive criticism.

>> Yes.

>> You want to criticize, but have you got an idea that's better?

>> Y >> So, so this is something that you know that uh was what I went through during all the selection process. Final one is done by the CEC. So, when I went down

there, the whole maybe 15 or 16 ministers and MPs were there. So, I was facing the prime minister which is Go Chuknong.

>> This side was Leangong and this side was Lie Kuwanu. Yeah.

Lie Kuwanu. Yeah.

>> So the first person who asked the question was Leang.

>> Yeah.

>> Is there a policy that you think we can change?

>> Yeah.

>> You know which policy I told him needs to change?

>> Was it the COE? I think you >> mentioned I told him the CO policy needs to change.

>> And I explained why. Then he asked me, can you give me a better suggestion?

>> Yeah.

>> I'm on the spot with so many people. I

say I can't give you now. I'll go back and email to you my my recommendation or what >> and which I did by the way after that.

>> Yeah. Then there were many other questions that were asked.

>> Nikon, you asked uh very first he asked me one of the question was what is the value of being a Singaporean >> you know uh then I explained I told him

I I gave him a story. I said I I travel a lot for my work. I went to Rome. When

I went to the airport I was queuing up the immigration. The immigration

the immigration. The immigration officers pulled me out send me to a room >> and I went into the room. my s whole bunch of Indians and Africans in the in the room and I asked the officer why. He

said, "No, you just wait."

>> Yeah.

>> Then I took out my Singapore password.

I'm a Singaporean.

>> Yeah.

>> Oh, Singapore. He got I I went out and I say reputation.

>> Yeah.

>> And uh many years later, Lie Kuanu gave a talk to Unionist. Next day, I read the newspaper.

>> Yeah.

>> He had a the newspaper reported a person slanging on on a with a turban on a flying carpet holding a Singapore passport. He told my story to the

passport. He told my story to the unionist about the value of Singapore pass.

>> Yeah.

>> So that was one of them. Then he asked me about challenges.

>> Yeah.

>> Singapore is going to face, what we should focus on and who are going to be our competitors.

>> And so I shared with him which country we should worry about. you know I actually at that time Taxin was running uh Thailand >> and I was doing business on behalf of TI

in Thailand and educated people good infrastructure good capability and I told him I wouldn't worry about the ones near us their system does not work but Thailand is something that we need to worry about >> and for China I say China is not a

competitor they are someone so big that we cannot even you know we collaborate right we don't compete >> and so these are the kind of questions that you know that okay very good question Um

you know when I went for the interview there were three of us two of them in front of me I was the last each one of them were five eight minutes they came up >> so I thought five eight minutes simple interview I I think I mine would have

been three quarter one hour I can't remember exactly now when I came out from the room I was so happy I say I got a chance to debate with Lee Kandu >> whether pap selects me or does not does not matter to me this was a good

experience for me that was what I thought >> what were you debating with him about >> all these things about board about challenges for Singapore, who our competitors are and so on. So,

>> I mean, the fact that you >> could address his questions >> without being challenged aggressively by him because if he gets aggressive, you're finished.

>> So, so you know, so I I I realized one thing. Why did the candidates before me

thing. Why did the candidates before me take five minutes or eight minutes?

>> Yeah.

>> As they were answering the question, he's just observing.

>> He doesn't bother. If he finds that it's not worth his time asking you a question, he will not ask a question.

>> So, so they came out very fast. Yeah.

>> Then those who he wanted he engaged.

Then that took a lot of time. He took

the longest time in asking questions.

>> I see.

>> That is how you worked at that time.

>> That was your very memorable account.

Um I think throughout your time in in politics and as an MP you have a con deep conviction on how to build a better Singapore and you believe that longterm if you rely on multinationals the economy actually suffer because once they move out either because of

geopolitics or cause politically what structure barriers do you see um that stop Singapore from making the transition towards like you know trying to you know build more local companies.

>> You must believe in your in your local entrepreneurs. Until today, I still see

entrepreneurs. Until today, I still see some good companies that struggle to raise funds here in Singapore.

>> Mhm.

>> Uh and then I would say, you know, we really need to handhold some of them, those who have potential to grow.

>> We should not over overdo because we create weak companies. Professor Wongpo

come from N US once wrote article about creating zombie companies. The

government gives so much of support they become zombie weak companies. No. So I

think you know how to find a way to support. I I I believe that

support. I I I believe that instead of um giving the funds to VCs which we did which a good thing >> the government should have a fund that is managed by

>> private sector players who have the heart for Singapore >> gather of people and we did it for a while >> uh uh uh spring seats >> was a seat fund I was chairman of the investment committee

>> we had two or three civil servants but we had banker we had VCs and and so government fund let us decide what to invest.

>> Oh, >> there was another fund after the seed stage. I pushed the government for many

stage. I pushed the government for many years in parliament.

>> Yeah.

>> Growth fund, growth enterprise fund.

>> We could invest up to 10 or $15 million for companies that cannot get funding from any VCs anymore.

>> Yeah.

>> But we believe can grow. And then this committee, I was chairing that committee. So again, the same

committee. So again, the same composition.

>> I see.

>> I think we can do something like that.

There's a lot of government money. But

the problem with government money is that ministry of finance must not expect that everything must come with a return.

>> Mhm.

>> That you must be prepared that there will be losses also.

>> But if you bet on some good ones, some will be like a VC mentality.

>> The good ones will really become very good for Singapore. But then you lose a lot also when you do that.

>> When it's a government fund, they dare not do that. So how do you manage?

That's why they gave it to VCs.

>> Yeah.

>> To manage and they are not. But I think we need to bring it back >> uh you know to be able to to do uh you know create the future multinationals of of Singapore. And then

of Singapore. And then >> I also talked about this before that Singapore rules mainly are designed as MNC friendly rules.

>> Yeah.

>> That sometimes can be very difficult for smaller companies to navigate.

>> If you reverse and we create friendly rules and regulations.

>> Yeah.

>> Very easy for MNC's to also follow. M

>> over time we did do some work uh I remember I was on this pro enterprise panel headed by Mr. Lionguan, chief of civil service, pro- enterprise panel.

>> Idea was look at all the rules and regulations. Anyone has complained, we

regulations. Anyone has complained, we will look and we help try to change. It

was a great committee. I think they may still have it.

>> So they did attempt to do some of these things but you know I think we limited success some success.

>> A lot more can be done in this way to whole change the whole environment so it becomes friendly for small and medium >> enterprises. Do you have example in

>> enterprises. Do you have example in terms of what what rules for instance that comes to mind that are most pertinent that benefits MNC's over? I I

give you uh a couple of examples. One of

it was uh indoor swimming pool. You need

to have indoor anything. You don't need a fire uh sprinkler, right?

>> Yes.

>> Indoor swimming pool.

>> Yeah.

>> And there was a rule that requires that.

>> Y >> and so so we managed to change that rule. There's another very interesting

rule. There's another very interesting one that see what happens. We get

feedback from industry.

>> Yeah.

>> And then we address it. So we we at that time when we started we did not think about what we should change but they need to feedback. Yeah.

>> Another one was uh the FMB industry >> bathtop dancing >> was illegal in Singapore.

>> Yeah.

>> And the FM industry came to us and say, "Oh, you know, uh why not?

>> Why don't we allow >> uh so the proenterprise panel wrote to the chief of Singapore police?"

>> Yeah.

>> The police say, "Yeah, but there's a rule."

rule." >> Then we wrote back, we invited him for an interview and we say, >> "Why can't we change the rule?"

>> Yeah.

>> If it's a rule, yeah, but let's change the rule. Yeah,

the rule. Yeah, >> the rule got changed after some time.

>> I see >> there's another example of uh NEA requiring multiple licenses >> for restaurant to get these license. How

can we streamline so that you know it's simple?

>> So we changed many during my time I I think I spent about six or seven years on the proenterprise panel.

>> Yeah.

>> I did not wait for feedback.

>> I decided to organize industry visits.

>> Yes.

>> Dialogue with different industry groups.

>> Gather feedback 15 20 come back and we address.

>> Yeah.

>> So I did. So during that time uh because I was on springboard I could do this and I was also on the panel.

>> Yeah.

>> Uh about 2,000 rules were changed or eliminated just by that exercise.

>> I see.

>> So that was was very good. So we need to continue to do uh things like this.

>> Imagine that there are people who feels that the MNC approach is still a very solid way going forward especially as Singapore tries to position itself as a very neutral uh ground considering the geopolitical context. Like what what do

geopolitical context. Like what what do you say to people that believe in this view? Well, Trump has told us, right?

view? Well, Trump has told us, right?

He's forcing companies to move back to us.

>> Yeah.

>> There will be more player, more leaders like that who will come >> and say bring it back.

>> And when that happens, if many of them go back together, we'll be in trouble.

>> Yeah.

>> Right. Because uh that is been bedrock of our of economic policy >> for since industrialization until until today.

>> So just hope that it does not happen so rapidly that we cannot make a switch.

Yeah, >> but I think we already seen the signs of it that they are pulling >> pulling back. Semiconductor companies

have to move back to US and you know car manufacturers having to we don't have these but some of them will move >> when pharmaceutical is going to push for movement move back.

>> Yeah.

>> Right. And and and US can do it with technology today >> uh you know uh manpower cost is not so important anymore.

>> Mhm.

>> Right. So and that's why I recommended manufacturing in Singapore.

>> Yeah.

>> That we can still do it. Yes.

>> Yeah. So I think uh we are very lucky it's not happened but I think you don't know what kind of leaders are going to come in the future things may change >> and are we ready for that change? Are

this something that we have to think about?

>> I would love to hear your thoughts I think on this whether you feel that because you were running UT back then and you had a business that if let's say anything goes wrong in the political realm that you can potentially go back to your business. Do you feel that that

gave you potentially more latitude to to be outspoken on these issues?

>> No. you know because uh I I uh you know I had uh two I won't name them two very well-known polit politicians some one very high up in office he told me you

take care of your own career don't depend on politics for your career >> you never know when you have to leave >> Mhm. So, so yes. So I for me this

>> Mhm. So, so yes. So I for me this politics was national service not career.

>> Y >> if I wanted that to be my career I would have been a yes man and you know would have done a lot more things have political office but for me it was just a national service. I had no no doubts

you know that this is important for me >> and this is a duty I'm doing to the country.

>> Yeah >> that was my mindset.

>> Yeah.

>> So so was not whether if I fail here I go back. No it's not that. I I had a I

go back. No it's not that. I I had a I looked at it uh when when I was asked to stand for election.

>> Yeah.

>> I thought to myself, I'm already doing national service as a grassroot leader.

>> Yeah.

>> As a as a MP, I can do more for the country.

>> Yeah.

>> Just more than what I was already doing.

So I was doing something I can do more and I'll take the opportunity if I get elected that I will do more for the country >> as my service to the country.

>> That that was my mindset all along.

>> Yeah. And uh so when I thought I have done enough after 20 years I decided to step down. I was not asked to leave.

step down. I was not asked to leave.

>> I decided to step down. Prime Minister

wanted me to call me for lunch when I had told him I want to and he tried to convince me to stay one more term.

>> Yeah.

>> But I I managed to convince him to let me go.

So you know so I thought I've done enough someone else should do the next phase. M as Singapore evolves across the

phase. M as Singapore evolves across the years I think earlier we touched upon upon the idea of let's say when we look at the past I think there were very radical uh decisions being being taken in terms of let's say when you mentioned

that um let's say nets for instance and you mentioned about how it's really important in terms of whether you have the good implementers there and I think that one other dynamic here is also um

you being a founder of let's say UTE you also have the legitimacy to be able to make drastic moves considering that you are the founder do you feel that given the current state in which Singapore is in, I mean now we are many many

generations away from the very founding generation. Do you feel that the space

generation. Do you feel that the space in which uh political leaders have to be able to make major adjustments does shrink over time?

>> It does because lack of experience >> if you look at the political office holders and look at their background >> uh their their experience is limited to governance and to policies and so on.

>> Mhm.

>> Uh they may not fully understand the private sector. Richard who was from the

private sector. Richard who was from the private sector from Shell. Yes.

>> Right. Uh Huikat was willing to listen.

>> I think uh Raymond Lim was private sector I believe and he came in willing to listen. So I think as long as you

to listen. So I think as long as you have people like that I think we'll be okay.

>> But if let's say you have people who who have always their whole political career was in government first civil servant military and then they become and they and and and that's all and they don't understand the rest they're in trouble.

I want to say that some of our current political leaders who are ministers are good listeners also.

>> They understand they're willing to listen but not all.

>> Yeah, we need more of them like that.

>> And I think that this idea about listening is is a really important skill. It's almost like an art as well.

skill. It's almost like an art as well.

And how do you actually get good feedback from the ground? You mentioned

that good leaders as well as I I guess previous generations of of PAP leaders including some select ones today have a neck of getting in. Could you elaborate more on this? Do you how how do you see previous generation leaders being able

to solicit such good feedback and being able to implement them >> as MPs? When when I was in uh in Amoku in Kabaru, I did lots of block parties.

My block party is not parties, dialogue sessions.

>> Yeah.

>> I sit down with a group of officers from the various agencies and my residents and I free flow. I listen what I don't set the agenda.

>> But I've seen some of my colleagues who sat down there and they were just one way. I'm explaining to you

way. I'm explaining to you >> but I reverse and I say I'm going to listen to you >> if I can answer. If not then we'll go back and change and we come back and we'll answer. And I always went back and

we'll answer. And I always went back and put a notice board what we have done based on the feedback. So you have to be accountable not just go down there you know listen and then don't do anything right? So you're accountable and show

right? So you're accountable and show your accountability. I think we can get

your accountability. I think we can get that done will be will be very good.

Some did it some did not. So I think listening is uh when you have an opportunity you uh you actually see what how can you make it better >> rather than to say no but then you know

by this work I and I give you one on so 2011 election was uh very bad one for us. Yeah,

us. Yeah, >> at >> that time the new batch of third G leaders came in, 3G leaders >> and uh so they were in charge of uh of postmortm.

>> I see.

>> And they went to different cons. They

came to Amoku. Of course, PM could not make it. I was there with other MPs. And

make it. I was there with other MPs. And

so this group of young ministers, yeah, you know, we lost words because we need to explain our policies better.

>> Mhm.

>> I say, wait a minute. I stopped them and I was they were minister. I say, no, no, you got it wrong.

Your job now is to see what can I do policy-wise so that five years from now they feel that their life has gotten better from the last five years.

>> Mhm. and do that rather than just explaining your obviously the policies uh you know uh did not make their life better that's why they didn't work for us >> right so so the mentality is very

important if just explain that's not listening >> mhm >> right you want to find out why >> then you know then do something about it so I think that has to be two-way thing not one way

>> the point that you're on in terms of this two-way thing it requires um I think people whoever are in charge to not have group think and you also touched on earlier a point about how there is a certain certain background in

terms of the composition of people who are leading uh Singapore. Do you feel that uh what is um necessary to be able to like I guess remedy this situation to get more commercially minded people

within government?

>> I think so. But then we got one good chap in parliament right now as a minister Taniling. I know him quite

minister Taniling. I know him quite well. He was my resident doctor and

well. He was my resident doctor and entrepreneur. I see

entrepreneur. I see >> then ran a big hospital.

>> Yeah. uh so they but not many >> uh and I I think the the culture is such that many private sector people probably

will not feel comfortable in a system that is dominated by people of the same background and the same system >> so I don't think so they able to attract many private sector people into into

government into political office >> it's sad I think they should Richard who came a few people came but then you know not many Uh so I think this is something that they need the the leaders need to

understand why >> why are all of them just from one background >> but not getting the enough diversity.

>> I was so happy when Taning got into parliament >> like what do you reckon is like actually obstacle in terms of getting I think mineral pay is one major issue the idea of MPs getting a lot of scrutiny in

terms of every single thing that you do the loss of privacy. Yeah, I think these are all factors and one of it the scrutiny is especially with social media, you know, it's uh you lose your privacy, your family loses privacy. I

think this is a a factor.

>> Uh I think uh salary people at Tilling, he's made his money so he doesn't so they you want to bring in people who are already successful >> and don't need the minister salary. They

see it as a as a service duty rather than as a income generating and who want to contribute. I think you have to get

to contribute. I think you have to get that right kind of uh people. Most of

them will not be young. They will like ceiling is about 60 right now I think.

>> Yeah.

>> So it's okay to get people like that but who are willing to come in and and and change but then they must feel comfortable that they will have influence over policies. If they come in down there and they try to change and

the civil service refuses to make any headway on then then the word will get out and the rest will say oh why waste my time you know I might as well spend my time on other things.

>> If let's say someone were to join um I think politics and the relationship between the political office holders as well as civil servants. Have you seen the dynamics of this evolve over time in any way?

>> Uh very hard for me to say because I was never in political office. Uh my my involvement with them was would have been dialogue sessions and so on.

>> Yeah.

>> I made a speech after the 2011 uh election about policy making. One of my characteristic was that you know uh a lot of policies that we make uh bottoms up rather than tops down.

>> Yeah.

>> Compared to the first generation leaders go say I want this to be done come out with a policy. He doesn't like it. He

throw it back and he comes back and >> but now I my impression again I may be wrong is that civil servants >> come up with the policies float up to the minister.

>> I don't know how much debate goes on down there.

>> Mhm.

>> And how much debate goes on in cabinet and the and the policies get passed.

>> Yeah. that I worry about that kind of a process where is there enough >> uh political judgment injected into policym >> if it's top down is political judgment

but it's bottoms up then you know and you don't debate that much it may just go up without and that's where the implementation part comes in you may not be able to implement it effectively and people don't see the effect >> you did touch upon this I think after as

a postmortm for the 2011 uh I think there was this YouTube speech in which you gave this >> a party conference >> yeah exactly like what was the response like to to writing this feedback?

>> No, I think the political leaders were unhappy with me.

>> You know, uh I was I was in Ukuidor for some work that I was doing down there for on behalf of government.

>> Yeah.

>> And I got a call from uh Henuket and says the party wants you to speak at the conference.

>> Yeah.

>> I declined. I said no I I don't want to speak >> you know let someone else speak.

>> Yeah.

>> Then after a couple of day I got the call no we want you to speak. I say if I speak I'm going to speak my mind.

>> Yeah.

>> I'm not going to say good things, you know. I'll speak my mind and then give

know. I'll speak my mind and then give my analysis.

>> Yeah.

>> And he was kind enough say uh yes you just one thing you need to note that is never a closed door session. You will

get out. Whatever you say will get out.

>> So up to you to decide what you say.

>> Yeah.

>> So I but so I went there and I made that speech.

>> I made my analysis of what went wrong.

>> Mhm.

>> And this is also the thing I thought about policy improve people life. I think I I must have said it in that speech also.

>> Yeah.

>> And about bottoms up also top down policy making.

>> Yes.

>> Yeah. And about more political injection into policies.

>> More political judgment injection. So

that was the context of that speech.

>> Yeah.

>> And I reluctantly gave that speech. No

choice. I was party leaders, you know.

>> Yeah. And I think that this is very important because um maybe I can quote from you as well. I think there was this um interview that you gave many many years back. Every time I challenge the

years back. Every time I challenge the ministers, they came back with a sledgehammer and I know where the sledge comes from was coming from. was coming

from the civil servants because civil servants are there to defend the policies and I think you on the receiving end of that like what was that like and do you feel that that continues

to persist you throughout your time in in I mean uh I give you an example uh I

made a speech I coined this term uh growth at all cost economic policy >> and I challenged the government I say you know we must inclusive and you know we cannot do these people will suffer and so on.

>> Yeah.

>> And he came back with a sledgehammer and the the the two ministers who came back with the sledgehammer were none other than Li Singlong. He was my partner in Amoku and Tam. He was a finance minister at that point.

>> Yeah.

>> But I knew where that was coming from as I say you know civil servants drafted their speeches response right. So, so

but was very interesting I think maybe three or five years later some years later Robin Chan I think is a journalist in straight time he wrote a two-page straight time report about how the

government so what happened was >> they keep on telling me there's no way we can control growth it has to be just grow and grow and grow >> so one day I met up with our former president uh before he became president

Tlitan >> he's an economist >> so I ask him can I ask you can we manage manage this so that we don't grow at all cost. He said of course we can.

cost. He said of course we can.

>> Yeah.

>> He said look at China they're managing that way. So I got a lot more confidence

that way. So I got a lot more confidence and I continued to push that line. So

anyway this Robin Chan came and he analyzed and government actually one day change.

>> Oh we will go for inclusive growth.

>> Yeah.

>> So you go and look at I think one of Tam's speeches he made that >> inclusive growth. So they changed after many years.

>> So he traced or in the deep coin the term growth at all cost at this year this happened all these battles and finally government relented and changed to grow inclusive growth.

>> I see. So, so, so, so, so yeah.

>> Um, uh, streaming. Oh, I had an education minister who wed me. Oh, your

definition of uh, of success is narrow.

I went back and said, your definition is narrower than mine. So, we had fought so many battles and finally they they change a hybrid system. Yeah.

>> That they have today. Something that I suggested many years ago. So, I

realized, you know, uh, >> when we criticize some of these policies, even with our own ideas, the government will never say, "Yeah, I agree.

Yeah, >> they will push back >> but I think they study and over the years then they come I've got this idea I'm going to implement this thing inclusive growth which is my idea that's fine as long as Singapore benefits it's okay.

>> Yeah.

>> So so that's how the system works.

>> So I don't expect in parliament I say today >> I'll and especially if I criticize a policy they will not they will let me off easily. They won't they have to

off easily. They won't they have to defend it.

>> Yeah. and and do you see many of these instances whereby there were contradictory opinions even within I think the political party itself because maybe I can site one specific case that

you mentioned in the interview with uh I think Mrs. Liua where you said that you went against the minister for national development for leaf upgrading where the leaf showed only up and down arrows

without showing which floor the residents are on and as chairman of amakio GRC you rejected all leave upgrading for the GRC and you mentioned that a big reason why this was actually

resolved was because PM Leong was CC within this entire threat and he stepped in to say that it cannot be this expensive to make those changes. Are

such incidents happen? Uh are such incidents common when you went against ministers?

>> No. Uh I mean uh when why I I copied the prime minister was because it's Amukio.

>> Yes.

>> I'm rejecting all of the leaf upgrading.

And if let's say Amuku does not get lift upgrading, >> he will be in trouble. I'll be in trouble also. Now rest will get angry.

trouble also. Now rest will get angry.

So so it's not that I used him.

>> Just I had to keep him praised on what I'm doing.

>> For sure. And uh and fortunately he believed in what I I thought and that helped after some time changed to >> that that got uh and and the good news

was that not only did we get the correct type of leaf numbers in Amoku.

>> Mhm.

>> Uh M&D decided that that they would even those other precinings that already had it to go back and change back.

>> So the whole of Singapore benefited from that.

>> Yeah.

and required someone like you to be willing to >> I mean if you did not you do not challenge uh I you know before Amoku there were others already had it >> and we heard about the rumblings at

residence or you know I don't know where the unappe but no one no one really challenged right so I did not want to let it go >> so but I could have let it go and say

why become the bad guy and you know you know just be nice to everyone they'll be nice to me if that had happened maybe Singapore would have as a kind of up down arrow. So, so but as I say, you

down arrow. So, so but as I say, you know, for me, I believe I was fighting not for myself.

>> I'm not living, you know, in a multi-story building.

>> Mhm.

>> But I was fighting for my residents, >> what is right, >> not what is popular.

>> Yeah. I think you tread always a very delicate line in terms of any kind of push backs or criticism. And I think that um after 2011 election for instance um I think you shared about how you were

giving feedback to to the PM PM at the time that his um that his father styles was autocratic uh PM godong style was consultative. You said that his style

consultative. You said that his style was more distributed and that he should pull it in a little bit. How do you arrive at like diagnosis like this and do you believe that this style was suitable for Singapore in his next phase?

>> Where did you read that? I think you mentioned this on the rise media interview. Yeah.

interview. Yeah.

>> All right. Okay. Yeah. I mean was I was with him uh from 93. I was with him >> uh and then when he became prime minister in 204.

>> Mhm.

>> Uh I mean so I observe it very and I I became a grassroot leader in 1984.

>> Yeah.

>> While Liquani was still a prime minister.

>> Mhm. Then go Chukton became prime minister when I became an MP and then he was so I observed because I I was I was observing their styles.

>> Yeah.

>> So I think clearly we can see top down goshi those kind of people right.

>> Yeah.

>> Then go change the whole style to consultative. So very obvious people saw

consultative. So very obvious people saw that.

>> Yeah.

>> And then I think uh you know his his style was >> I trust this. So my point to him was if they all not as good as you better be careful. Mhm.

careful. Mhm.

>> You have to bring it a bit in and then you know uh don't don't completely you know one person does a bad job all of us going to suffer.

>> Yeah.

>> That was my main point.

>> Yes.

>> Yeah. But you know uh thanks he he was a listener >> right. He he did not scold me for being

>> right. He he did not scold me for being so direct with him. Many occasions that I was direct with him and I think he appreciated my feedback you know.

>> Yeah.

>> He knew that it was nothing personal >> or nothing for my personal gain also.

So, so I had a good relationship till now I still have a good relationship with him.

>> You you did mention other interviews as well that in certain cases whereby you criticize certain policies and all this the minister for instance came back with the stat and sure maybe some of it was the civil servants but there will also

be I guess some personal egos that were hurt by I think your feedback. How do

how do you find a way to thread this balance and do you feel that it is still possible like how how easy is it to to do something? I think uh if let's say I

do something? I think uh if let's say I went with the attitude that oh I need to be in politics and I better don't ruffle feathers then I would have been very worried worried.

>> Mhm.

>> Uh but if let's say I went with I want to change and and I have to speak out to change even if let's say at a personal expense >> Mhm.

>> then I I have to pay that price. That

was my attitude. Yeah.

>> So, so, so I had lots of in parliament and also behind the scenes also lots of these things that >> that I did that you know because I believed in it >> uh and I had to say what is correct

rather than what is popular.

>> So that was the principle that I followed. Maybe we can move on a bit to

followed. Maybe we can move on a bit to I think towards entrepreneurship right.

How do you feel that Singapore's can nurture more entrepreneurs like yourself and I think just you mentioned people like Simon who >> I think we have made good progress. So

action committee for entrepreneurship lasted about 10 12 years.

>> Our goal was just to transform the environment.

>> Yeah.

>> In culture in education uh you know in rules and regulation and in financing.

Each one of us did different things. So

I did on finance and overall I think we made very good progress.

>> Yeah. in changing. So today you see many young are willing to start companies. In

the past I just want to work for multinational. Yeah.

multinational. Yeah.

>> So it's is down there. Financing I

mentioned we have improved quite a lot.

May not be perfect yet but then I think we are better.

>> Yeah.

>> Uh connectivity if you think Singapore as a market I think it's uh too small.

>> Yeah.

>> But AEAN is there. Southeast Asia our connectivity. So we have all the

connectivity. So we have all the ingredients. M

ingredients. M >> I think we just have to be patient and but I think support believe in your entrepreneurs >> and give them support and guidance >> mentorship >> and help with the networks.

>> Mhm.

>> I give you an example of um I was helping a company advising them.

>> This was a startup doing some projects in uh Vietnam. Great technology.

>> Mhm.

>> Uh competing with a big GLC in Vietnam.

>> Yeah.

>> Not great technology. The GLC

>> DLC went to the customer and said no this is small company they will collapse >> don't work with them work with me >> I would have taken the approach I'm a GLC I go to this why don't you work your

technology >> my strength >> but no is to kill >> so that one I think was quite sad you know that so we must believe and must

work together >> rather than try so the Taiwanese are good at this Japanese they go in a group We need to also develop that especially our GLC's they bully

>> sometimes not all but some do. Yeah. So

they have to give that mothership effect that I can help these companies. I don't

think so we have developed that mentality especially in the GLC's >> entrepreneurs who are starting out need to be aware of some of these dynamics right because for instance um you mentioned that Singapore is too small of

a market for I think a lot of things that people might want to do and as the eos ecosystem grows more and more mature there's actually discussions a lot about this in terms of the VCs not being able

to give back enough returns to the LPS um the market even may look at the entire assean region is still much smaller than even Guangong or you know shy combined Right. So in this case is

that we shouldn't aim for unicorn status right. We should maybe be um you know

right. We should maybe be um you know below a unicorn but in terms of that scale are there anything that um in terms of advice that you give to entrepreneur who is starting out they're starting out in Singapore.

>> Think global day one >> global uh you know can be big region or can be the whole world. Think global. So

UTC and infinity I started all global. I

mean I did not think about just serving as the market around me but global market. My customers came from Japan

market. My customers came from Japan from US.

>> Yeah. Yeah.

>> So think global right right from uh from from day one >> and you you need to have a a diversified team that has got the experience working in these regions.

>> I think many of our Singaporeans uh we comfort zone right we have not have that experience >> and I think you need to build a diversified enough team even if they bring from outside.

>> Yeah.

>> So I think you think the global they want diversify and then get smart money.

>> Yes.

>> And you have to get the right partners because VCs can be destructive if let's say you you can't sell.

>> Yeah. Yeah.

>> And so you really need to be very careful. Don't jump at the first sign of

careful. Don't jump at the first sign of money that comes your way.

>> I think if you can do these things a global day one great team >> smart money >> I mean it's a formula but also of course uh don't be a copycat entrepreneur.

>> Yeah.

>> If let's say you are just same as another don't do it.

>> Mhm.

>> But you have a great idea you can put a great team together >> but then you you know something different and it doesn't have to be rocket science. So Grab was not rocket

rocket science. So Grab was not rocket science. Mhm.

science. Mhm.

>> Grab was a copy of Uber >> but regional play.

>> Uber is not rocket science >> algorithms >> but it's different business model.

Airbnb is algorithm not rocket science.

>> So you I give you a simple example in Singapore I have a coffee shop.

>> The coffee shop remain a coffee shop for a long time.

>> Yeah.

>> In US there's a coffee shop. The coffee

shop became Starbucks.

>> Yeah.

>> Correct.

>> Yeah.

>> So that kind of mentality you must say how can you look at a business model?

that can you must be able to expand quickly if you want to become a big company but you going to do step by step no >> I think since you left politics one major topic that you've been trying to champion as well is the idea of

re-industrializing Singapore >> um I think when you're talking about industrial policy there's I think when you talk about other countries there's two popular ways to go about doing it I think there's a more centralized model

and there's almost the German middlean like model right whereby you have a lot more small shops do you think that Singapore's manufacturing model can fit within any of these two models.

>> No, I think we are largely multinational uh based right now or GLC based. So we

don't have that small we have some I would say to be fair some good middle companies how to make them into multinational. I think that should be a

multinational. I think that should be a a focus and then for startups that can become the future multinational. I think

that uh should also uh be something that we must believe industrialization at at that time when I started UT many people believe that indu uh manufacturing in Singapore is dead.

>> Mhm. I believe that we can do it >> with technology of that time.

>> Yeah.

>> And so I went on and and today you know 20 years later is still is still around.

Yeah.

>> So it can be done and I I still believe that you know we can do manufacturing in Singapore.

>> Uh and and I I I looked at our economic model. Uh we were 30% manufacturing. We

model. Uh we were 30% manufacturing. We

are down to less than 20% right now.

>> But you look at Taiwan and Korea they are about 25 30%. Yeah. So I actually wrote a paper right on on bringing back manufacturing to Singapore.

>> So the idea is that manufacturing jobs create a lot other more ancillary jobs.

>> Service jobs only create service jobs but no other not many.

>> So if you can have manufacturing as a base, you will create many other value added jobs in Singapore. That was my main idea. And so bring back

main idea. And so bring back manufacturing.

>> Yeah.

>> Bring it up to at least 25%.

>> And then you know I think we can create a dynamic economy. Now

>> but is manufacturing still viable?

>> Those days I felt was viable idea.

today. What are the cost in manufacturing? Land cost.

manufacturing? Land cost.

>> Yeah.

>> Utility cost.

>> Yeah.

>> Manpower cost.

>> Yeah.

>> Manpower I can solve by AI and robots.

>> Yeah.

>> Land cost I can go up but Singapore government maybe needs to put in the differentiated pricing policy for industries.

>> Mhm.

>> Right. And then uh utility and so on. I

think we are very expensive compared to others. I think this problem needs needs

others. I think this problem needs needs to be solved.

>> But at least the labor cost and labor availability is no longer a big problem.

>> Yeah.

>> Right. So I think we put all the technologies together. We can do some

technologies together. We can do some amount of high-end manufacturing very large scale still in Singapore.

>> Yeah.

>> But my suggestion was prototyping.

>> Government every year spends billions of dollars on R&D with uh our research institute with the unities and so on.

>> Mhm.

>> Many of this R&D just sits on shelves >> not commercialized.

>> But if you take the the the the research from the universities and the research in bring it to industry, it's not going to work. not ready yet.

to work. not ready yet.

>> So you cannot bring from lab to mass production. So I came up with the idea

production. So I came up with the idea that let's bring from lab and do prototyping manufacturing >> and then once prototyping prototyping is reflecting what a mass production is like. I mean I've been from this

like. I mean I've been from this industry >> but smaller scale >> then I'm ready to go. I just need to expand the equipment and have but equipment design is already >> so do prototype and then the

manufacturing can be done in Singapore can be done in any part of the world.

Maybe our special economic zone in Jaw may be a good place or US or China wherever.

>> Yeah.

>> But when you bring you control from lab to mass production, you control the manufacturing capability and the IP involved in manufacturing the processes.

And every time a new product come out, you are the first one.

>> Yeah.

>> And you remain in control. Singapore can

be the center.

>> Yeah.

>> Of manufacturing for globally. I would

say if you become the prototyping hub, that is my idea.

>> And I experimented with it when I started my second company, Infinity Solutions.

>> Mhm. I had a prototyping facility in Silicon Valley.

>> Yeah.

>> Mass production in the Philippines.

Design center in India.

>> Singapore HQ. And we had this model worked.

>> Yeah.

>> So we could do here in Singapore and there's lots of IP.

>> Now we need to focus on how to bring it to production. It doesn't go to industry

to production. It doesn't go to industry because the prototyping stage is missing.

>> And what do you feel is needed in terms of policy to be able to give effect something like So one of it is going to be uh differentiated pricing because you know if you if let's say that as a pro-time facility I fail because my cost

is expensive and I cannot you know utility there needs to be some differentiated pricing. If what I would

differentiated pricing. If what I would do I would say that if Taiwan electricity is $1 per kilowatt >> and mine is $5.

>> Yeah.

>> I bring down to $2 maybe not $5.

>> Mhm.

>> Industrial land.

>> Mhm.

>> If go to commercial is going to be $10 million. M

million. M >> but I will as JTC I'll let you have run it for a while and lower. So bring down some of the cost that within government's control >> and then some manpower ability I think

I'll manpower policy are not not bad.

>> We do allow quite a good flow then you know uh incentives to commercial uh automate and and AI adoption I think these are all there already anyway. So I

think it's not much change that's needed if you want to do >> and so uh but agree that uh that manufacturing should at least be 25% of our GDP.

>> Yeah.

>> Uh Chanun Singh when he was MPI he read my paper I met up with him >> 6 months later I think he announced I mean he must have done a lot more study than what I did gave him >> and he announced that they want to increase the manufacturing content of

the GDP by 50% which means it'll go to 25 >> that's a target 10 year target that they set.

>> Yes. So it can be done and I think prototyping will be the niche. We cannot

do mass production of cars and so on.

No, >> but we can do production of the electronics that go into the car >> mass or even prototyping.

>> Yeah.

>> So we choose the right areas. There's so

many areas that we can choose.

>> And now with the world in flux.

>> Yes.

>> I think there's an opportunity. I see

all these challenges as opportunities.

>> Yeah. I think always as an entrepreneur and I think maybe just um I think to end off the the interview as well I think I always like to ask my guests like one last question which is what's your most tough love opinion/take on Singapore

what we desperately need but no one is going to like it.

>> The composition of our uh political office holders needs to change.

>> Mhm.

>> Uh US is the other extreme. They keep on changing all from private sector.

>> Yeah. I actually had suggested something that you know if let's say the best people don't want to get into politics >> why don't we have an upper house

>> of nominated wise men >> doesn't have to be 100 can be 20 >> mhm >> georgio Tomicoon kind of people >> and appoint them as ministers like what

others do >> man Singh prime minister of India was not elected he was from the upper house but prime minister of India and he he changed India's future Yeah.

>> So I suggested this you know uh upper house >> and they some of these people they don't like to go and go for elections.

>> Yeah.

>> And then but so but they are experts in their area.

>> I think we must have a mindset change.

This is one way that we can bring in people who are different from the civil servants and mommy officers who are in the political office because >> let's face it even parliament does not make decisions.

>> Cabinet does. cabinet make the decision >> and we need to have more people in cabinet who have different backgrounds, different views >> then we will see real change.

>> Yeah.

>> Do you feel that the the MP portion of it because now if you want to be a minister you also need to be MP that keeps you close to the ground which is the the counterpoint to >> so so you need both.

>> So I'm not saying that every one of the minister come from upper house >> minister of finance can come from upper house >> but you know some others. So it's a mix.

>> At least you have an option of bringing in people who are not comfortable to going fighting the elections. Yeah.

>> Who can come in but MPs play a very important role of ground feedback.

>> So you not every MP is going to become a minister. I mean I can consider myself

minister. I mean I can consider myself as a grassroots MP during my 20 years.

>> Yeah.

>> I have very good feel of the ground. I

have good relationship people with the theme players and so on. So therefore I knew what the issues are. We need people like that >> and they also need to be listened to seriously these MPs when they speak. M

>> you know that that they are important.

You need to have some of the people who are current banks, army officers and civil servants to be ministers also because they know the system. We need

someone who can help the system run smoothly. Then we need the other group

smoothly. Then we need the other group who >> are private sector not just one but a few >> who can also contribute >> to a more robust environment.

>> I see >> that I think is a big change we have to make.

>> I don't see our leaders willing to make any change at this point of time.

Hopefully 5G may be like that >> and I I hope that that your your wish realizes and and with that thank you so much for coming on uh for the conversation Mr. Energ.

>> My pleasure. Thank you. Thank you so much.